Euclid I am keeping an open mind until I see the official report. Is that ok with you?
I am keeping an open mind until I see the official report. Is that ok with you?
That is what the rest of us are doing. And most of us know enough to wait patiently, and quietly, until some facts are known relevant to the actual incident rather than blathering away in a vaccuum with sometimes wild theories.
We would all prefer to ignore you; however in the interest of ensuring those without much experience in railroading do not get misled some dedicated souls feel it necessary to keep correcting you. We don't want those who wish to learn more believing you have any credibility. You probably also missed the fact those who have real experience refrain from posting outside their specific areas of expertise.
So, sure keep an open mind. And the best way to keep it open is to not have it overflowing with idle speculation so that there is no room when the truth comes out.
John
cx500 Euclid I am keeping an open mind until I see the official report. Is that ok with you? That is what the rest of us are doing. And most of us know enough to wait patiently, and quietly, until some facts are known relevant to the actual incident rather than blathering away in a vaccuum with sometimes wild theories. We would all prefer to ignore you; however in the interest of ensuring those without much experience in railroading do not get misled some dedicated souls feel it necessary to keep correcting you. We don't want those who wish to learn more believing you have any credibility. You probably also missed the fact those who have real experience refrain from posting outside their specific areas of expertise. So, sure keep an open mind. And the best way to keep it open is to not have it overflowing with idle speculation so that there is no room when the truth comes out. John
No that is not what the rest of you are doing. One person is insisting, as speculation, that the Hyndman wreck was caused by improper train make up. I am not saying it is incorrect. I don't know the cause, and I don't care if anyone speculates. I also believe that I am not obligated to endorse someone else's speculation just because they or others insist it is accurate. Yet that is suddenly the latest greivance here.
Here is something interesting from Railway Age. It seems to say that the NTSB blames the Hyndman derailment on the train crew for failing to release all of the handbrakes. From the article:
“A preliminary report cites human error as the cause of a fiery CSX derailment Aug. 2 that forced the evacuation of Hyndman, Pa.”
http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/safety/ntsb-preliminary-report-cites-crew-error-in-csx-hazmat-derailment.html
The actual NTSB report is considerably more interesting. You can’t tell puckey from that Railway Age story, but I think the preliminary report tells quite well, albeit a little between the lines, what the problem was and how the accident developed.
I can’t paste the link from a phone, but it’s the first thing that comes up when you google “NTSB Hyndman”.
No - it says that a number of cars were found with flat spots, indicating that the hand brakes were still applied.
Any correlation between the train crew erring and the handbrakes being set is inferred, even in the story.
The actual NTSB makes no such inferrence, and in fact states:NTSBNTSB is investigating many factors into the cause of the derailment, including the length, make-up, and operation of the train, as well as the condition of the railcars and track. The actual report is here: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/DCA17FR011-prelim-report.aspx
NTSBNTSB is investigating many factors into the cause of the derailment, including the length, make-up, and operation of the train, as well as the condition of the railcars and track.
The actual report is here: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/DCA17FR011-prelim-report.aspx
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
While at Raiway Age, I checked their evaluation of the NAS/TRB ECP study.
I don't think this table appeared in any of the summaries, only the average number of derailed cars...
ECPOverlay
DP orEOT
Conventional
Average
21.0
23.1
25.5
Minimum
12
14
8
Maximum
28
39
45
Range
16
25
37
Standarddeviation
4.4
5.6
7.2
So while the averages are similar, and allow the conclusion that ECP doesn't help in a derailment, the minimum and maximum number of derailed cars is significant.
Not surprisingly, ECP worked more consistently in the eighteen tests that each system underwent. The possible range of the number of derailed cars for ECP was less than HALF that for conventional brakes.
So if your train had ECP brakes in an accident with the conditions simulated, the maximum number of cars derailed would be 28 compared to 45 for conventional brakes and 39 for DP operation.
What is surprising is that for conventional front end initiated Westinghouse operation, the minimum number was only 8 cars derailed, compared to 12 for ECP and 14 for DP.
This clearly shows a wide variation in the effectiveness of operation of air brakes in emergency mode. Emergency is at the "edge of the envelope" and can sometimes work very well but at other times (presumably with exactly the same consist) not very well at all.
To quote
Railway Age asked noted rail industry technical expert Steven R. Ditmeyer, who has a long history with ECP brakes and PTC, among other technologies, to review and comment on the NAS/TRB report:
in which he concluded...
