What happen to Milwaukee Road?

[n012944]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Randy Stahl

What pisses me off are the large assortment of people who never set foot on the MILW property forming opinions from WHAT ????
All of us on the Milw knew exacly what was going on , the trains for the coast were moving in endless fashion .
If you weren't there.... SHUT YOUR HOLE !!!

Maybe it was they were moving so slow from all the slow orders they just never seemed to end[:D] But anyways, I am sure that the PCE was doing so good that the trustee, the ICC and the bankruptcy court were just plain blind as to what was going on out there. Sure, right.[X-)]


Bert

[n012944]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by n012944
Like I said, no serious takers, anytime there is an abandonment, plant closure or the like the employees seem to ban together and say "if we ran it, we would make it work." Very rarley does it work however.

North Western seemed to have made it work.

I said rarley, not never, ask the people at United how they feel about ESOP


Bert

[n012944]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by n012944
As for the line "showing" the it was profitable, ask anyone at Enron how easy it is to make things look good on the books.

Bert

Do you think about what you write?

The Trustee, in filing an Abandonment Petition, wanted to make it look profitable?

Don't you think it was more plausible that he did everything he could to make it show a loss? He was trying to abandon it, after all.

Unbelievable.

Sure, wanted to find some sucker that would pay more than scrap value for it.


Bert

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by cornmaze

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

You seem to be the one who "knows it all" here, without seeming to actually know anthing about it.
...
I keep asking these specific questions, since only if you had answers would you be able to make the statement, but you never seem to have any facts or answers, just broad conclusions.
....
You still know it all. Got it all figured it. And if the facts are contrary -- then reality is wrong, you just simply know all about it.

"a priori"

Another posting from Captain Irony. The irony, of course, is he is pointing out things in his oppent's reasoning that he himself is guilty of . I think it's the politician's tactic of accusing your opponent of the same weaknesses you have as a way of deflecting attention off of you and onto him.

The above poster again says, "a priori." Well the irony of course is that he himself is guilty of making fallacious arguments, and more guilty than his opponent, indeed, because he does it knowingly.

Examples:

The poster stated on another thread that because all other railroads of the world use DC electric power, that therefore DC power is the way to go. Sorry, that's the old fallacy of numbers. Does not mean or prove anything. Ten-thousand Elvis fans can be wrong.

Then there's the poster's comment that the trustee discovered his error, and then resigned, leading us to believe that the discovery of the error caused his resignation. Sorry, that's the old fallacy that because things happen in a sequence one therefore caused the other. Elvis died in 1979; the Milwaukee Road abandoned the lines west less than a year after. Therefore the death of Elvis caused the Milwaukee Road to abandon the PCE. Rubbish.

Then there's the poster's comment on another thread that because something he published in CTC Board Magazine went unchallenged by anyone, that it should therefore be taken as true. (The factoid in question was that "76% of Seattle Port traffic belonged to the Milwaukee Road.") Sorry, that's another fallacy. Just because someone can't disprove something you say, does not make it true. Futuremodal is Elvis. I can't disprove it... it must be true!

Wow!

Milwaukee derangement syndrome.

1) DC was specifically identified as superior to AC under the specific circumstances involved by a combined Electrification study done by the Puget Power & Light Co, Washington Water Power Co, and Montana Power Co., (which all generated AC power by the way -- no DC) in 1971 and a revised study done in 1973. If anyone wants a copy of the study that specifically, unequivocally says that, I will gladly send it to them. My comments were based on specific comments by a team of electrical engineers from three power companies, as well as specific comments to that effect to me by LW Wylie, Milwaukee Road Electrical Engineer who had also consulted on the Shinkasen high voltage AC line and was well versed in both.

With that background, that contention was fully supported by the fact that virtually
all of the world's railways that were electrified with high voltage DC patterned after Milwaukee Road remained and remain electrified using that standard, rather than switching to AC. That being said, I also stated that for new construction, the cost advantage was slightly in favor of AC.

2) The Trustee was described by Milwaukee VPO Paul Cruikshank as "difficult" after receiving the BAH report -- he also suffered a perforated ulcer after finding that his arguments in favor of abandonment of the PCE would, under the consultant's view kill the possibility of profitability, while shutting down the part of the railroad that would enable the system as a whole to regain profitability. My comments were based on the comments of a key insider coupled with the actual reports which showed "a problem" with the prior projections made.

