Here is a template for hiring, vetting and training procedures that I presented to the Amtrak Chief Transportation Officer in 2015. They felt that they had a better idea.
Hiring and Training Template for Train and Engine Service EmployeesAmtrak is rife with inexperience from top to bottom. Since it's inception Amtrak, eschewing the knowledge and experience of the veteran workforce it inherited in the 1983 takeover of operations on the Northeast Corridor (NEC), has used hit and miss trial and error tactics and nowhere is it more apparent than in their hiring and training procedures which have resulted in many incidents, most notably the incidents in Philadelphia involving the 'wrong way train' and the tragedy at Frankford Junction which could quite possibly have been avoided through vetting and proper training by experienced operations personnel not those of questionable pedigree that Amtrak chooses to employ.That being said I have a template for hiring and training of operations personnel. It is a comprehensive and multifaceted program.I have experienced operations personnel for an oversight committee made up of seasoned T&E veterans which can also screen prospective candidates, advise instructors, conduct field testing and evaluate trainees. Seasoned operations veterans can better assess the acumen for train operations a candidate possesses than a non experienced in operations Human Resources employee.Physical ability. Candidates must be able to pass a physical agility screening. How can one assist in an evacuation situation if that person cannot safely and without assistance evacuate themselves?OJT, OJT and more OJT. Nothing beats on the job training. Real-time situations with the accompanying conditions in all classes of service. Basic rules at the outset, more instruction midway, intense instruction at the end of OJT to be followed by final examination. All instructions on rules and special instructions are to be tailored to situations on the division for which hired. This way there is a mental picture when applying the rules. No 'generic' rules situations. Physical characteristics for engineers are extremely important and the candidate must exhibit intimate knowledge of such. Testing will be conducted by veteran engineers with 35 or more years of experience in all classes of service.Train handling for engineers, which I suspect is one of the culprits in the recent rash of crude oil derailments, instruction should be intense and evaluated strictly.Car handling for train service candidates should be extensive and equally intense.Present operating employees and supervision, most of who are 'victims' of Amtrak's inadequate training program, would be subject to evaluation and field testing and if need be assigned to other duties should they not measure up. No loss of job to present employees. Create a new position for those who cannot attain the standards for participating in train operations i.e. “ticket taker” where the individual would only be involved in collecting revenue and have nothing to do with train operations. They can observe operations and benefit with what would be considered 'paid training'. Seniority would be preserved in the craft from which they came should they be able to pass the required exams/tests at a later time.Amtrak must shed its arrogance and acknowledge its shortcomings and yield to the willing assistance from seasoned active and retired operations employees.Amtrak in its present state is an accident waiting to happen.
Murphy Siding 243129 Murphy Siding I'm not sure I understand what automated addiction means. Can you explain? Google is your friend. Whatever. If you don't want to be part of the discussion that's fine. Don't complain when nobody understands what you're trying to get accross.
243129
Murphy Siding I'm not sure I understand what automated addiction means. Can you explain? Google is your friend. Whatever. If you don't want to be part of the discussion that's fine. Don't complain when nobody understands what you're trying to get accross.
Murphy Siding I'm not sure I understand what automated addiction means. Can you explain?
Google is your friend.
This takes me back to when I rode the PATCO system (Philadelphia to Lindenwold) The operator ran to train to Lindenwold using the two buttons, #1 to close the doors, #2 to start the train. The train would accelerate, cruise, slow down and stop at the next station. On the return trip, the operator would again close the doors with the #1 button but then used the throttle to operate the train. Curious, I asked him why he was manually operating the train. His response was that the automated system was fine on dry rail but on wet rail, the auto brake rate was too high and the train would slide through the station. So, he ran manually to maintain his proficiency. I have read about Southwest Airlines not wanting some automatic landing systems because they wanted their pilots to maintain their proficiency. And I like knowing that the individual at the controls of a plane that I am on is VERY proficient on flying that plane.
