Trains aren't classified as "hazardous", the material being transported is either hazardous or it's not, as determined by the Department of Transportation. There are 9 classifications for hazardous materials (Explosives, Gases, Flammable Liquids, Flammable Solids, Oxidizers, Poisons, Radioactive, Corrosives and Other Regulated Materials) and the vehicle/vessel/container used in transportation (train, air, ship or highway) must be placarded or labeled. This also depends on how much (pounds, gallons or cubic feet) is being transported. Placards and or labels aren't required until certain amounts are exceeded.
Trains/Trucks/Ships/Aircraft transport hazardous materials hourly. Whether it's a tank car, hopper, boxcar, semi-trailer, tank trailer, delivery truck, van, etc., if the solid, liquid or gas is classified as a hazardous material and it exceeds a certain amount, it must be identified.
The identification placard or label is a quick reference. All trains/trucks/ships/aircraft also have manifests, bills of lading, shipping papers, etc that specifically identifies the material with further detailed information.
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I did read somewhere that this particular train did not receive a higher hazardous cargo classification because fewer than half the cars on the train contained hazardous material.
It takes an iron man to play with a toy iron horse.
I also saw a security camera video where that train went by in the background. The car with the bad wheel bearing was obviously on fire, quite spectacularly throwing sparks. The article said the railroad used to have hotbox detectors ever 20 miles, but they are not mandated by law and the railroad has cut back on the guys who maintained them, adding that task to the signal maintainers who are overworked anyway.
The detector near where the video showed flames and sparks apparently would electronically notify the train crew of the problem. I guess the guys in the cab didn't know. Oh, my kingdom for a caboose!
The threshold we had was 20 or more placarded tank cars of particular types or one or more toxic inhalation cars.
A version of this type of restriction has been in place since the late 1980's. The restrictions are pretty much standard across the whole railroad industry, might even be set by Federal law.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
MisterBeasleyThe article said the railroad used to have hotbox detectors ever 20 miles, but they are not mandated by law and the railroad has cut back on the guys who maintained them, adding that task to the signal maintainers who are overworked anyway. The detector near where the video showed flames and sparks apparently would electronically notify the train crew of the problem. I guess the guys in the cab didn't know. Oh, my kingdom for a caboose!
From what I have read, it went by two detectors, both functioned as intended. The first detector detects hot journals and the bearing had not heated up enough to generate an automatic warning to the crew. It did note the journal was warmer than normal. The second detector detected dragging equipment and it did broadcast a warning but the journal had failed by then and was most likely dragging because it was already derailed.
Thanks for bringing up this timely topic. I thought about doing likewise, but could easily see it get political. Just sad that such a place became the site for another industrial accident.
Whether it could have been prevented is something I cannot mention since not having worked on a railroad. Nonetheless, quite interestesting to read how consists of nearly two miles are far from the exception.
More food for thought: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/feb/11/ohio-train-derailment-wake-up-call
Chemicals carried in the derailment that caught fire:https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/15/climate/ohio-train-fire-toxic-chemicals.html
Not trying to stir ANY pots, but merely inform folks about what happened beyond: just another derailment.
There's quite a bit more discussion of this at the Trains forum:
https://cs.trains.com/trn/f/111/t/294698.aspx
Maybe the moderator could move this thread to the prototype for modeler's category?
Cheers, Ed
MisterBeasleyOh, my kingdom for a caboose!
I hear what you're saying, but a caboose crew may not have been much use in the era of "Monster Trains." They may not been able to see the flames from the failing axle anyway. Two mile long trains are pretty much the norm now as I understand it. Personally I think they're a bad idea but the Class 1's haven't asked me.
Back in the day when cabooses were being eliminated tests were done and crews can't really see anything in any detail more than 25 or so cars away. the visibility is entirely dependent on where they are, what the track alignment is, the time of day, the weather and what they are looking for.
If a car has a problem on the east side and the conductor is sitting on the west side of the caboose, it could be the car right in front of the caboose and he'd never see it. If it's a problem under the car and the conductor is in a traaditional cupola, he might never see it.
I have personally stopped 20-30 car locals that had occupied caboose and engine that had sticking brakes and were merrily showering sparks down the railroad. The crew never saw or smelled the sparks.
Yes, an occupied caboose seems like a great solution. In reality, not so much.
I saw a youtube vid by a CSX guy. He did not know anything specific about the accident but he showed a detector that malfunctioned falsely reporting a hot wheel. He said there can be bearing and wheel detectors together or just one type of detector. The shower of sparks with cars not appearing to lean are not due to a broken axle, but a lock up of the brakes and therefore the wheels.
His information about where the detectors were was different and all I can say is we are still in the fog of war regarding what is true.
The zig zag stacking of the railcars indicate an emergency stop.
Eventually the NTSB will tell us if the detectors worked and the engineer ignored them or the problem occured between detectors.
Henry
COB Potomac & Northern
Shenandoah Valley
I keep hearing that this derailment will cost NS big time.
Russell
Actually, FRA requirement is one every 50 miles. What is in place is every 15-20 miles, whch gives the railroad a chance to fix a malfunctioning detetctor without shutting down the whole line as the detectors on either side will meet the requirement
Read an article about DoT secretary's letter to N&S CEO. Here it is in full:https://drive.google.com/file/d/1NvzFpA2_YTbj7yaCQagG6uq-OkgtpN3m/view
Scathing is an understatement. Perhaps this is the clarian all for N&S and industry to undergo much needed reform to put people ahead of profits. Crank up the lobbyists to waterdown anything. Rinse and repeat.
DonRicardo What are the rules for classifying a train as "Hazardous"? And why wasn't that one classified as hazardous?
What are the rules for classifying a train as "Hazardous"? And why wasn't that one classified as hazardous?
I assume you're asking this because of the discussion of the rescinded ECP brake rule. The ECP provision (rescinded congruent to the 2015 FAST Act) was a small part of the Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains from 2015. The rule defined "high-hazard flammable trains" (HHFT) and "high-hazard flammable unit trains" (HHFUT). The ECP brake rule only applied to HHFUTs which are were trains comprised of 70 or more loaded tank cars containing Class 3 flammable liquids traveling at greater than 30 mph.
Since this discussion has to do with the prototype, not models, I'm moving it to the Trains Forum.
--Steven Otte, Model Railroader senior associate editorsotte@kalmbach.com
It's a sad day for what used to be America when a sitting Secretary of Transportation resorts to bluster and threats to obtain what, from what I've read, NS is voluntarily engaging in and doing.
Look for strict scrutiny to be applied to finding those "safety violations" whether or not they contributed to the accident, and to any EPA determinations. I suspect there is already some organized 'gearing up' to find the controlled release merely expedient to re-opening the line quickly.
I'm waiting with great interest to read the NTSB preliminary report, which among other things will document the testing of the 'relief valves that wouldn't relieve' and the precise nature of the axle 'failure'. Both those things are of evident great concern for the investigators not to 'prematurely disclose'.
BigDaddyThe zig zag stacking of the railcars indicate an emergency stop.
I would opine that the accordian stacking of the cars is indicative of a sudden stop - as in one of the cars "dug in" and the cars behind it had nowhere to go.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
EPA just announced that they were taking over the cleanup
If this was an accident you'd never think so given the harsh words from EPA administrator Michael Regan.."Norfolk Southern will pay for cleaning up the mess that they created and for the trauma that they inflicted". Maybe I missed where they said this was an intentional act of terror on the part of NS or the train crew. I haven't heard anything to suggest this was an intentional act.. in fact no one knows at this point what caused the accident. It could have been sabotage.. my opinion.. people are rushing to judgement.. again.
diningcarEPA just announced that they were taking over the cleanup
No matter which organization is the Authority for the clean up. I will not be easy and when all is said and done - it will not be clean. Politics will NEVER LET it be clean.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
I think the key phrase here is "stuff happens."
Clearly, we want to know what happened. From that comes two things - could it have been prevented, and what do we have to do to prevent it from happening again.
And we can't forget that the best laid plans of mice and men, etc, etc...
I'm starting to detect a pattern here. Mice and men... stuff happens ... best laid plans. Oh those darn laws of physics again....
Euclid I'm starting to detect a pattern here. Mice and men... stuff happens ... best laid plans. Oh those darn laws of physics again....
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
Murphy Siding Euclid I'm starting to detect a pattern here. Mice and men... stuff happens ... best laid plans. Oh those darn laws of physics again.... ... money can't buy happiness but it can buy a congressman...
... money can't buy happiness but it can buy a congressman...
I will have to add that to the list. Money can also buy the correct tool for the job.
Euclid Money can also buy the correct tool for the job.
A hammer is the correct tool for driving a nail, but people still manage to find their thumb from time to time...
It can also buy a political party (party hats are extra)
Platitudes and cliches abound with those who choose to trivialize rail safety. Predictable. Fortunately many others (especially those with power) see a real need to force safety measures on the irresponsible railroads.
charlie hebdo Euclid I'm starting to detect a pattern here. Mice and men... stuff happens ... best laid plans. Oh those darn laws of physics again.... Platitudes and cliches abound with those who choose to trivialize rail safety. Predictable. Fortunately many others (especially those with power) see a real need to force safety measures on the irresponsible railroads.
