jeffhergert No, as of a couple of weeks ago, the track warrant can be delivered by PTC and copied by the conductor off the PTC screen and is not verbally transmitted or read back to the dispatcher. Some parts (authority number, limits of authority, etc) of the warrant have to be verified with the dispatcher before it's considered in effect. I don't work TWC territory so haven't experienced this myself, but have worked with extra board conductors who have.
No, as of a couple of weeks ago, the track warrant can be delivered by PTC and copied by the conductor off the PTC screen and is not verbally transmitted or read back to the dispatcher. Some parts (authority number, limits of authority, etc) of the warrant have to be verified with the dispatcher before it's considered in effect. I don't work TWC territory so haven't experienced this myself, but have worked with extra board conductors who have.
Very interesting, thanks. This sounds like kind of a halfway step to full electronic transmission - they've eliminated the most error-prone part (the transmission and copying) while still keeping some verbal confirmation.
Does clearing a warrant still require the full song and dance? How about rolling up?
jeffhergert We have been receiving (at times) temporary speed restrictions via PTC. The dispatcher asks if we have a restriction number on our screen and then to read the restriction off the screen back to them.
We have been receiving (at times) temporary speed restrictions via PTC. The dispatcher asks if we have a restriction number on our screen and then to read the restriction off the screen back to them.
Also very interesting, thank you.
Just heard a presentation by the signal guys on what they have planned for the near future, and electronic transmissions of temporary speed restrictions and crossing warnings are near the top of the list. My understanding is that the intention is for fully vital transmission with no verbal communication required. Form B's are close behind, which offers up some new possibilities on the MOW side.
Track warrants are a little further down the list, but not too far away either.
It's also worth noting that the engineering department has had fully electronic granting and releasing of track and time for a decade already. I guess you don't need to prove the same level of safety for a hyrail truck that you do for a train, but in reality OF COURSE the computer transmits more accurately than a couple of humans talking over a radio...
Dan
You either have qualified personnel or you don't. Brown was NOT QUALIFIED to be operating on that particular segment of the overall run. No matter what he felt, or what the company said - he was NOT QUALIFIED.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Overmod Euclid But once you start down the road of adding more and more conspicuity to a visual warning device, where to you draw the line making the warning device noticeable enough to match the danger of reason for the warning? In this particular case, and I suspect in many if not most 'comparable' cases, there is very little way that making a warning device more 'conspicuous' will have a damaging effect on safety. You would either need lighting so bright as to cause serious loss of night accommodation or 'spots' many seconds later, or 'action' with lights or motion that might tend to induce one of the various kinds of seizure in the literature. Neither of these is likely for a practical wayside reminder. The very simplest form of warning would be to have two alternating flashing lights (NOT red so as not to be confused with crossing warnings! and a well-lighted speedboard. The problem here is that it's a wayside marker, and will come into view and be passed relatively quickly with the necessary offset from the track. If you install it close enough, and high enough, to be visible as an approach warning, you might as well go ahead and implement it as an approach warning. No one who is even indifferently trained will miss a signal set at approach, whereas they might well fail to see (or note, which here is really the same thing) an 'advisory' sign outside their working range or line of vision. Particularly, perhaps, if they mistake it for some kind of wayside feature or light. We made the joke, at one point, that we should adapt the end-of-the-world crossing warning for this purpose. Certainly a neon skull-and-bones flashing on, with accompanying alternating lights and accompanying siren or warning horn, could get the job done no matter how 'distracted' the engineer were, or how insistent some other task might be -- and it would be past with enough 'recovery time' that the shock and awe would dissipate before the time the engineer 'had' to do something based on the warning. What any neighbors in that region, including as I recall a country club, would think of the noise and reflected light, is an entirely different concern... I continue to see little that works better than a couple of well-positioned plated signals, in the absence of full and reliable PTC. Personally I can see little that any ad-hoc warning signs could do that this does not accomplish more directly and comprehensibly, requiring little if any additional rules or training to watch for or observe. It also invokes the safety layer of 'call and response' which advisory signs do not.
