jeffhergertI know of 3 incidents within the last year or two that the FRA seemed to go out of their way to try to relieve the company of as much responsibility as possible. (One involved a weakness in PTC that allowed a train to go through an open switch and derail. It seems everyone with an interest in PTC wants to sweep that one under the rug.) However, I still read our recrew report where a FRA mechanical inspector shows up and starts bad-ordering cars. So maybe the FRA isn't totally the railroads' lap dog they sometimes seem to be. Jeff Woof
So maybe the FRA isn't totally the railroads' lap dog they sometimes seem to be.
Jeff
Woof
The low level inspectors that the FRA sends and State inspectors of the same cast are EXPECTED to create havoc in shopping this and that - the same applies to the FRA track inspection vehicles. That is the window dressing to the 'public' to show that the FRA is doing their job. There is a much different FRA personality at the level of the Board Room,.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Lithonia Operator Zug, are you suggesting that because Batory has a background in railroad management that he might tend to lean more toward facilitating the railroads' wishes to save money (and thus maximize profits) than he would toward protecting the employees and the public? That may well be the case. I know very little about the FRA or Mr. Batory. I brought up the FRA only because it seemed to me they that their overseeing training would beat the railroads' policing themselves. Because this accident, and comments Joe has made, make it seem like the roads are grossly deficient in this regard, particularly Amtrak. However, if Batory is in the pocket of the railroads and the AAR, then clearly I'm barking up the wrong tree. The NTSB can only make recommendations, right? Am I correct that they have no enforcement powers? (I am foggy on where the STB fits into all of this.)
Zug, are you suggesting that because Batory has a background in railroad management that he might tend to lean more toward facilitating the railroads' wishes to save money (and thus maximize profits) than he would toward protecting the employees and the public?
That may well be the case. I know very little about the FRA or Mr. Batory. I brought up the FRA only because it seemed to me they that their overseeing training would beat the railroads' policing themselves. Because this accident, and comments Joe has made, make it seem like the roads are grossly deficient in this regard, particularly Amtrak.
However, if Batory is in the pocket of the railroads and the AAR, then clearly I'm barking up the wrong tree.
The NTSB can only make recommendations, right? Am I correct that they have no enforcement powers?
(I am foggy on where the STB fits into all of this.)
The FRA interprets and administers the law. Many things are delegated to the railroads. For example, my Locomotive Engineer's license. It says it's an FRA Certificate, but it's issued by the railroad pursuant to the Code of Federal Regulations.
I know of 3 incidents within the last year or two that the FRA seemed to go out of their way to try to relieve the company of as much responsibility as possible. (One involved a weakness in PTC that allowed a train to go through an open switch and derail. It seems everyone with an interest in PTC wants to sweep that one under the rug.) However, I still read our recrew report where a FRA mechanical inspector shows up and starts bad-ordering cars.
NorthWest I read the transcript, having met the engineer in question before the accident, differently than people seem to do here. In the context of an NTSB report I understand why, but these comments are self-deprecating jokes, rather than admission of incompetence. Most people in the Pacific Northwest are humble spirits, who care but try to keep things light. He was a respected engineer that was trusted with the opening of the new route. He certainly made a mistake, and owns that in the interview. From the NTSB report, it seems like he knew where he was until he was distracted by a new style of message appearing on the console of a locomotive type he'd never operated, a little over a mile away from the curve on a straight section of track that is largely identical for more than a mile along I-5.
I read the transcript, having met the engineer in question before the accident, differently than people seem to do here. In the context of an NTSB report I understand why, but these comments are self-deprecating jokes, rather than admission of incompetence. Most people in the Pacific Northwest are humble spirits, who care but try to keep things light. He was a respected engineer that was trusted with the opening of the new route.
He certainly made a mistake, and owns that in the interview. From the NTSB report, it seems like he knew where he was until he was distracted by a new style of message appearing on the console of a locomotive type he'd never operated, a little over a mile away from the curve on a straight section of track that is largely identical for more than a mile along I-5.
I do not interpret the engineer’s comments about, on previous occasions, being sent into areas where he was lost, as being self-deprecating humor. While it is humor, there is nothing self-deprecating about it. He is not mocking himself for not knowing that territory. He is mocking Amtrak for sending him there. And as such, he is dismissing that he had the responsibility to stop when he realized he was lost in those previous situations. But he did not stop. Instead he just soldiered on until the track led him back into familiar territory. He was doing exactly the same thing as he approached the deadly curve with the 30 mph speed restriction.
