EuclidGetting back to enforcing the 30 mph speed limit for the fatal curve: Is there a way with PTC or just some other form of control, to prevent trains from entering the curve at a speed exceeding 30 mph?
Read back over the other posts. That's exactly what PTC would do when it detected that the engineer was not slowing his train appropriately.
In fact, that's pretty much the whole idea of PTC.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Getting back to enforcing the 30 mph speed limit for the fatal curve: Is there a way with PTC or just some other form of control, to prevent trains from entering the curve at a speed exceeding 30 mph?
Such a system would have to allow for the emergency braking stopping distance for the fastest trains. I would call that the “deceleration zone.” That zone would extend for one mile preceding the start of the curve. Any train entering the deceleration zone exceeding 30 mph would suffer a penalty brake application that would stop the train. The deceleration zone would then provide the stopping distance for a train traveling 79 mph track speed.
So a train approaching the curve would slow to 30 mph by the engineer’s control before reaching the deceleration zone, and then traverse the deceleration zone not exceeding 30 mph. At the end of that deceleration zone, the train would enter the curve.
BaltACDTrack Warrant Control or TWC conveys track occupancy authority between the points specified in the authority.
NORAC operates similarly. Controlled track is under "DCS" or the "D Control System," the D being the "Form D." CSX calls their equivalent form the "EC1."
Orders can be given between any two specific railroad locations - either mileposts or block stations (sometimes just a sign), or a combination of the two (ie, between PODUNK and MP68).
We have a couple of areas that fall under NORAC Rule 98 - essentially yards. Form D's will be issued only between the borders of those areas. A train travelling beyond them, and back into DCS territory, will get an "additional line 2," the equivalent of another form.
While block stations are a thing, they are not limiting in and of themselves. A train may be given a Form D that passes several block stations.
As noted, a train can give up the track behind them using either block stations or mileposts. A following train will then get an additional line 2 (up to four) on their existing Form D.
Lithonia OperatorIs a track warrant pretty much just a modern term for "train order?" Now, I realize it can be transmitted by radio, whereas a train order could not. (And the idea of track warrants being incorporated into PTC is, of course, very different.) But is a track warrant basically a train order? Is there still, for freight trains, a timetable which gives specific (non-extra) trains rights over a territory for a specified time period; and that authority governs unless it is superceded by a track warrant? And when Amtrak runs on a line, are its train running on timetable authority? (I would think that would the case.) Or is everything now done by track warrants? I realize ETTs still exist; but do they show train authorites? Or are they more just a fact-sheet for the line, with mileages, features, standing special instructions, etc? And I have never understood this about CTC: in CTC territory, is all of the above done away with? In other words, is the dispatcher controlling authorities with the use of signals alone? Or is CTC just about signals and switches? Does a train in CTC territory still need either timetable authority (if that still exists) or a track warrant? I realize that (to use a TV news cliche') there's "a lot to unpack here." But any contributions to my knowledge bank will be much appreciated.
But is a track warrant basically a train order?
Is there still, for freight trains, a timetable which gives specific (non-extra) trains rights over a territory for a specified time period; and that authority governs unless it is superceded by a track warrant?
And when Amtrak runs on a line, are its train running on timetable authority? (I would think that would the case.)
Or is everything now done by track warrants?
I realize ETTs still exist; but do they show train authorites? Or are they more just a fact-sheet for the line, with mileages, features, standing special instructions, etc?
And I have never understood this about CTC: in CTC territory, is all of the above done away with? In other words, is the dispatcher controlling authorities with the use of signals alone? Or is CTC just about signals and switches? Does a train in CTC territory still need either timetable authority (if that still exists) or a track warrant?
I realize that (to use a TV news cliche') there's "a lot to unpack here." But any contributions to my knowledge bank will be much appreciated.
