Two points raised on the Model Railroader forum that I have not seen discussed here yet:
1. This occurred at nighttime, so the expected view of the open switch points might not have been as clear -- first 'warning' might have been the diversion. Standing power might not have been clearly visible at first, either. See the road bridge a car-length from the point of impact, and the likely absence of lights on the standing train.
2. Apparently in some views you can see the lead truck from the P42 directly in front of the CSX motor, confirming the impact was full head-on.
I might add that in all the pictures I have seen that show the vestibule ends of the derailed "V", both ends appear to have the same car number. This strongly indicates to me that the car is, in fact, broken transversely.
From another site NTSB press release/
Some additional info:
- The distance from the switch to the collision point was 659'
- The freight train was pushed back 15' by the collision, from its original position.
- The CSX train crew, Dispatcher and Train Master have been interviewed today. Surviving Amtrak crew will be interviewed tomorrow.
- The Amtrak locomotive has been moved from the site to the adjacent auto loading facility yard.
- NTSB expects to be present on the ground through the coming weekend.
- The freight had two crew members, an Engineer and a Conductor.
- Amtrak had 139 pax and 8 crew members consisting of 1 Engineer, 1 Conductor, 1 Assistant Conductor and the rest OBS crew.
- The speed limit in the area for operations using track warrant under signal suspension is 59mph. Amtrak was compliant with that.
- The correct procedure before releasing the track warrant by the freight train would be to align the switch to the main line, lock it in that position, then install a derail on the siding, and then release the warrant.
- The track warrant was released by the freight train crew but the switch was found locked in the position towards the siding.
- Amtrak did have the necessary track warrant to operate as they were.
this does bring a question up: When was the signal system suspended?
And, yet another: How many freight trains run through there each day, and when do they run?
Johnny
Overmod oltmannd Or, perhaps that train was put there before the signal suspension, so no record of switch thrown and locked was needed? Don, you're stretching it too far. Remember that Balt said the suspension he knew about was the previous day. I doubt that train had been sitting there unattended with the switch lined wrong and locked for that length of time. Do you really think so, either?
oltmannd Or, perhaps that train was put there before the signal suspension, so no record of switch thrown and locked was needed?
Don, you're stretching it too far. Remember that Balt said the suspension he knew about was the previous day. I doubt that train had been sitting there unattended with the switch lined wrong and locked for that length of time. Do you really think so, either?
Well, they certainly didn't run another train by with the switch like that, so the active time since the suspension couldn't have been that long.
It's entirely possible the trains was put away with the signal system active, so no "lined and locked" double check, etc. needed. Should it have shown as occupied on dispatcher track line view? I suspect so. Did the dispatcher notice. Sure, if he was lining a train over the route. Maybe not if it was a while until next train and signal system was made inactive.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
EKR In my opinion, all facing point switches in TWC territory should be approached prepared to stop. That's my plan from now on.
In my opinion, all facing point switches in TWC territory should be approached prepared to stop. That's my plan from now on.
Malicious rules compliance and delaying trains. That's what some would charge you with.
Jeff
rcdrye For northeast roads a signal displaying "Stop and Proceed" may be passed at restricted speed by a freight train if the signal displays both a number plate and a "G" or "R" plate. Passenger trains are still required to stop before proceeding. NORAC rule 291 (Stop and Proceed): Stop, then proceed at Restricted Speed until the entire train has: 1. Passed a more favorable fixed signal. or 2. Passed a location by one train length or 500 feet (whichever is greater), where a more favorable cab signal was received, or 3. Entered non-signalled DCS territory. Where a letter G (grade marker) or a letter R (restricting marker) is displayed in addition to a number plate as part of these aspects, freight trains may observe the signal as though Restricting, Rule 290, were displayed.
For northeast roads a signal displaying "Stop and Proceed" may be passed at restricted speed by a freight train if the signal displays both a number plate and a "G" or "R" plate. Passenger trains are still required to stop before proceeding.
