Perhaps this is the source: https://www.npr.org/2018/02/06/583778394/positive-train-control-technology-could-be-a-solution-for-amtrak-after-recent-cr
This thread is about the Herzog/BNSF accident however the following comments have been made. And when the facts are known about the cause of the accident, all this chatter might be moot. In the meantime
it has been said……….. Our railroads have not exactly been in the vanguard historically in regards to adopting new technology and rules that reduce accidents and injuries and deaths, as anybody who studies this would know. But that begs the question: why so slow? Is it something inherent in the culture?
tree has the answer …………money ………….and another person posted………when will the industry admit their demand for unreasonable work hours and the union which will have employees take a hit on pay……….both want to turn a blind eye to the source of SOME of these accidents.
also said was…………………. Whether the adoption of airbrakes and Janney couplers in the 19th C or PTC recently, it has often required a mandate from those hated bureaucrats to make progress.
The bureaucrats are disliked but there is a rub there in that conundrum : those hated bureaucrats are a problem, but on the other hand what other recourse do we have when things are not right……….something may be costly for industry verses safety sacrifice for the general public. Then again the bureaucrats make unfunded mandates. Fix it, you pay for it. We need ‘em, but then again they can be awfully unwise when making laws and spending our tax money. just sayin’ endmrw0616182218
Semper Vaporo Four percent of all the accidents might be a much higher percentage of the total cost of all the accidents.
Four percent of all the accidents might be a much higher percentage of the total cost of all the accidents.
I'm sure some variation of the 80-20 principle figures into that.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
"... PTC is designed to prevent 4% of all railroad incidents that happen."
"Incidents", not "accidents." Does that include every minor incident, for example, low-speed derailments in yards or on remote sidings? If the 4% includes the major accidents, it means a lot more than it sounds like.
_____________
"A stranger's just a friend you ain't met yet." --- Dave Gardner
EuclidThanks, I will see if I can look that up. Four percent makes it sound like it is not worthwhile.
Remember, PTC was designe to prevent the high profile accidents, not the yard derailment.
FRA mandated an analysis that was published in 2004: POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL (PTC): CALCULATING BENEFITS AND COSTS OF A NEW RAILROAD CONTROL TECHNOLOGY: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/208199/files/2005_PTCBenefits_paper.pdf
In this analysis the benifits outweighed the costs. FRA dropped all not accident related benefits from its final analysis.
The class 1 railroads chose an overlay to the existing signal system that is not able to create the benefits from the 2004 analysis in its current form anyway.
So it boils down to the question how high someone rates saved human lives. Congress apparently rated them high enough to mandate PTC.Regards, Volker
What is the source for the statement that PTC will prevent 4% of all railroad “incidents”? And what is an “incident”?
From the link I posted above, the Editor of Railway Age does not say PTC will prevent “incidents.” He says it will prevent 4% of railroad “accidents.”
From the link:
“VANTUONO: Well, putting it into context, PTC-preventable accidents represent about 4 percent of all railroad accidents that occur - that have occurred. So what we're talking about here are accidents that are caused by human error.”
Also, what are some examples of the 96% of railroad accidents caused by human error that PTC will not prevent?
One I've been thinking about recently: An engineer 'passes away'* his air on a steep downhill grade, and the train runs away and accelerates until it derails. (BaltACD can provide details of that wreck on CSX's Sand Patch grade about 10 - 15 years ago.) Even if PTC is loaded with the train consist to calculate Tons Per Operable Brake (TPOB) and speed is regulated accordingly (as on many mountain grades), the engineer can nevertheless use up most or all of his air keeping the train within limits. Speed will be within PTC limits until it isn't - and by then, there's not enough air left in the trainline to slow down the train, let alone stop it. PTC can scream "STOP!" all it wants, not gonna happen. I don't think PTC has the ability to monitor trainline pressure, auxilliary and emergency reservoirs on the cars, or the recharge rate of the main reservoir on the locomotive as compared to the accelerating speed of the train, etc. (I'm no airbrake or PTC expert - anyone who knows different, feel free to correct as needed.)
Then there's a car that somehow rolls out of a siding or yard and 'trails' through a properly lined switch to be in front of (or collide with) an oncoming train. Human error there someplace. Happened at a lumber siding in Massachusetts about 15 years ago, IIRC - CSX crew placed the car, a few hours later it got loose and hit an MBTA train. Fortunately, no one killed, I think.
- PDN.
*Slightly different term in the real railroading world, but the Forum software would probably censor it, even if legitimate.
Paul_D_North_Jr*Slightly different term in the real railroading world, but the Forum software would probably censor it, even if legitimate.
"i" see what you are doing there.
Paul,
I agree that peeing away the air and running away would not be preventable by PTC. I guess I would like to understand the whole picture of the total number of accidents in which 4% of them are preventable by PTC and 96% of them are not. What is needed is a detailed listing of a sampled number of these accidents.
Euclidhat is needed is a detailed listing of a sampled number of these accidents.
And are they considering all accidents or just FRA reportable?