Track Warrant Control or TWC conveys track occupancy authority between the points specified in the authority. On CSX Direct Train Control or DTC was a presursor system to TWC, DTC had timetable defined block limits that were given to and released by trains as they operated on orders from the Train Dispatcher. in the CSX implementation of TWC vs. DTC the TWC authorities can be between any two points on the territory. In DTC each 'block' had to be given to the train in turn, and also released in turn and these communications created much more radio traffic than does TWC. Trains can release specific TWC territory behind their 'rear end' for use by following trains.
The CADS when properly used, prvents the issuance of overlapping authorities in either DTD or TWC operations.
In CTC Territory - Signal Indication conveys all movement authority.
The Timetable and Train Order means of operation is no longer used by any Class 1 railroad. As such there is no superiority by either direction or schedule.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
I've read that CTC is a traffic control system in which authority is granted by signal indication. There is no timetable authority or track warrant.
Is a track warrant pretty much just a modern term for "train order?" Now, I realize it can be transmitted by radio, whereas a train order could not. (And the idea of track warrants being incorporated into PTC is, of course, very different.)
jeffhergert On Track Warrant Control territories, PTC is now being used to deliver and clear warrants.
On Track Warrant Control territories, PTC is now being used to deliver and clear warrants.
Jeff, to clarify this point - track warrants are automatically transmitted from the dispatching center to the on-board PTC computer, but I believe that at this time it is still required that the dispatcher transmit the warrant verbally to the train crew and that the train crew copy and repeat. The verbally copied version is still the official one that the crews are supposed to go by. Does that match your experience?
There are, or soon will be, one or more pilot programs on a Class 1 railroad where the electronically transmitted version of each mandatory directive (i.e. track warrants and track bulletins) will be the official version and no verbal transmission will be required. This will have an enormous effect on how some territories operate. But I don't think it's standard practice on any railroads yet.
Dan
tree68 Euclid Also, what, if anything, will be added to the protection of this curve warning sign with the activation of PTC on this line? As I understand it, the slow order will appear on the PTC display, and if the engineer does not take the appropriate actions to slow for said location, it will be done for him in the form of a penalty brake application. Unlike signals, moving blocks, switches, interlockings, etc, which are dynamic, this one will be hard coded into the system.
Euclid Also, what, if anything, will be added to the protection of this curve warning sign with the activation of PTC on this line?
As I understand it, the slow order will appear on the PTC display, and if the engineer does not take the appropriate actions to slow for said location, it will be done for him in the form of a penalty brake application.
Unlike signals, moving blocks, switches, interlockings, etc, which are dynamic, this one will be hard coded into the system.
Yes, speed restrictions both temporary and permanent appear on the PTC display. Temporary speed restrictions show up as a "Next Target" and also as a yellow segment on the otherwise green track line. The only drawback is that an approach signal also changes the track line yellow. And if there is a temporary slow within a temporary slow ( For example, a 40mph within a 60mph) one can't tell where the 40 begins or ends. The track segment is yellow no matter what the speed of the restriction. The "Next Target" will count down to the slow within the slow, but only in sequence as each 'target' is reached.
Permanent speed restrictions only appear as a "Next Target". They don't change the color of the track line segment. If the system calculates a train will be overspeed, it will give a warning of an imminent brake application if the engineer does not slow down.
PTC also updates temporary speed restrictions. As soon as the dispatcher puts them in the computer, they are transmitted to the trains by PTC. If a temporary is lifted, PTC removes it from the system, too. However, if it appears in the paperwork, unless the dispatcher specifically voids the restriction, trains still have to observe it at this time.
While I like PTC, there are some shortcomings and it can become a crutch and a distraction. The past couple of weeks I've been trying to help an engineer regain his license. Just about each trip with me I've had to tell him to stop looking at the PTC screen. He seemed to fixate on the screen. So much that one time I put my hand in front of the screen and told him: "Stop looking at that (censored) PTC screen and look at the (censored again) locomotive control screens and what's outside your front window. They tell you more on how you should be handling your train at this moment." It worked somewhat. I got him down to looking at the screen for 5 or 6 seconds instead of 30 or more seconds.
Jeff
Electroliner 1935A facetious proposal, put rumble strips on the rails in advance of the speed indicater markers like they use on highways to let one know they are crossing onto the shoulder. The negative is the passengers would be disturbed by them.
