The report does not go near the cause of the incident. What was the communication between the RUM and the Train Dispatcher. Did the Train Dispatcher authorize the RUM to operate in both directions? Did the RUM decide to operate in both directions on its own? If the Train Dispatcher knew the RUM was working in both directions, why was the Intermodal train allowed to operate in the same track segment where the RUM was operating in both directions?
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
RDG467The NTSB has released a preliminary report on this incident: RRD18FR009. Quoting the report:
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/rrd18fr009-preliminary.aspx
The NTSB has released a preliminary report on this incident: RRD18FR009. Quoting the report:
"The work train was 1800 feet long and consisted of 29 loaded railcars and 2 forward facing locomotives. It was originally a westbound train, but while unloading the rail on main track 1, moved in both directions. The work train was making a reverse move while ascending (shoving) the 1.5-percent grade traveling about 9 mph while approaching the 8 degree curve in Crozier Canyon........"
"The dispatcher lined the intermodal train on main track 1 behind the work train, believing the work train was heading west to drop off the work crew. The intermodal train was stopped at an intermediate restricting signal on main track 1. The crew noticed two westbound trains pass on main track 2 and heard on the radio that the work train would clear the block in 45 minutes. Believing the work train was headed west, the intermodal train crew proceeded past the red restricting signal at a restricted speed of 15 mph."
"According to preliminary information downloaded from the event recorders, the emergency brake of the intermodal train was applied at 14 mph and the train stopped about 363 feet from where the emergency brake was applied. The work train was traveling at 9 mph when the emergency brake of the work train was applied. The work train stopped 9 seconds later. The brakeman in the RUM was able to exit the vehicle seconds before the collision."
Any typos in the quotes are mine.
BaltACD My GUESS is that it is intended that we think it is about FRA Reportable incidents - it MAY be about all incidents. FRA Reportable incidents are governed by a monetary amount (the last number that sticks in my mind is $8700 US). Personnel, whenever possible will estimate the damages to a figure under the FRA Reportable threshhold - there may be 'horse trading' among the Operating - MofW - Car Depts. to bring the estimate under the FRA level.
FRA Reportable incidents are governed by a monetary amount (the last number that sticks in my mind is $8700 US). Personnel, whenever possible will estimate the damages to a figure under the FRA Reportable threshhold - there may be 'horse trading' among the Operating - MofW - Car Depts. to bring the estimate under the FRA level.
SD70Dude Euclid I agree that peeing away the air and running away would not be preventable by PTC. I guess I would like to understand the whole picture of the total number of accidents in which 4% of them are preventable by PTC and 96% of them are not. What is needed is a detailed listing of a sampled number of these accidents. Off the top of my head, some accidents PTC would not prevent: Hot Box, cracked wheel, broken axle, broken rail under train, washout and pretty much anything else happening behind the locomotives that causes a derailment. Crossing accidents where the vehicle fouls the track without sufficient time for the train to stop, or the vehicle drives into the side of the train. Anything happening in yards or non-main tracks. In my experience the majority of accidents fall into this category. But because they are mostly minor they tend not to make the news.
Euclid I agree that peeing away the air and running away would not be preventable by PTC. I guess I would like to understand the whole picture of the total number of accidents in which 4% of them are preventable by PTC and 96% of them are not. What is needed is a detailed listing of a sampled number of these accidents.
I agree that peeing away the air and running away would not be preventable by PTC. I guess I would like to understand the whole picture of the total number of accidents in which 4% of them are preventable by PTC and 96% of them are not. What is needed is a detailed listing of a sampled number of these accidents.
Off the top of my head, some accidents PTC would not prevent:
Hot Box, cracked wheel, broken axle, broken rail under train, washout and pretty much anything else happening behind the locomotives that causes a derailment.
Crossing accidents where the vehicle fouls the track without sufficient time for the train to stop, or the vehicle drives into the side of the train.
Anything happening in yards or non-main tracks. In my experience the majority of accidents fall into this category. But because they are mostly minor they tend not to make the news.
Go past a clear (green) signal at track speed entering a signal block. Within that signal block is a hand throw facing point switch. Trainman Ted, through miscommunication, opens said switch as you're approaching to let his train out of a siding. (There's a curve and trees, etc so you can't see too far down the tracks.) Currently, in this situation what will PTC do? Nothing. When you entered the block the signal showed no occupancy. PTC recognized that signal and is looking ahead at the next signal, but has no idea of the switch being opened within the block you are occupying. Remember, switches currently aren't directly integrated into PTC, but into the block signalling circuitry.
That's one argument for retaining cab signals where in place. The cab signal would detect the opening of the switch.
Jeff
VOLKER LANDWEHR Euclid Thanks, I will see if I can look that up. Four percent makes it sound like it is not worthwhile.
Euclid Thanks, I will see if I can look that up. Four percent makes it sound like it is not worthwhile.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
zugmann Euclid hat is needed is a detailed listing of a sampled number of these accidents. And are they considering all accidents or just FRA reportable?
