What happen to Milwaukee Road?

[greyhounds]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by MP173
How about this one...provide your data that Chicago wasnt a freight generating market.

Chicago was one of the most incredible freight generating cities on the face of the earth.

Well, this is typical. My point was specifically intermodal. Not a lot of westbound intermodal in those days. But, to you it suddenly became "freight generating." In 1974, those were two different things. There is no way to confuse my remarks unless you intend to.

Well, do you want to cite your 'sorce' on "Not a lot of wesbound intermodal in those days'.

[Kevin C. Smith]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol
It is true the PCE was remarkably compact -- not a lot of little branch lines wandering all over, and the ones such as Moses Lake were suprisingly productive. But that was the point. The PCE basically shot from the Twin Cities into the ports at Tacoma and Seattle, then Portland. That was 1770 miles of long haul, 1,916 including Portland. Add in the Louisville traffic and there is a 2600 mile line haul.

I seem to recall-in the dark recesses of my faulty memory-the TRAINS "Professional Iconoclast" suggested that two railroads that would work best for his proposed integral train system to bring Pacific Rim traffic to population centers in the east would be the MR and Erie. The Milwaukee Road because it was one of the transcons that ran through to Chicago, so there would be only the Chicago terminal interchange and both railroads had minimal branchlines compared to long haul mains to help eliminate rehandling and delays...FWIW

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by kenneo

The Port of Seattle and the Port of Tacoma also published their own figures concerning the MILW's westbound market share. They and the MILW's numbers are quite close to each other.

As I remember those proceedings, these two Ports and the Port of Portland complained loudly. The interesting part is that part of the UP, the Oregon-Washington Railway and Navigation Company (all UP West of Huntington, OR including Northern Idaho, Washington and Oregon) was headquartered in Portland and nearly all of the (then) independent share holders were "old money" Portlanders and had a lock on Port of Portland traffic.

Along came the MILW and that seemed to change. I was working the Brooklyn - Willsburg Interlocking during that time and it was usual to have at least two MILW "far East" (ie, Chicago) trains building at the same time at Brooklyn. We (the SP) did all of the MILW's work for them in Portland, and we did more for them than we did for the SP. Most of their trains ran in excess of 100 cars each, siphoning off eastbound traffic that usually would have gone via Ogden from as far south as the Rogue Valley (Siskiyou).

The MILW was taking 5,000 tons a day from such routings as SP-DRGW-Q, SP-DRGW-MP, SP-DRGW-CRIP, SP-UP-Omaha-Q or CNW or MILW or IC or CRIP. When you lose 300 trains per year to another railroad, you have a tendency to react in the negative.

As to the question of why the PCE was abandoned if it was profitable, It was politics. The FRA and the Department of Transportation among others "forced" the court decision to abandon. The BN, after having told the MILW and ICC to make whatever concessions they wanted for the BN merger, realized the magnitude of their error and "played politics" to undo the problem by getting the line abandoned. They succeeded. And who bought up the PCE properties? The BN was in the forfront (others were in their also, including Potlatch Forest Products and the State of Washington), and as quickly as they could, pulled up the rails.

Now, I don't have a library of sources. I never did have. The above are my experience and the conclusions that I drew. But I have seen the type of documents that Michael Sol quotes from for the SP and other roads, and his numbers have the ring of authenticity. I have made rates for loose car, multiple car, train load and captive moves, calculating the costs, revenues, and operating income. Joint, local and combination rates. And the same thing for an entire railroad. You can take it or leave it; if you leave it the problem is yours.

I am not an expert. But I do know when the numbers say "blow off" and when they are legit. When you quote someone elses numbers and/or opinions, they are not yours, but someone elses. So you can not "kill the messanger".

Thanks Eric. Very interesting stuff. I had assumed that the Portland entry was going to result in a lot of short haul to Seattle and Everett, and would not be much of a money maker. The original reason for asking for the condition in the first place was to "participate in the north-south traffic". Good grief, what 147 miles? Who needs it.? Saw some revenue, but figured the operating costs were probably sky high too.

This colored my thinking about Portland for a long time until John Crosby who worked as a brakeman on the Milwaukee's Portland run pointed out to me that these were big, heavy trains, and they were heading east, not north (figuratively). So, I went back and did the simple calculation of revenue by carloads and, holy cow, there was some premium revenue there, some of the the best I had ever seen on a carload basis for a reporting station that size.