They weren't put there on purpose, but on one of our grades, apparently a train stalled at one point and put some burns on the rails. MOW doesn't seem too concerned by them, so the rails in question haven't been replaced.
Since we're on jointed rail already, I'm not sure the passengers even notice.
Of course, we run at 25 MPH there - I'm not sure the FRA would appreciate such flaws on 100 MPH rail...
A facetious proposal, put rumble strips on the rails in advance of the speed indicater markers like they use on highways to let one know they are crossing onto the shoulder. The negative is the passengers would be disturbed by them.
Euclid Lithonia Operator I am not saying the following to be critical. Honest. But I do find it interesting that in the case of the CSX guys who walked in front of the Amtrak train (they were careless, doing something everyone is told, since they were kids, not to do), you faulted the company for inadequate training; I did not fault CSX for inadequate training of those two conductors. I faulted the CSX for failing to provide formal protection which everyone agreed they should have had. I also note that the NTSB said they were allowed to walk on the track if they watched for trains. No rule prohibited them from walking on the track. They made a mistake in failing to watch for trains during the last 15 seconds. I did specifically acknowledge that fact in those discussions.
Lithonia Operator I am not saying the following to be critical. Honest. But I do find it interesting that in the case of the CSX guys who walked in front of the Amtrak train (they were careless, doing something everyone is told, since they were kids, not to do), you faulted the company for inadequate training;
I am not saying the following to be critical. Honest. But I do find it interesting that in the case of the CSX guys who walked in front of the Amtrak train (they were careless, doing something everyone is told, since they were kids, not to do), you faulted the company for inadequate training;
I did not fault CSX for inadequate training of those two conductors. I faulted the CSX for failing to provide formal protection which everyone agreed they should have had.
I also note that the NTSB said they were allowed to walk on the track if they watched for trains. No rule prohibited them from walking on the track. They made a mistake in failing to watch for trains during the last 15 seconds. I did specifically acknowledge that fact in those discussions.
I stand corrected.
EuclidAlso, what, if anything, will be added to the protection of this curve warning sign with the activation of PTC on this line?
Lithonia Operator Euc, I know the poor guy should have seen the sign. But he didn't. Or he did, and for some reason it did not register. I'm sure he didn't enter the curve too fast on purpose. This is a particularly treacherous location because so much slowing is needed. Why not just put up extra warnings, to be extra careful, despite what the rule book says he should have done? Cheap insurance. In NTSB interviews, more than one person said crews were worried about that curve. Something distracted him, maybe just thoughts inside his head at the moment he passed the 2-mile marker. He probably wouldn't have missed two more markers. I don't subscribe to the idea that just because a man missed something in plain sight, it means he was careless. At times we all look right at things and fail to actually "see" them. All parties with knowledge of Steve Brown who were interviewed said he was a conscientious, skilled engineer.
Euc, I know the poor guy should have seen the sign. But he didn't. Or he did, and for some reason it did not register. I'm sure he didn't enter the curve too fast on purpose.
This is a particularly treacherous location because so much slowing is needed. Why not just put up extra warnings, to be extra careful, despite what the rule book says he should have done? Cheap insurance. In NTSB interviews, more than one person said crews were worried about that curve.
Something distracted him, maybe just thoughts inside his head at the moment he passed the 2-mile marker. He probably wouldn't have missed two more markers.
I don't subscribe to the idea that just because a man missed something in plain sight, it means he was careless. At times we all look right at things and fail to actually "see" them. All parties with knowledge of Steve Brown who were interviewed said he was a conscientious, skilled engineer.
This was not a case of merely being momentarily distracted. If you read the transcript of the cab recording, it is obvious that the engineer did not know enough about territory. His means of navigation largely consisted of merely following the track.
He did have a plan for the curve in checking some mile markers and signal locations along with the 2-mile warning. But is plan was too weak and he became confused as it unfolded.