“I believe that the silly argument going on between FRA and the AAR on how much of a safety improvement ECP brakes will provide by reducing the number of tank cars derailed and punctured in an oil train derailment is preventing the railroad industry from implementing a technology that can also provide it with significant operating and maintenance savings. The TRB committee report provided no guidance or encouragement to bringing this about.”
I myself am struck by the old adage about, "lies, bad lies and statistics".
If the maxima and minima had been quoted in the main body of the press release, fewer people would have felt happy with the conclusion that ECP doesn't help in a derailment.
Peter
The Railway Age article interprets the NTSB report as saying that the crew caused the derailment by human error. I have read the NTSB report many times and I do not interpret it as saying that the crew caused the derailment, although the investigation still has a long way to go. I believe the crew intentionally left the handbrakes set in order to supplement the air brakes, perhaps because they did not fully trust the air brakes after the experience of the previous crew who had trouble with the air brakes.
Although I do feel that the NTSB could have described this more carefully because it might not be obvious to many that proceeding with handbrakes set is an acceptable practice. Certainly several people in the previous threads indicated that proceeding with handbrakes set was never acceptable. And if you believe that, then the only meaning you can draw from the NTSB report is that the crew likely forgot to release the handbrakes. When I first read the report, that is what I thought it was saying.
Regarding the reason for leaving handbrakes set, here is the most definitive sentence from the NTSB report.
“The second crew, thinking the train may still have air brake problems, kept all 58 hand brakes applied and unsuccessfully tried to pull the train down the hill.”
When I read that, the key phrase is: “thinking the train may still have air brake problems.” The way that is inserted into the sentence means that that is the reason why the crew kept all 58 hand brakes applied.
I'm sorry, I see nothing in the Railway Age article that says the crew was as fault, as such, except the headline and the sub-headline.
While the article does say that there was damage to wheels, apparently due to handbrakes being left set, it does not say that the crew erred in that regard.
One could just as easily assume that the crew's error was switching between dynamics and air several times...
One thing to remember - ahead of the initially derailed car was 1600 tons of train. Behind the initially derailed car was 16000 tons of train.
The initially derailed car was 35 from the engines and was in a cut of 27 empty cars.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
BaltACD One thing to remember - ahead of the initially derailed car was 1600 tons of train. Behind the initially derailed car was 16000 tons of train. The initially derailed car was 35 from the engines and was in a cut of 27 empty cars.
I would not rule that out as being either part of the cause or the sole cause. I also do not see any reason to conclude that the accident was caused by human error of the crew.
Euclid BaltACD One thing to remember - ahead of the initially derailed car was 1600 tons of train. Behind the initially derailed car was 16000 tons of train. The initially derailed car was 35 from the engines and was in a cut of 27 empty cars. I would not rule that out as being either part of the cause or the sole cause. I also do not see any reason to conclude that the accident was caused by human error of the crew.
It's pretty straightforward, in the NTSB report that I read, that the derailed wheelset was in the middle of a block of cars with evidence of slid wheels from overapplied handbrakes, all of which were empty, all of which were in the part of the 58-car section that the crew couldn't be bothered to walk to to correct the brake application. Herein is the 'crew error' imho.
Even the CSX 'emergency' procedure calls for application of 'retainer handbrakes' only on loaded cars. If I understand the intent of this rule correctly, what 'should' have happened is that the relief crew, concerned about airbrake integrity, would (in some safe order) set the necessary number of brakes on known loaded cars, probably but not necessarily at optimal point(s) in the consist, and then release all the handbrakes on empty cars, not just the first 20 or so of them they happened to come to when walking back from the head end, as the NTSB report appears to clearly state they did.
And yes, had they done this, powering the train downhill would not have produced the wear and damage observed, and in all probability would not have resulted in the single wheelset derailing when it did. (Whether or not you think, as I happen to, that any use of handbraking as 'retainers' for a power downhill move is dumb.)
.
BigJim BaltACD One thing to remember - ahead of the initially derailed car was 1600 tons of train. Behind the initially derailed car was 16000 tons of train. The initially derailed car was 35 from the engines and was in a cut of 27 empty cars. While this may have contributed to the derailment, it surely wasn't the sole cause. There are a lot of things going on that caused this one. And don't put too much blame on that cut of empties either, I've had worse and didn't derail!