NORAC rule 291 (Stop and Proceed):
Stop, then proceed at Restricted Speed until the entire train has:
1. Passed a more favorable fixed signal. or
2. Passed a location by one train length or 500 feet (whichever is greater), where a more favorable cab signal was received, or
3. Entered non-signalled DCS territory.
Where a letter G (grade marker) or a letter R (restricting marker) is displayed in addition to a number plate as part of these aspects, freight trains may observe the signal as though Restricting, Rule 290, were displayed.
Not just for those in the northeast. Depending on the rule book (railroad and era), a "G", "R" or "P" plate allowed a train to pass without stopping. For some, again railroad and era, it may be applicable to certain trains, for example tonnage trains. For some the addition of those plates changed the signal from a Stop and Proceed to a Restricting and any train could pass it.
For us, we still have as one of the aspects listed for a Restricting, a red (or red over red) signal with both a number plate and a G plate. Restricted Proceed is slightly different from a Restricting in that where applicable, you can't exceed the proscribed speed through a turnout.
When it comes to signals, you really have to know your territory.
Deggesty LithoniaOperator https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/05/us/positive-train-control-explainer/index.html Is it accurate that, according to an NTSB official, PTC would have prevented this accident? Does PTC detect switches aligned the wrong way? (Particularly during a signal supension.) Say the siding was empty: would PTC slow a train knowing that no one would ever intend to enter a siding that fast? Would any switch aligned from a main to a siding always trigger PTC actions? Does PTC "know" that (in this case) a train is in that siding? Etc. Etc. Yes, had the PTC installation been complete and in service, there would have been a signal showing STOP. However, two things combined to make the collision possible: the installation was in process, necessitating the temporary inoperation of the signal system, and (far worse) the failure of an employee to realign the switch--MAN FAILURE.
LithoniaOperator https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/05/us/positive-train-control-explainer/index.html Is it accurate that, according to an NTSB official, PTC would have prevented this accident? Does PTC detect switches aligned the wrong way? (Particularly during a signal supension.) Say the siding was empty: would PTC slow a train knowing that no one would ever intend to enter a siding that fast? Would any switch aligned from a main to a siding always trigger PTC actions? Does PTC "know" that (in this case) a train is in that siding? Etc. Etc.
https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/05/us/positive-train-control-explainer/index.html
Is it accurate that, according to an NTSB official, PTC would have prevented this accident? Does PTC detect switches aligned the wrong way? (Particularly during a signal supension.) Say the siding was empty: would PTC slow a train knowing that no one would ever intend to enter a siding that fast? Would any switch aligned from a main to a siding always trigger PTC actions? Does PTC "know" that (in this case) a train is in that siding? Etc. Etc.
Yes, had the PTC installation been complete and in service, there would have been a signal showing STOP. However, two things combined to make the collision possible: the installation was in process, necessitating the temporary inoperation of the signal system, and (far worse) the failure of an employee to realign the switch--MAN FAILURE.
If the signal system had be active, the previous block signal would have been at stop. PTC would just prevent a man from sailing through it.
LithoniaOperatorSome video I saw tonight on NBC News made it look, briefly, like one car was indeed broken in half. So I guess I was wrong about that. Yikes.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Deggesty AsI recall, years ago when you came upon a permissive red block you stopped and waited five minutes and then proceeded at restricted speed. Do you still have to wait, or may you proceed after coming to a full stop?
AsI recall, years ago when you came upon a permissive red block you stopped and waited five minutes and then proceeded at restricted speed. Do you still have to wait, or may you proceed after coming to a full stop?
If you go back far enough (rule book wise) you'll find a flagman had to proceed a train or engine to the next signal at a permissive red signal. Most of the rule books that I have from about the 40s or 50s until the GCOR no longer required the 5 minute wait. Signals, then as now, can be highly railroad specific. Some may require things others didn't at specific signals.
When I hired out, we still had Stop and Proceed signals, a red signal with a number plate. You had to stop and then you could immediately proceed at restricted speed through the block. For a few years now, a red signal with a number plate is now a Restricted Proceed. You may pass the signal without stopping and continue through the block at restricted speed.