No investigation yet to determine what happened and mistakes made. No one would argue that safety is paramount, but suggesting that railroads are irresponsible is a bit harsh and premature. Quite possibly something was overlooked..somebody didn't do his/her job properly, and here we are. At this point we don't know. Sometimes mechanical failures are hard to predict..I got a flat on a brand new tire a couple of weeks ago. Tire was properly inflated..I was driving carefully on a dry road when it happened. Whose fault? I could have lost control and swerved into a crowded bus stop...whose fault would that have been? We live in a dangerous world, and our comfy lifestyles require the transport of hazardous materials at speed.. it may have been directly due to someone's negligence..or..as likely, it was due to an unpredictable failure of a component somewhere along the line. They're called accidents for a reason..no one meant for this to happen.
Ulrich charlie hebdo Euclid I'm starting to detect a pattern here. Mice and men... stuff happens ... best laid plans. Oh those darn laws of physics again.... Platitudes and cliches abound with those who choose to trivialize rail safety. Predictable. Fortunately many others (especially those with power) see a real need to force safety measures on the irresponsible railroads. No investigation yet to determine what happened and mistakes made. No one would argue that safety is paramount, but suggesting that railroads are irresponsible is a bit harsh and premature. Quite possibly something was overlooked..somebody didn't do his/her job properly, and here we are. At this point we don't know. Sometimes mechanical failures are hard to predict..I got a flat on a brand new tire a couple of weeks ago. Tire was properly inflated..I was driving carefully on a dry road when it happened. Whose fault? I could have lost control and swerved into a crowded bus stop...whose fault would that have been? We live in a dangerous world, and our comfy lifestyles require the transport of hazardous materials at speed.. it may have been directly due to someone's negligence..or..as likely, it was due to an unpredictable failure of a component somewhere along the line. They're called accidents for a reason..no one meant for this to happen.
Investigation has been taking place ever since people were allowed on to the wreck scene. They just aren't wearing clothing identifying them as a part of some Agency you think should be investigating. On wreck scenes, I have never seen anyone wearing clothing BRAZENLY identifying them as NTSB or some other agency - they are there, they don't advertise.
Nice story but itrelevant to what happened on the NS. Neithet the hotbox detector nor the crew noticed a fiery journal for 20 miles. Unacceptable.
charlie hebdo Neithet the hotbox detector nor the crew noticed a fiery journal for 20 miles. Unacceptable.
.
charlie hebdoPlatitudes and cliches abound with those who choose to trivialize rail safety. Predictable. Fortunately many others (especially those with power) see a real need to force safety measures on the irresponsible railroads.
It's not trivializing rail safety. Many of us here live that every day. Believe me when I say that having 500+ people riding in the cars on my coupler is no laughing matter.
What's being trivialized is the knee-jerk, unrealistic solutions being presented. Or should I say that there's a shot of reality being injected into said solutions.
By people who are in the business.
BigJim charlie hebdo Neithet the hotbox detector nor the crew noticed a fiery journal for 20 miles. Unacceptable. What is unacceptable is you dragging the crew into something that is out of their control, namely, the car being too far back to be seen!
What is unacceptable is you dragging the crew into something that is out of their control, namely, the car being too far back to be seen!
How far back can you see? Six? Twelve? Eighteen? My thought is that 25 cars back frequently CAN be seen. Especially if there's something very bright on a dark night.
Ed
Jim the car was throwing enough fire for a ring doorbell 2 blocks away from the tracks at night to activate on a darkened porch. If the crew had bothered to look behind them in a curve they would have seen the fire coming off the freaking car itself moving with the train.
7j43kHow far back can you see? Six? Twelve? Eighteen? My thought is that 25 cars back frequently CAN be seen. Especially if there's something very bright on a dark night.
Twenty-five cars is around a quarter mile, depending on the cars.
There is, conveniently, a train in the image from Acme Mapper, so one can get a feel for how far 25 cars is.
Following the line from Salem to East Palestine via satellite images, there aren't a lot of places where one would be able to see well very far along the train. Just looking at the trees next to the ROW shows that they could well block the view to the rear.
Coming in to East Palestine a train passes under the Main Street bridge, whose abutments would mask the rest of the train, even though it's on a right hand (eastbound) curve. Never mind the engineer focusing on upcoming crossings.
As for the defect detectors - if they report immediately on spotting something, that's one thing. OTOH, if they wait until the last car passes, the East Palestine defect detector would never pipe up with a report until well after the head end has cleared the village, which in this case was after the derailment. I'll defer to the experts on HBD/DED functioning in those cases.
I know from personal experience that there are times I can't see the end of our 12 car Polar Express trains.
dehusmanFrom what I have read, it went by two detectors, both functioned as intended. The first detector detects hot journals and the bearing had not heated up enough to generate an automatic warning to the crew. It did note the journal was warmer than normal. The second detector detected dragging equipment and it did broadcast a warning but the journal had failed by then and was most likely dragging because it was already derailed.
How far was the first detector from the surveillance video at Salem, Ohio? Did the train pass the first detector prior to passing the surveillance video?
If the car seen sparking in the video passed the detector in that condition, what would the detector likely do in response?
You say that the bearing had not heated up enough to generate an automatic warning to the crew. How do you know that?
tree68 charlie hebdo Platitudes and cliches abound with those who choose to trivialize rail safety. Predictable. Fortunately many others (especially those with power) see a real need to force safety measures on the irresponsible railroads. It's not trivializing rail safety. Many of us here live that every day. Believe me when I say that having 500+ people riding in the cars on my coupler is no laughing matter. What's being trivialized is the knee-jerk, unrealistic solutions being presented. Or should I say that there's a shot of reality being injected into said solutions. By people who are in the business.
charlie hebdo Platitudes and cliches abound with those who choose to trivialize rail safety. Predictable. Fortunately many others (especially those with power) see a real need to force safety measures on the irresponsible railroads.
I appreciate your voice of sanity. But apparently my deliberate use of hyperbole went undetected in the rush to defend the rails at all costs. It is apparent that many of the people in the business" are a part the problem and not part of the solution, else these issues would have been dealt with by these companies long ago. But corporate greed, manifested by PSR, is the problem. And rail history shows that the companies have always had to be forced into adopting sensible safety measures, usually by the government looking out for the public and worker safety. The same is true now. PTC was opposed by most insiders. It has flaws but it has doubtless prevented collisions. The rails need to get over their arrogant stance and try to be good neighbors with the communities they traverse. Bu on here it is the stale refrain of anti-NIMBYism.
charlie hebdo tree68 charlie hebdo Platitudes and cliches abound with those who choose to trivialize rail safety. Predictable. Fortunately many others (especially those with power) see a real need to force safety measures on the irresponsible railroads. It's not trivializing rail safety. Many of us here live that every day. Believe me when I say that having 500+ people riding in the cars on my coupler is no laughing matter. What's being trivialized is the knee-jerk, unrealistic solutions being presented. Or should I say that there's a shot of reality being injected into said solutions. By people who are in the business. I appreciate your voice of sanity. But apparently my deliberate use of hyperbole went undetected in the rush to defend the rails at all costs. It is apparent that many of the people in the business" are a part the problem and not part of the solution, else these issues would have been dealt with by these companies long ago. But corporate greed, manifested by PSR, is the problem. And rail history shows that the companies have always had to be forced into adopting sensible safety measures, usually by the government looking out for the public and worker safety. The same is true now. PTC was opposed by most insiders. It has flaws but it has doubtless prevented collisions. The rails need to get over their arrogant stance and try to be good neighbors with the communities they traverse. Bu on here it is the stale refrain of anti-NIMBYism.
Let me spend all the money I want from YOUR BUSINESS the ways I WANT TO as opposed to the way YOU with your expertise and experience feature it should be spent and invested. It will be fun!
Thank you, Larry,
for your examination of my idea. I am not familiar with the topography of the area, and I appreciate your exploration of same.
It does bother me when workers are expected to monitor an event that rarely happens (as is the case here). I have been employed thusly, and it is not a pleasant feeling to be told to watch for "something" unlikely to happen, while doing other tasks.
I do think that railroad operation should be revised in these United States.
7j43kI am not familiar with the topography of the area, and I appreciate your exploration of same.
I based my conclusions on what can be seen from the satellite images. I did not look at topography, which would also be a potential factor. You can't see through dirt, if you will. Cuts, fills, etc.
Yes, you are supposed to look back from time to time when the situation allows. But you still have to be looking forward. Things like crossings, signals, etc.
7j43k BigJim charlie hebdo Neithet the hotbox detector nor the crew noticed a fiery journal for 20 miles. Unacceptable. What is unacceptable is you dragging the crew into something that is out of their control, namely, the car being too far back to be seen! How far back can you see? Six? Twelve? Eighteen? My thought is that 25 cars back frequently CAN be seen. Especially if there's something very bright on a dark night. Ed
Have we heard what the detector would have offered to the crew as warning information in such case that we saw developing at Salem? All we know is that there was a detector that was intended to prevent this derailment. Both the detector and the crew had a responsibility to react for the purpose of preventing it. Either one alone could have prevented it.
duplicate
BaltACDLet me spend all the money I want from YOUR BUSINESS the ways I WANT TO as opposed to the way YOU with your expertise and experience feature it should be spent and invested. It will be fun!
You are obviously losing it with your shouting (the meaning of all caps). You are all over the railroads with criticism of PSR and Wall Street and beancounters, but if anyone says the operating end of a railroad is screwed up, you are a raging bull. Can't you realize PSR, etc. and screwed up operations and deferred maintenance are directly related? Perhaps not.
With all their expertise, those rail execs and managers are the ones with the disasters occuring. The public has a stake in safe operations.