Euclid hat is needed is a detailed listing of a sampled number of these accidents.
And are they considering all accidents or just FRA reportable?
My GUESS is that it is intended that we think it is about FRA Reportable incidents - it MAY be about all incidents.
@PDN: it is clearly defined in 49CFR236.1005 what PTC is requred to do:
- prevent train to train collisions- prevent overspeed derailments- prevent movement of a train trough a main line switch in the impropper position- prevent incursions into established work zones without appropriate authority
PTC is limited to controlling max. allowed speed at restricted speed by law to save costs and time.Regards, Volker
Euclidhat is needed is a detailed listing of a sampled number of these accidents.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
Paul,
Paul_D_North_Jr*Slightly different term in the real railroading world, but the Forum software would probably censor it, even if legitimate.
"i" see what you are doing there.
One I've been thinking about recently: An engineer 'passes away'* his air on a steep downhill grade, and the train runs away and accelerates until it derails. (BaltACD can provide details of that wreck on CSX's Sand Patch grade about 10 - 15 years ago.) Even if PTC is loaded with the train consist to calculate Tons Per Operable Brake (TPOB) and speed is regulated accordingly (as on many mountain grades), the engineer can nevertheless use up most or all of his air keeping the train within limits. Speed will be within PTC limits until it isn't - and by then, there's not enough air left in the trainline to slow down the train, let alone stop it. PTC can scream "STOP!" all it wants, not gonna happen. I don't think PTC has the ability to monitor trainline pressure, auxilliary and emergency reservoirs on the cars, or the recharge rate of the main reservoir on the locomotive as compared to the accelerating speed of the train, etc. (I'm no airbrake or PTC expert - anyone who knows different, feel free to correct as needed.)
Then there's a car that somehow rolls out of a siding or yard and 'trails' through a properly lined switch to be in front of (or collide with) an oncoming train. Human error there someplace. Happened at a lumber siding in Massachusetts about 15 years ago, IIRC - CSX crew placed the car, a few hours later it got loose and hit an MBTA train. Fortunately, no one killed, I think.
- PDN.
*Slightly different term in the real railroading world, but the Forum software would probably censor it, even if legitimate.
What is the source for the statement that PTC will prevent 4% of all railroad “incidents”? And what is an “incident”?
From the link I posted above, the Editor of Railway Age does not say PTC will prevent “incidents.” He says it will prevent 4% of railroad “accidents.”
From the link:
“VANTUONO: Well, putting it into context, PTC-preventable accidents represent about 4 percent of all railroad accidents that occur - that have occurred. So what we're talking about here are accidents that are caused by human error.”
Also, what are some examples of the 96% of railroad accidents caused by human error that PTC will not prevent?
EuclidThanks, I will see if I can look that up. Four percent makes it sound like it is not worthwhile.
Remember, PTC was designe to prevent the high profile accidents, not the yard derailment.
FRA mandated an analysis that was published in 2004: POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL (PTC): CALCULATING BENEFITS AND COSTS OF A NEW RAILROAD CONTROL TECHNOLOGY: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/208199/files/2005_PTCBenefits_paper.pdf
In this analysis the benifits outweighed the costs. FRA dropped all not accident related benefits from its final analysis.
The class 1 railroads chose an overlay to the existing signal system that is not able to create the benefits from the 2004 analysis in its current form anyway.
So it boils down to the question how high someone rates saved human lives. Congress apparently rated them high enough to mandate PTC.Regards, Volker
"... PTC is designed to prevent 4% of all railroad incidents that happen."
"Incidents", not "accidents." Does that include every minor incident, for example, low-speed derailments in yards or on remote sidings? If the 4% includes the major accidents, it means a lot more than it sounds like.
_____________
"A stranger's just a friend you ain't met yet." --- Dave Gardner
Semper Vaporo Four percent of all the accidents might be a much higher percentage of the total cost of all the accidents.
Four percent of all the accidents might be a much higher percentage of the total cost of all the accidents.
I'm sure some variation of the 80-20 principle figures into that.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
This thread is about the Herzog/BNSF accident however the following comments have been made. And when the facts are known about the cause of the accident, all this chatter might be moot. In the meantime
it has been said……….. Our railroads have not exactly been in the vanguard historically in regards to adopting new technology and rules that reduce accidents and injuries and deaths, as anybody who studies this would know. But that begs the question: why so slow? Is it something inherent in the culture?
tree has the answer …………money ………….and another person posted………when will the industry admit their demand for unreasonable work hours and the union which will have employees take a hit on pay……….both want to turn a blind eye to the source of SOME of these accidents.
also said was…………………. Whether the adoption of airbrakes and Janney couplers in the 19th C or PTC recently, it has often required a mandate from those hated bureaucrats to make progress.
