I read in a history about John Rockefeller that he was involved in financing the Milwaukee Road's extension. IIRC, it said the line was to be built to Everett, Wa.
duplicate
[quote user="TRR"]John D. Rockefeller rarely got involved in William's various investments. However, he did make a significant exception for the Pacific Coast Extension, and invested $7 million in it, upon the advice of his personal financial advisor. See, Confidential Letter, re: Analysis of Milwaukee Road, H.E. Cooper to John D. Rockefeller, November 6, 1908. Note: this is how "real" history is done.
Except that the John D. Rockefeller in question is John D. Rockefeller JUNIOR (see end of letter), a nephew of William Rockefeller. So as far as I can see, JDR Senior had no investment in this railroad.
TRR CMStPnP Erik_Mag I suggest you read Stan Johnson's The Milwaukee Road's Western Extension, specifically page 23. I assisted Stan Johnson with that book, and wrote the Forward. Meticulously researched and well written, it is well worth the read. Never discount the usefulness of a viewpoint and a history infomed by eduction and experience. Best regards, Michael Sol
CMStPnP Erik_Mag I suggest you read Stan Johnson's The Milwaukee Road's Western Extension, specifically page 23.
Erik_Mag
I suggest you read Stan Johnson's The Milwaukee Road's Western Extension, specifically page 23.
I assisted Stan Johnson with that book, and wrote the Forward. Meticulously researched and well written, it is well worth the read. Never discount the usefulness of a viewpoint and a history infomed by eduction and experience.
Best regards, Michael Sol
Whose history? We have all the meeting minutes of the railroad in the Milwaukee Public Library collection. Why on earth would I travel to read up on a conspiracy theory with no evidence in the public record. What your alleging is completely illegal and the individuals involved could have been prosecuted for it because at a minimum it should have been recorded in the public record (no citation by you), Further it would have been available to bankruptcy trustees of the railroad since the PCE and related expenses were cited as reasons for bankruptcy......yet evidence on the decision making leading to it was suppressed (never mentioned by any bankruptcy trustee or presented as evidence to get more favorable reorg terms).
The biggest part of the story which makes me think it is all untrue is Anaconda Copper rarely contracted with Milwaukee Road for haulage, preferring NP and GN and even more so, most of Anaconda's ore haulage was on it's own lines in Mont as it was fairly self-contained. So if the conspiracy theory was true there was nowhere the Milwaukee benefitted from the alleged (but never proven) collusion between companies. Also, the timber and timber lands had zero to do with Anaconda Copper.
I read another spin on the Rockefeller story where he used his money to stave off a Milwaukee Bankruptcy. If true prior to the strengthening of the Fed, pretty normal for extremely wealthy folks to pool their money together to form a kind of stimulus to prevent a run on the banks and stave off a recession. If you look in history prior to the 1900's, it happened a few times. So I do not necessarily even see that move as a move directed at the railroad per se but to keep the economy from a deeper recession.
So until I see something in the public Corporation records or other than one persons point of view......will file this as bunk.
Upon a closer re-reading I see you are right. My apologies.
Upon a still closer re-reading you would find that, indeed, the memo was addressed solely to JDR Jr, as was the following note.
Cooper references in the latter that, in the interim between the two, JDR Jr. had told him he was forwarding the memo to his father.
The concern, therefore, is to research whether there is any record of that communication between Jr. and Sr., or subsequent action on Sr.'s part to purchase stock (whether or not inspired by the memo or any further inquiry or research into the opportunity). While Mr. Sol is probably not as avid a Rockefeller scholar as he is a PCE one, this information might already be known in secondary materials or railroad correspondence, and it might be interesting to see if there is evidence in William's contemporary correspondence too.
"Milwaukee went after "foreign freight" through the Ports of Seattle and Tacoma, and got most of that too."
Can you please provide context?
If the MR did become a formidable competitor with its PCE, how did it lose its edge, later becoming an also-ran?