Euclid Do we know how far back the defective car was? I have seen several differing references. The least distance stated was 12 car lengths. I think that would have been within easy eye sight even on straight track, where there was little to no other ambient light.
From a list of the loads of the cars involved, which included such things as reporting marks, car numbers, etc., it was the 25th car back.
It was GPLX 75465. It was loaded with polyethylene, as was the car behind it. Then there was an empty that formerly contained lube oil. And then 4 cars of vinyl chloride. And so on.
You can see the two polyethylene cars on their sides in photos.
BigJimYet again foliage is a big hinderence as to what can and cannot be seen!
Shorter trains?
What good is the extra set of eyes to look for problems if they can only see a short distance? I don't blame operating crews. The fault is with the system.
Foliage in the Midwest in February?
EuclidBoth the detector and the crew had a responsibility to react for the purpose of preventing it. Either one alone could have prevented it.
The crew can only react to what they are aware of. As has been noted, twenty-five cars back may be far enough back that they couldn't see the issue in that section. Remember, too, that the doorbell videos are taken from alongside the train, not down its length.
And the crew has enough to do without spending all their time looking back along the train. Automobile drivers look out the windshield - they don't spend all their time looking in the rear view mirrors.
The East Palestine detector, mere car lengths from the point of derailment, was too little, too late. Even if it immediately broadcast the issue, it was too late. And it has been discussed here that applying the brakes may have even exacerbated the issue.
That leaves the Salem detector. Since we don't know what its sensor specifications are, we don't know if it actually failed. Apparently it did sense something, as there is plenty of talk of an over-warm report. It's been discussed here what the appropriate reaction is to such a report - I don't recall the specifics. I'm sure NTSB and the FRA are looking at it.
The final report will be interesting.
7j43k Euclid Do we know how far back the defective car was? I have seen several differing references. The least distance stated was 12 car lengths. I think that would have been within easy eye sight even on straight track, where there was little to no other ambient light. From a list of the loads of the cars involved, which included such things as reporting marks, car numbers, etc., it was the 25th car back. It was GPLX 75465. It was loaded with polyethylene, as was the car behind it. Then there was an empty that formerly contained lube oil. And then 4 cars of vinyl chloride. And so on. You can see the two polyethylene cars on their sides in photos. Ed
charlie hebdo BigJim Yet again foliage is a big hinderence as to what can and cannot be seen! Shorter trains? What good are the extra set of eyes? Foliage in the Midwest in February?
BigJim Yet again foliage is a big hinderence as to what can and cannot be seen!
What good are the extra set of eyes?
The shear mass of closely spaced tree trunks, branches, and undergrowth even in Winter is surprisingly dense. I took this photo on Monday. You can only see 11 car lengths back and this is a fairly broad curve.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/ns145/52705640639
With railroads no longer using lineside code line poles and wires for signalling and communications, the trees and brush are growing right up to the sides of the track. The resulting "tree canyons" are making the railfanning hobby more and more difficult as once great locations are no longer usable for photography.
Maybe we should wait to hear what the crew has to say. Likely they've been told not to speak to anyone other than to investigators for now.
tree68 Euclid Both the detector and the crew had a responsibility to react for the purpose of preventing it. Either one alone could have prevented it. The crew can only react to what they are aware of. As has been noted, twenty-five cars back may be far enough back that they couldn't see the issue in that section. Remember, too, that the doorbell videos are taken from alongside the train, not down its length. And the crew has enough to do without spending all their time looking back along the train. Automobile drivers look out the windshield - they don't spend all their time looking in the rear view mirrors. The East Palestine detector, mere car lengths from the point of derailment, was too little, too late. Even if it immediately broadcast the issue, it was too late. And it has been discussed here that applying the brakes may have even exacerbated the issue. That leaves the Salem detector. Since we don't know what its sensor specifications are, we don't know if it actually failed. Apparently it did sense something, as there is plenty of talk of an over-warm report. It's been discussed here what the appropriate reaction is to such a report - I don't recall the specifics. I'm sure NTSB and the FRA are looking at it. The final report will be interesting.
Euclid Both the detector and the crew had a responsibility to react for the purpose of preventing it. Either one alone could have prevented it.
Here's info from the preliminary report from Trains:
https://www.trains.com/trn/news-reviews/news-wire/hot-box-warning-came-too-late-for-norfolk-southern-train-that-derailed-in-ohio/?fbclid=IwAR2n5L9N0SZdWNWSgFTRCtpaFOGSIz6VNSE3cPffDixv48Ks17s9BX7bEeA
Many of your points are addressed in this report.
Euclid[If they had looked back when the view was not blocked, it would have been impossible for them not to see the problem 25 cars back]
Euclid[I am referring to watching the 25 cars from the locomotive. The only relevance of the video is that it shows us the failing bearing that caused the wreck]
Again, what indicates that the hot bearing was ever visible from the locomotive 25 cars away?
Man, in hindsight it sure would have been a good idea to have stopped 32N east of Salem and checked out that 23rd car. Question is what is the normal range of operating temperatures for a properly operating roller bearing? I suspect NS' data analytics predicted that if it were developing into a problem that the next detector would catch it in time. Close, but no cigar.
EAST PALESTINE, Ohio (AP) — The crew operating a freight train that derailed in East Palestine, Ohio, did not receive a critical warning about an overheated axle until just before dozens of cars went off the tracks, federal safety investigators said in a report Thursday.
An engineer slowed and stopped the train after getting a “critical audible alarm message,” according to a preliminary report by the National Transportation Safety Board. The crew then saw fire and smoke and alerted dispatch of a possible derailment, the report said.
The axle investigators are focused on had been heating up as the train went down the tracks, but did not reach the threshold for stopping the train and inspecting it until just before the derailment, the report said. The train was going about 47 mph (75 kph) at the time, just under the speed limit of 50 mph (80 kph), according to safety investigators
https://wtop.com/national/2023/02/buttigieg-visits-east-palestine-ohio-train-derailment-site/
I earlier said that the failed car was the 25th car. Seeing the mention that it was the 23rd prompted me to re-examine the load list.
The car was on the 25th LINE. I now suspect that Line 1 and Line 2 were the locomotives. Thus Line 25 would be the 23rd CAR.
Goodtiming An engineer slowed and stopped the train after getting a “critical audible alarm message,” according to a preliminary report by the National Transportation Safety Board. The crew then saw fire and smoke and alerted dispatch of a possible derailment, the report said.
If there was a derailment (which there was), it seems to me the air line would have parted, and the front of the train stopped without any input from the engineer.
Am I missing something?
Please take a look at the end view image of a freight car (a box car in this case):
https://digital.hagley.org/PRR_18475
US rails are 4' 8" apart. Rail cars are around 10' 6" apart. That leave about 3 feet of overhang on each side. The wheel journals are somewhat outside of the rails, but still positioned well underneath the car body.
On tangent track, most, if not all, of the sparking would be obscured from the crew view by the carbody of not only the failing car, but all the other preceeeding cars. As has been pointed out by others, 25 cars back is far enough where visibility will be significantly obscured by any vegetation when rouding a curve, and even then the journal is still partially obscured by the car body.
I suppose it is possible that there may have been one or two locations where the one crew member on the failing side might have been able to catch a glimpse of something 25 cars back (the other crew member won't see anything, so the opportunity to spot something was only available to one crew member, not both). I'll wait for the final report, but I have a hard time buying any assertions that crew member inattention had any part in this.
7j43k Goodtiming An engineer slowed and stopped the train after getting a “critical audible alarm message,” according to a preliminary report by the National Transportation Safety Board. The crew then saw fire and smoke and alerted dispatch of a possible derailment, the report said. If there was a derailment (which there was), it seems to me the air line would have parted, and the front of the train stopped without any input from the engineer. Am I missing something? Ed
Read the actual report, not just the news page. It does not say he slowed and stopped the train. The alarm message instructed him to slow and stop the train. The engineer began the process ("engineer increased the dynamic brake application to further slow and stop the train"), but before he got it stopped an automatic brake application initiated (due to the derail).
Preliminary NTSB Report
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/RRD23MR005%20East%20Palestine%20OH%20Prelim.pdf?fbclid=IwAR32DHLAjqacuNtaabYznHEuK85sIYMsxTs2tv1cwMBWjyVRjBAgXU_R2b8
Shadow the Cats owner Jim the car was throwing enough fire for a ring doorbell 2 blocks away from the tracks at night to activate on a darkened porch. If the crew had bothered to look behind them in a curve they would have seen the fire coming off the freaking car itself moving with the train.
Unless there's another video I don't know about, it didn't "activate a ring doorbell camera." The camera was a security camera that is apparently on all the time because the video starts before the effected car is visible. It's also operating in night vision mode - have you ever seen even modestly bright objects in such a video? To the naked eye the sprkrs coming off that railcar would have been nowhere near that bright. In fact, a lot of that brightness would have been in the infrared range, which of course humans can't see but security cameras can.
The problem with limiting train size...instead of of one large train hauling hazmat you have several shorter trains all hauling hazmat. More trains, more chances of accidents.
tree68 Euclid [If they had looked back when the view was not blocked, it would have been impossible for them not to see the problem 25 cars back] Key point: when the view was not blocked. Please point out where that might be. As has been noted, even on a curve, 25 cars back may not be visible. Euclid [I am referring to watching the 25 cars from the locomotive. The only relevance of the video is that it shows us the failing bearing that caused the wreck] Again, what indicates that the hot bearing was ever visible from the locomotive 25 cars away?