Euclid But once you start down the road of adding more and more conspicuity to a visual warning device, where to you draw the line making the warning device noticeable enough to match the danger of reason for the warning?
In this particular case, and I suspect in many if not most 'comparable' cases, there is very little way that making a warning device more 'conspicuous' will have a damaging effect on safety.
You would either need lighting so bright as to cause serious loss of night accommodation or 'spots' many seconds later, or 'action' with lights or motion that might tend to induce one of the various kinds of seizure in the literature. Neither of these is likely for a practical wayside reminder.
The very simplest form of warning would be to have two alternating flashing lights (NOT red so as not to be confused with crossing warnings! and a well-lighted speedboard. The problem here is that it's a wayside marker, and will come into view and be passed relatively quickly with the necessary offset from the track. If you install it close enough, and high enough, to be visible as an approach warning, you might as well go ahead and implement it as an approach warning. No one who is even indifferently trained will miss a signal set at approach, whereas they might well fail to see (or note, which here is really the same thing) an 'advisory' sign outside their working range or line of vision. Particularly, perhaps, if they mistake it for some kind of wayside feature or light.
We made the joke, at one point, that we should adapt the end-of-the-world crossing warning for this purpose. Certainly a neon skull-and-bones flashing on, with accompanying alternating lights and accompanying siren or warning horn, could get the job done no matter how 'distracted' the engineer were, or how insistent some other task might be -- and it would be past with enough 'recovery time' that the shock and awe would dissipate before the time the engineer 'had' to do something based on the warning.
What any neighbors in that region, including as I recall a country club, would think of the noise and reflected light, is an entirely different concern...
I continue to see little that works better than a couple of well-positioned plated signals, in the absence of full and reliable PTC. Personally I can see little that any ad-hoc warning signs could do that this does not accomplish more directly and comprehensibly, requiring little if any additional rules or training to watch for or observe. It also invokes the safety layer of 'call and response' which advisory signs do not.
You can say that again.
EuclidBut once you start down the road of adding more and more conspicuity to a visual warning device, where to you draw the line making the warning device noticeable enough to match the danger of reason for the warning?
I continue to see little that works better than a couple of well-positioned plated signals, in the absence of full and reliable PTC. Personally I can see little that any ad-hoc warning signs could do that this does not accomplish more directly and comprehensibly, requiring little if any additional rules or training to watch for or observe.
Overmod Euclid What does the light at the start of the curve have to do with the curve, or controlling the speed at which a train enters the curve? As far as I know it acts as the 'home signal' at the curve, and it was left in position and operated as it was by the WiDOT people. It rather obviously has little effectively to do with either controlling approach to the curve or the speed of oncoming trains in a practical manner -- at least, it does not to me. As I understand it, the proposal being discussed is to replace a fixed approach sign followed by another fixed sign at the curve; and replace those signs with a fixed approach signal followed by another fixed signal at the curve, and that curve signal having a permanent aspect that limits the curve speed to 30 mph. The only real 'proposal' being discussed is to implement and then maintain PTC, with the minimum standards that have been discussed. The two methods have the same meaning, so why are the signals better than the signs? If you can't figure out why searchlight aspects are better than small reflectorized signs, I can't really help you understand very much further.
Euclid What does the light at the start of the curve have to do with the curve, or controlling the speed at which a train enters the curve?
As far as I know it acts as the 'home signal' at the curve, and it was left in position and operated as it was by the WiDOT people. It rather obviously has little effectively to do with either controlling approach to the curve or the speed of oncoming trains in a practical manner -- at least, it does not to me.
As I understand it, the proposal being discussed is to replace a fixed approach sign followed by another fixed sign at the curve; and replace those signs with a fixed approach signal followed by another fixed signal at the curve, and that curve signal having a permanent aspect that limits the curve speed to 30 mph.