3) I've never published anything in CTC. Simply false.

Another author did, based however, on a direct quote from a Milwaukee Asst Vice President of Planning, Bill Brodsky. I had nothing to do with Brodsky's comment which was earlier published by a Milwaukee RR Historical Society publication. I did however confirm the allegation, long before Brodsky's remarks were published anywhere, by talking to the general manager of the Port of Seattle, Hank Levenger. I further checked the story with Milwaukee Road's director of intermodal import/export, CK Dunning, who confirmed it. Two publications and two interviews on the subject is pretty good sourcing. Indeed, between Port of Seattle and Milwaukee Road officials, not sure who else would know. I have also spoken to Rob Leachman, UP traffic officer at the time, and my recollection is that he felt that was about right. A BN dispatcher who dispatched both Milwaukee and BN in the Seattle area confirmed "Milwaukee was having BN for lunch." Not sure who else to talk to. BNSF refuses to give me a station revenue report for that era.

CTC, I am told, had the largest reader response to that article of any they had published. No contradictions to the fact put forward on the point among the general rail community.

[MP173]

I am inclined to think that if the PCE were around today, it would be a viable rail line. Ditto for the Erie Lackawanna mainline from Chicago/NewYork. But they are long gone.

My guess is the EL was profitable on the west end, say...Marion, Oh. on to Chicago, but I have no data to back that up. What I do know is the PCE and EL West were parts of larger railroads which were not profitable. To isolate those lines and say they were profitable is a bit misleading, because they were not stand alone lines. Also, since I have no data to back me up, I wont elaborate, but there is a certain amount of overhead (fixed costs) associated with any enterprize.

I am reading Rush Loving's Men Who Loved Trains and am really enjoying it. I would suggest that many of you also read this book. It is a very personal view, as told by those involved of the history of the Conrail lines from NYC/PRR days forward.

Lets not sugar coat it at all, those days in the 70's were bleak. The entire national rail system was not too far from tipping over, according to Loving. Richard Saunder's books on mergers is also a great economic study on the rail systems, past and present.

Pretty easy today for us to pick and choose which lines should be around today. The simple fact is that between today and 1976 there lies 30 years which basically defined what our rail system is today. The choices that were made at that time were not easy, nor was the execution of the plan easy.

As far as the Milw management and BOD is concerned...it certainly appears they were not up to the task and one must wonder...were they more concerned about the bondholders or shareholders?

It appears pretty obvious to me, from a distance.

Heading to North Carolina coast tomorrow...SPF45 is packed.

ed

[arbfbe]

As for the SP and its fears, funny how the CP is making the midwest core work just fine. Bert

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by nanaimo73

QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding

QUOTE: Originally posted by n012944
As for the SP and its fears, funny how the CP is making the midwest core work just fine.
Bert

You lost me with the reference to SP and CP. Can you elaborate?

Bert was thinking CP has the Midwest core of the Milwaukee Road. All they have is the Twin Cities-Chicago mainline. CP's 400 miles is not the midwest core, that would be more like 4000 miles.

Aside from Bert's 1000% error in mileage, the observation underscores both the NewMil contention and the BAH study: on its own, the C/TC maininline was not inherently profitable. It could be only in conjunction with a transcontinental system. Then it became very profitable.

There is still not, to this day, a rail system like Milwaukee Road that routinely had 2600 mile line haul traffic, Portland to Louisville, that was not subject to ocean shipping diversion.

Bert may have also forgotten that CP is a transcontinental system. Yet, because of Louisville and Portland, even CP can't leverage that Chicago/Twin Cities main the way Milwaukee Road could and did.

As pertinent, however, is the fact that the rest of the MILW core is pretty much spun off or gone -- just as NewMil proposed to create the most efficient and productive system by saving the transcon and getting rid of the redundant Midwestern trackage.

[Randy Stahl]

What pisses me off are the large assortment of people who never set foot on the MILW property forming opinions from WHAT ????
All of us on the Milw knew exacly what was going on , the trains for the coast were moving in endless fashion .
If you weren't there.... SHUT YOUR HOLE !!!

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by n012944
Like I said, no serious takers, anytime there is an abandonment, plant closure or the like the employees seem to ban together and say "if we ran it, we would make it work." Very rarley does it work however.

North Western seemed to have made it work.

However, the reasoning behind the plan was both financial and strategic, not any idealistic motives of employee operation. Once again, it just doesn't seem like you are aware of the specifics here.