TRR Gramp If the MR did become a formidable competitor with its PCE, how did it lose its edge, later becoming an also-ran? The loading of the question AND providing the answer, offers no room for error in the analysis does it? You can reference the Professional Study that changed Trustee Stanley Hillman's mind from "we think we might keep some lines running" to "It turns out that the Milwaukee Road is a relatively wealthy company," to reading in Leon Levy's interesting book, "The Mind of Wall Street" how Milwaukee Road stock became the most valuable such railroad stock in America, and made Levy, among others, a fabulously wealthy man. The Professional Study that so shocked Trustee Hillman that he essentially stopped speaking to the officers whom he felt had misled him, got an ulcer, and then resigned, can be found in the "Milwaukee Road Strategic Planning Studies, Booz-Allen-Hamilton Consulting Study, May 2, 1979." Best regards, Michael Sol
Gramp If the MR did become a formidable competitor with its PCE, how did it lose its edge, later becoming an also-ran?
The loading of the question AND providing the answer, offers no room for error in the analysis does it?
You can reference the Professional Study that changed Trustee Stanley Hillman's mind from "we think we might keep some lines running" to "It turns out that the Milwaukee Road is a relatively wealthy company," to reading in Leon Levy's interesting book, "The Mind of Wall Street" how Milwaukee Road stock became the most valuable such railroad stock in America, and made Levy, among others, a fabulously wealthy man.
The Professional Study that so shocked Trustee Hillman that he essentially stopped speaking to the officers whom he felt had misled him, got an ulcer, and then resigned, can be found in the "Milwaukee Road Strategic Planning Studies, Booz-Allen-Hamilton Consulting Study, May 2, 1979."
no, youth wants to know. The Olympian Hi was cut back well before its competitors. It got gateways with the BN merger which to me implies it was at a disadvantage prior to, not just afterward. Did regulatory mumbo jumbo through the decades weaken its ability to flourish vis a vis the others? Hardening of the arteries?
Hundreds of railroads have gone by the wayside ...
For those of us who are not following this closely and/or don't have much basis in Milwaukee Road history, what is so special about this story?
I understand that the Milwaukee Road had the ill-fated western expansion. But what is it about the MILW that spurs so much emotion and even active discord?
Still in training.
Lithonia Operator Hundreds of railroads have gone by the wayside ... For those of us who are not following this closely and/or don't have much basis in Milwaukee Road history, what is so special about this story? I understand that the Milwaukee Road had the ill-fated western expansion. But what is it about the MILW that spurs so much emotion and even active discord?
I guess there must be two camps even now:
a) Never shoulda done it and should have known better, and
b) Great idea, but got killed off by inevitable, but then unforeseeable, historical developments in the railroad industry.
Lithonia Operator I guess there must be two camps even now: a) Never shoulda done it and should have known better, and b) Great idea, but got killed off by inevitable, but then unforeseeable, historical developments in the railroad industry.
Probbably many factors LO. The subjective thought that MILW always had the most direct and fastest route, the memories of the Olympian Hiawatha traveling through the majestic northern Rockies, people who passionately worked for the MILW, railfans who don't understand railroad economics 101, and believe every single rail line should exist just because. I'll throw in this. People generally speaking do enjoy conspiracy theory, and drama as well.
The operational reality is that we had an overbuilt rail network. Quite a few lines were built for short term gain, with losses being passed onto investors. Look at all the booms and preceding bust we've had. Right now it's EV's. 20 years ago it was the .com boom and bust. The rails were no different back then. It should be no surprise we went from almost 270,000 miles of rail. To todays roughly 140,000 miles.
It appears during this time there was a weird dislike of the BN back then. Which I don't quite understand. If it wasn't for the 11 Western Gateways, MILW PCE would have been abandoned sooner than later in my opinion. MILW gained traffic at the expense of BN gateways. Not its own. traffic did grow on the Lines West. Yet it wasn't enough to cover a massive deficit the MILW carried for most of its existence. Nor did it put a large dent in BN's higher margin traffic.
The other question is that even if the PCE was making a good profit in its latter years, were the bonds required to build it still sapping the overall financial condition of the company? I don't know, that's why I'm asking.
Michael Sol:Great to have you back. Missed you and the spirited conversations during the last 10 years.
It has been boring.
Ed
I just don't understand the writer's passion to stomp on the fond memories of the fans of the Milwaukee Road Pacific Extension. There is no other reason for the way he approached the subject.