It seems for a while, the Restricted Proceed (or it's equivalent) seemed to become in vogue on railroads. Then some went back to Stop and Proceed. I'm thinking some of the western carriers about the last 30 years. This from rule books and time tables I've acquired over the years. While I'm not adverse to railroading east of the Mississippi, most of the material I come across usually is midwest to western in nature.
Interesting article about the deceased Amtrak engineer worrying about wreck. God rest his soul.
https://wtop.com/national/2018/02/mom-fatal-train-crash-engineer-worried-after-earlier-wreck/
LithoniaOperator AP story says: One car in the middle of the Amtrak train was snapped in half, forming a V off to one side of the tracks. I don’t think that is true. I‘m pretty sure a pair of cars jackknifed.
AP story says:
One car in the middle of the Amtrak train was snapped in half, forming a V off to one side of the tracks.
I don’t think that is true. I‘m pretty sure a pair of cars jackknifed.
Still in training.
jeffhergert Deggesty LithoniaOperator https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/05/us/positive-train-control-explainer/index.html Is it accurate that, according to an NTSB official, PTC would have prevented this accident? Does PTC detect switches aligned the wrong way? (Particularly during a signal supension.) Say the siding was empty: would PTC slow a train knowing that no one would ever intend to enter a siding that fast? Would any switch aligned from a main to a siding always trigger PTC actions? Does PTC "know" that (in this case) a train is in that siding? Etc. Etc. Yes, had the PTC installation been complete and in service, there would have been a signal showing STOP. However, two things combined to make the collision possible: the installation was in process, necessitating the temporary inoperation of the signal system, and (far worse) the failure of an employee to realign the switch--MAN FAILURE. One could only hope. https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAB1306.pdf Currently, hand throw switches themselves aren't in direct communication with PTC in signalled territory, but they are tied into the block system. If the signal systems detects an occupancy in a block protected by non-absolute signals, PTC will allow entrance at restricted speed. If there are switches in the block, PTC knows where they are at, but doesn't know their position. It will prompt the engineer on the screen to confirm which way the switch is aligned. In a signal suspension, PTC really won't know much of anything. I'm guessing to go through a signal suspension, PTC will have to be put in a "soft cut-out" state. It temporarily removes enforcement and disengages the system. (It's also done when making switching moves such as picking up or setting out cars.) Mind that this is the current state of PTC. As PTC evolves, things could change. Jeff
One could only hope.
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAB1306.pdf
Currently, hand throw switches themselves aren't in direct communication with PTC in signalled territory, but they are tied into the block system. If the signal systems detects an occupancy in a block protected by non-absolute signals, PTC will allow entrance at restricted speed. If there are switches in the block, PTC knows where they are at, but doesn't know their position. It will prompt the engineer on the screen to confirm which way the switch is aligned.
In a signal suspension, PTC really won't know much of anything. I'm guessing to go through a signal suspension, PTC will have to be put in a "soft cut-out" state. It temporarily removes enforcement and disengages the system. (It's also done when making switching moves such as picking up or setting out cars.)
Mind that this is the current state of PTC. As PTC evolves, things could change.
As I recall, years ago when you came upon a permissive red block you stopped and waited five minutes and then proceeded at restricted speed. Do you still have to wait, or may you proceed after coming to a full stop?
Since this is CTC territory, reporting hand throw switch position and or required FRA form(s) are quite likely not second nature to the crew members. What may well come out is CSX has gone through a gigantic shakeup from the late EEH, including brand new non railroad background managers, etc. Events like this are most often the result of several missteps coming together at the wrong time. The results are tragic. Lets hope lessons are quickly learned and no more of this occurs during the rest of the nationwide PTC construction and rollout.
Dennis who?
Semper Vaporo
Pkgs.
BaltACDNorth Korea does!
LithoniaOperator Murphy Siding Are you serious, or are you just being sarcastic? (Sorry man- the made me do it.) I'm serious. I love Dennis Rodman. Everyone does.
Murphy Siding Are you serious, or are you just being sarcastic? (Sorry man- the made me do it.)