Northwest, deep thanks for your comment.
NorthWest This is a bit of a difficult topic for me to write about, but after two years of watching people here type in circles, I think it's time I break my silence. I do this with the understanding that some here are going to twist my words to suit their agendas or otherwise split hairs in the meaningless semantics debates that these threads tend to spiral into, but I hope that everyone reading this keeps in mind that this incident has ruined dozens of lives and deeply affected a lot of people. Mistakes were made, and efforts should be made to make sure these errors are never made again. I have a problem with people spinning the incident around for their own entertainment value, though. I read the transcript, having met the engineer in question before the accident, differently than people seem to do here. In the context of an NTSB report I understand why, but these comments are self-deprecating jokes, rather than admission of incompetence. Most people in the Pacific Northwest are humble spirits, who care but try to keep things light. He was a respected engineer that was trusted with the opening of the new route. He certainly made a mistake, and owns that in the interview. From the NTSB report, it seems like he knew where he was until he was distracted by a new style of message appearing on the console of a locomotive type he'd never operated, a little over a mile away from the curve on a straight section of track that is largely identical for more than a mile along I-5. Travelling a mile at 80MPH takes 45 seconds. That's not a lot of time. Figure a few seconds to realize you're not where you thought, then a few more to look for a couple landmarks in the low light of near sunrise, and then... you're at the curve. Amtrak set him up to fail. Ideally, there were things he could have done to avoid this, but the mistakes are understandable. Human. It's very hard to hire people who never make mistakes, despite the attitudes of some here. I think this lawsuit is in no way about money. It's about establishing a legal precedent in the case surrounding the accident, pending further suits in what's likely to be a long, drawn-out legal battle. The railfan community in the Pacific Northwest is very tight. Steve almost certainly knew Jim and Zach, as well as many of the injured on the train. That, I think, should be punishment enough for someone who got into the industry for the love of trains. We exchanged waves along the Seattle Sub on December 17, 2018, as a large group of us gathered in the greater Steilacoom area to witness what was to be the last runs on the old route. The train derailed at 7:33 the next morning. I got the first phone call at 7:54. A very tight community. That was not an easy day.
This is a bit of a difficult topic for me to write about, but after two years of watching people here type in circles, I think it's time I break my silence. I do this with the understanding that some here are going to twist my words to suit their agendas or otherwise split hairs in the meaningless semantics debates that these threads tend to spiral into, but I hope that everyone reading this keeps in mind that this incident has ruined dozens of lives and deeply affected a lot of people. Mistakes were made, and efforts should be made to make sure these errors are never made again. I have a problem with people spinning the incident around for their own entertainment value, though.
Travelling a mile at 80MPH takes 45 seconds. That's not a lot of time. Figure a few seconds to realize you're not where you thought, then a few more to look for a couple landmarks in the low light of near sunrise, and then... you're at the curve.
Amtrak set him up to fail. Ideally, there were things he could have done to avoid this, but the mistakes are understandable. Human. It's very hard to hire people who never make mistakes, despite the attitudes of some here.
I think this lawsuit is in no way about money. It's about establishing a legal precedent in the case surrounding the accident, pending further suits in what's likely to be a long, drawn-out legal battle.
The railfan community in the Pacific Northwest is very tight. Steve almost certainly knew Jim and Zach, as well as many of the injured on the train. That, I think, should be punishment enough for someone who got into the industry for the love of trains.
We exchanged waves along the Seattle Sub on December 17, 2018, as a large group of us gathered in the greater Steilacoom area to witness what was to be the last runs on the old route.
The train derailed at 7:33 the next morning. I got the first phone call at 7:54.
A very tight community. That was not an easy day.
Well said.
Thank you very much for writing this. It is never easy to talk about the death of friends.
While I am located somewhat northeast of the Pacific Northwest, I too use humour as a way to cope with difficult situations. As do my friends and co-workers. I don't see anything malicious in his answers.
I agree with your views on punishment. Deserved or not, Steve Brown will carry this guilt for the rest of his life.
One small bit to add about braking, on some locomotives when you place the air brakes into emergency the dynamics stop working. Most freight units have been modified to keep (hold) DB when in emergency. I don't know how Amtrak's units are set up, but this could have been the source of the information Steve Brown received about full service blended braking providing the same braking effort as an emergency application.