That prompted me to take a closer look at Louisville and found the same thing. Those two terminals, 2600 miles apart, were apparenty sharing some freight or if not, there was an unusually high quality overall to the amount of revenue generated at those two stations.

Best -- Michael Sol

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MP173
Also, what is the accounting basis for the $170 million? Is that the revenue carried by the line in 1974 west of Miles City? Does that $170 million inclusive of all freight revenue carried? If so, discounting the revenue is necessary to correctly account for pickup and linehaul aspects of the revenue EAST of Miles City. In other words, if you had a $1000 revenue carload from Chicago to Seattle, I don't see how you can assess all of that $1000 to 1440 route miles.

Also, you are comparing system revenue per mile for the two mega carriers vs mainline selective revenue per mile. If you would compare the Milwaukee system revenue per mile, my guess it was much less than the figures stated.

The total revenue value of the freight handled on Lines West was in the neighborhood of $220 million or so, I don't have my spreadsheets here. The ICC required the revenue attributable to the line be segregated from revenue earned on another portion of the system. Naturally, for internal purposes, Milwaukee knew full well exactly how much haul revenue was attributable to what portion of the system, as well as the probability of the loss of the entire revenue stream from a shutdown. Milwaukee thought, for instance, they might be able to keep the intermodal traffic that was such a big part of their traffic. When asked how much of that traffic he thought Milwaukee could get back at Council Bluffs if they turned the PNW business over to UP, Milwaukee's intermodal manager, C.K. Dunning said "I almost fell off my chair laughing. How about 'none.'"

So, if you have a $1000 carload from Chicago to Seattle, but don't get the traffic at all if you don't go to Seattle anymore, you lose $1000 in revenue, even though there is still an existing section of track between Chicago and the Twin Cities that still costs money to operate.

In the revenue per mile case, the "route miles" of each system were used. It is true the PCE was remarkably compact -- not a lot of little branch lines wandering all over, and the ones such as Moses Lake were suprisingly productive. But that was the point. The PCE basically shot from the Twin Cities into the ports at Tacoma and Seattle, then Portland. That was 1770 miles of long haul, 1,916 including Portland. Add in the Louisville traffic and there is a 2600 mile line haul.

The Louisvile and Portland Station Revenue figures for originating and terminating tonnage show a considerable amount of traffic that was going the long haul.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Bob-Fryml
After the electricification shut down in June 1974, I understand that the Railroad kept certain segments of the electrification energized for awhile so as to prevent theft. Does anyone have any details on this?

They certainly wanted everyone to think it was energized. It wasn't.

On April 18, 1974 during a Milwaukee Road Board meeting, Director Kaplan argued that the transmission lines should be scrapped rather than sold, as the April, 1974 price of copper was at $1.24 per pound, and the market was quoting $1.35 per pound for May purchases. W.L. Smith estimated for Kaplan that the Milwaukee would need to receive approximately $1.60 per pound in order to exceed the negotiated purchase price with the Montana Power Company, and that it didn't appear that the copper market would go that high.

During actual salvage, prices received ranged from 80 cents a pound in December, 1974, 73 cents in December, 1975, 72 cents in December, 1976, and 71 cents on the final progress report dated September 9, 1977.

The transmission line sale was completed to the Montana Power Co.. MPC Chairman Paul Schmechel later told me that MPC had been expecting to negotiate a sale price between $15 million and $20 million -- "we needed that line" -- and had been pleasantly stunned when Milwaukee proposed the sale at $3.25 million.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[wallyworld]

Randy,
After reading all of the above, I agree with you. This is an inescapable conclusion gleaned from reading this thread.

[Randy Stahl]

W.L. Smith maintains to this day that "if certain members of the Board of Directors had done their jobs, we could have avoided that bankruptcy. It just wasn't necessary."

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by cornmaze
... but what you gave instead is a quote taken from an interview with a person with a stated goal of making the case for preserving the PCE. Then your claim that credentials of a speaker are what make a statement true or not -- logical fallacy. True statements stand on their own; it doesn't matter who makes them.

Well, the interview, you will note, was in 1994. Assuming that Bill Brodsky wanted to put a lot of energy as well as his personal credibility as a railroad president into saving the PCE at that late date is probably the logical fallacy.