Also, I have said that I blame Amtrak for inadequate training for the route. I am not placing the blame entirely on the engineer. But you seem to be placing the blame entirely on Amtrak while 100% exonerating the engineer because all he did was make an honest mistake. I feel that he did not take the matter seriously enough. He was lazy. He carries a watch and timetable. He could have used those tools and knew exactly when he was approaching that curve.
He was taking on an enormous responsibility in running a new passenger train full of people through unfamiliar territory with all of the marketing pressure of being the first run on a brand new route. His response to that extreme responsibility was greatly inadequate. The passengers were trusting him with their lives, and yet, unbeknown to them, he was taking an extreme risk in the hope that everything would come out okay.
The engineer's carelessness was far greater in scope than just missing the sign. It was in his whole method of operation and a failure to take the job seriously enough.
I am not saying the following to be critical. Honest. But I do find it interesting that in the case of the CSX guys who walked in front of the Amtrak train (they were careless, doing something everyone is told, since they were kids, not to do), you faulted the company for inadequate training; but in this case (which to me is much less clear on why the accident came to happen) you seem to want to blame the employee. But really, I am not taking a shot at you. Ralph Waldo Emerson, after all, said that "Consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds!
Lithonia Operator Thanks, Balt. Maybe rig them with daylight sensors, have them only light and/or flash in the daytime.
Thanks, Balt.
Maybe rig them with daylight sensors, have them only light and/or flash in the daytime.
What more is needed? Do engineers need something like that outlandish Billups "skull and crossbones" overhead grade crossing warning that was tried out in Mississippi?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billups_Neon_Crossing_Signal
Also, what, if anything, will be added to the protection of this curve warning sign with the activation of PTC on this line?
BaltACDIn today's railroad world - all signs such as permanent speed restriction signs as well as any advance boards are all made with highly reflectorized materials, that show up as bright as most things that are lit with incandescent light bulbs.
Indeed - unlike on the highway, where there are numerous other light distractions - the ROW is often isolated, so even a six to eight inch square of reflective material sticks out like a sore thumb at night, and from quite a distance. Been there.
And many of the colors of reflective material are also available with a flourescent component, which can really pop in daylight.
More signage for such a drastic change in speed probably wouldn't hurt.
Lithonia OperatorBuy four more marker signs: two for northbound, two for southbound. At 1 mile out, and at 1/2 mile out. Maybe go wild and put train-triggered flashing lights on them. Stick them in the ground. Connect a few wires. Done. Then you don't have this accident. How much would that have cost? How hard would that have been? How much did being frugal cost? This was a new stretch for passenger trains and their crews. It's one with the unusual feature of having a high-speed tangent end abruptly at a 30-mph curve. The Washington DOT and Sound Transit must have been too busy scheduling press conferences and photo-ops with politicians to actually go out and look at their much-ballyhooed new line. Total incompetence. If you don't have a railroad expert, hire one. And wait for the PTC to get done. It's mind-boggling and maddening that this could happen. A terrible, needless tragedy.
How much would that have cost? How hard would that have been?
How much did being frugal cost?
This was a new stretch for passenger trains and their crews. It's one with the unusual feature of having a high-speed tangent end abruptly at a 30-mph curve.
The Washington DOT and Sound Transit must have been too busy scheduling press conferences and photo-ops with politicians to actually go out and look at their much-ballyhooed new line. Total incompetence. If you don't have a railroad expert, hire one. And wait for the PTC to get done.
It's mind-boggling and maddening that this could happen. A terrible, needless tragedy.
In today's railroad world - all signs such as permanent speed restriction signs as well as any advance boards are all made with highly reflectorized materials, that show up as bright as most things that are lit with incandescent light bulbs.
High intensity LED, as used on Emergency Vehicles, from my highway vantage point are MUCH TOO BRIGHT AT NIGHT - they are fine for the day but overkill at night.
Buy four more marker signs: two for northbound, two for southbound. At 1 mile out, and at 1/2 mile out. Maybe go wild and put train-triggered flashing lights on them. Stick them in the ground. Connect a few wires. Done. Then you don't have this accident.