While this may have contributed to the derailment, it surely wasn't the sole cause. There are a lot of things going on that caused this one. And don't put too much blame on that cut of empties either, I've had worse and didn't derail!
Have you oprated the East slope of Sand Patch?
I get the feeling, once the train got stopped - this became a damned if you do, damned if you don't kind of train. Had the train not been stopped by a UDE it may have been able to be properly controlled with the use of both air and dynamics. Once it was stopped, the dynamics of trying to get the train started and not have it become a runaway became much more difficult.
BaltACDHave you oprated the East slope of Sand Patch? I get the feeling, once the train got stopped - this became a damned if you do, damned if you don't kind of train. Had the train not been stopped by a UDE it may have been able to be properly controlled with the use of both air and dynamics. Once it was stopped, the dynamics of trying to get the train started and not have it become a runaway became much more difficult.
This wasn't a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" situation. You are correct that had the train not had to stop, things would have probably gone along fine. Now, it is my understanding that the first crew stopped the train on their own volition because they felt something was wrong with the brakes, not because of a UDE. They also, properly tied up enough hand brakes to hold the train in order that the brake pipe pressure could be restored to fully charged.
It really makes no difference how the train stopped, nothing derailed at that time. It was only after the second crew took over that things took a turn for the worse. And, therein begins the story!
BigJim BaltACD Have you oprated the East slope of Sand Patch? I get the feeling, once the train got stopped - this became a damned if you do, damned if you don't kind of train. Had the train not been stopped by a UDE it may have been able to be properly controlled with the use of both air and dynamics. Once it was stopped, the dynamics of trying to get the train started and not have it become a runaway became much more difficult. No, I haven't operated the East slope of Sand Patch. That is a moot point. This wasn't a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" situation. You are correct that had the train not had to stop, things would have probably gone along fine. Now, it is my understanding that the first crew stopped the train on their own volition because they felt something was wrong with the brakes, not because of a UDE. They also, properly tied up enough hand brakes to hold the train in order that the brake pipe pressure could be restored to fully charged. It really makes no difference how the train stopped, nothing derailed at that time. It was only after the second crew took over that things took a turn for the worse. And, therein begins the story!
BaltACD Have you oprated the East slope of Sand Patch? I get the feeling, once the train got stopped - this became a damned if you do, damned if you don't kind of train. Had the train not been stopped by a UDE it may have been able to be properly controlled with the use of both air and dynamics. Once it was stopped, the dynamics of trying to get the train started and not have it become a runaway became much more difficult.
No, I haven't operated the East slope of Sand Patch. That is a moot point.
Crew was not able to move the train with all 58 hand brakes applied.
NTSB Preliminary ReportThe second crew, thinking the train may still have air brake problems, kept all 58 hand brakes applied and unsuccessfully tried to pull the train down the hill. The conductor of the second crew then released the first 25 hand brakes, leaving 33 hand brakes still applied. The engineer applied a minimum air brake application and started the train with locomotive power down the grade. The train speed varied from 20 to 30 mph. The engineer transitioned from locomotive power to dynamic braking three times before the train derailed.
Had all hand brakes been released, I suspect the engine consist would not have been able to hold the train of almost 18000 tons in place to allow the Conductor to be able to reboard the locomotives. It can be argued that the hand brakes should have been released from the Westernmost car Eastward as the Conductor returned to the head end. Report seems to indicate that the hand brakes were released from the engines Westward which left the rear portion of the previously applied hand brakes still applied.
Gentlemen,
I have no dog in this fight but from my perspective I believe it may have resulted in a different outcome had the crew requested assistance either in the form of a couple of locomotives connected to the rear to act as braking power or at the head end for the dynamics. Bottom line as I see it was the lack of being able to control the train on the downgrade even with some brakes set.
Norm
BaltACDCrew was not able to move the train with all 58 hand brakes applied.
BaltACDHad all hand brakes been released, I suspect the engine consist would not have been able to hold the train of almost 18000 tons in place to allow the Conductor to be able to reboard the locomotives. It can be argued that the hand brakes should have been released from the Westernmost car Eastward as the Conductor returned to the head end. Report seems to indicate that the hand brakes were released from the engines Westward which left the rear portion of the previously applied hand brakes still applied.
NO!
I have had simulator time being supervised by a CSX Road Foreman of Engines. I know it is nowhere near the real thing.