[MichaelSol]

Tom Ploss mentions in his book, The Nation Pays Again his perceptions of the entire line on a trip he took West. His description paints a railroad doing pretty well on the East end in terms of maintenance, but slowly dribbling off the further he went West on the trip.

However, when engineering estimates were made, segment by segment, by various outside engineers, the Chicago-Twin Cities main needed about $110 million, to get rid of slow orders, but the Twin Cities-Seattle/Tacoma main needed only about $53 million (Tom Dyer's estimate) to fully bring it up to Class IV standards, even though it was nearly four times longer than the Chi/TC main.

There were a lot of slow orders out West. Bill Wilkerson and other Milwaukee employees complained loudly that 10 mph slow orders were placed on 50mph track. Rails and ties were purchased for the Western line, stored, then hauled back East. After the Joes were retired, derailments west of Harlowton skyrocketed under the SD-40-2s. The Joes were weighted much like a steam engine, the diesels had a much lower center of gravity. Don't know if that was the cause, but sure saw the results. The Avery Hill had been rebuilt in 1971, crushed quartzite, the whole nine yards, but by 1975, it was hard to get a train over the Bitterroots. So, it wasn't poor track to begin with, it was simply failing to maintain it for the heavy traffic Milwaukee put over it 1971-1974.

That was no "cash out" strategy. Pay the maintenance or pay the cost of derailments and damaged equipment and goods. The cash out strategy would have been to make the maintenance and earn the profit, rather than dump carloads of cash into the St. Joe River and get nothing back for it.

So, slow orders everywhere, but were they justified? Were the SD's hard on the track? Every derailment I saw always involved the PS-2 covered hoppers. At the time, I always assumed, well, there's a lot of wheat going West. I don't recall anyone pointing to the PS-2s as the cause of derailments. So, the slow orders were put on the track. The track may not have been the problem utlimately. But all these trains were moving slowly. They were still beating today's transit time standards oddly enough, but by Milwaukee standards, equipment cycle times had doubled out West. Perhaps it wasn't necessary, and was a mistaken judgment on derailment causes, I don't know. I just recently became aware that the PS-2s were a big problem on any railroad that had them and represented a perplexing dilemma that was not easy to figure out. Maybe Milwaukee didn't figure it out. When Gordon Jonassen got a dribble of money to fix the Cascade crossing in 1980, he was able to restore normal speed limits at relatively little cost and in a short amount of time. To me that confirmed why Harry Williamson's and Tom Dyer's engineering estimates to rehab the Western lines were so remarkably low -- the track just wasn't that bad; it was actually pretty good. Williamson's engineering notes from his line survey in 1978 use the words several times, "this is actually a pretty good mountain railroad ...".

Of course, the Midwestern core was sucking up funds, the Midwest Rail Crisis was in full flower. Allan Boyd had just been fired at Illinois Central, Chicago & Northwestern was approaching $950 million in deferred maintenance and deferred capital spending (the largest such deficit in the country), BN was at $389 million in deferred maintenance and cs, Rock Island was slowly caving in on itself. Milwaukee's core was probably the worst of the bunch, but avoided an earlier crisis because of the life support system provided by Lines West that kept pumping money into the system. But, nobody was doing anything about the drain in the Midwest. Everbody just kept staring at each other. The heart pump was working hard to supply funds, but at some point, something had to give.

There was a real disconnect at Milwaukee Road between where the money was being made, and where it was being spent.

The bankruptcy was a surprise. Everyone expected ICG to go; ICC Chairman O'Neal described it to the U.S. Senate as a "basket case," but they were all basket cases. The short haul demon had come home to roost. ICG's problems came after two years of management by Stanley E.G. Hillman -- but Milwaukee's cash flow position was pretty good even though it was losing money on the P&L. Caught most management by surprise; the Montana Division Superintendent found out about it from the BN division office in Missoula. CMC, not management, filed the petition. W.L. Smith maintains to this day that "if certain members of the Board of Directors had done their jobs, we could have avoided that bankruptcy. It just wasn't necessary."

The transcontinentals were all making money even in those days. Milwaukee Road's PCE was no exception. Milwaukee's long haul statistics were better than anybody's. It's cost structure was very favorable out West. Notwithstanding the unsubstantiated accusations on this thread, every reasonable inference as well as the available statistical record supported the Milwaukee's transcon.