Zug is spot-on about Batory's background.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
For those windering about FRA governance, just remember the FRA is headed by a guy that spent his life working in progressively higher levels of railroad management. Form your own conclusions.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
NorthWest, thanks for your perspective.
Jeff, thanks for the info.
BaltACD Lithonia Operator If the FRA specified, and enforced, training standards, then railroads could not pressure employees into making unwise conditions. It would be like HOS. The FRA does not have the staffing to do as you suggest - with government being what it is as the present time, the FRA will be lucky to retain the staffing they currently have. HOS deals with the clock. Qualifications don't.
Lithonia Operator If the FRA specified, and enforced, training standards, then railroads could not pressure employees into making unwise conditions. It would be like HOS.
The FRA does not have the staffing to do as you suggest - with government being what it is as the present time, the FRA will be lucky to retain the staffing they currently have.
HOS deals with the clock. Qualifications don't.
Here's what the law says about qualifications.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/49/240.231
In the past we have detoured at times over both the Iowa Interstate and Canadian National (exIllinois Central) trackage. We used our own pilots who were qualified over the trackage used. At least once, maybe a couple times, those pilots were qualified after a ride over the line in a high-rail vehicle.
We've used the CN more often. I know a couple of times after you made two trips over the CN, individual engineers and conductors were said to be qualified over the line and didn't need a pilot. In defence of that, the CN trackage used is mostly within view of our own line and the only real grades are to go up and over our own tracks.
BaltACD Lithonia Operator Man, it's painful reading the interview with that poor engineer. I feel bad for the guy. But it does seem like after a certain amount of time looking for MP 18 and not finding it, he should have concluded he might have missed it and begun braking hard. It also seems like the markers were woefully inadequate. What's the point of having a 30 mph sign if it's not positioned such that a train can get from 79 down to 30 before the curve? When you are lost - you are lost. The internal fog the engineer was operating in would not permit him to recognize any of the landmarks on the route. Historically, Permanent Slow Signs are place at the start of the restriction. On CSX Temporary Speed Restrictions do have a 'advance warning sign' that is placed 2 miles in advance of the restriction, WHEN SIGNS ARE USED. Not all Temporary Speed Restrictions will have signs displayed. The Train Message that the slow order is issued on will indicate if signs are dispalyed or not. Qualifications, Qualifications, Qualifications - Engineers need to be 'intimately' qualified on the territory they operate over. The Engineer in this instance was not. Being a Engineer you can't 'fake it until you make it', the downside is much too steep as this incident demonstrates.
Lithonia Operator Man, it's painful reading the interview with that poor engineer. I feel bad for the guy. But it does seem like after a certain amount of time looking for MP 18 and not finding it, he should have concluded he might have missed it and begun braking hard. It also seems like the markers were woefully inadequate. What's the point of having a 30 mph sign if it's not positioned such that a train can get from 79 down to 30 before the curve?
When you are lost - you are lost. The internal fog the engineer was operating in would not permit him to recognize any of the landmarks on the route.
Historically, Permanent Slow Signs are place at the start of the restriction. On CSX Temporary Speed Restrictions do have a 'advance warning sign' that is placed 2 miles in advance of the restriction, WHEN SIGNS ARE USED. Not all Temporary Speed Restrictions will have signs displayed. The Train Message that the slow order is issued on will indicate if signs are dispalyed or not.
Qualifications, Qualifications, Qualifications - Engineers need to be 'intimately' qualified on the territory they operate over. The Engineer in this instance was not. Being a Engineer you can't 'fake it until you make it', the downside is much too steep as this incident demonstrates.
I believe the BNSF was using an advance board and a second board at or closer to the restriction. This was also a permanent speed restriction. Although on my territory there are a couple places that don't have permanent boards, it's locations where speeds are under 30 mph to begin with.
The distance between the speed boards and beginning of the restriction vary by railroad. UP standard is 2500 feet. SP was 2 miles and I don't know if all former SP territories have been updated. The speed board design was also different between the two companies.
As to "full service" application. That happens when the equalization is reached between the brake pipe, auxilary reservoir and brake cylinder pressures. Any more reduction at a service rate does not increase braking effort . That point at which equalization happens depends on the intial pressure of the brake pipe. For freight service with the usual 90 psi pressure, that point is about 64 psi. Passenger service is (I believe) usually 110 psi brake pipe pressure. So yes, there is still air in the brake pipe and an emergency application is still possible with a full service application in effect.