I did recieve 'Trainmasters Training' at the Chessie System Engineers Training School; of course at that time GP40's were the company's BIG power of choice. Needless to say this was all a few years ago and not being a Engineer by trade I have no day in, day out experience of operating trains big or small, flatland's or mountains.
I do understand train dynamics as well as draft and buff forces and how they act within a moving train. I have been the recipent of a 'wild ride' in a caboose as well as nearly being knocked off a caboose by slack action. I have held onto the side of a car that had to be shoved a couple of miles to be spoted (without shoving platform).
My career didn't have me operating trains daily, rather supervising the men and women that operated them as well as creating some of the computer applications that affect the operations of trains and yards as well as dispatching them.
As the conductor releases the handbrakes, wouldn't the train be held by the automatic air brakes throughout the train, thus allowing the conductor time to get the handbrakes released and board the locomotive?
EuclidAs the conductor releases the handbrakes, wouldn't the train be held by the automatic air brakes throughout the train, thus allowing the conductor time to get the handbrakes released and board the locomotive?
Sure - but then there wouldn't be enough air in the reservoirs on the cars for another application, which would be needed almost immediately. You'd be amazed at how fast a train of that size can get rolling in no time at all, on a grade like that.
Engineers who make repeated sets without letting the entire train recharge are said to be "pissing away their air." Pardon the vernacular. This has been a common cause of runaways for years. In this case, starting from a set would have put the engineer at an immediate disadvantage due to the reduced pressure left in the service reservoirs.
As Balt notes - this was a lose-lose situation under the circumstances.
Euclid BaltACD Had all hand brakes been released, I suspect the engine consist would not have been able to hold the train of almost 18000 tons in place to allow the Conductor to be able to reboard the locomotives. It can be argued that the hand brakes should have been released from the Westernmost car Eastward as the Conductor returned to the head end. Report seems to indicate that the hand brakes were released from the engines Westward which left the rear portion of the previously applied hand brakes still applied. As the conductor releases the handbrakes, wouldn't the train be held by the automatic air brakes throughout the train, thus allowing the conductor time to get the handbrakes released and board the locomotive?
BaltACD Had all hand brakes been released, I suspect the engine consist would not have been able to hold the train of almost 18000 tons in place to allow the Conductor to be able to reboard the locomotives. It can be argued that the hand brakes should have been released from the Westernmost car Eastward as the Conductor returned to the head end. Report seems to indicate that the hand brakes were released from the engines Westward which left the rear portion of the previously applied hand brakes still applied.
When you are 'recharging' the air brake system - it is releasing the air brakes throughout the train. With the trains air brake system being recharged, the only brakes to hold back the train on a grade are whatever hand brakes have been applied as well as the Independent brakes that are applied on the locomotives.
On Sand Patch's grades, 17K+ tons of train can easily overpower the sole braking power of 5 locomotive units.
Okay, let me follow this sequence:
The train is being held by handbrakes while the reservoirs are being recharged. Once they are recharged, all the air brakes on the cars will have released during the recharge, but the train is still being held by the handbrakes.
Then the engineer makes a service application that is sufficient to hold the train without handbrakes.
Then the concuctor walks the train, releases the handbrakes, and gets back on the engine.
Then the engineer releases the automatic air brakes on the entire train. He must go to full release to begin moving even though some degree of set will immediately be needed after the full release. When the air brakes througout the train fully release, the train starts rolling.
So far, there is no issue of P-ing away the air. The system is fully charged, the [hand] brakes are fully released, the conductor is on board, and the train has started to roll.
So then what does the engineer do next?
EuclidOkay, let me follow this sequence: The train is being held by handbrakes while the reservoirs are being recharged. Once they are recharged, all the air brakes on the cars will have released during the recharge, but the train is still being held by the handbrakes. Then the engineer makes a service application that is sufficient to hold the train without handbrakes. Then the concuctor walks the train, releases the handbrakes, and gets back on the engine. Then the engineer releases the automatic air brakes on the entire train. He must go to full release to begin moving even though some degree of set will immediately be needed after the full release. When the air brakes througout the train fully release, the train starts rolling. So far, there is no issue of P-ing away the air. The system is fully charged, the brakes are fully released, the conductor is on board, and the train has started to roll. So then what does the engineer do next?
So far, there is no issue of P-ing away the air. The system is fully charged, the brakes are fully released, the conductor is on board, and the train has started to roll.
A 'running release' on this territory is prohibited by TTSI. What you are outlining constitutes a running release of the air brakes.