TRRSince I have no idea where you "get your information," I will try and keep this brief and adressed to your key, salient, point. Your contention is false. The Anaconda Company, the Milwaukee Road, and the Montana Power Company shared the same ownership. Start there. The controlling owners of the Anaconda Company controlled the Milwaukee Road for 20 years prior to their acquisition of the ACM (Anaconda Copper Mining Co). In the book, "Frenzied Finance, The Crime of the Amlgmated" (1907) by Thomas Lawson, Lawson noted, in detail, the animosity that H.H. Rogers, in particular, had for Financier J.P. Morgan, who was the key financier of... James J. Hill, and the GN and NP. Lawson examined Rogers' actions in 1901, with the collapse of the Northern Securities Company, meant at that time to bring a truce in railroad competition and building, by constructing a general holding company to include the UP, GN, NP, and MILW. One of the handicaps was that all of Northern Pacific's assets, including the vast Land Grants, were tied up by its 100 Year Bonds, that Morgan had been forced to issue in order to get the "otherwise worthless railroad" out of its 1893 Bankruptcy (it's second one). James J. Hill had, however, gotten effective control of the NP at that time. Hill was well known for exploiting any power he had to impose high freight rates. That was one reason he never took a salary from the Great Northern: at the sacrifice of his own customers, he made sure the GN always earned a healthy profit. One of the legacy "sayings" of farmers in Minnesota was "After the grasshoppers, we had Jim Hill." It became clear to William Rockefeller and H.H. Rogers that the Northern Securities Company was not going to offer any protection on rates out of Montana for what was to become one of the world's largest copper producers, as well a timber owners. They directed the Milwaukee Road to commence surveys to serve Butte in 1902. And the first two surveys only went as far as Butte. But, as Rogers told Thomas Lawson, "It won't be long before we won't have to deal with Morgan and Hill, not long at all." The Milwaukee surveys resurrected old surveys to Seattle (the CM&StP had purchased harbor/dock frontage there in 1887. "St. Paul Buys Terminal Frontage in Seattle," The_Railway News, May 28, 1887 The entire point was to avoid Hill's onerous use of captive freight rates to handsomely line his own pockets. H.H. Rogers himself organized the Milwaukee's "Pacific Extension Committee" and served as its Chair until his death in 1909. A key point, however, was to generate for the Milwaukee Road a superior route structure not only from the standpoint of economical operation, but also to exploit the Milwaukee's acknolwedged expertise in homesteading and settlement. The Company added to that the purchase of nearly 500,000 acres of the best forest lands in the United States by purchases in Northern Idaho and on the Olympic Peninsula. After that, Milwaukee went after "foreign freight" through the Ports of Seattle and Tacoma, and got most of that too. The advent of the Milwaukee "out West" was devastating to the Northern Pacific, although somewhat less so for the Great Northern, since the GN didn't have that much business on its western end, most of its business, and profit, came as an ore hauler out of the Messabe Range in Minnesota. By 1916, the Milwaukee had cut substantially into NP's traffic, and reduced GN's share of that traffic to a distant ... third. Indeed, in Louis Renz's seminal book on the Northern Pacific, he notes at one chapter heading, beginning in 1914, as the beginning of the "long decline." GN, in the meantime, killed more people than any railroad in American history when a passenger train got "stuck in the snow." The White Cascade: The Great Northern Railway Disaster and America's Deadliest Avalanche," Gary Krist. It first crossed Stevens Pass (using switchbacks), then a tunnel that suffered 10 degree curves and asphixiation, followed by, in 1929, an 8 mile tunnel that required gas masks for the crews to get through it. And it still had a plethora of 10 degree curves on both sides! And, for specific reference, the records of the ACM, demonstrating the heavy tonnage delivered daily to the Milwaukee Road can be found in the "Anaconda Copper Mining Company records, 1876-1974," on file at the Montana Historical Society, Research Center Archives, Helena, Montana, although I note that, for some reason, one year of those records, 1917, is on file at the University of Montana Library Archives, Missoula. As Wm Rockefeller and H.H. Rogers intended, the Milwaukee Road got most of the ACM and allied company traffic. The completion of the PCE began a traffic boom on the CM&StP, whereas on both GN and NP, traffic dried up. Milwaukee went from the smallest of its peer railroads in 1905, to the largest by 1925. Indeed, to emphasize the point, the ACM had a cash flow problem in 1917, and borrowed $10 million from ... the CM&STP. Source: Minutes, Board of Directors, February 21, 1917. Ryan was present but did not vote on the loan. Milwaukee Road Archives, Milwaukee Public Library. I hope this helps. Best regards, Michael Sol
I find it rather amazing all this tonnage and freight was carried without the knowledge of the Milwaukee Road employees in operations. So where are your links to the traffic studies and tonnage carried because most Milwaukee employees on YouTube stated the Milwaukee never carried much freight on the PCE.