Blended braking is a system used on some passenger engines that 'blends' the automatic brake application with a dynamic brake application. I don't know that much about it, but I think when you increase the automatic (air) application, it also increases the dynamic brake effort. I've heard it improves train handling a lot.
Reading the linked Trainwire article and another Trainwire article linked within it, I think that part of the reason of the lawsuit may be for injuries received under the Federal Employers Liability Act. Railroad workers are not covered by Workman's Compensation laws. To recover damages for injuries received, the employee must sue the railroad. To do this, one must show where the railroad was negligent. Damages received would be at what percentage Amtrak was found (if at all) to be negligent. For example, if a jury was to say fault for the incident that caused the injury was 50-50, he might be awarded half of what was asked for.
Questions in trial or at least depositions
1. Who was qualified on the new part of the route at the time of the accident ? That should include any BNSF engineers.
2. Depose all on that list asking them how many times over the route and how long before the accident ?
4. Have any Sound transit engineers gone over the whole route or just to Lakewood ? If so then they disposed also.
5, All === awareness of curve and any other significant problems ?
Lithonia OperatorIf the FRA specified, and enforced, training standards, then railroads could not pressure employees into making unwise conditions. It would be like HOS.
I'm wondering how much of this all goes back to politicians, rail officials, etc., having promoted a specific start date (complete with ribbon cuttings, media coverage, etc.) they were then resistant to delaying startup.
Wait til the track is done. Wait for PTC. Wait for engineers to be properly trained. So often, because of time pressures, the tail begins to wag the dog.
Wasn't Boeing hot to get their plane on the market? And now I'm reading that the new Acela may not be ready when it's "due." That's backwards: let it be due when it's ready. It's only ready when it's ready.
Euclid, I was referring to the engineer's comments in his interview with the NTSB panel. Overmod linked it on Pg. 1 of this thread. Perhaps I'll listen to that audio also, and maybe comment on it later.
I agree with Balt that a guy has to be willing to say he's not qualified. But I also feel strongly that Amtrak had no business calling him for that job.
And as I posted, I feel there should be strict FRA rules about what constitutes "qualified." I don't feel anyone with that engineer's level of familiarization should be anywhere near being deemed qualified: on any train, much less a passenger train. Plus, they sent him out with an engine he was unfamiliar with! The whole thing was a disgraceful fiasco.
If the FRA specified, and enforced, training standards, then railroads could not pressure employees into making unwise conditions. It would be like HOS.
blue streak 1Before there was service planned on this segment who was qualified on the route ? Understood no freight on the line ? Did BNSF ever detour on the route if the the other route was blocked ? Or Amtrak ? Sounds like the blind leading the blind ?
My understanding
Washington DOT had the track upgraded to 79 MPH where possible for their passenger operation. Except for 'training trips' no other trains had been operating at 79 MPH on the line (and I am not so sure that the training trips were done at 79 MPH). Washington DOT also resttriced the times when training trips could be made as the contractors were still working on the line during the same period of time.
Before there was service planned on this segment who was qualified on the route ? Understood no freight on the line ? Did BNSF ever detour on the route if the the other route was blocked ? Or Amtrak ? Sounds like the blind leading the blind ?
Just remember Lithonia - a lot of the comments here and elsewhere are being made by people that never held a locomotive engineer's license. Keep that in mind.
I feel at the time of the interview he was not putting it off on anyone else.
Once he sues, that goes out the window. But I still think the case, particularly if it goes to trail, will be a good thing for the industry.
(I did not see how much he's suing for. My impression is litigators start out at about 1000% of what they hope to eventually settle on.)
It seems like the FRA needs to issue hard and fast rules for familiarization on new territory, keyed to mileage, with no exceptions.
For example: 50 miles, 5 R/Ts; 100 miles, 8 R/Ts; 200 miles, 12 R/Ts. Etc.
Perhaps the number of runs could be reduced slightly for routes with no running over 39 mph. Conversely, add 30% more runs for passenger train qualifying.
It seems that waaaay too much is being left in the hands of the cost-conscious railroads.
Lithonia Operator I agree that when you're lost, you're lost. But there's also the question of do you know you're lost. And this engineer was at least begininng to suspect he was lost. As soon as any doubt or confusion crept in, it was time to hit the brakes. I will give him credit for one thing: at the time, he did not try to put any of it off on anyone else.