BaltACD Euclid Okay, let me follow this sequence: The train is being held by handbrakes while the reservoirs are being recharged. Once they are recharged, all the air brakes on the cars will have released during the recharge, but the train is still being held by the handbrakes. Then the engineer makes a service application that is sufficient to hold the train without handbrakes. Then the concuctor walks the train, releases the handbrakes, and gets back on the engine. Then the engineer releases the automatic air brakes on the entire train. He must go to full release to begin moving even though some degree of set will immediately be needed after the full release. When the air brakes througout the train fully release, the train starts rolling. So far, there is no issue of P-ing away the air. The system is fully charged, the brakes are fully released, the conductor is on board, and the train has started to roll. So then what does the engineer do next? A 'running release' on this territory is prohibited by TTSI. What you are outlining constitutes a running release of the air brakes.
Euclid Okay, let me follow this sequence: The train is being held by handbrakes while the reservoirs are being recharged. Once they are recharged, all the air brakes on the cars will have released during the recharge, but the train is still being held by the handbrakes. Then the engineer makes a service application that is sufficient to hold the train without handbrakes. Then the concuctor walks the train, releases the handbrakes, and gets back on the engine. Then the engineer releases the automatic air brakes on the entire train. He must go to full release to begin moving even though some degree of set will immediately be needed after the full release. When the air brakes througout the train fully release, the train starts rolling. So far, there is no issue of P-ing away the air. The system is fully charged, the brakes are fully released, the conductor is on board, and the train has started to roll. So then what does the engineer do next?
Ok, so what is the allowed procedure?
Semper Vaporo
Pkgs.
Balt ACD,
In regard to your previous post, how is it a running release? The automatic air brakes are released before the train begins moving. Then once the train begins to move, a service application is made to limit the train's acceleration down the grade. Where is the running release that you refer to? Please explain.
Note: For clarification, I did edit the second to last sentence of my previous post to indicate the word "brakes" to mean handbrakes.
I am watching this with some interest as to what the detailed procedure is going to be, both 'in general' and in the case of the special CSX 'rule' permitting handbraking on power downhill moves.
In the present case, we should remember that according to the NTSB the crew did not trust that the automatic air brake was working correctly -- detail of the actual problem precipitating the incident, and what the crew thought the problem was, not yet fully provided as far as I can see. As I understand it the 'workaround' being followed was to keep sufficient non-automatic-brake-related resistance on the consist to require the addition of locomotive power to gravity to physically move the train down even the steepest part of the grade. I would further presume, perhaps quite wrongly, that this precluded any use of dynamics, or a release and recharge while the train was thoroughly secured on the grade (with handbrakes and independent) followed by some reasonable graduated application, perhaps in stages, sufficient to assure control of the train during the time the crew is progressively releasing all the set handbrakes.
(I would think you'd keep the independent on until after all the handbrakes were released, and the crew all safely returned to the train, and then bail off the independent (perhaps with the power quickly in dynamic to assist in control) to start the train moving with the automatic in set, applying a little more air as needed to control acceleration and achieved speed just as for a running descent that didn't involve a stop on the grade.)
Now, obviously, if you don't trust that the automatic brake will take and hold the required partial application ... that method either won't work or won't be safe enough, particularly on a part of the railroad, if I remember correctly, where it has been conclusively established that at achieved speeds higher than about 23mph no brake shoes (applied by air or hand) will hold the train from uncontrolled acceleration. Under that circumstance, and given whatever circumstances do not allow full repair and testing of the automatic brake system before attempting to move the train, it would seem to make sense to hold the train with 'something other than the automatic brake' to get it down the grade; you could do part of that with dynamics but (a) it's a Federal offense to use dynamics alone to hold such a train on such a grade; and (b) if the dynamics fail or prove inadequate there are going to be problems in very short order if the automatic doesn't set on almost any part of the consist as expected.
Therefore you have the CSX 'expedient', which if I understand it correctly says that if you have an automatic that is unreliable in graduated application (or prone to unexpected release) and you are stopped on a steep downgrade, about the only thing you can do is substitute some number of handbrakes for the capability of the automatic air brake, and proceed with using the independent (together with the set handbrakes) to hold the train when the automatic is released; the 'catch' being that because you can't adjust the set of the handbrakes while the train is in motion the only 'safe' expedient will be to set more brakes than you need and 'power' the train down to where the brake system can be remediated, defective cars cut out, etc. etc. etc.