I think the stat I heard from the 1950s was 2-3 through freights a day plus the passenger trains. Show me the written testimony from operations of this windfall traffic, maybe a few first person accounts from operations.
How did the Milwaukee survive on so few PCE Electric locomotives with all this tonnage and trains hauled over the PCE? Where were all the employees on the PCE to handle this freight. Last, why was the Milwaukees rail, roadbed and tunnels so substandard by it's own internal studies by 1960's-1970's. Beyond initial construction I do not see a lot of investment at line improvement. Certainly that would be the case with a line that had booming traffic.
TRRWhy would you find conversations between the identical owners of both companies in the "business records" out in Montana? Those conversations and those decisions took place at "26 Broadway, New York City." William Rockefeller does have limited records at the "Rockerfeller Archives, Tarrytown, NY." Best regards, Michael Sol
As stated you can Google the history of the Anaconda Mining Corp online and it contradicts a lot of what you state including the alleged tonnage that the Milwaukee handled from Anaconda Mining in Montana.
There sure is a lot of snarkiness in this thread...
Michael Sol: I know relatively little about the PCE. However, I am glad you have returned, as these fora need some energy, even if controversy is a byproduct.
TRR CMStPnP I think the stat I heard from the 1950s was 2-3 through freights a day plus the passenger trains. Show me the written testimony from operations of this windfall traffic, maybe a few first person accounts from operations. Well, relying on "actual data," we do know this:Lines East (of Miles City): Carloadings, indexed:Year Carloads Percentage1966 1,008,971 100.001977 651,866 64.6The same analysis, Lines West:Milwaukee Road Lines West Carloadings/IndexedYear Carloads Percentage1966 140,000 100.001967 141,000 100.711968 142,000 101.431969 148,000 105.711970 156,600 111.861971 173,700 124.071972 186,400 133.141973 198,100 141.501974 172,200 123.001975 156,700 111.931976 202,500 144.641977 199,900 142.79So, there you have Lines East collapsing over the ten year period, by 36%, and Lines West, during the same period, growing by 43%. THAT is why an exasprated retired President, VP Finance, Curtiss Crippen shot down Worthington Smith in 1975: "That line is the lifeblood of this Company." This does not illuminate the high value, long haul nature of that traffic, most of which was 1) high value, 2) long haul, on the longest haul transcontinental railroad in the nation, Portland/Louisville.
CMStPnP I think the stat I heard from the 1950s was 2-3 through freights a day plus the passenger trains. Show me the written testimony from operations of this windfall traffic, maybe a few first person accounts from operations.
Well, relying on "actual data," we do know this:Lines East (of Miles City): Carloadings, indexed:Year Carloads Percentage1966 1,008,971 100.001977 651,866 64.6The same analysis, Lines West:Milwaukee Road Lines West Carloadings/IndexedYear Carloads Percentage1966 140,000 100.001967 141,000 100.711968 142,000 101.431969 148,000 105.711970 156,600 111.861971 173,700 124.071972 186,400 133.141973 198,100 141.501974 172,200 123.001975 156,700 111.931976 202,500 144.641977 199,900 142.79So, there you have Lines East collapsing over the ten year period, by 36%, and Lines West, during the same period, growing by 43%. THAT is why an exasprated retired President, VP Finance, Curtiss Crippen shot down Worthington Smith in 1975: "That line is the lifeblood of this Company."
This does not illuminate the high value, long haul nature of that traffic, most of which was 1) high value, 2) long haul, on the longest haul transcontinental railroad in the nation, Portland/Louisville.
The carload numbers for Lines West show large variability in the 70s. How typical was 1977 for Lines East. Even so Lines East was still carrying more than 3 times the carloads of Lines West in 1977. Ton-miles per mile of mainline might be a more informative comparison if such a stat exists.
TRRPerhaps I can help you out!
Oh I doubt it, you have already convinced me your not serious about defending any of your comments here and are just putting forth another fantasy for readers to indulge in. Have fun.