Someone refresh our memories. After the MNRR overturn and the Amtrak one did the FRA come up with some rule that if speed reduced by more than a certain value there would need to be additional warnings ?
I would suspect that one rule might be if present speed would cause an overturn at next speed reduction ? ?
Electroliner 1935 BaltACD Don't absolve WSDOT - they defined the limited time that Amtrak was allowed for training and set the date for the inaugural trip that ended in tragedy. Amtrak should have fought the limited training time made available to them, but politics is politics and the opening of this line was nothing if not political. WSDOT started the chain of failures that ended in the incident, neither Amtrak nor Engineer Brown performed their duities to prevent the accident from happening. Totally agree.
BaltACD Don't absolve WSDOT - they defined the limited time that Amtrak was allowed for training and set the date for the inaugural trip that ended in tragedy. Amtrak should have fought the limited training time made available to them, but politics is politics and the opening of this line was nothing if not political. WSDOT started the chain of failures that ended in the incident, neither Amtrak nor Engineer Brown performed their duities to prevent the accident from happening.
Don't absolve WSDOT - they defined the limited time that Amtrak was allowed for training and set the date for the inaugural trip that ended in tragedy. Amtrak should have fought the limited training time made available to them, but politics is politics and the opening of this line was nothing if not political. WSDOT started the chain of failures that ended in the incident, neither Amtrak nor Engineer Brown performed their duities to prevent the accident from happening.
Totally agree.
Lithonia Operator,
Okay, I see that I misunderstood your reference to the unlit warning. Now I understand that you were referring to the 2-mile warning sign and not the overspeed warning. I agree that something stronger than the 2-mile warning would have maybe saved the day. But the industry tends to draw the line at enough is enough. They expect you to read every sign that comes your way, and no excuses will do. Also, the requirement to "know the territory" should not be underestimated. It does not mean to just be familiar enough to recognise various landmarks and have a feel for the distances, etc. It means to know every inch of it like the back of your hand.
The engineer was watching for the curve and checking mileposts, but got confused in the process. I would tend to conclude that he did not know he was lost until the engine started to tip over. However, I think he was also not competely certain of his location over the last few miles.
I only mentioned that the transcript I refer to was a recorded conversation as a matter of clarification, not to take issure with anything you said about your source of the trip information.
Generally, I think the engineer should have make a stronger effort prior to the trip to learn exactly how to pinpoint the curve, using reliable landmarks. If I were in his position, I would have driven out there a day or two earlier and followed the line, spotting landmarks, etc. I would have taken notes. I still may have not got to perfectly knowing the territory, but I would have been certain to know where that curve was and how to recognize it as I approched it.
I also would not completely absolve Amtrak from blame. They had a duty to train to the point where the engineer did know the territory.
Euclid 1) It is real stretch to dismiss the engineer’s remarks as merely “dark humor,” or “black humor.” 2) What I posted was not an interview. It was an in-cab recording of his conversation with the conductor. 3) Also, you seem to misunderstand this point: The speed warning the engineer got just before the curve had absolutely nothing to do with the curve and its speed limit. The warning was system generated because he was exceeding the track speed limit of 79 mph by 2 mph.
1) It is real stretch to dismiss the engineer’s remarks as merely “dark humor,” or “black humor.”
2) What I posted was not an interview. It was an in-cab recording of his conversation with the conductor.
3) Also, you seem to misunderstand this point:
The speed warning the engineer got just before the curve had absolutely nothing to do with the curve and its speed limit. The warning was system generated because he was exceeding the track speed limit of 79 mph by 2 mph.
1) And I think your interpretation of the conversation is a stretch.
2) I knew that. I never said it was an interview. (I did however, btw, read that audio transcript; but I never referred to it in my post. I also read the notes on the inward-facing camera footage, and saw the freeze-frames accompanying them.)
3) I did not misunderstand that "point." I made no reference whatsoever to the overspeed warning. I agree with you 100% when you state this: "The speed warning the engineer got just before the curve had absolutely nothing to do with the curve and its speed limit. The warning was system generated because he was exceeding the track speed limit of 79 mph by 2 mph." When it comes to the overspeed warning, there is no "point."