In the instance of the Milwaukee, Congress, in the Milwaukee Railroad Restructuring Act, Title 45, Chapter 18, Section 905, provided for expedited consideration of an ESOP if one was proposed. That expedited consideration was extremely important as traffic was being driven off and delay was going to be fatal to retaining the revenue stream if a viable operation was to come out of the PCE.

It was important, therefore, for any viable proposal to be specifically structured as an ESOP, in order to obtain the expedited consideration mandated by Congress.

Further, since the employees had a substantial amount of money coming from the Milwaukee, particularly had they all elected New York Dock, the thinking was that the Trustee would respond by removing his risk that the Milwaukee might have to liquidate entirely by negotiating the money potentially due the employees into a plan to save the PCE and also save the remainder of the MILW from complete liquidation.

Consequently the ESOP provisions of the Federal legislation provided a crucial time frame, and a logical means of financing.

[MichaelSol]

The total value recovered by the Trustee from sales of Lines West of Miles City, including sales of portions of the mainline to Potlatch, Burlington Northern, Union Pacific, Seattle & North Coast, industrial property, and the Idaho and Washington tree farms of the Milwaukee Land Company, was approximately $240 million.

In return, the cost of termination of the employees involved was just under $80,000,000.

The value of the abandonment to the Milwaukee estate was a rough net of $160 million.

NewMil Corp. was backed by Western Energy Co, Montana Power Co., Port of Seattle, Port of Tacoma, Port of Portland, and had obtained the necessary financing committments from Lazard Freres investment bankers, and SeaFirst Bank, to offer $152 million. That was their opening offer; they never got a counter-offer from the Trustee. He simply didn't want a railroad out there.

Of course, that was in 1979, whereas Milwaukee did not recover its $160 million from asset sales until the 1981-1984 period. The present value of the NewMil offer was substantially larger than the present value of what the Milwaukee Road ultimately obtained for the property.

The executives of the NewMil company included shipper executives, but also Milwaukee Road planning dept. executives. Same guys who would later run Montana Rail Link.

It was a serious offer; serious people involved.

[nanaimo73]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding

QUOTE: Originally posted by n012944

Like I said, no serious takers, anytime there is an abandonment, plant closure or the like the employees seem to ban together and say "if we ran it, we would make it work." Very rarley does it work however. I know, I had the experiance of being management at a bankrupt company, always the know it all "experts" much like on this board, who think that management is out to get them and stupid. However they rarley have the big picture. I'm sure the three examples you used were underfunded and did not want to pay the scrap value of the line. As for the SP and its fears, funny how the CP is making the midwest core work just fine. As for the line "showing" the it was profitable, ask anyone at Enron how easy it is to make things look good on the books.
Bert

You lost me with the reference to SP and CP. Can you elaborate?

Bert was thinking CP has the Midwest core of the Milwaukee Road. All they have is the Twin Cities-Chicago mainline. CP's 400 miles is not the midwest core, that would be more like 4000 miles.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by n012944
As for the line "showing" the it was profitable, ask anyone at Enron how easy it is to make things look good on the books.

Bert

Do you think about what you write?

The Trustee, in filing an Abandonment Petition, wanted to make it look profitable?

Don't you think it was more plausible that he did everything he could to make it show a loss? He was trying to abandon it, after all.

Unbelievable.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by n012944
[ I know, I had the experiance of being management at a bankrupt company, always the know it all "experts" much like on this board, who think that management is out to get them and stupid. However they rarley have the big picture. I'm sure the three examples you used were underfunded and did not want to pay the scrap value of the line.

You seem to be the one who "knows it all" here, without seeming to actually know anthing about it.

How do you know they were underfunded? How do you know what they wanted to pay?

I keep asking these specific questions, since only if you had answers would you be able to make the statement, but you never seem to have any facts or answers, just broad conclusions.

Like your "loss of traffic" statement earlier. The actual fact being exactly the opposite has absolutely no effect on you.

You still know it all. Got it all figured it. And if the facts are contrary -- then reality is wrong, you just simply know all about it.