Euclid [If they had looked back when the view was not blocked, it would have been impossible for them not to see the problem 25 cars back]
Key point: when the view was not blocked. Please point out where that might be. As has been noted, even on a curve, 25 cars back may not be visible.
Euclid [I am referring to watching the 25 cars from the locomotive. The only relevance of the video is that it shows us the failing bearing that caused the wreck]
EuclidThat is why I said, “If they had looked back when the view was not blocked…”
See ADK64's comments on the topic. He covers it quite well.
Euclid... That is why I said, “If they had looked back when the view was not blocked…”
Euc - you need to ride some trains to figure out what can be seen and at what distance.
NTSB reports the suspect car was 23rd from the two engines, thus somewhere between 1800 & 2000 feet from where a crew member could view it.
How a ring camera works is they're motion activated or whenever their button gets pushed. So this camera saw something bright enough for it to automatically turn on and record and then save the footage. It did all of this automatically with no input from the homeowner whatsoever.
Plus the NTSB report saying that for over 60 miles the axle temperature of the car in question had been going upwards. This whole accident was preventable if the crew had been alerted and allowed to investigate the problem. The most interesting thing is the crew isn't currently catching heat from NS it's all falling on their dispatchers.
Why didn't some fine upstanding railfan report the "smoke and fire and jello"!
adkrr64I suppose it is possible that there may have been one or two locations where the one crew member on the failing side might have been able to catch a glimpse of something 25 cars back (the other crew member won't see anything, so the opportunity to spot something was only available to one crew member, not both). I'll wait for the final report, but I have a hard time buying any assertions that crew member inattention had any part in this.
To see much of anyting, there has to be a curve. And then it is much easier to see along the inside of the curve; and impossible to see anything on the outside. So yes, it is the person in the cab on the inside of curves who looks for fire flying.
And from the outside of the curve, the view gets better as you get further from the cars you are looking at because you are seeing the cars more as a direct side view rather than nearly an end view if they are close to you. But as the vew gets better perspective from the distance into the cuve turning the car, that also increases the distance, so that works against the view quality as it gets too far to see.
There's a lot of curves where you can't see back more than 12 or 15 cars because of the overgrowth of vegetation. There's only a few places anymore that I can look back and see more than that. Even then, the further back the less you can tell if something's wrong. And should the wind be wrong, it will blow any smoke or dust underneath the car.
Once they stopped maintaing communication and signal line pole lines, they just let the vegetation take over the right of way.
Jeff
Salem is at 40.90104 -80.86401
East Palestine (specifically the site of the wreck) is at 40.83642 -80.52180
Jump on Google maps, or Acme Mapper, or whatever satellite image program you prefer and follow the line across. Note the locations of curves, and especially note the existence of vegetation. As noted, even in winter, trees and underbrush provide a pretty substantial view block.
A look at the topo map will also show numerous cuts and places where the line winds around hills.
Seeing 25 cars back isn't going to be all that easy.
tree68Salem is at 40.90104 -80.86401 East Palestine (specifically the site of the wreck) is at 40.83642 -80.52180 Jump on Google maps, or Acme Mapper, or whatever satellite image program you prefer and follow the line across. Note the locations of curves, and especially note the existence of vegetation. As noted, even in winter, trees and underbrush provide a pretty substantial view block. A look at the topo map will also show numerous cuts and places where the line winds around hills. Seeing 25 cars back isn't going to be all that easy.
Reality is a female dog!
BaltACD tree68 Salem is at 40.90104 -80.86401 East Palestine (specifically the site of the wreck) is at 40.83642 -80.52180 Jump on Google maps, or Acme Mapper, or whatever satellite image program you prefer and follow the line across. Note the locations of curves, and especially note the existence of vegetation. As noted, even in winter, trees and underbrush provide a pretty substantial view block. A look at the topo map will also show numerous cuts and places where the line winds around hills. Seeing 25 cars back isn't going to be all that easy. Reality is a female dog!
tree68 Salem is at 40.90104 -80.86401 East Palestine (specifically the site of the wreck) is at 40.83642 -80.52180 Jump on Google maps, or Acme Mapper, or whatever satellite image program you prefer and follow the line across. Note the locations of curves, and especially note the existence of vegetation. As noted, even in winter, trees and underbrush provide a pretty substantial view block. A look at the topo map will also show numerous cuts and places where the line winds around hills. Seeing 25 cars back isn't going to be all that easy.
To Note; and some observations, from the 'Media' reportage on the wreck scene in E. Palestine, Oh.
It has been reported that the NS Train had traveled some 20 miles (?) fromm the location of its last 'hot box' detector(?). The 'defect was becoming so 'prominent' that at severaql locations it was picked up on local businesses cameras. as well as several individuals 'ring- door bell cameras(?) Today, it was noted that 'the crew' had received a 'warning' as the train was entering the area of the crossings in E. Palestine. Appare4ntly, because of that 'warning' the 'engineer' made an emergency brake application*(?). The 'drone footage' seems to indicate that as that applicaton took place; the cars within the train began to 'accordian', and derailed within the community limits (?). All this is shown in the drone footage accompanying the media reporting. And of course, the'media' is spinning the whole episode, "...who's responsible for the 'burning of the accident scene, and the oliticians are wither there or keeping their distances...It has to be a reality that NS's 'Insurance' is going totake whatever 'hit' they can handle. Porportedly, that coverage, has been noted to be somewhere in the $1 Billion dollar per incident range(*?)...All that will get thrashed out in the aftermath by government, politicians, and courts... All should go on for some time(??).
samfp1943 BaltACD tree68 Salem is at 40.90104 -80.86401 East Palestine (specifically the site of the wreck) is at 40.83642 -80.52180 Jump on Google maps, or Acme Mapper, or whatever satellite image program you prefer and follow the line across. Note the locations of curves, and especially note the existence of vegetation. As noted, even in winter, trees and underbrush provide a pretty substantial view block. A look at the topo map will also show numerous cuts and places where the line winds around hills. Seeing 25 cars back isn't going to be all that easy. Reality is a female dog! To Note; and some observations, from the 'Media' reportage on the wreck scene in E. Palestine, Oh. It has been reported that the NS Train had traveled some 20 miles (?) fromm the location of its last 'hot box' detector(?). The 'defect was becoming so 'prominent' that at severaql locations it was picked up on local businesses cameras. as well as several individuals 'ring- door bell cameras(?) Today, it was noted that 'the crew' had received a 'warning' as the train was entering the area of the crossings in E. Palestine. Appare4ntly, because of that 'warning' the 'engineer' made an emergency brake application*(?). The 'drone footage' seems to indicate that as that applicaton took place; the cars within the train began to 'accordian', and derailed within the community limits (?). All this is shown in the drone footage accompanying the media reporting. And of course, the'media' is spinning the whole episode, "...who's responsible for the 'burning of the accident scene, and the oliticians are wither there or keeping their distances...It has to be a reality that NS's 'Insurance' is going totake whatever 'hit' they can handle. Porportedly, that coverage, has been noted to be somewhere in the $1 Billion dollar per incident range(*?)...All that will get thrashed out in the aftermath by government, politicians, and courts... All should go on for some time(??).
Read the NTSB preliminary report. It varies from your description as it is taken from real data.
Has there been any mention of which side of the train the defective journal was on? From the video at Salem I think it was the left side. The pictures of the derailment seem to show the train on the right hand track. With the train running on the right hand track of a double track line it would be much easier to look back 25 car lengths along the left side of the train.
I saw somewhere that there were three crew members on the locomotive. That would probably mean that two of them were on the left side of the cab.
The report mentioned that the Salem detector showed the journal temperature at 103 degrees which did not trigger an alarm. 103 seems low for a journal that was on fire. A person can have a fever higher than that.
samfp1943The 'drone footage' seems to indicate that as that applicaton took place; the cars within the train began to 'accordian', and derailed within the community limits (?). All this is shown in the drone footage accompanying the media reporting.
Can you provide a link to that drone footage. I have not seen it.
EuclidCan you provide a link to that drone footage. I have not seen it.
Just Google "East Palestine Derailment." Lots of news footage.
I've long held the opinion that one of the cars "dug in," thus stopping suddenly and causing the pile-up behind it.
mvlandswThe report mentioned that the Salem detector showed the journal temperature at 103 degrees which did not trigger an alarm. 103 seems low for a journal that was on fire. A person can have a fever higher than that.
103 degrees over ambient. I don't know that the journal was on fire. I know that's what everyone's claiming, but it may just be shooting sparks. That security camera is operating in night mode and anything bright is ging to be grossly over exposed. Just look at the lights in the video and see how they look like glowing orbs. Now imagine a shower of sparks overexposed like that and it's probably going to look like a ball of fire.
IMO the engine crew did an outstading job. The train was in dynamic braking ( maybe because of descending grade )before the crew was aware of the problem. Once they got the report they did not panic but increased dynamics to gradually slow train and not go to emergency. Imagine they might have put DPU full dynamic to keep train streached.
However, before train could slow derailment started and brakes went to emergency . Front of train probably continued until it rolled to a stop. Then crew went out, appplied hand brakes on two cars, then boogied out of there. Now tell me how a single person could have acccomplished that.?
Oh wait, the traveling conductor would have done that as soon as he drove the 20 miles to the accident.
CSX Robert mvlandsw The report mentioned that the Salem detector showed the journal temperature at 103 degrees which did not trigger an alarm. 103 seems low for a journal that was on fire. A person can have a fever higher than that. 103 degrees over ambient. I don't know that the journal was on fire. I know that's what everyone's claiming, but it may just be shooting sparks.
mvlandsw The report mentioned that the Salem detector showed the journal temperature at 103 degrees which did not trigger an alarm. 103 seems low for a journal that was on fire. A person can have a fever higher than that.