The crash happened because Mr. Brown was lost. Not because he briefly went 81 in a 79 zone. Any discussion regarding the overspeed alarm, including by the media and the investigators, falls under the heading of Red Herrings.
I have no idea why Steve Brown got lost. Maybe he had a mini-stroke or something. Maybe he lied about having gotten good rest, but I doubt that. It was a tragic mistake that probably Mr. Brown himself will never understand, much less the rest of us.
Lithonia Operator First, I'd like to say that I disagree with Euc that the brief dark-humor remarks by engineer Brown reveal some sort of state of mind, or level of "right/wrong stuff," or undue concern, or incompetence, or lack of confidence. To me it's just dark humor, with a whiff of roll-the-eyes mild frustration with Amtrak. Mainly, to me, it's just wise-cracking. But YMMV. A single, unlit, warning about the curve, two miles beforehand, is woefully inadequate.
First, I'd like to say that I disagree with Euc that the brief dark-humor remarks by engineer Brown reveal some sort of state of mind, or level of "right/wrong stuff," or undue concern, or incompetence, or lack of confidence. To me it's just dark humor, with a whiff of roll-the-eyes mild frustration with Amtrak. Mainly, to me, it's just wise-cracking. But YMMV.
A single, unlit, warning about the curve, two miles beforehand, is woefully inadequate.
It is real stretch to dismiss the engineer’s remarks as merely “dark humor,” or “black humor.” It is not even dark humor at all according to the definitions of dark humor because it is not anywhere close to being as strong as the definitions.
Definition of black humor
: humor marked by the use of usually morbid, ironic, grotesquely comic episodes
noun
a form of humor that regards human suffering as absurd rather than pitiable, or that considers human existence as ironic and pointless but somehow comic.
What the engineer was doing was mocking-humor. He was laughing at the stupidity of Amtrak for sending him into territories that he was not familiar with. What that indicates to me is that it never occurs to him that he is responsible for knowing where he is when running a train. He puts that responsibility entirely on his employer. And then he just runs blind and laughs about how stupid Amtrak is for sending him there.
But, in any case, his remarks are merely instructive and not essential to making the case that he did not know the territory on much of the fatal first run. What I posted was not an interview. It was an in-cab recording of his conversation with the conductor. That conversation continued through much of the trip, and much of it was about him not being entirely sure of where he was. In other interviews, he said that everyone, including him, knew about and dreaded that deadly curve. He said they all regarded it as being of the utmost importance because you cannot take it at track speed.
Also, you seem to misunderstand this point:
The speed warning the engineer got just before the curve had absolutely nothing to do with the curve and its speed limit. The warning was system generated because he was exceeding the track speed limit of 79 mph by 2 mph. He immediately complied with that warning and then headed right into the curve at 79 mph. He never even made an emergency application in the final approach to the curve where any truly qualified person would have visually recognized the actual curve let alone the 30 mph limit sign just ahead of the curve.
There is probably at least 2,000 feet there where anyone knowing the route would have recognized they were approaching the curve, even if they had missed the 2-mile advance warning sign. Besides the visual appearance of the curve itself, there are the distinctive retaining walls and other details. How much speed could he have taken off of that train with 2000 feet of emergency braking?
My view of the qualification procedures used for this new line is that those procedures were a joke.
When Keolis took over the operation of VRE's commuter operations from Amtrak half a decade or more ago. Familiarization trips were done with Keolis engineers for a period of approximately 3 months with one or at most two engineers participating in each trip and those engineers were at the controls of equipment like they would be operating in revenue service. Most of the familiarization was done at nights - after the normal evening VRE runs and before the morning VRE runs. Some familarization runs were coducted on Weekends and Holidays when VRE did not provide service so that the engineers could view the territory in both daylight and dark.