Part of the problem of the Boeing 737 MAX was the "automation" used to compensate for the bigger engines tendency to push the nose of the plane up which moved the trim to push the nose back down. It failed and the pilots had not been trained on its operation and did not know enough to save the plane
See https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/automation-addiction-pilots-forgetting-fly/story?id=14417730
charlie hebdo zugmann charlie hebdo Also look at people in other industries where change is frequent. They seem to have figured it out. Probably have to start with having a managment structure/philosophy that isn't out of the 1800s. Definitely! And that is the sine non qua here, a definite sticking point in an industry known for a "that's the way we always have done it" management style.
zugmann charlie hebdo Also look at people in other industries where change is frequent. They seem to have figured it out. Probably have to start with having a managment structure/philosophy that isn't out of the 1800s.
charlie hebdo Also look at people in other industries where change is frequent. They seem to have figured it out.
Probably have to start with having a managment structure/philosophy that isn't out of the 1800s.
Definitely! And that is the sine non qua here, a definite sticking point in an industry known for a "that's the way we always have done it" management style.
When the 'state of the art' systems fail we do hark back. Manual block dates from the 1880's does it not?
BaltACD Would 243129 be adaptable to 21st Century railroad operation, with the vetting he received in the early 60's? Many of the elements that are required of 21st Century railroader weren't even a wildass dream at the time of his vetting for his ability to adapt. Times change and job requirements change.
Would 243129 be adaptable to 21st Century railroad operation, with the vetting he received in the early 60's? Many of the elements that are required of 21st Century railroader weren't even a wildass dream at the time of his vetting for his ability to adapt.
Times change and job requirements change.
Vetting and proper supervision plus ongoing training as stated before. If the cognitive and personality characeristics I mentioned before were present when hired, most would be preserved, unless there had been a TBI or infection such as meningitis.
charlie hebdo, a definite sticking point in an industry known for a "that's the way we always have done it" management style.
Perhaps the crowning irony being that perhaps nowhere in the industry has the impact of the Hunter Harrison 'revolution' culminating in modern PSR been more severe, or traumatic, than the ranks of 'we've always done it this way' management. I particularly remember Hunter's account of the CN bilingual management as he found it -- that was certainly NOT the way it was when he left...
Murphy SidingI'm not sure I understand what automated addiction means. Can you explain?
This can apply to railroad engineers also.
https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/automation-addiction-pilots-forgetting-fly/story?id=14417730
When I retired in 2014 there was a dearth of engineers who were not lost when these systems, ATC,PTC etc. failed.
BaltACDWould 243129 be adaptable to 21st Century railroad operation
I worked 14 years into the 21st century.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
charlie hebdoAlso look at people in other industries where change is frequent. They seem to have figured it out.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
zugmann Also how do you vet an employee in an industry that is ever-changing? There have been many changes in the past 5 years, both technological (PTC, EM, TO) and operatinal (PSR). The place I work in is not the same I hired in. As far as attracting new talent - the internet has provided those prospective employees what the job is really like - for better or worse.
Also how do you vet an employee in an industry that is ever-changing? There have been many changes in the past 5 years, both technological (PTC, EM, TO) and operatinal (PSR). The place I work in is not the same I hired in.
As far as attracting new talent - the internet has provided those prospective employees what the job is really like - for better or worse.
That's a function of a good ongoing training program. People that are properly vetted for the specific industry and area of work would necessarily be adaptable/flexible (an old dog capable of learning new tricks) like you.
Also look at people in other industries where change is frequent. They seem to have figured it out.
Jeff: Offhand, I think your incident was a process/system error, not your error. And as OM said, your recognition of the error and coolly taking corrective action indicates your cognitive processes (especially decision-making and judgement) are flexible and quick.
jeffhergertI guess the railroad didn't vet me enough because I failed.
No, the railroad vetted you quite correctly; you had the presence of mind to put the train in emergency while watching the surroundings, and then apologize to your people for the oversight.