I agree that when you're lost, you're lost. But there's also the question of do you know you're lost. And this engineer was at least begininng to suspect he was lost. As soon as any doubt or confusion crept in, it was time to hit the brakes.
I will give him credit for one thing: at the time, he did not try to put any of it off on anyone else.
If prior to taking the run, he did not have every inch of that route memorized with all the pertinent landmarks, including curves, grades, switches, crossings, bridges, etc.; he was lost; and he should not have taken the run. And you don't have the option of not knowing what you do not know. I disagree with your conclusion that he did not put it off on anyone else. I think he did exactly the opposite. He made himself into a victim of Amtrak because they gave him a run for which he was not qualified.
Euclid Lithonia Operator Man, it's painful reading the interview with that poor engineer. I feel bad for the guy. But it does seem like after a certain amount of time looking for MP 18 and not finding it, he should have concluded he might have missed it and begun braking hard. It also seems like the markers were woefully inadequate. What's the point of having a 30 mph sign if it's not positioned such that a train can get from 79 down to 30 before the curve? The signs and markers are only secondary references. The critical control is that you have to know the territory. That is not just a happy generalization. You must know every inch of the territory. This engineer never met that requirement. He was also aware of his lack of knowing the territory. He is not the victim here. The real victims are those who suffered or died due to his ciminal negligence. He should have refused to take make that run.
Man, it's painful reading the interview with that poor engineer. I feel bad for the guy. But it does seem like after a certain amount of time looking for MP 18 and not finding it, he should have concluded he might have missed it and begun braking hard.
It also seems like the markers were woefully inadequate. What's the point of having a 30 mph sign if it's not positioned such that a train can get from 79 down to 30 before the curve?
The signs and markers are only secondary references. The critical control is that you have to know the territory. That is not just a happy generalization. You must know every inch of the territory. This engineer never met that requirement. He was also aware of his lack of knowing the territory. He is not the victim here. The real victims are those who suffered or died due to his ciminal negligence. He should have refused to take make that run.
I agree. At the same time he admits to not being very familiar with the route, he is also saying he felt confident and that the route was staighforward.
What I have to wonder is how much pressure there was from management. Can an engineer say, "I need at least five more round-trips accompanied by a route-seasoned engineer or an RFE before I'll do this run alone?" My guess is he didn't feel he had much choice regarding taking the run.
My understanding is that "full-service" is the maximum braking short of emergency. Does this mean some air is retained in the train pipe, just not much? Or does it mean it's a full release of air, but at a slower rate?
And what does "blended" or "blending" mean?
The engineer said he used "full-service with blending." He said he had been told that full-service with blending would provide the same braking as emergency, so he chose the former. A layman like me has to wonder: if they are truly THE SAME, then why do we have both? I have to think they are not identical.
My understanding is that with emergency, once a train stops, the entire pipe and reservoirs will have to be fully re-charged. Correct? Was this engineer's decision perhaps colored by the fact that he did not think he needed to fully stop, and that he did not want to have to fully recharge the train line?
What IS the difference between emergency and full-service-with-blending?
Perhaps it is "traditional" for a speed limit sign to be right at the curve or restriction. And maybe that's good, because it creates a visual/mental connection for learning/reinforcement purposes; "This curve is a 30."
However, if that practice is going to endure, it seems to me that you must also have (and let's assume for a moment a level grade, even though this was not): 1) a fixed marker, with a flashing yellow light, two miles beforehand, saying "30 mph Curve 2 Miles Ahead", and then 2) a fixed marker, with a flashing red light one mile before the curve, saying "30 mph Curve 1 Mile Ahead."
Maybe those two markers could also transmit an audible signal to inside the cab, with the second warning more urgent-sounding than the first.
This is a fast train, a passenger train, and it crosses a busy Interstate via the route's most dangerous curves. The situation calls for serious measures. Amtrak apparently figured it could save some bucks with half-ass training, and no special signs/signals.
They should ask their lawyers how much they've "saved" on this travesty so far ...
What a disgrace.
Now times have changed, and he realizes that, a) in fact he was not adequately trained or, b) this is a cynical money-grab.