"a priori"

[Murphy Siding]

QUOTE: Originally posted by n012944

Like I said, no serious takers, anytime there is an abandonment, plant closure or the like the employees seem to ban together and say "if we ran it, we would make it work." Very rarley does it work however. I know, I had the experiance of being management at a bankrupt company, always the know it all "experts" much like on this board, who think that management is out to get them and stupid. However they rarley have the big picture. I'm sure the three examples you used were underfunded and did not want to pay the scrap value of the line. As for the SP and its fears, funny how the CP is making the midwest core work just fine. As for the line "showing" the it was profitable, ask anyone at Enron how easy it is to make things look good on the books.
Bert

You lost me with the reference to SP and CP. Can you elaborate?

[n012944]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by n012944
If the PCE was indeed a moneymaker as you and the other Kool-Aid drinkers say, someone would have bought it from the MILW and kept it in service. There were no serious takers however.

I would make just a wild guess that you weren't there and don't really know. Just a wild guess.

Milwaukee Road's own ICC Application to Abandon showed that the line was profitable; not just maybe, that it was consistently profitable through the most recent operating year, 1978. Not many US railroads were able to say that consistently during that time period, 1975-1978.

Milwaukee Road's own consultants, Booz Allen Hamilton, could not offer a configuration that would be profitable without including the line. With the line, they projected profitability. The most profitable configuration they projected was only the transcon -- dump the rest.

There were three serious efforts to buy the line, one included shipper/ESOP financing, one included shipper/investment bank/ESOP financing, and one involved state and federal financing.

They were S.O.R.E., NewMil Corp., and Montana Rail Corporation.

In addition, Southern Pacific Railway considered purchasing the transcontinental line, but feared it would get stuck with the Midwestern core as well.

Milwaukee Road's own bankers, Continental Illinois Bank and Harris Bank testified that in their view, Milwaukee Road could not be reorganized successfully without the transcontinental line.

Now, what is the specific basis for your statement?

Like I said, no serious takers, anytime there is an abandonment, plant closure or the like the employees seem to ban together and say "if we ran it, we would make it work." Very rarley does it work however. I know, I had the experiance of being management at a bankrupt company, always the know it all "experts" much like on this board, who think that management is out to get them and stupid. However they rarley have the big picture. I'm sure the three examples you used were underfunded and did not want to pay the scrap value of the line. As for the SP and its fears, funny how the CP is making the midwest core work just fine. As for the line "showing" the it was profitable, ask anyone at Enron how easy it is to make things look good on the books.


Bert

[doghouse]

I last read this thread when it was on page 14. It is on page 28 and the bullets are still flying. Keep it commin, gents!

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by n012944
If the PCE was indeed a moneymaker as you and the other Kool-Aid drinkers say, someone would have bought it from the MILW and kept it in service. There were no serious takers however.

I would make just a wild guess that you weren't there and don't really know. Just a wild guess.

Milwaukee Road's own ICC Application to Abandon showed that the line was profitable; not just maybe, that it was consistently profitable through the most recent operating year, 1978. Not many US railroads were able to say that consistently during that time period, 1975-1978.

Milwaukee Road's own consultants, Booz Allen Hamilton, could not offer a configuration that would be profitable without including the line. With the line, they projected profitability. The most profitable configuration they projected was only the transcon -- dump the rest.

There were three serious efforts to buy the line, one included shipper/ESOP financing, one included shipper/investment bank/ESOP financing, and one involved state and federal financing.

They were S.O.R.E., NewMil Corp., and Montana Rail Corporation.

In addition, Southern Pacific Railway considered purchasing the transcontinental line, but feared it would get stuck with the Midwestern core as well.

Milwaukee Road's own bankers, Continental Illinois Bank and Harris Bank testified that in their view, Milwaukee Road could not be reorganized successfully without the transcontinental line.

Now, what is the specific basis for your statement?

[n012944]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by n012944
I think the most telling financial analysis was that it was ABANDONED. Don't need a law degree to figure that one out.

Bert

Bert

A nice neat little world of a priori reasoning, there.

Airtight, apparently.

"Lincoln is dead. Therefore Lincoln deserved to die."

Don't need any degree to see instantly the logical fallacy of your proposition and the inability to support empty conclusions by any reference to experience or a factual record.
[

I know better than to waste my time than to respond, since certain people here have been drinking too much MILW Kool-Aid, and therefore are blind too the facts. Your Lincoln response is so off base it is funny. You are comparing apples to oranges on that one. If the PCE was indeed a moneymaker as you and the other Kool-Aid drinkers say, someone would have bought it from the MILW and kept it in service. There were no serious takers however. The PCE along with the Western Pacific were long called the transcons that should not have been built, and for good reason.