The bureaucrats are disliked but there is a rub there in that conundrum : those hated bureaucrats are a problem, but on the other hand what other recourse do we have when things are not right……….something may be costly for industry verses safety sacrifice for the general public. Then again the bureaucrats make unfunded mandates. Fix it, you pay for it. We need ‘em, but then again they can be awfully unwise when making laws and spending our tax money. just sayin’ endmrw0616182218
Perhaps this is the source: https://www.npr.org/2018/02/06/583778394/positive-train-control-technology-could-be-a-solution-for-amtrak-after-recent-cr
Semper Vaporo
Pkgs.
ChuckCobleigh tree68 Euclid Where does that 4% number come from? Good question - someone else posted it in this thread. Jeff posted the following several pages ago: "I recently read, I think in Railway Age, that the AAR figures that PTC is designed to prevent 4% of all railroad incidents that happen. The ones that don't happen everyday, but make the headlines on the nightly news when they do."
tree68 Euclid Where does that 4% number come from? Good question - someone else posted it in this thread.
Euclid Where does that 4% number come from?
Good question - someone else posted it in this thread.
Jeff posted the following several pages ago:
"I recently read, I think in Railway Age, that the AAR figures that PTC is designed to prevent 4% of all railroad incidents that happen. The ones that don't happen everyday, but make the headlines on the nightly news when they do."
Thanks, I will see if I can look that up. Four percent makes it sound like it is not worthwhile.
EuclidWhere does that 4% number come from?
tree68 It's been pointed out here that PTC will prevent perhaps 4% of the incidents, albeit usually those with the highest profile.
Where does that 4% number come from?
good posts on this THREAD appreciate the civility
…………..If it was warm I am sure the cab of the Herzog rig is nice and quiet with great A/C and they may not have heard anything.
While very true and good for the poor deceased Herzog fellow, everyone will agree he should not have to listen for whistle and bells
……………..Videos that have been published indicate that the Herzog equipment is coupled to the rear end of the rail train that (in the videos) are being pulled by locomotives. I sincerely doubt that the Herzog equipment would have sufficient tractive effort to actually move a loaded rail train.
while so true………….some long time ago on this thread it was mentioned before the Herzog way of “unloading”……….. I thought I read that the “free end was bolted down to allow the rail train unload by forward movement”. But that has been replaced with the Herzog hook-up. Too I have heard it said that this job of unloading ribbon rail is one of the most dangerous jobs on the RR. i.e. normal day of operations and not the crash situation
……………….but got confused when it was mentioned that they were in a shoving maneuver. Only written accounts were from the AP and maybe there is confusion thinking that the Herzog equipment was pushing the rail train, not that there were locomotives on the other end.
wow, how many times have we read NEWS accounts that were way off base with descriptions endmrw0616181836
rdamonIf they were maintaining visual separation those curves would be a challenge. However if they were following, was the rail train stopped?
BaltACD Videos that have been published indicate that the Herzog equipment is coupled to the rear end of the rail train that (in the videos) are being pulled by locomotives. I sincerely doubt that the Herzog equipment would have sufficient tractive effort to actually move a loaded rail train.
Videos that have been published indicate that the Herzog equipment is coupled to the rear end of the rail train that (in the videos) are being pulled by locomotives. I sincerely doubt that the Herzog equipment would have sufficient tractive effort to actually move a loaded rail train.
Fully agree ... If they were moving 'in reverse' it would be from the locomotives on the other end. Just speculating that the media does not fully understand the operation.
It also seems that the other train would be ringing their bell and whistling freely. If it was warm I am sure the cab of the Herzog rig is nice and quiet with great A/C and they may not have heard anything.
rdamonEL1935 I agree with you thoughts, but got confused when it was mentioned that they were in a shoving maneuver. Only written accounts were from the AP and maybe there is confusion thinking that the Herzog equipment was pushing the rail train, not that there were locomotives on the other end. If they were maintaining visual separation those curves would be a challenge. However if they were following, was the rail train stopped? Things do not add up.
charlie hebdoWhether the adoption of airbrakes and Janney couplers in the 19th C or PTC recently, it has often required a mandate from those hated bureaucrats to make progress.
Money, pure and simple. Plus the occasional disbelief in the technology ("You propose to stop my trains with wind?)
Who cares if you're losing a brakeman daily? There are hundreds out there willing to take his place, and aside from perhaps a small stipend to the wife, there is no cost to speak of.
Changing over to Janney couplers and air brakes cost the railroad's money, and they could not see an economic advantage to either. Hindsight has pretty much proved them wrong, but hindsight is generally 20-20.
I would opine that PTC is in much the same boat. It's been pointed out here that PTC will prevent perhaps 4% of the incidents, albeit usually those with the highest profile.
If PTC had been sold as a way to increase the bottom line (after the initial capital expense) the railroads might have bought in at the beginning. Even now we hear little about how PTC will benefit the railroads economically. I'm sure features like moving blocks would be a good thing for the railroads, particularly on busy routes, but I believe it's been noted that moving blocks are not included in the current iteration of PTC.
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