It seems to me he has an pretty good, but not great, case. The training and familiarization was a pathetic sad joke. 2-3 trips, during which he was not always in the lead unit, much less the engineer's seat. Training sessions with two many people in the cab for adequate visibility. Etc., etc., etc. I hope he wins the case, actually, so as to get Amtrak's attention where it hurts. But OTOH, he should have marked off as unqualified, not taken the run. Now, in the interview he said he felt confident; that will hurt his civil case. Win or lose though, my feeling is the case must go forward, to expose how inadequate the training was.
Dose anyone know: was this engineer fired?
Lithonia OperatorMan, it's painful reading the interview with that poor engineer. I feel bad for the guy. But it does seem like after a certain amount of time looking for MP 18 and not finding it, he should have concluded he might have missed it and begun braking hard. It also seems like the markers were woefully inadequate. What's the point of having a 30 mph sign if it's not positioned such that a train can get from 79 down to 30 before the curve?
jeffhergert PTC does not use the signal system to enforce permanent or temporary speed restrictions. The overlay of the signal system only pertains to track occupancy. Whether that occupancy is due to a train/equipment in the signal block, an open hand throw switch or a broken rail. Using the existing signal system PTC (current version) 'knows' there is something within the signal block, but not exactly where it is. PTC track data base 'knows' where the speed restrictions are. The PTC display shows "Next Target", what the allowable speed is and counts down the distance to it. The next target is the next condition and speed required that will be encountered that is less than the current maximun authorized speed. The next target condition can be due to a speed restriction (permanent or temporary), block signal indication, or limits of authority. (Speed for limit of authority is 0 mph.) The count down begins as early as 6 miles, or when reaching the first target speed condition and then the distance to the next slower target speed when less than 6 miles. I've had the count down distance because of circumstances be a few hundred feet. The system calculates stopping distance and the display provides a visual display of warning distance and stopping distance. It is constantly updated and changes as speed and/or throttle/braking force is changed. The system gives a warning when it thinks you will be overspeed for a particular target. It counts down how many seconds before it will make a penalty brake application. The count also recalculates. It's possible as you are slowing to stop and hold the count if it detects that the train is slowing enough for the system to wait on taking action. If while slowing it determines you will slow or stop without any automatic action, the warning will disappear. If, for example, you release brakes or start applying power, if it determines you will again be overspeed, the warning comes back. Had PTC been in effect and no other condition requiring less than maximum speed, the display would display a green track segment line meaning proceed at maximum speed. At 6 miles out, the Next Target would change from "none within 6 miles" to "speed 30 mph 6.0 miles" and start counting down to the point of restriction. Upon reaching one mile, the distance turns to footage remaining. Jeff
PTC does not use the signal system to enforce permanent or temporary speed restrictions. The overlay of the signal system only pertains to track occupancy. Whether that occupancy is due to a train/equipment in the signal block, an open hand throw switch or a broken rail. Using the existing signal system PTC (current version) 'knows' there is something within the signal block, but not exactly where it is.
PTC track data base 'knows' where the speed restrictions are. The PTC display shows "Next Target", what the allowable speed is and counts down the distance to it. The next target is the next condition and speed required that will be encountered that is less than the current maximun authorized speed. The next target condition can be due to a speed restriction (permanent or temporary), block signal indication, or limits of authority. (Speed for limit of authority is 0 mph.) The count down begins as early as 6 miles, or when reaching the first target speed condition and then the distance to the next slower target speed when less than 6 miles. I've had the count down distance because of circumstances be a few hundred feet.
The system calculates stopping distance and the display provides a visual display of warning distance and stopping distance. It is constantly updated and changes as speed and/or throttle/braking force is changed. The system gives a warning when it thinks you will be overspeed for a particular target. It counts down how many seconds before it will make a penalty brake application. The count also recalculates. It's possible as you are slowing to stop and hold the count if it detects that the train is slowing enough for the system to wait on taking action. If while slowing it determines you will slow or stop without any automatic action, the warning will disappear. If, for example, you release brakes or start applying power, if it determines you will again be overspeed, the warning comes back.
Had PTC been in effect and no other condition requiring less than maximum speed, the display would display a green track segment line meaning proceed at maximum speed. At 6 miles out, the Next Target would change from "none within 6 miles" to "speed 30 mph 6.0 miles" and start counting down to the point of restriction. Upon reaching one mile, the distance turns to footage remaining.
I've read a lot of negative things about PTC, but that sounds pretty damn good to me! Impressive.
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