Could it have been different if you were a perfect Stakhanovite railroader? Perhaps, but perfection is not what 'vetting' can practically accomplish -- it selects in part for precisely the kind of awareness that recovers from accidents most effectively. Which is the kind of awareness you showed that day and and demonstrated again that you have today.
As Joe repeatedly points out, what the vetting actually selects for is a kind of mindfulness and common sense, and ongoing attention to 'right' attitude, more than SAC-style 'zero-defects' roboticism that fails the first time something unusual upsets the routine.
Only you would know if the lapse was truly concerning as more than a momentary oversight, and you have certainly taken the event as a cautionary reminder, which is also an indication to me that you have the 'right stuff' attitude for the business.
OM: I agree. Vetting should be carefully handled by people outside the corporation to avoid corporate politics and have people who are skilled at the job-appropriate testing (Griggs v Duke Power, 1971). Some of the tests exist. Other metrics need to be developed. I had hoped our resident engineers might seriously answer my query., but no cigar.
I particularly think that having thousands of rules is ineffective or even dangerous because keeping them in mind is possibly a distraction.
Making sloppy errors can be fatal. How do other transportation industries manage this?
charlie hebdo Jeff: You are engaging in a reductio ad absurdem argument to make your points. Obviously no vetting process and no psychological evaluation is 100% accurate in predicting future behavior. Not really close. But if it might improve the probability of weeding out people who are prone to carelessness or misplaced overconfidence, it should be implemented. Stuff happens, yes, but it is sensible to try to reduce failures, both mechanical and human. What's wrong with that?
Jeff: You are engaging in a reductio ad absurdem argument to make your points. Obviously no vetting process and no psychological evaluation is 100% accurate in predicting future behavior. Not really close. But if it might improve the probability of weeding out people who are prone to carelessness or misplaced overconfidence, it should be implemented.
Stuff happens, yes, but it is sensible to try to reduce failures, both mechanical and human. What's wrong with that?
My argument isn't really with you. It's just to say EVERYTIME there is an incident that those responsible weren't vetted enough is getting old. Especially when the records of those involved aren't known.
I never said prospective new hires shouldn't be vetted. I'm guessing the major class ones (I can't say about others including Amtrak) do a better job than most employers, in or out of the industry. I'm sure even with the processes in place, some are still hired who maybe shouldn't and some who should be hired instead aren't. Because tests aren't infallable either.
About ten years ago, I caught the West Wayfreight off the extra board. The crew was me, about 5 years as an engineer (plus about 6 more as a conductor), the conductor with over 30 years and a new hire making his student trips. There was a Form B bulletin in effect that covered where the switch (CTC control point) from the yard to the main track was. Being inside the Form B, there was no red board located at the main track switch. We discussed this in the yard office when reviewing our track bulletins. We went out got our train of 10 or so cars together, did our air tests, headed towards the switch. We had talked to the dispatcher and we had a signal to leave (high green) as we approached.
They weren't working in that location. As we were getting close to the signal - still on the yard lead, I spotted a signal maintainer (his orange vest) up near a signal bungalow. "S@#$, there's a Form B out here!" I announced has I initiated a desired emergency. We stopped short of the signal, got clearance from the foreman and continued on. I apologized to the conductor and new hire about forgetting the B. The conductor did too, the new hire I think was still trying to process what just happened.
I guess the railroad didn't vet me enough because I failed. I may have caught it in time to not get fired, but the fact is I had a failure that day. The conductor is now retired, I don't know about the new hire - I don't remember who it was. So I suppose when I get back home, I should resign because obviously I don't have the makings of a good railroader and their vetting just didn't catch it.
Jeff
zugmannYes, the 100 - question test that asks the same questions several different ways. For example: what is your idea of a perfect sunday? A. Sitting at home reading a book B.taking a leisurely walk or bike ride C. Declaring yourself dictator and burning down large cities with a flamethrower
Hey Zug, why'd you forget D, the 'actual' answer to this question, "happily waiting at home for a two-hour call for a garbage train"
Ha Ha ha
charlie hebdo Zug and Jeff: When you were hired or promoted to engineer, did you get some sort of psychological evaluation for personality traits?