The only real 'proposal' being discussed is to implement and then maintain PTC, with the minimum standards that have been discussed.
The two methods have the same meaning, so why are the signals better than the signs?
If you can't figure out why searchlight aspects are better than small reflectorized signs, I can't really help you understand very much further.
I understand what PTC would do. It would simply not allow a train to enter the curve exceeding 30 mph. It would take control from the engineer to accomplish that goal if the engineer fails to comply with manual operation of the train. I understand that PTC will soon be completed for the line, and I assume it will protect the curve as Jeff explained on the previous page.
But when I refer to the "proposal being discussed," I am referring to the proposal for fixed signals introduced in the last post of the previous page, and the first post of this page.
The intention seems to be to increase compliance by enhancing the visual recognizability of the warning device in order to better get the attention of the train crew. This seems in line with the similar proposal here to add illumination to the fixed warning signs.
But once you start down the road of adding more and more conspicuity to a visual warning device, where to you draw the line making the warning device noticeable enough to match the danger of reason for the warning?
BaltACDUsing Block Signalling for any other purpose starts one down a very slippery slope.
Except that approach restricting/clear, switch open signals, slide protection signals, cab speed indications, phase break signals, etc. already exists.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
BaltACDThe purpose of Block Signalling since the time it was invented has been to signal the condition of the block(s) ahead as to whether they contain trains or not. Using Block Signalling for any other purpose starts one down a very slippery slope.
The problem of course being that since very early in the history of ABS per se, railroads have been delighted in using the pretty colored lights for other purposes ... for example, route signaling. And I believe the specific use of lights for distant and home signals considerably predates ABS as a practice.
To this we might add the use of color lights in CTC, which is 'Block Signaling' only in the sense that it indicates a route free of traffic. I'm waiting with some interest to see how track warrants and CTC authority are combined in practice, especially when only part of a route is physically CTC controlled.
In this particular case, reserving lights only for block occupancy would be cute, but relatively worthless: as I recall, there is only something like one block between the curve entry and functional end of track for the route.
I'm not saying there is no good way to distinguish home/distant lighting provision from "ABS" block signaling properly implemented -- only that if there HAS to be a distinction, it had better be done in hardware than in philosophical argument. There NEEDS to be approach-lit signaling and a home-lit restriction in advance of that curve, just as at any other fixed hazard, and little wayside speed markers will very, very likely not do it, dwarf- or floodlit or not.
The purpose of Block Signalling since the time it was invented has been to signal the condition of the block(s) ahead as to whether they contain trains or not.
Using Block Signalling for any other purpose starts one down a very slippery slope.
Some form of lighted Speed Signs would not be out of line, however, they should not be a part of the Block Signalling system.
EuclidWhat does the light at the start of the curve have to do with the curve, or controlling the speed at which a train enters the curve?
The only real 'proposal' being discussed is to implement and then maintain PTC, with the minimum standards that have been discussed. (I think there are somewhat redundant and overlapping protections in current PTC any of which would have either stopped the train or served to alert the engineer to control its speed in the absence of any external reference, competent or otherwise.) The discussion is more in the shoulda-woulda-coulda range: what should WiDOT have provided knowing they would not have PTC even at restricted capability in place to protect the wildly-irresponsible transition from 79mph to a hard curve. It is not in any way a substitute -- even if Washington taxpayers be made to pay for it -- for functional PTC, which you may recall the Federal Government mandates for this operation.
Overmod Euclid What would be the advange of a permanent approach signal and permanent restricting signal over the existing fixed sign warning 2 miles out, and at the start of the curve? For one thing, there's already a light at the start of the curve -- you may recall that it was knocked down during the accident. I think it is obvious that a lighted signal aspect is preferable to a small reflectorized sign, in so many respects as to require little discussion. The 'remaining' question is how far in advance of the actual hazard the actual 'restricting' signal should be. The existing aspect is more on the lines of a 'home' signal, which in many cases is located right at the hazard it governs, say a grade crossing with another railroad, or a working drawbridge. In this particular case, it may make sense to have the 'restriction' far enough in front of the curve to allow full-blended-plus-service braking from the point of visibility of restricting signal at the previous 'approach' speed, in a safe distance from actual curve entry -- it could be argued that this would be in 'half the distance'. That might involve two signals in addition to the existing one at physical curve entry.