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
@PDN: it is clearly defined in 49CFR236.1005 what PTC is requred to do:
- prevent train to train collisions- prevent overspeed derailments- prevent movement of a train trough a main line switch in the impropper position- prevent incursions into established work zones without appropriate authority
PTC is limited to controlling max. allowed speed at restricted speed by law to save costs and time.Regards, Volker
zugmann Euclid hat is needed is a detailed listing of a sampled number of these accidents. And are they considering all accidents or just FRA reportable?
Euclid hat is needed is a detailed listing of a sampled number of these accidents.
My GUESS is that it is intended that we think it is about FRA Reportable incidents - it MAY be about all incidents.
FRA Reportable incidents are governed by a monetary amount (the last number that sticks in my mind is $8700 US). Personnel, whenever possible will estimate the damages to a figure under the FRA Reportable threshhold - there may be 'horse trading' among the Operating - MofW - Car Depts. to bring the estimate under the FRA level.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Euclid I agree that peeing away the air and running away would not be preventable by PTC. I guess I would like to understand the whole picture of the total number of accidents in which 4% of them are preventable by PTC and 96% of them are not. What is needed is a detailed listing of a sampled number of these accidents.
Off the top of my head, some accidents PTC would not prevent:
Hot Box, cracked wheel, broken axle, broken rail under train, washout and pretty much anything else happening behind the locomotives that causes a derailment.
Crossing accidents where the vehicle fouls the track without sufficient time for the train to stop, or the vehicle drives into the side of the train.
Anything happening in yards or non-main tracks. In my experience the majority of accidents fall into this category. But because they are mostly minor they tend not to make the news.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
VOLKER LANDWEHR Euclid Thanks, I will see if I can look that up. Four percent makes it sound like it is not worthwhile.
Euclid Thanks, I will see if I can look that up. Four percent makes it sound like it is not worthwhile.
SD70Dude Euclid I agree that peeing away the air and running away would not be preventable by PTC. I guess I would like to understand the whole picture of the total number of accidents in which 4% of them are preventable by PTC and 96% of them are not. What is needed is a detailed listing of a sampled number of these accidents. Off the top of my head, some accidents PTC would not prevent: Hot Box, cracked wheel, broken axle, broken rail under train, washout and pretty much anything else happening behind the locomotives that causes a derailment. Crossing accidents where the vehicle fouls the track without sufficient time for the train to stop, or the vehicle drives into the side of the train. Anything happening in yards or non-main tracks. In my experience the majority of accidents fall into this category. But because they are mostly minor they tend not to make the news.
Go past a clear (green) signal at track speed entering a signal block. Within that signal block is a hand throw facing point switch. Trainman Ted, through miscommunication, opens said switch as you're approaching to let his train out of a siding. (There's a curve and trees, etc so you can't see too far down the tracks.) Currently, in this situation what will PTC do? Nothing. When you entered the block the signal showed no occupancy. PTC recognized that signal and is looking ahead at the next signal, but has no idea of the switch being opened within the block you are occupying. Remember, switches currently aren't directly integrated into PTC, but into the block signalling circuitry.
That's one argument for retaining cab signals where in place. The cab signal would detect the opening of the switch.
Jeff
BaltACD My GUESS is that it is intended that we think it is about FRA Reportable incidents - it MAY be about all incidents. FRA Reportable incidents are governed by a monetary amount (the last number that sticks in my mind is $8700 US). Personnel, whenever possible will estimate the damages to a figure under the FRA Reportable threshhold - there may be 'horse trading' among the Operating - MofW - Car Depts. to bring the estimate under the FRA level.
The NTSB has released a preliminary report on this incident: RRD18FR009. Quoting the report:
"The work train was 1800 feet long and consisted of 29 loaded railcars and 2 forward facing locomotives. It was originally a westbound train, but while unloading the rail on main track 1, moved in both directions. The work train was making a reverse move while ascending (shoving) the 1.5-percent grade traveling about 9 mph while approaching the 8 degree curve in Crozier Canyon........"
"The dispatcher lined the intermodal train on main track 1 behind the work train, believing the work train was heading west to drop off the work crew. The intermodal train was stopped at an intermediate restricting signal on main track 1. The crew noticed two westbound trains pass on main track 2 and heard on the radio that the work train would clear the block in 45 minutes. Believing the work train was headed west, the intermodal train crew proceeded past the red restricting signal at a restricted speed of 15 mph."
"According to preliminary information downloaded from the event recorders, the emergency brake of the intermodal train was applied at 14 mph and the train stopped about 363 feet from where the emergency brake was applied. The work train was traveling at 9 mph when the emergency brake of the work train was applied. The work train stopped 9 seconds later. The brakeman in the RUM was able to exit the vehicle seconds before the collision."
Any typos in the quotes are mine.
RDG467The NTSB has released a preliminary report on this incident: RRD18FR009. Quoting the report:
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/rrd18fr009-preliminary.aspx
The report does not go near the cause of the incident. What was the communication between the RUM and the Train Dispatcher. Did the Train Dispatcher authorize the RUM to operate in both directions? Did the RUM decide to operate in both directions on its own? If the Train Dispatcher knew the RUM was working in both directions, why was the Intermodal train allowed to operate in the same track segment where the RUM was operating in both directions?
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