As one Milwaukee VP who was a strong advocate for abandoning the PCE told me, paraphrasing, "we had trouble with Mr. Hillman after the consulting study came back supporting the transcontinental line."

[wallyworld]

Lets see the picture-great photo.

[CMSTPP]

..............................childish.............................[:(][V]

Anyway, I want to post a picture I drew here but by the looks of it you two are still acting like dog and cat that can't seem to get "along"[*^_^*]

But okay, we'll see how this ends up....................

[wallyworld]

I agree there seems to be a subtext to this thread-empirical data versus opinion and where that line is drawn is easy to determine, for those of us who dont have a horse in this race.

[nanaimo73]

Michael-
During the 1975 to 1978 period, was the Milwaukee Road maintaining the Twin Cities to Seattle-Tacoma line equally, or was there a point like Butte, Miles City or Aberdeen where they decided to underfund west of ?

[wallyworld]

1.Stepping on corns-ouch.
2.Poke back with stick. .
3. You are a knucklehead.
4. Prove it.

I learned more than I anticipated.

[Murphy Siding]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MP173

Not much point talking to me?


ed

Ed- from the context, I believe that remark was directed at me, not you.[:)]

[kenneo]

The Port of Seattle and the Port of Tacoma also published their own figures concerning the MILW's westbound market share. They and the MILW's numbers are quite close to each other.

As I remember those proceedings, these two Ports and the Port of Portland complained loudly. The interesting part is that part of the UP, the Oregon-Washington Railway and Navigation Company (all UP West of Huntington, OR including Northern Idaho, Washington and Oregon) was headquartered in Portland and nearly all of the (then) independent share holders were "old money" Portlanders and had a lock on Port of Portland traffic.

Along came the MILW and that seemed to change. I was working the Brooklyn - Willsburg Interlocking during that time and it was usual to have at least two MILW "far East" (ie, Chicago) trains building at the same time at Brooklyn. We (the SP) did all of the MILW's work for them in Portland, and we did more for them than we did for the SP. Most of their trains ran in excess of 100 cars each, siphoning off eastbound traffic that usually would have gone via Ogden from as far south as the Rogue Valley (Siskiyou).

The MILW was taking 5,000 tons a day from such routings as SP-DRGW-Q, SP-DRGW-MP, SP-DRGW-CRIP, SP-UP-Omaha-Q or CNW or MILW or IC or CRIP. When you lose 300 trains per year to another railroad, you have a tendency to react in the negative.

As to the question of why the PCE was abandoned if it was profitable, It was politics. The FRA and the Department of Transportation among others "forced" the court decision to abandon. The BN, after having told the MILW and ICC to make whatever concessions they wanted for the BN merger, realized the magnitude of their error and "played politics" to undo the problem by getting the line abandoned. They succeeded. And who bought up the PCE properties? The BN was in the forfront (others were in their also, including Potlatch Forest Products and the State of Washington), and as quickly as they could, pulled up the rails.

Now, I don't have a library of sources. I never did have. The above are my experience and the conclusions that I drew. But I have seen the type of documents that Michael Sol quotes from for the SP and other roads, and his numbers have the ring of authenticity. I have made rates for loose car, multiple car, train load and captive moves, calculating the costs, revenues, and operating income. Joint, local and combination rates. And the same thing for an entire railroad. You can take it or leave it; if you leave it the problem is yours.

I am not an expert. But I do know when the numbers say "blow off" and when they are legit. When you quote someone elses numbers and/or opinions, they are not yours, but someone elses. So you can not "kill the messanger".

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by cornmaze

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol
Milwaukee's market share of intermodal is from the Washington state DOT.

Did DOT actually report a Milw 75% share of Seattle port traffic? Or did you calculate that figure from other numbers they reported. After Greyhounds' comments on Seattle based on personal experience, I would be interested in seeing exactly where you got that number. Fair enough?

Where on earth did greyhounds say he had any personal experience with Seattle?

“Milwaukee Road had in excess of 76% of the Port of Seattle’s business. It had mail, it had Toyotas, it had almost all the domestic auto business westbound. It had the long ticket items we needed to build on that today are what railroads are all about." William Brodsky, Interview by Jim Scribbins, “S.O.R.E.” Milwaukee Railroader, First Quarter, 1994, p. 11.