Euclid What would be the advange of a permanent approach signal and permanent restricting signal over the existing fixed sign warning 2 miles out, and at the start of the curve?
For one thing, there's already a light at the start of the curve -- you may recall that it was knocked down during the accident.
I think it is obvious that a lighted signal aspect is preferable to a small reflectorized sign, in so many respects as to require little discussion.
The 'remaining' question is how far in advance of the actual hazard the actual 'restricting' signal should be. The existing aspect is more on the lines of a 'home' signal, which in many cases is located right at the hazard it governs, say a grade crossing with another railroad, or a working drawbridge. In this particular case, it may make sense to have the 'restriction' far enough in front of the curve to allow full-blended-plus-service braking from the point of visibility of restricting signal at the previous 'approach' speed, in a safe distance from actual curve entry -- it could be argued that this would be in 'half the distance'. That might involve two signals in addition to the existing one at physical curve entry.
What does the light at the start of the curve have to do with the curve, or controlling the speed at which a train enters the curve?
EuclidWhat would be the advange of a permanent approach signal and permanent restricting signal over the existing fixed sign warning 2 miles out, and at the start of the curve?
What would be the advange of a permanent approach signal and permanent restricting signal over the existing fixed sign warning 2 miles out, and at the start of the curve?
What I think he was intending was precisely what I think should have been in place from the beginning: a permanent APPROACH signal (about 2 miles out) leading to a permanent RESTRICTING signal a reasonable distance ahead of the curve. There was, and is, no sense in allowing 79mph unrestricted on that couple of miles of effectively-required braking distance, without effective automatic train control.
This could always be 'removed' once PTC had been installed and tested, to minimize elapsed time from 79mph to the actual curve restriction.
I leave it up to practical railroaders knowledgeable in GCOR on what the aspects, their plating, and their distances should be.
Lithonia Operator aegrotatio Would it not make sense to have a permanent restricting signal aspect at a stopping distance from the curve along with extra speed warning signs? It sure would to me.
aegrotatio Would it not make sense to have a permanent restricting signal aspect at a stopping distance from the curve along with extra speed warning signs?
Would it not make sense to have a permanent restricting signal aspect at a stopping distance from the curve along with extra speed warning signs?
It sure would to me.
A permanent Restricting Indication signal would, in signalled territory, have to have the immediatly prior signal indicating Approach (Trains exceeding Medium Speed immediately reduce to that speed and approach the next signal prepared to STOP). The Restricting signal itself would command Restricted Speed (20 MPH max looking for defects or trains ahead, prepared to STOP within 1/2 the range of vision).
Signal Displays for other than signal reasons have consequences - be careful what you ask for.
One thing non-railroaders overlook - rules as stated in the Rule Book are not stand alone statements. The statements made in the Rule Book are interlocked and dependent on all the other rules in the book.
Lithonia OperatorOh wait! You mean pass thru from the train! Forward. Duh.
Not as dumb as you think. Remember that NYC stopped being supplied with sleepers direct from Chicago recently, for the first time in well over a century, because of the lack of nose doors on suitable (third-rail-equipped) diesels. (The alternative discussed at the time being restoration to service of at least one set of FL9s, which have doors).
Were the train to have only one locomotive, pass-through would be possible, but you won't see that too often.
Lithonia OperatorMaybe I don't understand what you mean by face-to-face? You mean standing forward of engineer, looking aft?
Just means a personal meeting, as opposed to working over the radio. Which way they're actually facing is of little import.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Lithonia OperatorMy point being, how does a passenger train deal with having only one person up front?