103 degrees over ambient. I don't know that the journal was on fire. I know that's what everyone's claiming, but it may just be shooting sparks.
103° above "ambient" ? Think about that! If the "ambient" was, for example, 50°, then it would be 153°. Not even hot enough to fry spit! Not even enough to start smoking!
tree68 Euclid Can you provide a link to that drone footage. I have not seen it. Just Google "East Palestine Derailment." Lots of news footage. I've long held the opinion that one of the cars "dug in," thus stopping suddenly and causing the pile-up behind it.
Euclid Can you provide a link to that drone footage. I have not seen it.
Yes, I have seen countless news stories of the wreck. I have also heard reference to a video of the derailment in progress, but maybe that is inaccurate. I thought samfp 1943 was referring to that, but maybe not. I must assume that if there was such a video, it would have been all over the place.
I agree that the cars dug in. They usually do to some extent. But they also frequently just turn sideways because they are being pushed from behind. So they form a zigzag pattern that closes up so all the cars stack tightly sideways into a heap.
The preliminary report found the accident was "completely preventable" blaming the first two hotbox detectors having a threshold for alarm too high. Crew was not at fault at all.
Maybe the rails need to use modern, cheap technology? A door alarm camera would pick up sparking and fire (clearly what counts) instead of the hotbox detector method: inferring a problem by estimating degrees above ambient temperature.
charlie hebdo The preliminary report found the accident was "completely preventable" blaming the first two hotbox detectors having a threshold for alarm too high. Crew was not at fault at all. Maybe the rails need to use modern, cheap technology? A door alarm camera would pick up sparking and fire (clearly what counts) instead of the hotbox detector method: inferring a problem by estimating degrees above ambient temperature.
If every train with a bearing at or above 103F gets stopped and inspected, the US railroad network is going to turn into one huge congested mess - well, a bigger congested mess than it already is! We need better data on bearing failures and better predictive analytics to isolate problem axles. Also pretty obvious that hotbox detectors need to be spaced closer together, especially on routes with high operating speeds, high train counts and hazmat traffic.
I do agree that visual recording systems located at and between detector sites would be helpful. Visual and infrared images could be collected and processed automatically by machine learning software to isolate problem conditions. This system could identify other safety issues such as shifted loads, excessive rocking, train hoppers, etc. Yeah, yeah I know - it'll cost money! Too bad. Can't have this sort of thing happening. It's easy to pooh-pooh rare events like this from a distance, but imagine your local railroad having an major hazmat incident in your proverbial back yard and forcing you to shut your business down or stop working and evacuate for an extended amount of time.
BigJimNot even hot enough to fry spit! Not even enough to start smoking!
Which is why they didn't get an alarm. Most people are claiming the bearing is on fire in that video. As I explained before, I don't think it was, I think it was just shooting sparks. What it looks like to me is something failed relatively quickly, causing direct metal to metal wear and a massive shower of sparks, that, in that nighttime video, looks like fire.
I would be interested in seeing the list of all the temperatures of all the axles measured by the detector, and then see if that one axle at 103 degrees above ambient is a statistical outlier relative to all the other ones. If it was, I'm thinking that could be a basis for making a relatively simple software change in the detectors to look for such statistical anomalies. If one axle on a train is running much hotter than all the rest, stop and inspect the anomaly, even if that axle might not otherwise be at a threshold requiring a stop.
CSX Robert BigJim Not even hot enough to fry spit! Not even enough to start smoking! Which is why they didn't get an alarm. Most people are claiming the bearing is on fire in that video. As I explained before, I don't think it was, I think it was just shooting sparks. What it looks like to me is something failed relatively quickly, causing direct metal to metal wear and a massive shower of sparks, that, in that nighttime video, looks like fire.
BigJim Not even hot enough to fry spit! Not even enough to start smoking!
The phrases, "On fire" and "Shooting sparks" seem rather subjective in this context. The point is the actual temperature, which is what the detectors sense.
Would't "shooting sparks" be the dropping of molten steel from the melting of the bearing components and the axle? Molten steel will be around 2,500 degrees F. Why wouldn't the heat detector have sensed that high temperature?
EuclidThe phrases, "On fire" and "Shooting sparks" seem rather subjective in this context. The point is the actual temperature, which is what the detectors sense.
Something in a fire is going to get hot a lot faster than something shooting sparks. I can hold a bolt in my bare hand and grind on it for quite sometime before it gets too hot to hold, but put that bolt in an oil fed fire and it's going to get hot a lot quicker. A lot of people have claimed it should have triggered an alarm at the Salem hotbox detector because it was "on fire" before it got to it. Well, if it wasn't on fire, but was just shooting sparks it's going to take longer to heat up enough to trigger an alarm.
EuclidWould't "shooting sparks" be the dropping of molten steel from the melting of the bearing components and the axle? Molten steel will be around 2,500 degrees F. Why wouldn't the heat detector have sensed that high temperature?
The individual sparks may reach that temperature, but they are miniscule particles surrounded by air, I don't know what the non-contact heat sensors they use in hotboxes would see if aimed at them. If the sparks where emanating from the top or bottom of the bearing, it's also possible that it with the sensor aimed at the height of the bearing itself that it wiouldn't even see them.
"Sparks" are almost by definition of a small size.
Perhaps because the source of the high temperature is so much smaller than the surrounding field of view.
If it looks at 50 pieces the size of a gnat that are 2500F, how does it process that info, if it even "sees" it?
charlie hebdoFortunately many others (especially those with power) see a real need to force safety measures on the irresponsible railroads.
They didn't seem too concerned last 5 years. Maybe the next 5?
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
Euclid CSX Robert BigJim Not even hot enough to fry spit! Not even enough to start smoking! Which is why they didn't get an alarm. Most people are claiming the bearing is on fire in that video. As I explained before, I don't think it was, I think it was just shooting sparks. What it looks like to me is something failed relatively quickly, causing direct metal to metal wear and a massive shower of sparks, that, in that nighttime video, looks like fire. The phrases, "On fire" and "Shooting sparks" seem rather subjective in this context. The point is the actual temperature, which is what the detectors sense. Would't "shooting sparks" be the dropping of molten steel from the melting of the bearing components and the axle? Molten steel will be around 2,500 degrees F. Why wouldn't the heat detector have sensed that high temperature?
Sparks can occur, and be very visible, at a lot lower temperature than that.
Especially when it's dark.
Actual NTSB report states the bearing temperatures at specific defect detectors passed, were all below the reporting levels until just before it completely failed. (30 miles out, +34 degrees, 10 miles out +103 degrees. Report minimum threshold is +115 difference each side same axle, or any +170 above ambient. Neither detector recorded a big enough number to trigger an alarm. Prior detector 10 miles out was only +103, below the minimum of +115 same axle/+170 any. Defect detector at East Palestine hit +253. With a below 32F ambient temp, this is still under 300F. This set off the defect alarm, and the engineer increased the dynamics at this point.) When the crew finally got the warning, from the East Palestine detector, the engineer increased the dynamic brakes (to avoid adding more heat to the failing bearing, the correct move) but the bearing totally failed before the train could safely stop, creating a derailment, and that derailment triggered the fully-automatic emergency brake application.
Those sparks may have been visible, at night, or the "night vision mode" on the security camera may have been drastically over-exagerating the actual "naked eye" visible sparks. No way to know if the crew could see 25 car lengths back at any given point even if the sparks were completely visible.
Either way, rotating metal on metal contact can and does create sparks at a much lower temperature than the melting point of 2,500F. (Video evidence indeed shows sparking at the +253 recorded by the last detector, under 300F when ambient temperature is added in.)
And in any case, there was no chance the crew could have prevented this derailment with the known facts as they are. The warning they received occurred way too late.
Ricky W.
HO scale Proto-freelancer.
My Railroad rules:
1: It's my railroad, my rules.
2: It's for having fun and enjoyment.
3: Any objections, consult above rules.
Here's a short video, unrelated to railroads, that demonstrates proper technique for grinding using a hand tool.
Of note, starting at about 1:00 in the video, is the appearance of the sparks flying off the work.
Odds are, if you put your hand there, you wouldn't be burned, although the closing shot is rather humorous...
https://youtu.be/wfyvTsw1gXw
ricktrains4824 Euclid CSX Robert BigJim Not even hot enough to fry spit! Not even enough to start smoking! Which is why they didn't get an alarm. Most people are claiming the bearing is on fire in that video. As I explained before, I don't think it was, I think it was just shooting sparks. What it looks like to me is something failed relatively quickly, causing direct metal to metal wear and a massive shower of sparks, that, in that nighttime video, looks like fire. The phrases, "On fire" and "Shooting sparks" seem rather subjective in this context. The point is the actual temperature, which is what the detectors sense. Would't "shooting sparks" be the dropping of molten steel from the melting of the bearing components and the axle? Molten steel will be around 2,500 degrees F. Why wouldn't the heat detector have sensed that high temperature? Sparks can occur, and be very visible, at a lot lower temperature than that. Especially when it's dark. Actual NTSB report states the bearing temperatures at specific defect detectors passed, were all below the reporting levels until just before it completely failed. (30 miles out, +34 degrees, 10 miles out +103 degrees. Report minimum threshold is +115 difference each side same axle, or any +170 above ambient. Neither detector recorded a big enough number to trigger an alarm. Prior detector 10 miles out was only +103, below the minimum of +115 same axle/+170 any. Defect detector at East Palestine hit +253. With a below 32F ambient temp, this is still under 300F. This set off the defect alarm, and the engineer increased the dynamics at this point.) When the crew finally got the warning, from the East Palestine detector, the engineer increased the dynamic brakes (to avoid adding more heat to the failing bearing, the correct move) but the bearing totally failed before the train could safely stop, creating a derailment, and that derailment triggered the fully-automatic emergency brake application. Those sparks may have been visible, at night, or the "night vision mode" on the security camera may have been drastically over-exagerating the actual "naked eye" visible sparks. No way to know if the crew could see 25 car lengths back at any given point even if the sparks were completely visible. Either way, rotating metal on metal contact can and does create sparks at a much lower temperature than the melting point of 2,500F. (Video evidence indeed shows sparking at the +253 recorded by the last detector, under 300F when ambient temperature is added in.) And in any case, there was no chance the crew could have prevented this derailment with the known facts as they are. The warning they received occurred way too late.