There is the quote. Brodsky was a Milwaukee officer. Started out as asst Elec. Engineer in Tacoma. He was then stationed in Seattle. A former Milwaukee exec was VP or managed Port of Seattle -- Hank Levenger. Brodsky was later Asst VP at Milwaukee, then in the Planning Dept. After that, President, Montana Rail Link. A good deal more authentic railroading experience than greyhounds and a great deal more actual railroad experience in the Seattle area. There is the page. There is the date and there is the publication. Greyhounds knows nothing about the Port of Seattle.

Please ask greyhounds for his sources. You might wonder how he knows so much about Milwaukee and the PNW.

Wouldn't hurt to ask him.

Fair enough?

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by greyhounds

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by greyhounds
Because you don't know, a "shut down" load is a load than will shut down a manufacturing plant if id doesn't arrive on time. If they don't have the parts, they can't build the cars. The Santa Fe never let us down. #188 got 'er done..

QUOTE: Not a lot of westbound intermodal in those days.

By God!, yiou're a fool.

I must be. I didn't know the Santa Fe Railroad ran into the Pacific Northwest.

I didn't say that it did, now did I. Now what's Fred's phone number?

Ken Strawbridge

Well, since we were talking about the PNW, the Santa Fe didn't seem to have much to do with the conversation. If I can get ahold of him tomorrow, I will see if Fred will talk to you.

And, if you come across as completely uninformed by a refusal to read preparatory material, I will consider it an imposition on both Fred Simpson and myself, as neither of us has the time or inclination to educate someone from scratch who refuses to read a single thing about what he intends to argue about, having demonstrated conclusively so far you don't know anything about the subject material as, by admission, you refused to deal with Milwaukee Road and actually know nothing about it.

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol
Milwaukee's market share of intermodal is from the Washington state DOT.

Did DOT actually report a Milw 75% share of Seattle port traffic? Or did you calculate that figure from other numbers they reported. After Greyhounds' comments on Seattle based on personal experience, I would be interested in seeing exactly where you got that number. Fair enough?

[greyhounds]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by greyhounds
Because you don't know, a "shut down" load is a load than will shut down a manufacturing plant if id doesn't arrive on time. If they don't have the parts, they can't build the cars. The Santa Fe never let us down. #188 got 'er done..

QUOTE: Not a lot of westbound intermodal in those days.

By God!, yiou're a fool.

I must be. I didn't know the Santa Fe Railroad ran into the Pacific Northwest.

I didn't say that it did, now did I. Now what's Fred's phone number?

Ken Strawbridge

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by greyhounds
Because you don't know, a "shut down" load is a load than will shut down a manufacturing plant if id doesn't arrive on time. If they don't have the parts, they can't build the cars. The Santa Fe never let us down. #188 got 'er done..

QUOTE: Not a lot of westbound intermodal in those days.

By God!, yiou're a fool.

I must be. I didn't know the Santa Fe Railroad ran into the Pacific Northwest.

[greyhounds]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by greyhounds
OK, give me Fred's phone number.

And you're wrong again. That ICC costing formula came from the 1930's. (or 20's) Is Fred still alive?

Fred lives across town. He does not suffer fools gladly.

Accordingly, I would suggest you read, first, his description of the events at Jim Scribbins, “S.O.R.E.” Milwaukee Railroader, First Quarter, 1994, p. 9.

Then, Fred's affidavit at Simpson, Fred, "Supplemental Affidavit of J. Fred Simpson in Support of Motion for Leave to Intervene," In the Matter of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company, Reorganization, Cause No. 77 B 8999, U.S.D.C., Northern District Ill., Eastern Division,), March 5, 1979. I will send you a copy if you wish.

I would also suggest a conversation with C.K. Dunning, Milwaukee's international intermodal pricing director. He is more than willing to talk about this stuff and, assuming he would give me permission, I would send his email addresss to you.

Then, after you have actually learned something about all of this, call Fred. He recently retired as executive VP Montana Rail Link.

No, you offered his phone number. I want his phone number.

Ken Strawbridge

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by greyhounds
It was all about the MILW and your asinine allocation of revenue to the malignant PCE.
But you seem to not understand that, but then again, you don't seem to understand much.

Ken Strawbridge

QUOTE: OK, give me Fred's phone number.