Zug and Jeff: When you were hired or promoted to engineer, did you get some sort of psychological evaluation for personality traits?
Yes, the 100 - question test that asks the same questions several different ways. For example:
what is your idea of a perfect sunday?
A. Sitting at home reading a book
B.taking a leisurely walk or bike ride
C. Declaring yourself dictator and burning down large cities with a flamethrower
-----
243129 Murphy Siding I'm not sure I understand what automated addiction means. Can you explain? Google is your friend.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
charlie hebdoStuff happens, yes, but it is sensible to try to reduce failures, both mechanical and human. What's wrong with that?
I agree completely with your premise in this post, and with the idea both of better selection of good employees and of better training (including the ongoing 'training' both from other employees and the results of experience) once hired on. But in the wider context of accidents like the one at Cayce, I think more care regarding the above quote should be taken.
The problem is that it usually isn't that simple, either in engineering or 'HR'.
First you need to consider the principle in the original Hippocratic oath (or in Pareto optimality): do no harm in what you implement. A 'safety' procedure, for example, that introduces additional potential points of failure or that fatigues proper vigilance or 'thoughtfulness' may be worse than the original concern; we have seen as recently as the 737MAX controversy the danger involved in 'automatic' safety systems that do not function appropriately in anomalous situations.
I think we are all in agreement that better 'weeding out' whether in "pre-vetting" or during the course of training is appropriate and beneficial. But I immediately think about the various ways this has been tinkered with in other contexts -- training for the fire service, for example, or for some organizations in the military -- where political priorities become more significant than assured 'job performance'. Implicit in Zug's comment a bit earlier is 'when to follow procedure' and 'when to think outside the box when needed' -- which further implies that proper 'training' has given employees the experience and acquired wisdom to know when and when not to use judgment in emergencies or unfamiliar situations that involve danger. (And very few things on the railroad do not involve danger, expected or unexpected but always threatening).
In some cases, recursion is appropriate, as for example in the arbitration between multiple processors in a safety-critical system like the Space Shuttle controls. A point to remember in this context is that common-mode failures have to be precluded or actively designed out of proper redundant systems if the redundancy is actually to mean something: requiring switchmen to take a picture to confirm the result of their SPAF that has been radioed to the dispatcher and noted on their Form 31 or whatever is just four separate steps to be overlooked if the crew intentionally ignores confirming switch position. It looks to bureaucrats as though one step will 'catch' any omissions in other steps, and perhaps in some cases this will be so: you will not hear me arguing against meaningful reminders to 'check your work' in critical safety. But if the common mode of failure is not to check in the first place, no paper means is likely to give additional assurance, and I think we have had ample evidence of how distracting complicated procedures can be in the presence of personal risk. I add that this is almost explicit in the language NTSB has used in their assessment of 'probable cause' of the Cayce accident.
Lithonia OperatorSorry, Larry. I was actually not referring to you, but did not make that clear. I was referring to a comment by Overmod, who seemed to be saying the form is useless, if I read him correctly.
I tried to make the same correction but my phone wouldn't let me. In short, I think that some sort of SPAF procedure is quite reasonable, and in fact something like it ought to be trained as a 'backstop' to moves that involve mainline switching. My complaint is more with the way the NTSB recommendation and subsequent actions implemented the idea of 'documenting' switch position.
It's not that the SPAF is 'useless'; it's that it merely reinforces and bureaucratizes something that ought to be "standard procedure" and has the ugly additional effect of providing additional 'gotchas' if it isn't filled out precisely and properly -- for management, government, and lawyers' potential use. (In addition to which, as I recall, we were treated to Bella claiming it would address the problems in 2008 which were not at all solved by it at Cayce, which is something of a problem with these government ukases, like the PTC mandate, that throw out 'answers' without really comprehending the extent or even the source of the problems.