On CSX when mandatory directives are to be copied and the Engineer is the only person on the locomotive. The Engineer must stop the train, normally at a station stop - distance permitting, for the Engineer to copy and repeat it. The Engineer can request for his Conductor to proceed through the locomotive (note - Amtrak diesels do not have a nose door, so if there is more than one locomotive, the conductor cannot) come to the operating cab to copy the directive.
In the Cayce incident, both Amtrak's Engineer and Conductor were killed as they were both on the lead locomotive account the necessity of copying and releasing mandatory directives in negotiating the Signal Suspension territory.
Oh wait! You mean pass thru from the train! Forward. Duh.
tree68 Lithonia Operator My point being, how does a passenger train deal with having only one person up front? Most of the time such directives will be copied by the engineer during a station stop. If the directive needs to be copied before the next station stop, the conductor can copy it and then provide a copy to the engineer face-to-face. If the loco will allow it, the conductor can pass through there. If not, they'll have to stop briefly. The rules prohibit the engineer from copying such directives whilst the loco is in motion.
Lithonia Operator My point being, how does a passenger train deal with having only one person up front?
Most of the time such directives will be copied by the engineer during a station stop.
If the directive needs to be copied before the next station stop, the conductor can copy it and then provide a copy to the engineer face-to-face. If the loco will allow it, the conductor can pass through there. If not, they'll have to stop briefly.
The rules prohibit the engineer from copying such directives whilst the loco is in motion.
Thanks, Larry.
But I don't get what you mean by "passing through if the loco allows." Don't all cabs allow the conductor to walk over to the other side? (Well, since the camelback days!)
Maybe I don't understand what you mean by face-to-face? You mean standing forward of engineer, looking aft?
I can't picture a scenario in which the engineer is not at least somewhat distracted.
Does anyone remember how long after the Cascade's bypass start date it was projected to be before PTC was ready?
Thanks, Jeff, Balt, tree and Dan. I've learned a lot from these recent posts.
Jeff, you indirectly touched on something I've been wondering about.
A lot of things involve writing, reading something off a screen, and read-backs to the DS. On a freight, my assumption has been that if the train is underway, then those things are all done by the conductor, so as not to distract the engineer. Am I correct on this?
Which begs the question of what happens on passenger trains. On a passenger train, won't the conductor (the chief conductor) frequently be at work elsewhere in the train, not in the engine? Or maybe never in the engine? Some of this stuff can be done from elsewhere, obviously; but is the conductor's handheld radio as powerful as the cab unit? I'm thinking not.
My point being, how does a passenger train deal with having only one person up front?
In the example you gave where it would be good (or possibly even the only really rule-abiding way) for the conductor to have a workable PTC screen, that won't help if the conductor ain't there!
It's kind of ironic that we seem to be at the point where freights have two sets of eyes up front, but passenger trains have only one. Isn't something wrong with this picture?