And you're wrong again. That ICC costing formula came from the 1930's. (or 20's) Is Fred still alive?

Ken Strawbridge

What I said was that Milwaukee's planning department worked on the revenue numbers for internal planning purposes long before they had to worry about filling out ICC forms or meeting those standards. The internal numbers had nothing to do with the ICC numbers. Fred Simpson did not meet with Stanley Hillman in the 1930s.

However, the ICC numbers are interesting since most intermodal was eastbound in 1974, and Milwaukee's station revenue numbers clearly show what was originating and terminating. No mistake as to what they say.

According to his son, Fred is doing fine. He recently retired as Executive VP, Montana Rail Link. He lives across town.

Fred does not suffer fools gladly. Before talking to him I would suggest reading Jim Scribbin's' interview with him, “S.O.R.E.” Milwaukee Railroader, First Quarter, 1994, p. 9. If you don't have it available, I will send it to you.

I would also suggest reading his "Supplemental Affidavit of J. Fred Simpson in Support of Motion for Leave to Intervene," In the Matter of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company, Reorganization, Cause No. 77 B 8999, U.S.D.C., Northern District Ill., Eastern Division,), March 5, 1979. If you don't have it, I will send it to you.

After that, I would suggest a conversation with Milwaukee's manager of international intermodal pricing, C.K. Dunning, who will set you straight from the perspective of someone who actually managed railroad intermodal. If you are willing, I will ask him for permission to send his email to you.

Once you have informed yourself, I would be more than willing to ask Fred if I can send you his phone number.

Once you have done this, you will be able to report to this Forum that none of these opinions are mine.

[greyhounds]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by MP173
How about this one...provide your data that Chicago wasnt a freight generating market.

Chicago was one of the most incredible freight generating cities on the face of the earth.

Well, this is typical. My point was specifically intermodal. Not a lot of westbound intermodal in those days. But, to you it suddenly became "freight generating." In 1974, those were two different things. There is no way to confuse my remarks unless you intend to.

MY rear end! We made a living at Merchant Shippers on wesbound intermodal. North Coast was secondary to South Coast. Auto plants at Van Nuys and South Gate. Truckers would bring the loads out of Flint, MI for the Santa Fe ramp at Corwith. I'd get the "Telex"

It'd start out "SHUT DOWN, SHUT DOWN, SHUT DOWN". "XTRZ206154" shut down load Van Nuys.... etc. Then it would list the other "shut down" loads, and the other trailers going to the plants.

Because you don't know, a "shut down" load is a load than will shut down a manufacturing plant if id doesn't arrive on time. If they don't have the parts, they can't build the cars. The Santa Fe never let us down. #188 got 'er done..

QUOTE: Not a lot of westbound intermodal in those days.

By God!, yiou're a fool. There were no auto plants in the PNW, but they sure took UPS. Terminal Freight from Sears in Chicago, Montgomery Ward from Chicago, Cracker Jax from Chicago, and everything else from the east over the Chicago interchange.

Two solid intermodal trains per day operated into Seattle/Porland from Chicago. They didn't run empty. And the MILW didn't much get any of it, because they sucked as a service railroad.

Ken Strawbridge

[greyhounds]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by greyhounds

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

Anything about the Milwaukee Road, or just the usual name-calling?

It was all about the MILW and your asinine allocation of revenue to the malignant PCE.
But you seem to not understand that, but then again, you don't seem to understand much.

Ken Strawbridge

Actually, I had nothing to do with it, it was the Milwaukee Planning Dept. that made the specific allocation, and which made the specific objection to the Trustee regarding cash flow to the parent company, but, what would they know compared to your knowledge of the Milwaukee Road?

Oh, a published interview exists with Milwaukee Road Asst. Vice President -- Planning Fred Simpson about that entire episode. I can give you his phone number if you wish so that you can challenge his "asinine allocation." He made it long before they had to fill out an ICC form about it.

OK, give me Fred's phone number.

And you're wrong again. That ICC costing formula came from the 1930's. (or 20's) Is Fred still alive?

Ken Strawbridge

"By many measures, the U.S. freight rail system is the safest, most efficient and cost effective in the world." - Federal Railroad Administration, October, 2009. I'm just your average, everyday, uncivilized howling "anti-government" critic of mass government expenditures for "High Speed Rail" in the US. And I'm gosh darn proud of that.

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