(Sorry man- the made me do it.)
I'm serious. I love Dennis Rodman. Everyone does.
North Korea does!
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Murphy SidingAre you serious, or are you just being sarcastic? (Sorry man- the made me do it.)
BaltACDNuance is lost around here! State it clearly or not at all!
I think I'll continue to express myself as I see fit.
And I am more than happy if others express themselves as they see fit.
The best count of injuries has apparently ~ 0nly 20 passengeers were not injured. A detailed study why they were not injured will probably be included in the accident report. That is often the case from investigated air accidents.
maybe a few items. Backward facing seats, some heard emergency brakes and grabbed hold , bedroom persons up against bulkhead, etc ?
I read a news report today that the signal suspension was still in effect. That supposedly from a conference call with an Amtrak official.
oltmannd tree68 rdamon Isn't the anti-climber supposed to reduce damage that the lead CSX unit suffered or is the P42 designed differently? I would opine that above a certain speed, such features become merely decorative. +1 ...they still help, but...
tree68 rdamon Isn't the anti-climber supposed to reduce damage that the lead CSX unit suffered or is the P42 designed differently? I would opine that above a certain speed, such features become merely decorative.
rdamon Isn't the anti-climber supposed to reduce damage that the lead CSX unit suffered or is the P42 designed differently?
Isn't the anti-climber supposed to reduce damage that the lead CSX unit suffered or is the P42 designed differently?
I would opine that above a certain speed, such features become merely decorative.
+1
...they still help, but...
The anti-climber is meant to prevent an engine from 'telescoping' the other train in a head-on. The anticlimber in a head-on like this is supposed to prevent one engine from 'climbing' over the other; to momentarily 'lock' the two engines until one is deflected to the side - which looks like may have happened here, since the Amtrak engine ended up on it's left side. An engine hitting a sitting train at an estimated 50-55 MPH is going to cause damage, but that doesn't mean the anticlimbers didn't keep it from being even worse.
BaltACD Switches in signalled territory where trains (rule book definition) may CLEAR the Main track and the Main Track speed is designated to be above 20 MPH must be Electric Lock Switches per FRA rules. If a train is placed in a track without a Electric Lock switch, then the Dispatcher must issue a Speed Restriction of 20 MPH at that switch. NOW - if that is in fact a normal manual switch, was the Dispatcher informed that locomotives were a part of what was shoved off into the 'siding' thus creating a train. The audio tapes will tell the tale.
Switches in signalled territory where trains (rule book definition) may CLEAR the Main track and the Main Track speed is designated to be above 20 MPH must be Electric Lock Switches per FRA rules. If a train is placed in a track without a Electric Lock switch, then the Dispatcher must issue a Speed Restriction of 20 MPH at that switch.
NOW - if that is in fact a normal manual switch, was the Dispatcher informed that locomotives were a part of what was shoved off into the 'siding' thus creating a train.
The audio tapes will tell the tale.
Or equipped with a signal governing entrance to the main track over the hand throw switch. We commonly call this a "leaving signal." UP seems to have come to favor them over electric locks at hand throws where a train or engine might have to clear up.
BaltACD LithoniaOperator I didn't realize these emoticons were "alive." Apparently when I glanced at it, it wasn't winking! I still think it helps to identify sarcasm. Example: Everyone loves Dennis Rodman. Nuance is lost around here! State it clearly or not at all!
LithoniaOperator I didn't realize these emoticons were "alive." Apparently when I glanced at it, it wasn't winking! I still think it helps to identify sarcasm. Example: Everyone loves Dennis Rodman.
I still think it helps to identify sarcasm. Example:
Everyone loves Dennis Rodman.
Nuance is lost around here! State it clearly or not at all!
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
LithoniaOperatorI didn't realize these emoticons were "alive." Apparently when I glanced at it, it wasn't winking! I still think it helps to identify sarcasm. Example: Everyone loves Dennis Rodman.
I didn't realize these emoticons were "alive." Apparently when I glanced at it, it wasn't winking!
Our community is FREE to join. To participate you must either login or register for an account.