jeffhergert Euclid Getting back to enforcing the 30 mph speed limit for the fatal curve: Is there a way with PTC or just some other form of control, to prevent trains from entering the curve at a speed exceeding 30 mph? Such a system would have to allow for the emergency braking stopping distance for the fastest trains. I would call that the “deceleration zone.” That zone would extend for one mile preceding the start of the curve. Any train entering the deceleration zone exceeding 30 mph would suffer a penalty brake application that would stop the train. The deceleration zone would then provide the stopping distance for a train traveling 79 mph track speed. So a train approaching the curve would slow to 30 mph by the engineer’s control before reaching the deceleration zone, and then traverse the deceleration zone not exceeding 30 mph. At the end of that deceleration zone, the train would enter the curve. PTC braking is calculated on board the engine's PTC equipment. The 'zone' before a restriction is not set in stone. It fluctuates with the speed of the train. The slower the train goes the smaller the 'zone' becomes. If speed increases, then the 'zone' also increases. The PTC display includes a Warning Distance, which is a yellow line on the display. There is also a Stopping Distance, which is a red line on the display. Both have a distance to those lines ahead of the train. When the Warning distance line intersects with a restriction, the screen starts showing a warning banner and count down to an imminent penalty brake application. It also starts counting down. If the train starts slowing, the warning distance can change and the count down also can change, increasing instead of decreasing, or just holding at x seconds. The count down is to when the red line reaches the point where the brake application will happen. Speed restrictions are a bit different. The warning distance line may or may not have reached the point of restriction before the warning appears. I've had the warning pop up for a speed restriction way before the warning distance line reached it on a 70 mph (for a 40 mph restriction) because the PTC calculated the train needed to start slowing under the current throttle/brake conditions at the time. PTC is on the conservative side, and I slowed down like I normally do. The train wasn't out of control. When the system noted the train was slowing, the warning count slowed or halted and ultimately went away. Jeff
Euclid Getting back to enforcing the 30 mph speed limit for the fatal curve: Is there a way with PTC or just some other form of control, to prevent trains from entering the curve at a speed exceeding 30 mph? Such a system would have to allow for the emergency braking stopping distance for the fastest trains. I would call that the “deceleration zone.” That zone would extend for one mile preceding the start of the curve. Any train entering the deceleration zone exceeding 30 mph would suffer a penalty brake application that would stop the train. The deceleration zone would then provide the stopping distance for a train traveling 79 mph track speed. So a train approaching the curve would slow to 30 mph by the engineer’s control before reaching the deceleration zone, and then traverse the deceleration zone not exceeding 30 mph. At the end of that deceleration zone, the train would enter the curve.
Getting back to enforcing the 30 mph speed limit for the fatal curve: Is there a way with PTC or just some other form of control, to prevent trains from entering the curve at a speed exceeding 30 mph?
Such a system would have to allow for the emergency braking stopping distance for the fastest trains. I would call that the “deceleration zone.” That zone would extend for one mile preceding the start of the curve. Any train entering the deceleration zone exceeding 30 mph would suffer a penalty brake application that would stop the train. The deceleration zone would then provide the stopping distance for a train traveling 79 mph track speed.
So a train approaching the curve would slow to 30 mph by the engineer’s control before reaching the deceleration zone, and then traverse the deceleration zone not exceeding 30 mph. At the end of that deceleration zone, the train would enter the curve.
PTC braking is calculated on board the engine's PTC equipment. The 'zone' before a restriction is not set in stone. It fluctuates with the speed of the train. The slower the train goes the smaller the 'zone' becomes. If speed increases, then the 'zone' also increases.
The PTC display includes a Warning Distance, which is a yellow line on the display. There is also a Stopping Distance, which is a red line on the display. Both have a distance to those lines ahead of the train. When the Warning distance line intersects with a restriction, the screen starts showing a warning banner and count down to an imminent penalty brake application. It also starts counting down. If the train starts slowing, the warning distance can change and the count down also can change, increasing instead of decreasing, or just holding at x seconds. The count down is to when the red line reaches the point where the brake application will happen.
Speed restrictions are a bit different. The warning distance line may or may not have reached the point of restriction before the warning appears. I've had the warning pop up for a speed restriction way before the warning distance line reached it on a 70 mph (for a 40 mph restriction) because the PTC calculated the train needed to start slowing under the current throttle/brake conditions at the time. PTC is on the conservative side, and I slowed down like I normally do. The train wasn't out of control. When the system noted the train was slowing, the warning count slowed or halted and ultimately went away.
Jeff
Jeff,
Thanks for that explanation. That sounds like the system would respond as precisely as the situation calls for to prevent a speed restriction violation with the least automatic interference necessary by reducing that interference threshold as the train is slowed manually. In my example of a basic response, it would initiate full penalty stop braking if the train entered the deceleration zone while traveling over 30 mph. That would not be very efficient because it would be all or nothing and could have the train completely stopped say 3/4-mile short of the curve. But from your description, I can see that it only initiates penalty braking as necessary and no more.
