How fast does a typical 150 car frieghter go? Would reducing speeds, while that would increase times and costs, help reduce these derailments? There was just another 20 car derailment, and I understand that since Jan 1st, ther ehave been at least a dozen.
Is sabotage a possibility?
This route appears to be rather busy. It now has 2 main tracks at the accident scene. The site appears that at one time a third track was between the present 2 main tracks. If the 2 MTs are at approximately HBD mile posts locations 79, 69, and 49 that means that 2 complete on track monitors at each location. Why did NS not have HBDs at approximately MP 59 ?
As well are there detectors at MPs ~ 89 and 39 and onward ? Just trying for information of NS's thoughts on spacing.
Find it interesting that CP had more derailments due to defects than CN which had a centralized monitoring system. Granted the total numbers are too small for statistical comparsion.
EuclidBut my overall point was the settings having a threshold that was too high to prevent the disaster. That suggests either changing the settings to lower the threshold or increase the frequency of detectors.
I would opine that the temperature trigger level of the detectors, etc, is set based on experience. It's not like these are new to the railroads. That the system can detect trends is an indication of where that technology has gotten.
The danger of setting the thresholds lower is a likely increase in false alarms which will require a stop for inspection. With a 13,000 foot train on a busy mainline, this would be a problem. Most folks could cover that distance in under an hour, on a good surface. That's one way, so we're talking up to a two hour delay, even if nothing is found.
Adding acoustic sensors to existing detectors may be one of the better solutions. Given the sparks/fire seen in that vicinity, the Salem detector may have sensed something amiss, which probably would have led to an earlier stop. The sites already exist, including the necessary power and communications. This would simply be adding another sensor to the suite.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
CSX Robert Euclid Brake performance played no part in this disaster. It also seems likely that the detectors performed fine. All three reported the overheat condition. To be clear, the first detector did not report an overheat condition and the I don't believe the second did either. Wheel bearings do not operate at ambient temperature, the 38° over ambient is well within normal operating parameters - definitely not an overheat. The second one, while at the high end, I believe is still in normal range (there's variety of what's consider 'normal' from what I've read). It definitely heated up significantly, but one thing the preliminary report did not have was the train speed at each detector. If the train had slowed significantly before the first detector and the speed back up to track speed before the second, then the tenperature rise could be expected. Also, a comparison of other bearing temperatures could help. If they all rose significantly between the two detectors. that one bearing may appear normal, but if if the others didn't rise, or if this one rose significantly more, then maybe that should have been a sign of an issue.
Euclid Brake performance played no part in this disaster. It also seems likely that the detectors performed fine. All three reported the overheat condition.
To be clear, the first detector did not report an overheat condition and the I don't believe the second did either. Wheel bearings do not operate at ambient temperature, the 38° over ambient is well within normal operating parameters - definitely not an overheat. The second one, while at the high end, I believe is still in normal range (there's variety of what's consider 'normal' from what I've read). It definitely heated up significantly, but one thing the preliminary report did not have was the train speed at each detector. If the train had slowed significantly before the first detector and the speed back up to track speed before the second, then the tenperature rise could be expected. Also, a comparison of other bearing temperatures could help. If they all rose significantly between the two detectors. that one bearing may appear normal, but if if the others didn't rise, or if this one rose significantly more, then maybe that should have been a sign of an issue.
The first two didn't didn't trigger an alarm to the crew. They recorded the condition. I don't know, but would guess NS has some kind of "bearing desk" that monitors such things.
It's possible to fool hot box detectors. Our instructions are to avoid using air brakes close or while passing over them when possible. They either could have a false activation or mask one that's hot. Detectors also compare the temperature of the entire train. It would be nice to have information as to temps on the rest of the train. If there were something that may have appeared to account for an elevated temp between the first and second detector.
Jeff
EuclidBrake performance played no part in this disaster. It also seems likely that the detectors performed fine. All three reported the overheat condition.
tree68 Euclid In this wreck, the spacing between the Salem and East Palestine detectors was a little too long. If it was just 19 miles instead of 20, there would have been no derailment. All they needed was the distance it would have taken to stop the train. Which, at track speed for a train of that size, would have been a mile. I suspect that even if there had been another detector 10 miles out, they ran a high risk of a derailment, unless that intermediate detector tripped an alarm. Note the Canadian study/report, cited elsewhere, which put the failure distance at a little as ten miles.
Euclid In this wreck, the spacing between the Salem and East Palestine detectors was a little too long. If it was just 19 miles instead of 20, there would have been no derailment. All they needed was the distance it would have taken to stop the train.
Which, at track speed for a train of that size, would have been a mile. I suspect that even if there had been another detector 10 miles out, they ran a high risk of a derailment, unless that intermediate detector tripped an alarm.