One thing the Cayce incident proved to me is that it's too easy to fake a SPAF (following the definitions of SPAF compliance in the NTSB 'recommendations'. If it could be done in this circumstance, under known conditions of signal suspension, I can only imagine what the actual compliance rate might be.
Meanwhile, at least in my opinion, a real 'safety' procedure shouldn't be something that can be reduced to rote, even though it becomes a reflex when properly trained. If 'safety compliance' becomes one additional annoying bureaucratic formality like truckers having to remember to buckle their seat belt when an officer tells them to move your truck a few yards, it may actually become counterproductive to actual enforcement on the grounds of safety. I would be far less pessimistic had I not seen such a long paper trail of NTSB and TCA mentions of paper 'violations' in accident response reports, with little actual relevance to the accident at hand...
There is a potential problem with 'reporting on the radio that a switch is open or closed' -- I think it would often be a distraction from the often-complex work of dispatching, and in part it would require a dispatcher not only to pause and note down the information appropriately in writing, but to trust that the communication is correct, recognize which crew makes it (and perhaps call back to confirm information if, for example, the transmission was partially 'stepped on', and then return seamlessly to whatever else they might have been doing. While of course the radio transmissions are being recorded, the dispatcher won't be able to 'rewind and replay' anything that might have been missed ... that not being the purpose of the recording, really ... so what is being added there is a bit like the Waffle House rule that makes everyone on a shift responsible for a shortage in the register from whatever cause; it spreads the potential liability around, in the name of assuring something that is only one or two men's responsibility and that the remote people have no way to prove, disprove, or monitor as correct.
Now, if you were to provide a CTC-like data overlay that confirmed not only the position of all switches but also the integrity of all locking mechanisms (including switch locks, something that is surprisingly easy to provide with modern technologies) you'd have 90% of the assurance necessary to back up a paper SPAF, with the radio call becoming what it always would have been: a means of CYA that the folks in the field went through the necessary steps to confirm the result, with the 'automatics' backing them up but not replacing their 'due vigilance'. Unfortunately, such a system would either have been suspended along with the rest of the legacy signaling at the time of the Cayce accident, or would have required independent data integrity which might be difficult to provide reliably even at great cost. If I understand the current melange of PTC implementation correctly, the current version does not provide the necessary independent datastream capability to implement a function like this.
The camera is a good idea ... except (1) it introduces whole new levels of Mickey Mouse mandatory/forbidden regulations regarding electronic devices and 'permissible times and uses thereof'; it presupposes communication at appropriate bandwidth to send an image of appropriate resolution to confirm the switch is properly fully open/closed and locked; it presupposes the camera will work in even the worst cold, inclement, or dark conditions as expected; it presupposes some unambiguous marker on or near the switch that confirms which switch, in a possibly complex or confusing layout, has been opened or closed; and perhaps most troublingly, it only reports whether the switch has been moved, not what it 'ought' to be lined for as the dispatcher might expect. We encountered this issue with the control modalities at nuclear plants like TMI, where the color-coding of the various valves was 'green' for open and 'red' for closed, regardless both of the normal operating position of the valve in service or whether it was part of a more complex system. (One conclusion for R10 was that a repeater board be provided showing an overlay of 'correct' positions, which would change as appropriate during commanded emergency procedures... for the record, I think a system to implement this in actual train dispatching would not be easy or particularly valuable to design and try to implement.)
It also presupposes that the person on the crew 'responsible' for switching will take the time to fumble the camera out, line up and take the shot, and put the camera away again every time. And that someone will remember to remind them if they 'forget' ... which won't happen unless someone is watching to detect the failure. I'd be reasonably certain much of the resulting omission would only be detected upon 'literature review' later ... by folks all too willing to hand down some discipline or worse if 20/20 hindsight reveals some problem with the information retrieval. (I'll also be cynical and say the nasty infectious virus that affects cab cameras in so many severe accidents would also affect critical pictures of switch positions when the time comes for the blame to be gamed ... but take that with the necessary grains of salt).