The news coverage of the accident mentions PTC being planned for the new route, but not finished in time for the opening. That does not seem like a critical issue because PTC is not essential to safe operation. But it does seem kind of ironic, that in this case, the first very run featured a fatal derailment that PTC would have prevented.
jeffhergertSpeed restrictions are a bit different. The warning distance line may or may not have reached the point of restriction before the warning appears. I've had the warning pop up for a speed restriction way before the warning distance line reached it on a 70 mph (for a 40 mph restriction) because the PTC calculated the train needed to start slowing under the current throttle/brake conditions at the time. PTC is on the conservative side, and I slowed down like I normally do. The train wasn't out of control. When the system noted the train was slowing, the warning count slowed or halted and ultimately went away. Jeff
Complaint I heard from some the the Engineers that were operating CSX's PTC installation was that PTC was suggesting and in some cases enforcing braking much earlier than the Engineers would under normal circumstance. This was very early in the testing and I don't know if the braking algorithms have been adjusted since the complaints were registered.
dpeltier jeffhergert On Track Warrant Control territories, PTC is now being used to deliver and clear warrants. Jeff, to clarify this point - track warrants are automatically transmitted from the dispatching center to the on-board PTC computer, but I believe that at this time it is still required that the dispatcher transmit the warrant verbally to the train crew and that the train crew copy and repeat. The verbally copied version is still the official one that the crews are supposed to go by. Does that match your experience? There are, or soon will be, one or more pilot programs on a Class 1 railroad where the electronically transmitted version of each mandatory directive (i.e. track warrants and track bulletins) will be the official version and no verbal transmission will be required. This will have an enormous effect on how some territories operate. But I don't think it's standard practice on any railroads yet. Dan
jeffhergert On Track Warrant Control territories, PTC is now being used to deliver and clear warrants.
On Track Warrant Control territories, PTC is now being used to deliver and clear warrants.
Jeff, to clarify this point - track warrants are automatically transmitted from the dispatching center to the on-board PTC computer, but I believe that at this time it is still required that the dispatcher transmit the warrant verbally to the train crew and that the train crew copy and repeat. The verbally copied version is still the official one that the crews are supposed to go by. Does that match your experience?
There are, or soon will be, one or more pilot programs on a Class 1 railroad where the electronically transmitted version of each mandatory directive (i.e. track warrants and track bulletins) will be the official version and no verbal transmission will be required. This will have an enormous effect on how some territories operate. But I don't think it's standard practice on any railroads yet.
Going to the screens that show mandatory directives, I've been told the TWC screen may automatically pop up, require leaving the operation screen and going to the mandatory directive menu and respective screen. Some of us believe leaving the operation screen to go to a mandatory directive screen is the same as copying a mandatory directive while moving and requires the train to be stopped since the engineer can no longer view or act upon PTC changes. When told the train will be stopped before accessing a mandatory directive, the dispatcher will often verbally issue the directive. An easy fix would be to have the conductor be able to access the mandatory directive screens separate from the engineer's screen. Currently the buttons on the conductor's side screen do nothing.
tree68 Euclid Getting back to enforcing the 30 mph speed limit for the fatal curve: Is there a way with PTC or just some other form of control, to prevent trains from entering the curve at a speed exceeding 30 mph? Read back over the other posts. That's exactly what PTC would do when it detected that the engineer was not slowing his train appropriately. In fact, that's pretty much the whole idea of PTC.
Euclid Getting back to enforcing the 30 mph speed limit for the fatal curve: Is there a way with PTC or just some other form of control, to prevent trains from entering the curve at a speed exceeding 30 mph?
Read back over the other posts. That's exactly what PTC would do when it detected that the engineer was not slowing his train appropriately.
In fact, that's pretty much the whole idea of PTC.
Okay, so then I conclude that this accident at the curve would not have occurred had PTC been completed as planned and in operation (as I described) at the time of the first train.
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