BigJim CSX Robert mvlandsw The report mentioned that the Salem detector showed the journal temperature at 103 degrees which did not trigger an alarm. 103 seems low for a journal that was on fire. A person can have a fever higher than that. 103 degrees over ambient. I don't know that the journal was on fire. I know that's what everyone's claiming, but it may just be shooting sparks. 103° above "ambient" ? Think about that! If the "ambient" was, for example, 50°, then it would be 153°. Not even hot enough to fry spit! Not even enough to start smoking!
zugmann charlie hebdo Fortunately many others (especially those with power) see a real need to force safety measures on the irresponsible railroads. They didn't seem too concerned last 5 years. Maybe the next 5?
charlie hebdo Fortunately many others (especially those with power) see a real need to force safety measures on the irresponsible railroads.
Murphy SidingWhy is the measurement compared to ambient temperature and not the actual tempurature? Our area has temps between -30 a and +115. Why would ambient temperature matter? It seems like the temperature at which a bearing becomes a problem is the same no matter what the weather.
Because a bearing's normal operating range is not absolute, but relative to the ambient temperture. What they are looking for is a bearing outside of the normal operating range. The temperture at which it becomes a problem (fails) may be absolute, that I don't know, but they don't want it to ever get close to there.
The Hot Box Detector engineers are way way ahead of you Euc.
Perhaps NS could use this oldie by Talking Heads for commercials? Just change the lyric to "Burning Down the Town" to be more relevant?
https://youtu.be/_3eC35LoF4U
But rather that placing detectors 100 feet apart along the track, you could place them on the train and get the same benefit of real time monitoring.
Euclid But rather that placing detectors 100 feet apart along the track, you could place them on the train and get the same benefit of real time monitoring.
They would have to work reliably first and be proven to work - has not happened yet. TTC/MxV has seen plenty of fails.
Bearings that fail apparently don't all progress at the same rate. Some will operate many miles while failing. Some will be okay and then fail to burnoff in a few miles.
Wayside detectors would be hard pressed to catch them all. Nearly all? Yes. All? No.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
Euclid I assume the bearing produces heat when running normally, depending on its load. So a bearing running with a constant load within a constant ambient temperature would always be the same bearing temperature; which would be the constant bearing operating temperature plus the ambient temperature. And that constant temperature of the bearing would be above the ambient temperature. So, under that running condition, if the bearing temperature started to rise, that would be abnormal or an anomaly. It seems to me that would have mean that something is wrong with the bearing. So, I would think that hotbox detectors should be looking for any temperature that exceeds operating temperature plus ambient temperature. But then if braking is adding heat to the detection zone, that can throw the meaning of the hotbox detector temperature readings. So you would want to allow some heat rise in the bearings before taking any action to stop and inspect. Also the ambient temperature will not be constant. It will probably be changing most of the time. So the sensors would have to constantly revise what is considered normal. Also, even ambient temperature alone only includes air temperature. Yet the heating of objects will also depend on solar gain which does not directly affect air temperature. I would guess the term “detector temperature reading above ambient” is just a way of saying “temperature reading above background.” And that would include ambient temperature plus heat produced by the bearing. Overall, it seems like it would be difficult to see a trend that predicts a bearing failure with certainty. That points to a need to have more frequent detectors. For instance, if you had one every 100 feet, there probably would never be a bearing failure. They could let the temperature rise until a failure was certain, and still have time to stop the train.
HBDs compare side with side and other axles on same car.
UP came up with method to trend from detector to detector (combines AEI data and digital detector data) 5 or 10 years ago. Don't know how/if NS implemented.
Acoustic detectors looked promising as bearings get noisy before they get hot. NS had a few...Don't know status.
oltmannd Bearings that fail apparently don't all progress at the same rate. Some will operate many miles while failing. Some will be okay and then fail to burnoff in a few miles.
Then if you want to protect against train wrecks due to wheel bearing failure, you can either:
install reliable detectors closer together than "a few miles",
or
install reliable detectors on all bearings on all cars,
install wheel bearings that will not fail in "a few miles",
accept that there will be "some" train crashes due to bearing failure.
I added the "no-fail" bearings because it would seem far past time to not to have researched WHY a bearing would fail quickly, and what to do about it, if anything. If the bearing had not (quickly) failed in East Palestine, there likely would have been no wreck.
Since that's the direct cause of the wreck, it would seem that the NTSB would research the matter.
PS: Thought it wouldn't hurt to research my own "question", and I found this from 1992:
https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/fra_net/15067/Roller_Bearing_Failure.pdf
Don't have time to read it right now, though.
Bearings go bad unfortunately this bearing burnt off in place that just happened to be East Palestine.. As well I know people are giving NS the 10th degree on bearing/wheelset inspection. However the covered hopper that initiated the derailment came off of UP. Did UP bother to do a proper inspection? More than likely this bearing was already in a poor conditon on the UP.. All this will come up in the cars MD-11 history. 32N originates in Madison, IL off the TRRA and carries quite a bit of UP interchange traffic from the Texas/Gulf to the East Coast..
7j43kPS: Thought it wouldn't hurt to research my own "question", and I found this from 1992: https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/fra_net/15067/Roller_Bearing_Failure.pdf
Note the condition of the damage to "Bearing B" and then read the description of overtemperature observation during 70mph testing. On p.45 you will note that the typical wayside indicator tends to read temperature from the outside bearing race and 'below' whereas the highest developing temperatures concern the inner race at the top (where the cups sit in the bearing adapter). Then look at the result noted on p.50 where the temperature of the damaged test bearing B increased 256F in 20 minutes at 60mph.
Small consolation for East Palestine, yet had this derailment occurred another twenty miles to the east, it would have directly impacted the Beaver and Ohio rivers and greater population centers. Indeed, NS had a rather dramatic 24 car ethanol spill on the Beaver River bridge in 2006.
https://www.epaosc.org/site/site_profile.aspx?site_id=2611
While most of the dialogue seems to be about detectors, and they are certainly an important consideration, it is doubtful enough devices can be installed to prevent the anomaly. I would suggest that it may be advisable to examine isolating certain highly toxic loads in controlled consists.
Over the years the movement of high and wide shipments has presented problems with regard to clearance on adjacent tracks with overhanging loads, swing-out loads on curves or vertical clearance restrictions. In endeavors to minize delays to traffic, some roads have run high and wide specials to corral these shipments onto smaller trains that can clear opposing or passing trains on short spread track segments or sidings. PRR, PC and CR did this, as well as UP and I would imagine other roads to some extent.
While transit time would be affected and shipment costs would increase, the thought is that corraling these highly toxic loads onto more or less exclusive consists of restricted length, perhaps more restrictive speeds and more restrictive inspection processes enroute might have a mitigating affect upon potential disasters. Regardless, I think one upshot of this event will be that shipments such as vinyl chloride do not belong in high tonnage 150 car trains anymore.
PennsyBoomerRegardless, I think one upshot of this event will be that shipments such as vinyl chloride do not belong in high tonnage 150 car trains anymore.
Beware! Those defenders will attack you as a kneejerker.
I have seen a number of discussions (but have no citations) that restricting all PIH and hazmat to specific key trains only (and this potentially goes with re-imposing key train speed limits) is an invitation to activism or outright terrorism in the current climate (where people feel empowered to tamper with signal systems or mess with switch positions in the hope of provoking discrediting consequences). The flip side of key train concentration is that if an event occurs to one, the consequences can be more severe, especially if the various derailed or damaged loads can synergistically react.
In the East Palestine case, much of the controversy involves a 'block' of vinyl chloride tanks, one of which started to suffer runaway polymerization that would cause it to detonate. Since (in the opinion of those who were there) this one car could not be relieved without "relieving" the other four around it, we got a massive release of monomer, which was then strategically ignited 'of necessity' but not for some time after the release clouds began to expand. Perhaps this suggests that spacing explosion or BLEVE hazards several 'more inert' cars apart in a consist, and reassembling them in a block only for last-mile delivery, would be a workable alternative. (Unfortunately in this era of flat-switched blocks for cheapness, I don't see this being adoptable...)
PennsyBoomer Regardless, I think one upshot of this event will be that shipments such as vinyl chloride do not belong in high tonnage 150 car trains anymore.
What are the options?
You don't want to put all the hazmat in one train (see: Dow Death Train).
In this case, a shorter train might have meant less cars piled up behind the derailed car, but if those cars that did still pile up included hazmat, the result would have been the same.