TRRWell, relying on "actual data," we do know this: Lines East (of Miles City): Carloadings, indexed: Year Carloads Percentage 1966 1,008,971 100.00 1977 651,866 64.6 The same analysis, Lines West: Milwaukee Road Lines West Carloadings/Indexed Year Carloads Percentage 1966 140,000 100.00 1967 141,000 100.71 1968 142,000 101.43 1969 148,000 105.71 1970 156,600 111.86 1971 173,700 124.07 1972 186,400 133.14 1973 198,100 141.50 1974 172,200 123.00 1975 156,700 111.93 1976 202,500 144.64 1977 199,900 142.79 So, there you have Lines East collapsing over the ten year period, by 36%, confirming the experience of the Northeastern and all Midwestern railroads, and Lines West, during the same period, growing by 43%. THAT is why an exasprated retired President, VP Finance, Curtiss Crippen shot down Worthington Smith in 1975: "That line is the lifeblood of this Company." This does not illuminate the high value, long haul nature of that traffic, most of which was 1) high value, 2) long haul, on the longest haul transcontinental railroad in the nation, Portland/Louisville.
Key points here.....
Was the PCE paid for by this point or was the debt for it still carried on the books? If the debt for the PCE was largely still on the Milwaukee's books those profitability figures per mile need to be adjusted downwards quite a bit.
GN's practice was not to build until the lines could pay for themselves via traffic. NP was built per Congressional Mandate, so can't speak for NP. So how much of BN's per mile profitability was margin based on debt carried?
World's longest and most useless branch line
TRRLines West, gross revenue, 2,296 miles of line, $192,554,074. Earnings per mile of line: $91,257.
"gross revenue", so how much was the Milwaukee losing per year in operating the PCE and servicing the construction debt?
TRR CMStPnP I think the stat I heard from the 1950s was 2-3 through freights a day plus the passenger trains. Show me the written testimony from operations of this windfall traffic, maybe a few first person accounts from operations. Well, relying on "actual data," we do know this:Lines East (of Miles City): Carloadings, indexed:Year Carloads Percentage1966 1,008,971 100.001977 651,866 64.6The same analysis, Lines West:Milwaukee Road Lines West Carloadings/IndexedYear Carloads Percentage1966 140,000 100.001967 141,000 100.711968 142,000 101.431969 148,000 105.711970 156,600 111.861971 173,700 124.071972 186,400 133.141973 198,100 141.501974 172,200 123.001975 156,700 111.931976 202,500 144.641977 199,900 142.79So, there you have Lines East collapsing over the ten year period, by 36%, confirming the experience of the Northeastern and all Midwestern railroads, and Lines West, during the same period, growing by 43%. THAT is why an exasprated retired President, VP Finance, Curtiss Crippen shot down Worthington Smith in 1975: "That line is the lifeblood of this Company." This does not illuminate the high value, long haul nature of that traffic, most of which was 1) high value, 2) long haul, on the longest haul transcontinental railroad in the nation, Portland/Louisville.
Well, relying on "actual data," we do know this:Lines East (of Miles City): Carloadings, indexed:Year Carloads Percentage1966 1,008,971 100.001977 651,866 64.6The same analysis, Lines West:Milwaukee Road Lines West Carloadings/IndexedYear Carloads Percentage1966 140,000 100.001967 141,000 100.711968 142,000 101.431969 148,000 105.711970 156,600 111.861971 173,700 124.071972 186,400 133.141973 198,100 141.501974 172,200 123.001975 156,700 111.931976 202,500 144.641977 199,900 142.79So, there you have Lines East collapsing over the ten year period, by 36%, confirming the experience of the Northeastern and all Midwestern railroads, and Lines West, during the same period, growing by 43%. THAT is why an exasprated retired President, VP Finance, Curtiss Crippen shot down Worthington Smith in 1975: "That line is the lifeblood of this Company."
That data just highlights the conundrum of the Milwaukee Road. They finally score a victory over their Hill Lines nemisis only to have the resulting onslaught of traffic use up what little remaining service life the PCE line had left. The traffic boom at the end was the PCE's undoing. There simply wasn't enough money to rebuild the line as the company's finances imploded.
In reality the Milwaukee Road should have petitioned for inclusion into the BN. That was the only option that may have resulted in parts of the PCE being saved. Just like the Rock Island, the Milwaukee Road was one railroad too many to survive on its own. Building the PCE was always a risky venture because it meant throwing down the gaunlet against both the Hill and Harriman interests. That said, the Milwaukee Road was doomed anyway, so building a transcon line of its own was probably its best chance at remaining independant. And the government certainly didn't do the Milwaukee Road or the people of the Northwest any favors by allowing the Hill interests to retain ownership and control over both the GN and NP. If the Hill interests would have been forced to dump the NP, as Harriman was the SP, then things could have turned out much differently for the Milwaukee Road. But, as a university history professor once told me, "what-if's" are non-history.