VRE's normal operations have the Engineer operating from a Cab Car on the trips from Fredericksbug/Manassas to DC and operating the locomotive when departing DC to the end terminals. Equipment lays over and is serviced at Fredericksburg and Manassas. Once in DC the equipment lays over at Ivy City between their morning and evening uses, so operating from Union Station to Ivy City and return was also a part of the qualification procedure.
I have now read the complete, verbatim interviews with the engineer, the conductor, the conductor-trainee, and two different Amtrak RFEs.
Several things jumped out at me from those interviews:
The whole process of qualifying an engineer on a territory was/is Keystone Coppish. No set standards. "Qualify" at night, but never once run in the daytime until you're on a revenue run with hundreds of passengers. Familiarization runs wth too many people in the cab. Some qualifying engineers riding the trailing unit, assumedly looking backwards for their "familiarization." And the Final Exam basically consists of this: "Frank, do you feel quailified?" "Yep." (meaning, have I had enough of being up all night in a crowded cab looking backwards?) "Yep, Joe. I feel good." "Excellent, Frank; you're qualified. Congratulations!" If this is typical "familiarization," including on freight roads, God help us all.
The signal awareness form for the Lakewood sub was an "unofficial" one, cobbled together through cut-and-paste using a BNSF one and something inserted by an Amtrak employee. Meaning it could be wrong, and no single entity is taking ownership of it.
Poor engineer Brown made a mistake, and will have to live with that. But the NTSB man is correct: Brown was set up for failure. I feel awful for the victims' families; but also for the trainmen involved, particularly Brown.
* * * *
Now let's talk about the NTSB interviews. Yikes. They are characterized by a ton of sentence fragments, pauses, re-phrasing, interruptions, confusion, questions that never really get answered at all, some incorrect uses of railroad terms and English words in general, and in some cases piss-poor overall communications skills (on both sides).
One segment really left me scratching my head. It seems that the interviewee contradicts himself within seconds, and that the interviewer actually (through his own poor communications skills) facilitates there being a misunderstanding. Read the following section. The person being interviewed is the conductor-trainee. To the non-railroaders here; tell me whether you think the question about markers (or not) on intermediate signals gets answered, and thus documented, in a coherent way.
Q. Okay. Now in terms of signals, we have different types of
5 signals out there. And the question I guess is, can you tell me
6 what the difference is between an intermediate signal and an
7 absolute signal or a CP signal, if you're looking at it?
8 A. The intermediate signal, basically it's just a prep. It's
9 kind of giving you -- it's forewarning you what the next signal is
10 going to be. The next signal, as you mentioned, the absolute, is
11 going to be the signal for that block of territory and that's
12 going to be your next governing signal that you have to comply
13 with.
14 Q. Okay. Can you define what the actual physical
15 characteristics are different between an intermediate signal and
16 an absolute signal? How do you determine --
17 A. Repeat your question again.
18 Q. How do you determine if this is an absolutely signal I'm
19 looking at or an intermediate signal I'm looking at?
20 A. Well, the intermediate is -- it typically doesn't have like a
21 -- what's the word I'm looking for -- like a plate or dedicated
22 mile number associated with it.
23 Q. Okay. So did -- are you saying then that the intermediate
24 does not have the number plate, or are you saying it does have the
25 number plate?
Free State Reporting, Inc. (410) 974-0947
1 A. I'm saying typically it does not have one.
2 Q. Okay.
3 A. But the governing signal is going to have like the actual
4 mile marker or the adjacent track number to it so you know this is
5 my signal; I got to abide by this.
6 Q. Okay. So the absolute in your -- you're stating then that
7 the absolute signal has the number plate on it; is that correct?
8 A. Yes.
Got that? ?????
Finally, I found it really odd that out of all the interviews, this is the one in which the questioners are most adversarial in tone. And this is the one guy (who, although he was potentially a good witness, but really was not) who had absolutely nothing to do with the crash or the factors leading up to up.
IMO, the resulting recommendations of the investigation were probably compromised by poor interviewing and interview-moderating.
Next time I think about riding Amtrak ... aww heck ... I'll just drive. And hope no Amtrak locomotive leaps off of an overpass onto my car.
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