Should I stop buying orange Kool-Aid??


Bert

[n012944]

QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal

QUOTE: Originally posted by cornmaze

Bert,
Just walk away from this thread and find something more useful to do with your time.

Like perhaps go back and get your GED!

Another uninformed statement from mr conspiracy


Bert

[MichaelSol]

The CNW/MILW merger fell apart just before I arrived. But in those first two years afterward, 1970 and 1971, the changes at Milwaukee were dramatic and positive -- the 11 Western Gateways, the Portland Entry, Louisville, big changes.

However, I notice from my notes that I wrote on that era, oh probably 1985 or so, I had a distinctly pessimistic view -- but I hadn't gone over the revenue reports from the gateways yet. My view had to have come from those I knew and talked to, and I am surprised, in hindsight, how negative this assessment was:

"The loss of the merger was catastrophic. The Milwaukee Road's management had lived with the prospect of merger for so long, it had seemed so assured, so necessary, that there was no alternative for the Milwaukee board; no "plan B." Worse, the years of juggling the books on maintenance to make the corporate profitability appear more favorable had left the Company with an accumulated tidal wave of deferred maintenance.

"The merger had been the guiding principle for all that Crowley, Quinn, and Crippen had done on the Milwaukee Road, and represented two decades of effort. The Northwestern merger had been so important, that the Burlington Northern merger was of a secondary, almost unimportant, consideration, compared to the overwhelming benefits of combining the Milwaukee and the Northwestern, and the Milwaukee had treated it that way right up to the U.S. Supreme Court.

"The merger with the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad, at first the symbol of, had become the substitute for, progressive management of the Milwaukee Road. Suddenly, with no merger forthcoming, the Company found itself, in 1969, in the worst of all possible scenarios: it had no viable merger prospects with any other railroad, it had squandered the talented resources of mid-level management by not offering promotional inducements, its physical plant was in an accelerating disrepair, and, worst of all, its old enemies were -- with the Milwaukee's thoughtless blessing -- about to consummate their unholy alliance into the largest railroad entity in the United States.

"The implications of all that happened in 1969 would haunt the Milwaukee Road to its final days. "

Good grief. I think I was probably suffering, in 1985, from post-apocalyptic Milwaukee Road depression. I wouldn't write it that way today, but it was on my mind at the time.

[Murphy Siding]

QUOTE: Originally posted by arbfbe

I can give three examples of railroads who managed their companies with the goal of a white kniight in a merger clothing coming along to save the day. Once the decision was made to merge that became the goal. All other management plans to build the business, improve the infrastructure and serve the customers went by the wayside. Moneys which should have gone towards maintenance instead went to dividends or building a small cash holding so as to look more appealing to any suitors. Developing a Plan B in case the merger Plan A failed to actualize would be prima facia evidence the managers had doubts. Now when have you ever heard top managers admit they were hedging their bets account there were cloudy areas they could not see into. That just does not happen. Successful managers are bold and sure and steady to implement "the plan". Allowing for something to fail would encourage underlings to seek their own alternative plans or even take over the top job with a plan to insure success of Plan A.

The C&NW was treading water waiting for first the MILW and later the UP to take the load off management. Given the UPs need for a connection to Chicago and later the C&NWs access to the PRB they finally pulled it off and the UP took them over. That was after the cash flows from the PRB were coming in. Next look at the Rock Island. They even had the UP carrying the paper on thier new locomotives. Unfortunately the merger took so long account all the other carriers that wanted protection the RI managements deferred maintenance caught up with them and they lost it all. Finally, the MILW. Merger with the C&NW to eliminate competition in both railroads core business areas. Those railroads could not come to terms, one side or the other had to feel they were coming out on top. So next the MILW cast it's lot with the BN. After all, the original BN merger mandated the BN had to consider inclusion on the MILW after a specified time. But the BN did not want yet a third line to Seattle and account the huge capital expenses of the PRB could not afford to take on the MILW in its ragged state. Again management rode the merger unicorn into the dirt and lost it all.

Ouch, indeed.

I'm not so certain that you couldn't put PRR and NYC in that same basket as well.[:(]

[kenneo]

arbfbe --------

Just a tiny addition to the MILW part of your answer, the NP (and later, the BN) were quite diligent in using any situation that came along to clip the wings of the PCE. Had the MILW been assigned a different receivor for the bankruptcy, I think the PCE through Louisville core would still be around as an independant line.