Note the Canadian study/report, cited elsewhere, which put the failure distance at a little as ten miles.
So what I have mentioned about the 19 versus 20 miles is just an example. We know the last detector, 20 miles from Salem, did call for the train to stop, and the derailment happened to occur at that same moment. So the 20 mile interval was not quite short enough to prevent the derailment.
But there are still other pieces to the picture. With other bearing failures the failure interval from detector #2 might have only been 5 miles. But overall, the detector sampling resolution was not high enough to prevent this derailment. And raising that resolution will cost money. So there is the ultimate tradeoff.
EuclidIn this wreck, the spacing between the Salem and East Palestine detectors was a little too long. If it was just 19 miles instead of 20, there would have been no derailment. All they needed was the distance it would have taken to stop the train.
tree68 Fred M Cain You know the more I hear and read about this tragedy, the more I'm beginning to wonder if perhaps NS was even really negligent. Could it be, could it just be that it was simply a "freak accident"? In the colloquial - "stuff happens." History is rife with "undiagnosed flaws." One disintegrating roller, finally giving up the ghost after how many thousands of miles, would certainly wreak havoc with a bearing. Given a 36" wheel, that's 1760 revolutions per mile, at 39 MPH, that's about 1,100 RPM. Coulda, shoulda, woulda facing off against "did."
Fred M Cain You know the more I hear and read about this tragedy, the more I'm beginning to wonder if perhaps NS was even really negligent. Could it be, could it just be that it was simply a "freak accident"?
In the colloquial - "stuff happens."
History is rife with "undiagnosed flaws." One disintegrating roller, finally giving up the ghost after how many thousands of miles, would certainly wreak havoc with a bearing. Given a 36" wheel, that's 1760 revolutions per mile, at 39 MPH, that's about 1,100 RPM.
Coulda, shoulda, woulda facing off against "did."
The big game changer here are those lineside security cameras that clearly showed something was wrong with that covered hopper 20 miles before the derailment. To the general public that's totally unacceptable.
I was looking for more info on roller bearing failures and found this enlightening Canadian Transport Safety Board report on a 2013 CP derailment involving a burnt off journal: https://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2013/r13t0122/r13t0122.html
The report illustrates all of the roller bearing parts and explains how wear and tear, especially spalling on the raceways or rollers, can cause a bearing to fail. They weren't able to determine what went wrong with the failed bearing because it was too badly damaged, but when they examined the intact bearing on the other side of the axle they found that it was condemnable. They also make the following statement about 2/3's of the way thru the report: "It is recognized in the railway industry that wheelset roller bearings can fail catastrophically in as few as 10 to 15 miles on a train travelling at track speed". If that is the case, then it is very hard to justify 20 mile detector spacings - even more so on a rail line with a traffic density well in excess of 100 million gross tons.
Update: page 062 of NS' 2016 Pittsburgh Division track chart book shows the traffic density thru East Palestine, OH was 129.8 million gross tons: http://www.multimodalways.org/docs/railroads/companies/NS/NS%20Track%20Charts/NS%20Pgh%20Division%20Track%20Chart%202016.pdf
Fred M CainYou know the more I hear and read about this tragedy, the more I'm beginning to wonder if perhaps NS was even really negligent. Could it be, could it just be that it was simply a "freak accident"?
So far, that seems to be the case. If you read the NTSB preliminary report, there is nothing to indicate anything anybody did or did not do caused this.
SD60MAC9500 Bearings go bad unfortunately this bearing burnt off in place that just happened to be East Palestine.. As well I know people are giving NS the 10th degree on bearing/wheelset inspection. However the covered hopper that initiated the derailment came off of UP. Did UP bother to do a proper inspection? More than likely this bearing was already in a poor conditon on the UP.. All this will come up in the cars MD-11 history. 32N originates in Madison, IL off the TRRA and carries quite a bit of UP interchange traffic from the Texas/Gulf to the East Coast..
Bearings go bad unfortunately this bearing burnt off in place that just happened to be East Palestine.. As well I know people are giving NS the 10th degree on bearing/wheelset inspection. However the covered hopper that initiated the derailment came off of UP. Did UP bother to do a proper inspection? More than likely this bearing was already in a poor conditon on the UP.. All this will come up in the cars MD-11 history. 32N originates in Madison, IL off the TRRA and carries quite a bit of UP interchange traffic from the Texas/Gulf to the East Coast..
You know the more I hear and read about this tragedy, the more I'm beginning to wonder if perhaps NS was even really negligent. Could it be, could it just be that it was simply a "freak accident"?
I know that in today's world, people tend to strongly believe that "there is no such thing as an accident". No, we simply MUST find someone to blame.