243129 Murphy Siding You do a disservice by editing Jeff's quote to suit your needs. Well then, perhaps you can explain to me how you read it.
Murphy Siding You do a disservice by editing Jeff's quote to suit your needs.
Well then, perhaps you can explain to me how you read it.
I said what I said because anytime there is an incident, it is always brought up that it's due to poor vetting, training, and supervision. I spoke to the poor vetting process.
In the case of this incident under discussion, I don't know either of the two CSX employees involved. I don't know their length of service, their work or discipline records. I doubt anyone on this forum does. I didn't read the NTSB report, but I did read the FRA report. It mentions interviewing both employees and reviewing their respective records but doesn't reveal them.
I'm going to guess that since both were working off their respective extra boards, they were lower in seniority. However, going by my home terminal's board, it takes 12 years of seniority to hold either. For the engineer that also means 3 to 5 extra years as a trainman before going to engine service. With the associated cuts PSR brings, I'm going to guess that both CSX people have at least 5 years (and maybe more) worth of working experience.
Not knowing them or their records, to say they weren't vetted enough is ludicrous. It's (poor vetting) is being tossed out willy-nilly everytime there is an incident. Therefore, I said what I did. That, in essence, to be able to successfully vet out any prospective employee that might fail at some point is impossible. The only way to do so means a vetting process that results in no one ever being hired. I'm sorry if Chuck H doesn't like the 'ship happens' resemblence, but no one on this earth is perfect or infallable.
Murphy : I only know what I meant in terms of automation of the operating side of railroads. If it looks like it will be difficult to hire new, young people to replace retirees, that will spur automation even more. Look at trucking. When the economy is really booming, they have chronic shortages of drivers. Maybe this is a function of permissive child-rearing practices or maybe qualified people don't want jobs with a highly variable work schedule. I don't know.
243129 charlie hebdo It's unfortunate that there can't be a discussion about this without defensive sarcasm and acrimony. If Jeff is even half serious, statements like his are what will lead to automated systems with the excuse of safety because new hires are not conscientious enough to follow simple procedures carefully, even though the pay is good. Isn't that the inevitable result? Automated addiction then becomes a problem.
charlie hebdo It's unfortunate that there can't be a discussion about this without defensive sarcasm and acrimony. If Jeff is even half serious, statements like his are what will lead to automated systems with the excuse of safety because new hires are not conscientious enough to follow simple procedures carefully, even though the pay is good. Isn't that the inevitable result?
It's unfortunate that there can't be a discussion about this without defensive sarcasm and acrimony. If Jeff is even half serious, statements like his are what will lead to automated systems with the excuse of safety because new hires are not conscientious enough to follow simple procedures carefully, even though the pay is good. Isn't that the inevitable result?
Automated addiction then becomes a problem.
Yes, we need to weed out those who might have a failure, possibly many years, in the future. You won't be hiring very many. Heck, you won't be hiring anyone - ever.
But I've already had the feeling that no one in this day and age would meet the standards some want to set. Actually, in a way I understand this. Generally speaking, the attitude of many in the work force is different than it once was. At all age levels and in those fairly new and those who have a lot of time in.
Jeff I agree with Jeff. The world is changing. Having qualified people making sure that new employees meet the standards you are hoping for might be nigh-impossible if there's not a very deep well to draw from. We have the same issue in my business. It used to be hard to find good help. Now it's hard to find any help.
The CNW gave a 'personality' test as part of their hiring sessions. The UP does not. There is no further evaluation along those lines when going into engine service.
The test the CNW gave was used to evaluate if a person would 'fit in' (for lack of a better term) with the lifestyle. The CNW also gave an aptitude test that the UP didn't.
I think because of the aptitude test, more than the personality test, the CNW tended to have new hires who made it through on the job training and successfully become full employees. The UP tends to lose more during and shortly after the OJT portion. They both ended up with about the same nmber successfully completing the process. It's just the CNW 'weeded' them out before hiring them, the UP after hiring them.
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