Byond that, you have the short answer.

[arbfbe]

I can give three examples of railroads who managed their companies with the goal of a white kniight in a merger clothing coming along to save the day. Once the decision was made to merge that became the goal. All other management plans to build the business, improve the infrastructure and serve the customers went by the wayside. Moneys which should have gone towards maintenance instead went to dividends or building a small cash holding so as to look more appealing to any suitors. Developing a Plan B in case the merger Plan A failed to actualize would be prima facia evidence the managers had doubts. Now when have you ever heard top managers admit they were hedging their bets account there were cloudy areas they could not see into. That just does not happen. Successful managers are bold and sure and steady to implement "the plan". Allowing for something to fail would encourage underlings to seek their own alternative plans or even take over the top job with a plan to insure success of Plan A.

The C&NW was treading water waiting for first the MILW and later the UP to take the load off management. Given the UPs need for a connection to Chicago and later the C&NWs access to the PRB they finally pulled it off and the UP took them over. That was after the cash flows from the PRB were coming in. Next look at the Rock Island. They even had the UP carrying the paper on thier new locomotives. Unfortunately the merger took so long account all the other carriers that wanted protection the RI managements deferred maintenance caught up with them and they lost it all. Finally, the MILW. Merger with the C&NW to eliminate competition in both railroads core business areas. Those railroads could not come to terms, one side or the other had to feel they were coming out on top. So next the MILW cast it's lot with the BN. After all, the original BN merger mandated the BN had to consider inclusion on the MILW after a specified time. But the BN did not want yet a third line to Seattle and account the huge capital expenses of the PRB could not afford to take on the MILW in its ragged state. Again management rode the merger unicorn into the dirt and lost it all.

Ouch, indeed.

[MichaelSol]

Ouch.

[Murphy Siding]

QUOTE: Originally posted by arbfbe

What is so hard to comprehend the MILW management from about the 1960s on was not an heroic bunch of professionals who got overwhelmed by economics and lead the good fight to the bitter end, but instead were some mediocre half wits who made all the wrong decisions and crashed a thriving enterprise in spite of opportunities to turn the situation in their favor. Economic history is filled with examples of businesses who were so poorly managed they were bankrupted from within. Just because an extant business with a huge infrastructure, increasing business potential and an established customer base is there for all to see there is no guarantee management cannot find a way to collapse the entire operation. There does not have to be any reason except some one is in over their head and no one else is watching the candy store to protect their interests.

Now that's the best explantion I've heard yet.[^]

[arbfbe]

What is so hard to comprehend the MILW management from about the 1960s on was not an heroic bunch of professionals who got overwhelmed by economics and lead the good fight to the bitter end, but instead were some mediocre half wits who made all the wrong decisions and crashed a thriving enterprise in spite of opportunities to turn the situation in their favor. Economic history is filled with examples of businesses who were so poorly managed they were bankrupted from within. Just because an extant business with a huge infrastructure, increasing business potential and an established customer base is there for all to see there is no guarantee management cannot find a way to collapse the entire operation. There does not have to be any reason except some one is in over their head and no one else is watching the candy store to protect their interests.

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by cornmaze

Bert,
Just walk away from this thread and find something more useful to do with your time.

Like perhaps go back and get your GED!

[Anonymous]

The Milwaukee Road Historical group has some interesting items on the reason for their demise. Sounded like suicide to me, but that is from the position of a monday morning quarterback. I would have re-equipped and extended the juice and bought more F-M's, but I was only 15 at the time.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by n012944
I think the most telling financial analysis was that it was ABANDONED. Don't need a law degree to figure that one out.

Bert

Bert

A nice neat little world of a priori reasoning, there.

Airtight, apparently.

"Lincoln is dead. Therefore Lincoln deserved to die."

Don't need any degree to see instantly the logical fallacy of your proposition and the inability to support empty conclusions by any reference to experience or a factual record.

a pri·o·ri adj.
1. Proceeding from a known or assumed cause to a necessarily related effect; deductive.
2.
a. Derived by or designating the process of reasoning without reference to particular facts or experience.
b. Knowable without appeal to particular experience.
3. Made before or without examination; not supported by factual study.

[n012944]

QUOTE: Originally posted by cornmaze

Bert,
Don't waste your time with this guy. Just walk away from this thread and find something more useful to do with your time.

I think I will do that


Bert