We can lessen the probability of a repeat of this incident, but, as been aptly noted by many, completely preventing a recurrence is virtually impossible.
charlie hebdo PennsyBoomer Regardless, I think one upshot of this event will be that shipments such as vinyl chloride do not belong in high tonnage 150 car trains anymore. Beware! Those defenders will attack you as a kneejerker.
If railroads are required to handle these shipments in some restricted way they will certainly have to raise the rates charged. This may then result in trucks hauling the commodities. Do we want them on the highways, and through our communities and cities?
Shadow the Cat's Owner will chime in here, with distinctive competence, but I suspect that the additional qualified drivers for even a tiny percentage of the hazmat that currently moves routinely by rail won't be available, or will involve such costs as to make the truck alternative higher than anything a sensible rail mandate might involve.
Did plain bearings fail catastrophically?
7j43k Did plain bearings fail catastrophically? Ed
Yes definitely. They got overheated for various reasons, set the oil on fire, burned up the oil, then got hotter with the rising friction, then melted the babbit liner on the bronze; and then melted the axle, the bronze, the wedge, the bearing box, and the end of the portion of the axle that engages the bearing.
It was similar to the failure of roller bearing, but it happened more frequently with plain bearings.
From what I've read, one of the functions of the caboose crew, besides watching the train ahead, was being alert for the smell of a hotbox. I understand it was quite distinctive. That odor might indicate a problem even if it could not be seen from the caboose.
Friction bearings rely on a thin layer of oil between the axle and the bearing surface. Dry that out and it's dry metal on dry metal, and that's never good. Speed notwithstanding, I don't know how long it would take for one to completely fail.
I've been getting a video lately in my FB feed that includes a fellow sitting in a chair trackside, armed with an oil can with which he squirts a shot into each journal box while a fellow next to him then pulls them shut. Unseen was the fellow who was opening them.
I asked because I thought I recalled that roller bearings were more subject to "quick failure" than plain bearings.
The cause of the wreck was a bearing failure. A QUICK bearing failure. That is, a very short time for anyone to notice (I'm leaving out the possibility that the failure could have been predicted if someone had disassembled the bearing and examined it).
The problem wasn't so much that the bearing failed, but that it failed before anyone noticed.
I do suspect that running a caboose with a kupla guys with working noses solved a bunch of potential derailments.
I am beginning to think that there should be one conductor in a caboose, an engineer in the locomotive, and a head brakeman to take care of things needing taking care of. The conductor will have to take over for the old rear brakeman.
7j43kI asked because I thought I recalled that roller bearings were more subject to "quick failure" than plain bearings. The cause of the wreck was a bearing failure. A QUICK bearing failure. That is, a very short time for anyone to notice (I'm leaving out the possibility that the failure could have been predicted if someone had disassembled the bearing and examined it). The problem wasn't so much that the bearing failed, but that it failed before anyone noticed. I do suspect that running a caboose with a kupla guys with working noses solved a bunch of potential derailments. I am beginning to think that there should be one conductor in a caboose, an engineer in the locomotive, and a head brakeman to take care of things needing taking care of. The conductor will have to take over for the old rear brakeman. Ed
Even better bring back all the manned Interlocking and Train Order towers that were every 10 to 20 miles communicating with the Train Dispatcher and each other over open copper wire telephone circuits so the trains could get a visual and smell test every tower they passed, communicating to the occupant of the caboose by hand signals. [/sarcasm]
7j43kI asked because I thought I recalled that roller bearings were more subject to "quick failure" than plain bearings.
See the reference p.50, where one severely spalled roller allowed the loaded bearing to go up by about the same temperature over ambient as in the East Palestine wreck, in even less distance.
7j43kI am beginning to think that there should be one conductor in a caboose,
The cost of the added man and car notwithstanding, this goes back to one of the reasons cabeese disappeared. And it would actually be worse now.
Slack.
Slack going out can take a caboose from zero to something in an instant.
Slack running in will do the opposite.
Even if the train is on the move, the sudden changes in speed can be dangerous.
If you have a 200 car train (upwards of 13,000 feet) and there's just six inches of slack between each car, that's a lot of slop.
These days, I think you'd have to put in a NASCAR-style seat/harness for the poor soul stuck in said caboose.
tree68 7j43k I am beginning to think that there should be one conductor in a caboose, The cost of the added man and car notwithstanding, this goes back to one of the reasons cabeese disappeared. And it would actually be worse now. Slack. Slack going out can take a caboose from zero to something in an instant. Slack running in will do the opposite. Even if the train is on the move, the sudden changes in speed can be dangerous. If you have a 200 car train (upwards of 13,000 feet) and there's just six inches of slack between each car, that's a lot of slop. These days, I think you'd have to put in a NASCAR-style seat/harness for the poor soul stuck in said caboose.
7j43k I am beginning to think that there should be one conductor in a caboose,
Back in the day of cabooses - Conductors had Engineers they liked working with, they also had Engineers that the DETESTED working with.
BaltACD tree68 7j43k I am beginning to think that there should be one conductor in a caboose, The cost of the added man and car notwithstanding, this goes back to one of the reasons cabeese disappeared. And it would actually be worse now. Slack. Slack going out can take a caboose from zero to something in an instant. Slack running in will do the opposite. Even if the train is on the move, the sudden changes in speed can be dangerous. If you have a 200 car train (upwards of 13,000 feet) and there's just six inches of slack between each car, that's a lot of slop. These days, I think you'd have to put in a NASCAR-style seat/harness for the poor soul stuck in said caboose. Back in the day of cabooses - Conductors had Engineers they liked working with, they also had Engineers that the DETESTED working with.
Still true today. The same from the engineer's perspective but for different reasons.
A little too much in cab "slack action", eh?
I don't think I agree that train length affects the intensity of the "snap" in the caboose. It's all in the acceleration of the car that's going to be pulling the caboose. Or deceleration, for that matter.
The faster the acceleration, the faster the velocity when the slack is taken up. The faster the preceding car is going when that happens, the greater the "snap" in the caboose.
IF a locomotive can deliver acceleration to a train at a constant input, the resulting snap at the end of the train will always be the same, no matter the train length.
What likely happens with a long train is that the engineer needs to run out the slack to get it moving. For a short train, he doesn't. As the train length grows, the more necessary it is.
When switching some engineers forget that the cars also have brakes, not just the engine. And some conductors don't understand that it's ok to tell the engineer to stop before the drawbars actually hit.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
SD70DudeAnd some conductors don't understand that it's ok to tell the engineer to stop before the drawbars actually hit.
That gets to be an art, in a way. Knowing how a given engineer likes to come in and judging when you should tell them to stop so the momentum is enough to make the pin drop, but not so much as to move the car you're coupling to.
When we're doing some of our runarounds, we are working with occupied cars, oftimes with passengers watching what we're doing from the vestibule.
Had one engineer proud as punch at how perfectly he'd hit the coupler. Had to have him back away and do it again - just a tad harder...
Then there was the engineer who liked to use every bit of that 4 MPH when making a hitch...
From Overmod:
"I have seen a number of discussions (but have no citations) that restricting all PIH and hazmat to specific key trains only (and this potentially goes with re-imposing key train speed limits) is an invitation to activism or outright terrorism in the current climate"
From Tree68:
You don't want to put all the hazmat in one train
Oil and ethanol travel in trains approx. 105 cars, and thus you already have concentrated consists of hazmat, even if somewhat more benign than some other obnoxious commodities. And a case might be made that it would be more practicable to protect concentrated shipments rather than random blocks of four or six or twenty cars, if sabotage is the premise. We'll have to see how the aftermath of this event plays and what political pressure evolves as to how restrictive a response may be necessary and in what form. But any change whatsoever is going to cost, whether it occasions more detectors, more inspections or different handling.
I recall witnessing a particularly violent coupling at Albany of the new locomotives onto the westbound Lake Shore Limited one evening years ago.
BAM!
"Beginner's Night," the car knocker said outloud, to no one in particular.
Train Handling is not One Size Fits All in any physical actions - braking or accelerating.
7j43k I don't think I agree that train length affects the intensity of the "snap" in the caboose. It's all in the acceleration of the car that's going to be pulling the caboose. Or deceleration, for that matter. The faster the acceleration, the faster the velocity when the slack is taken up. The faster the preceding car is going when that happens, the greater the "snap" in the caboose. IF a locomotive can deliver acceleration to a train at a constant input, the resulting snap at the end of the train will always be the same, no matter the train length. What likely happens with a long train is that the engineer needs to run out the slack to get it moving. For a short train, he doesn't. As the train length grows, the more necessary it is. Ed
Only under certain circumstances does one need slack in the train to start it. That was mostly a steam engine practice. Diesels put out their highest traction effort at slow speeds. They normally can start most trains stretched out.
The adjustment of slack is what causes the snap. And can break knuckles and pull out drawbar. The snap is when one part of the train is moving faster than the other and then the parts try to equalize at one speed. Either causing a run in or out.
The longer the train, the more chance for slack to be moving in different directions at the same time. DP helps, but doesn't entirely eliminate slack. Especially with long travel car cushioning drawbar.
It's usually the big ugly manifests with lots of those drawbars that have the problems. When talking about limiting train length, those are the ones that need to be limited, DP or not.
In the "Let's get Euclid chasing his tail" category:
I have long thought that there should be a device that restricts travel and/or compliance in hydraulic cushion underframes when the car is moving above a certain speed. This could be done even more easily if you have a 'smart car' installation that controls braking based on car weight, monitors individual journals and wheel condition, etc. Benefits if you can get power off an ECP 220V line...