Which is what this crew appeared to be trying, except that some large number of the brakes they were using turned out to be on unloaded cars -- contrary to CSX emergency procedure as well as normal railroad-rule common sense -- with resulting skidding, tread buildup, and ultimately it would seem wheelset derailment.
EuclidSo far, there is no issue of P-ing away the air. The system is fully charged, the [hand] brakes are fully released, the conductor is on board, and the train has started to roll.
Please explain how the system is fully charged immediately after the automatic brakes are released.
I don't run 100 car trains - mine are rarely over 4 or 5 (except Polar Express - that's a dozen cars). But it still takes 15-20 seconds or better for the air flow indicator to settle down, indicating that the train is fully charged.
As for the independent brakes holding that train on that grade - ain't happening.
And as for the dynamics - I slipped the dynamics the other day with an eight car train, two locomotives in dynamics on about a 1.5% downgrade.
In case anyone needs a refresher: http://www.railway-technical.com/trains/rolling-stock-index-l/train-equipment/brakes/north-american-freight.html
BaltACDA 'running release' on this territory is prohibited by TTSI. What you are outlining constitutes a running release of the air brakes.
Balt,
While I'm by no means totally familiar with the air brake system I seek to learn more than what little I know.
I believe normal trainline pressure on freights is 90 PI. If it starts from a fully charged state, and after a 20 PSI reduction to 'service application that Euclid suggested' the train line will now be 70 PSI and it can't be recharged while in service application but only after the brake handle is returned to the 'release' position hence not having enough air to make a further set without going into emergency. I'm assuming (Yeah, I know) that the reservoirs on the cars will drop to 70 the same as the trainline will. Where does that leave the emergency reservoirs? I would think they would still have full pressure.
So, what reserve air does that 20 PSI reduction leave on each car's normal brake reservoir to be effective for more braking power should the engineer decide he needs another 10 PSI reduction? Will there be enough pressure in those car reservoirs to make that reduction effective?
I'm not faulting the crew for their actions but wonder if they had communicated their problem to a Road Foreman who may have given them bad advice. It's still in my mind that additional power could have helped mitigate the situation by adding additional braking on either the lead ot the rear of the train.
Rules be damned at times that call for them to be worked around. Would have parking the train till assistance arrived have prevented the problem?
I don't work heavy grade territory. The worst I deal with is a couple of short 1 to 1.25 % grades.
What Euclid said about starting out (setting air, releasing hand brakes then releasing air, etc) is how we would start out. But we don't have miles of heavy grade to traverse. Actually, we routinely stop on one of these grades with heavy trains. The only time hand brakes are applied is if there was a UDE. Once you release, you are going to move. The independent isn't going to hold. I start out in dynamics and it keeps one slow enough to get a good, but not fully recharge of the brakes. Especially with a DP in the train.
Normally, releasing the air brake while stopped isn't considered a running release. Without knowing the details of the TT/SI in effect at that location, I'm thinking CSX may not allow any release of the air brakes when on the grade. Although I'm not sure if the timeline is correct, I note before starting the engineer made a minimum reduction of the automatic brake. Then started pulling the train with a minimum set and some hand brakes applied.
Balt is may be correct that the engine brakes and a minimum set alone might not allow all hand brakes to be released without movement. A heavier set, enough to hold might not allow the engines to pull, even downgrade. I don't know CSX rules but we are allowed when having an AC engine consist to shove back into the train to hold it. It's frowned upon with DC engines because it's hard on the traction motors.
I guess what I would do, and it might be wrong-as I said I don't work territory like that, but would make the minimum set. If that and the engine's independent wasn't enough to hold, then shove back enough to hold the train, even if I had DC engines in the consist, to allow the condr to release the hand brakes and get back on the engines. When ready to move, get out of power shoving back and go into dynamics going forward and release the independent. Once moving if dynamics and the minimum set aren't enough to hold the proper speed, you could squeeze off a couple more pounds of air. Just use enough air so that modulating dynamic braking controls speed. If the grade lessens or levels out, you might have to go into power and pull the train in spots. It sounds like the engineer did this a few times. That's the trick, using just the right amount of air. If you use to much air, you'll have to stop and go through the whole process again to release and recharge.
If the crew had any doubts, a supervisor should have been consulted. Oh wait, EHH got rid of the Road Foremen.
Jeff
Thanks Jeff. That does help explain things.
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