Trial lawyers and liberal politicians clearly smell blood. They are sharpening their knives. Some of the lawyers will end up making a small fortune on the litigation of all this.
I don't think that much of Pete Buttigieg and normally tend to disagree sharply with him but when he says that 1,000 derailments a year is far too many, that's kinda hard to disagree with.
What exactly is the issue here? Could it be that there is something wrong or basically flawed with the technology of modern American freight car equipment? Are some cars too heavy for the technology used in the roller bearing journals? Are further advances in metalurgy necessary to help address things?
I have no answers but it's something to think about.
In the "Let's get Euclid chasing his tail" category:
I have long thought that there should be a device that restricts travel and/or compliance in hydraulic cushion underframes when the car is moving above a certain speed. This could be done even more easily if you have a 'smart car' installation that controls braking based on car weight, monitors individual journals and wheel condition, etc. Benefits if you can get power off an ECP 220V line...
Sic em!
7j43k I don't think I agree that train length affects the intensity of the "snap" in the caboose. It's all in the acceleration of the car that's going to be pulling the caboose. Or deceleration, for that matter. The faster the acceleration, the faster the velocity when the slack is taken up. The faster the preceding car is going when that happens, the greater the "snap" in the caboose. IF a locomotive can deliver acceleration to a train at a constant input, the resulting snap at the end of the train will always be the same, no matter the train length. What likely happens with a long train is that the engineer needs to run out the slack to get it moving. For a short train, he doesn't. As the train length grows, the more necessary it is. Ed
I don't think I agree that train length affects the intensity of the "snap" in the caboose. It's all in the acceleration of the car that's going to be pulling the caboose. Or deceleration, for that matter.
The faster the acceleration, the faster the velocity when the slack is taken up. The faster the preceding car is going when that happens, the greater the "snap" in the caboose.
IF a locomotive can deliver acceleration to a train at a constant input, the resulting snap at the end of the train will always be the same, no matter the train length.
What likely happens with a long train is that the engineer needs to run out the slack to get it moving. For a short train, he doesn't. As the train length grows, the more necessary it is.
Ed
Only under certain circumstances does one need slack in the train to start it. That was mostly a steam engine practice. Diesels put out their highest traction effort at slow speeds. They normally can start most trains stretched out.
The adjustment of slack is what causes the snap. And can break knuckles and pull out drawbar. The snap is when one part of the train is moving faster than the other and then the parts try to equalize at one speed. Either causing a run in or out.
The longer the train, the more chance for slack to be moving in different directions at the same time. DP helps, but doesn't entirely eliminate slack. Especially with long travel car cushioning drawbar.
It's usually the big ugly manifests with lots of those drawbars that have the problems. When talking about limiting train length, those are the ones that need to be limited, DP or not.
Train Handling is not One Size Fits All in any physical actions - braking or accelerating.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
I recall witnessing a particularly violent coupling at Albany of the new locomotives onto the westbound Lake Shore Limited one evening years ago.
BAM!
"Beginner's Night," the car knocker said outloud, to no one in particular.
PennsyBoomer Regardless, I think one upshot of this event will be that shipments such as vinyl chloride do not belong in high tonnage 150 car trains anymore.
From Overmod:
"I have seen a number of discussions (but have no citations) that restricting all PIH and hazmat to specific key trains only (and this potentially goes with re-imposing key train speed limits) is an invitation to activism or outright terrorism in the current climate"
From Tree68:
What are the options?
You don't want to put all the hazmat in one train
Oil and ethanol travel in trains approx. 105 cars, and thus you already have concentrated consists of hazmat, even if somewhat more benign than some other obnoxious commodities. And a case might be made that it would be more practicable to protect concentrated shipments rather than random blocks of four or six or twenty cars, if sabotage is the premise. We'll have to see how the aftermath of this event plays and what political pressure evolves as to how restrictive a response may be necessary and in what form. But any change whatsoever is going to cost, whether it occasions more detectors, more inspections or different handling.
SD70DudeAnd some conductors don't understand that it's ok to tell the engineer to stop before the drawbars actually hit.
That gets to be an art, in a way. Knowing how a given engineer likes to come in and judging when you should tell them to stop so the momentum is enough to make the pin drop, but not so much as to move the car you're coupling to.
When we're doing some of our runarounds, we are working with occupied cars, oftimes with passengers watching what we're doing from the vestibule.
Had one engineer proud as punch at how perfectly he'd hit the coupler. Had to have him back away and do it again - just a tad harder...
Then there was the engineer who liked to use every bit of that 4 MPH when making a hitch...
When switching some engineers forget that the cars also have brakes, not just the engine. And some conductors don't understand that it's ok to tell the engineer to stop before the drawbars actually hit.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
A little too much in cab "slack action", eh?