Sic em!
SD60MAC9500 Bearings go bad unfortunately this bearing burnt off in place that just happened to be East Palestine.. As well I know people are giving NS the 10th degree on bearing/wheelset inspection. However the covered hopper that initiated the derailment came off of UP. Did UP bother to do a proper inspection? More than likely this bearing was already in a poor conditon on the UP.. All this will come up in the cars MD-11 history. 32N originates in Madison, IL off the TRRA and carries quite a bit of UP interchange traffic from the Texas/Gulf to the East Coast..
You know the more I hear and read about this tragedy, the more I'm beginning to wonder if perhaps NS was even really negligent. Could it be, could it just be that it was simply a "freak accident"?
I know that in today's world, people tend to strongly believe that "there is no such thing as an accident". No, we simply MUST find someone to blame.
Trial lawyers and liberal politicians clearly smell blood. They are sharpening their knives. Some of the lawyers will end up making a small fortune on the litigation of all this.
I don't think that much of Pete Buttigieg and normally tend to disagree sharply with him but when he says that 1,000 derailments a year is far too many, that's kinda hard to disagree with.
What exactly is the issue here? Could it be that there is something wrong or basically flawed with the technology of modern American freight car equipment? Are some cars too heavy for the technology used in the roller bearing journals? Are further advances in metalurgy necessary to help address things?
I have no answers but it's something to think about.
Fred M CainYou know the more I hear and read about this tragedy, the more I'm beginning to wonder if perhaps NS was even really negligent. Could it be, could it just be that it was simply a "freak accident"?
So far, that seems to be the case. If you read the NTSB preliminary report, there is nothing to indicate anything anybody did or did not do caused this.
In the colloquial - "stuff happens."
History is rife with "undiagnosed flaws." One disintegrating roller, finally giving up the ghost after how many thousands of miles, would certainly wreak havoc with a bearing. Given a 36" wheel, that's 1760 revolutions per mile, at 39 MPH, that's about 1,100 RPM.
Coulda, shoulda, woulda facing off against "did."
tree68 Fred M Cain You know the more I hear and read about this tragedy, the more I'm beginning to wonder if perhaps NS was even really negligent. Could it be, could it just be that it was simply a "freak accident"? In the colloquial - "stuff happens." History is rife with "undiagnosed flaws." One disintegrating roller, finally giving up the ghost after how many thousands of miles, would certainly wreak havoc with a bearing. Given a 36" wheel, that's 1760 revolutions per mile, at 39 MPH, that's about 1,100 RPM. Coulda, shoulda, woulda facing off against "did."
Fred M Cain You know the more I hear and read about this tragedy, the more I'm beginning to wonder if perhaps NS was even really negligent. Could it be, could it just be that it was simply a "freak accident"?
The big game changer here are those lineside security cameras that clearly showed something was wrong with that covered hopper 20 miles before the derailment. To the general public that's totally unacceptable.
I was looking for more info on roller bearing failures and found this enlightening Canadian Transport Safety Board report on a 2013 CP derailment involving a burnt off journal: https://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2013/r13t0122/r13t0122.html
The report illustrates all of the roller bearing parts and explains how wear and tear, especially spalling on the raceways or rollers, can cause a bearing to fail. They weren't able to determine what went wrong with the failed bearing because it was too badly damaged, but when they examined the intact bearing on the other side of the axle they found that it was condemnable. They also make the following statement about 2/3's of the way thru the report: "It is recognized in the railway industry that wheelset roller bearings can fail catastrophically in as few as 10 to 15 miles on a train travelling at track speed". If that is the case, then it is very hard to justify 20 mile detector spacings - even more so on a rail line with a traffic density well in excess of 100 million gross tons.
Update: page 062 of NS' 2016 Pittsburgh Division track chart book shows the traffic density thru East Palestine, OH was 129.8 million gross tons: http://www.multimodalways.org/docs/railroads/companies/NS/NS%20Track%20Charts/NS%20Pgh%20Division%20Track%20Chart%202016.pdf
EuclidIn this wreck, the spacing between the Salem and East Palestine detectors was a little too long. If it was just 19 miles instead of 20, there would have been no derailment. All they needed was the distance it would have taken to stop the train.
Which, at track speed for a train of that size, would have been a mile. I suspect that even if there had been another detector 10 miles out, they ran a high risk of a derailment, unless that intermediate detector tripped an alarm.
Note the Canadian study/report, cited elsewhere, which put the failure distance at a little as ten miles.
tree68 Euclid In this wreck, the spacing between the Salem and East Palestine detectors was a little too long. If it was just 19 miles instead of 20, there would have been no derailment. All they needed was the distance it would have taken to stop the train. Which, at track speed for a train of that size, would have been a mile. I suspect that even if there had been another detector 10 miles out, they ran a high risk of a derailment, unless that intermediate detector tripped an alarm. Note the Canadian study/report, cited elsewhere, which put the failure distance at a little as ten miles.
Euclid In this wreck, the spacing between the Salem and East Palestine detectors was a little too long. If it was just 19 miles instead of 20, there would have been no derailment. All they needed was the distance it would have taken to stop the train.
So what I have mentioned about the 19 versus 20 miles is just an example. We know the last detector, 20 miles from Salem, did call for the train to stop, and the derailment happened to occur at that same moment. So the 20 mile interval was not quite short enough to prevent the derailment.
But there are still other pieces to the picture. With other bearing failures the failure interval from detector #2 might have only been 5 miles. But overall, the detector sampling resolution was not high enough to prevent this derailment. And raising that resolution will cost money. So there is the ultimate tradeoff.
EuclidBrake performance played no part in this disaster. It also seems likely that the detectors performed fine. All three reported the overheat condition.
To be clear, the first detector did not report an overheat condition and the I don't believe the second did either. Wheel bearings do not operate at ambient temperature, the 38° over ambient is well within normal operating parameters - definitely not an overheat. The second one, while at the high end, I believe is still in normal range (there's variety of what's consider 'normal' from what I've read). It definitely heated up significantly, but one thing the preliminary report did not have was the train speed at each detector. If the train had slowed significantly before the first detector and the speed back up to track speed before the second, then the tenperature rise could be expected. Also, a comparison of other bearing temperatures could help. If they all rose significantly between the two detectors. that one bearing may appear normal, but if if the others didn't rise, or if this one rose significantly more, then maybe that should have been a sign of an issue.
The first two didn't didn't trigger an alarm to the crew. They recorded the condition. I don't know, but would guess NS has some kind of "bearing desk" that monitors such things.
It's possible to fool hot box detectors. Our instructions are to avoid using air brakes close or while passing over them when possible. They either could have a false activation or mask one that's hot. Detectors also compare the temperature of the entire train. It would be nice to have information as to temps on the rest of the train. If there were something that may have appeared to account for an elevated temp between the first and second detector.
CSX Robert Euclid Brake performance played no part in this disaster. It also seems likely that the detectors performed fine. All three reported the overheat condition. To be clear, the first detector did not report an overheat condition and the I don't believe the second did either. Wheel bearings do not operate at ambient temperature, the 38° over ambient is well within normal operating parameters - definitely not an overheat. The second one, while at the high end, I believe is still in normal range (there's variety of what's consider 'normal' from what I've read). It definitely heated up significantly, but one thing the preliminary report did not have was the train speed at each detector. If the train had slowed significantly before the first detector and the speed back up to track speed before the second, then the tenperature rise could be expected. Also, a comparison of other bearing temperatures could help. If they all rose significantly between the two detectors. that one bearing may appear normal, but if if the others didn't rise, or if this one rose significantly more, then maybe that should have been a sign of an issue.
Euclid Brake performance played no part in this disaster. It also seems likely that the detectors performed fine. All three reported the overheat condition.
EuclidBut my overall point was the settings having a threshold that was too high to prevent the disaster. That suggests either changing the settings to lower the threshold or increase the frequency of detectors.
I would opine that the temperature trigger level of the detectors, etc, is set based on experience. It's not like these are new to the railroads. That the system can detect trends is an indication of where that technology has gotten.
The danger of setting the thresholds lower is a likely increase in false alarms which will require a stop for inspection. With a 13,000 foot train on a busy mainline, this would be a problem. Most folks could cover that distance in under an hour, on a good surface. That's one way, so we're talking up to a two hour delay, even if nothing is found.
Adding acoustic sensors to existing detectors may be one of the better solutions. Given the sparks/fire seen in that vicinity, the Salem detector may have sensed something amiss, which probably would have led to an earlier stop. The sites already exist, including the necessary power and communications. This would simply be adding another sensor to the suite.
This route appears to be rather busy. It now has 2 main tracks at the accident scene. The site appears that at one time a third track was between the present 2 main tracks. If the 2 MTs are at approximately HBD mile posts locations 79, 69, and 49 that means that 2 complete on track monitors at each location. Why did NS not have HBDs at approximately MP 59 ?
As well are there detectors at MPs ~ 89 and 39 and onward ? Just trying for information of NS's thoughts on spacing.
Find it interesting that CP had more derailments due to defects than CN which had a centralized monitoring system. Granted the total numbers are too small for statistical comparsion.
How fast does a typical 150 car frieghter go? Would reducing speeds, while that would increase times and costs, help reduce these derailments? There was just another 20 car derailment, and I understand that since Jan 1st, ther ehave been at least a dozen.
Is sabotage a possibility?
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