One last observation about the value/viability of Lines East vs. Lines West. I believe that the CP-KCS merger shows that the most valuable portion of the Milwaukee Road was always its triangle of lines between Chicago, St. Paul, and Kansas City. GTW, C&NW, and C&NW got into a bidding war for these lines and now they will form the crux of an East-West/North-South transcontinental system.
ns145 TRR CMStPnP I think the stat I heard from the 1950s was 2-3 through freights a day plus the passenger trains. Show me the written testimony from operations of this windfall traffic, maybe a few first person accounts from operations. Well, relying on "actual data," we do know this:Lines East (of Miles City): Carloadings, indexed:Year Carloads Percentage1966 1,008,971 100.001977 651,866 64.6The same analysis, Lines West:Milwaukee Road Lines West Carloadings/IndexedYear Carloads Percentage1966 140,000 100.001967 141,000 100.711968 142,000 101.431969 148,000 105.711970 156,600 111.861971 173,700 124.071972 186,400 133.141973 198,100 141.501974 172,200 123.001975 156,700 111.931976 202,500 144.641977 199,900 142.79So, there you have Lines East collapsing over the ten year period, by 36%, confirming the experience of the Northeastern and all Midwestern railroads, and Lines West, during the same period, growing by 43%. THAT is why an exasprated retired President, VP Finance, Curtiss Crippen shot down Worthington Smith in 1975: "That line is the lifeblood of this Company." This does not illuminate the high value, long haul nature of that traffic, most of which was 1) high value, 2) long haul, on the longest haul transcontinental railroad in the nation, Portland/Louisville. That data just highlights the conundrum of the Milwaukee Road. They finally score a victory over their Hill Lines nemisis only to have the resulting onslaught of traffic use up what little remaining service life the PCE line had left. The traffic boom at the end was the PCE's undoing. There simply wasn't enough money to rebuild the line as the company's finances imploded. In reality the Milwaukee Road should have petitioned for inclusion into the BN. That was the only option that may have resulted in parts of the PCE being saved. Just like the Rock Island, the Milwaukee Road was one railroad too many to survive on its own. Building the PCE was always a risky venture because it meant throwing down the gaunlet against both the Hill and Harriman interests. That said, the Milwaukee Road was doomed anyway, so building a transcon line of its own was probably its best chance at remaining independant. And the government certainly didn't do the Milwaukee Road or the people of the Northwest any favors by allowing the Hill interests to retain ownership and control over both the GN and NP. If the Hill interests would have been forced to dump the NP, as Harriman was the SP, then things could have turned out much differently for the Milwaukee Road. But, as a university history professor once told me, "what-if's" are non-history. One last observation about the value/viability of Lines East vs. Lines West. I believe that the CP-KCS merger shows that the most valuable portion of the Milwaukee Road was always its triangle of lines between Chicago, St. Paul, and Kansas City. GTW, C&NW, and C&NW got into a bidding war for these lines and now they will form the crux of an East-West/North-South transcontinental system.
MILW did petition the BN in 1973. However going further back in time before the PCE was a thought. MILW interchanged it's freight with the Hill Lines at the Twin Cities. I'm sure James Hill would have had no problem acquiring the MILW at the time. However the financial's must have not have been healthy. Hence the joint ownership of the Q. A much better connection as far as financial health and future traffic projections.
Once MILW lost that interchange they felt the need to go west. In my opinion a bad decision. As this goes to my comment further back about too much capacity which drives up cost..
Michael Sol's numbers while useful numbers don't show a victory as there's no comparison to the Northern Lines, or UP pre-1970, or BN, and UP post-1970. Just an example in 1972 alone BN originated 319,000 carloads of grain compared to Lines West total carloads for the year.
I'm hoping to find more annual reports from BN so here's one to start with. BN's annual report from 1969. Compare the numbers and make your decision.
http://www.nprha.org/Publications/Annual_Reports/1960s/1969_NPR_ANNUAL_REPORT_M.pdf
Not the Milwaukee, but an interesting read on the battle for the Northern Pacific.https://muse.jhu.edu/book/27303
Yet, for all this talk of how well the MILW was doing and how it was trouncing everyone, it failed.
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