BaltACD tree68 7j43k I am beginning to think that there should be one conductor in a caboose, The cost of the added man and car notwithstanding, this goes back to one of the reasons cabeese disappeared. And it would actually be worse now. Slack. Slack going out can take a caboose from zero to something in an instant. Slack running in will do the opposite. Even if the train is on the move, the sudden changes in speed can be dangerous. If you have a 200 car train (upwards of 13,000 feet) and there's just six inches of slack between each car, that's a lot of slop. These days, I think you'd have to put in a NASCAR-style seat/harness for the poor soul stuck in said caboose. Back in the day of cabooses - Conductors had Engineers they liked working with, they also had Engineers that the DETESTED working with.
tree68 7j43k I am beginning to think that there should be one conductor in a caboose, The cost of the added man and car notwithstanding, this goes back to one of the reasons cabeese disappeared. And it would actually be worse now. Slack. Slack going out can take a caboose from zero to something in an instant. Slack running in will do the opposite. Even if the train is on the move, the sudden changes in speed can be dangerous. If you have a 200 car train (upwards of 13,000 feet) and there's just six inches of slack between each car, that's a lot of slop. These days, I think you'd have to put in a NASCAR-style seat/harness for the poor soul stuck in said caboose.
7j43k I am beginning to think that there should be one conductor in a caboose,
The cost of the added man and car notwithstanding, this goes back to one of the reasons cabeese disappeared. And it would actually be worse now.
Slack.
Slack going out can take a caboose from zero to something in an instant.
Slack running in will do the opposite.
Even if the train is on the move, the sudden changes in speed can be dangerous.
If you have a 200 car train (upwards of 13,000 feet) and there's just six inches of slack between each car, that's a lot of slop.
These days, I think you'd have to put in a NASCAR-style seat/harness for the poor soul stuck in said caboose.
Back in the day of cabooses - Conductors had Engineers they liked working with, they also had Engineers that the DETESTED working with.
Still true today. The same from the engineer's perspective but for different reasons.
7j43kI am beginning to think that there should be one conductor in a caboose,
7j43kI asked because I thought I recalled that roller bearings were more subject to "quick failure" than plain bearings.
See the reference p.50, where one severely spalled roller allowed the loaded bearing to go up by about the same temperature over ambient as in the East Palestine wreck, in even less distance.
7j43kI asked because I thought I recalled that roller bearings were more subject to "quick failure" than plain bearings. The cause of the wreck was a bearing failure. A QUICK bearing failure. That is, a very short time for anyone to notice (I'm leaving out the possibility that the failure could have been predicted if someone had disassembled the bearing and examined it). The problem wasn't so much that the bearing failed, but that it failed before anyone noticed. I do suspect that running a caboose with a kupla guys with working noses solved a bunch of potential derailments. I am beginning to think that there should be one conductor in a caboose, an engineer in the locomotive, and a head brakeman to take care of things needing taking care of. The conductor will have to take over for the old rear brakeman. Ed
The cause of the wreck was a bearing failure. A QUICK bearing failure. That is, a very short time for anyone to notice (I'm leaving out the possibility that the failure could have been predicted if someone had disassembled the bearing and examined it).
The problem wasn't so much that the bearing failed, but that it failed before anyone noticed.
I do suspect that running a caboose with a kupla guys with working noses solved a bunch of potential derailments.
I am beginning to think that there should be one conductor in a caboose, an engineer in the locomotive, and a head brakeman to take care of things needing taking care of. The conductor will have to take over for the old rear brakeman.
Even better bring back all the manned Interlocking and Train Order towers that were every 10 to 20 miles communicating with the Train Dispatcher and each other over open copper wire telephone circuits so the trains could get a visual and smell test every tower they passed, communicating to the occupant of the caboose by hand signals. [/sarcasm]
I asked because I thought I recalled that roller bearings were more subject to "quick failure" than plain bearings.
7j43k Did plain bearings fail catastrophically? Ed
Did plain bearings fail catastrophically?
From what I've read, one of the functions of the caboose crew, besides watching the train ahead, was being alert for the smell of a hotbox. I understand it was quite distinctive. That odor might indicate a problem even if it could not be seen from the caboose.
Friction bearings rely on a thin layer of oil between the axle and the bearing surface. Dry that out and it's dry metal on dry metal, and that's never good. Speed notwithstanding, I don't know how long it would take for one to completely fail.
I've been getting a video lately in my FB feed that includes a fellow sitting in a chair trackside, armed with an oil can with which he squirts a shot into each journal box while a fellow next to him then pulls them shut. Unseen was the fellow who was opening them.
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