EuclidBut ECP also applies simultaneously whereas conventional air brakes apply sequentially car by car. The simultaneous application prevents derailments by limiting slack force.
You've never seen an emergency application.
As soon as a car detects an emergency application, it, too, dumps the brakes. It's so close to instantaneous as you can get without actually being instantaneous.
And you can't forget momentum. Once again we go back to the video tape (the tornado video) where it's quite obvious that the train line has parted (thus the car's brakes are in emergency), yet the remaining cars run smack into the locomotive with the camera.
And I suspect that is why M636 sees limited value in ECP for track-caused derailments. If the track structure fails, the cars are derailing regardless of what the brakes do. At that point, the only value of brakes is to perhaps prevent some of the succeeding cars from becoming part of the pile. And since ECP is only marginally better than conventional brakes in an emergency application, that simply means that the number of cars in the pile will be marginally less.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
tree68 Euclid But ECP also applies simultaneously whereas conventional air brakes apply sequentially car by car. The simultaneous application prevents derailments by limiting slack force. You've never seen an emergency application. As soon as a car detects an emergency application, it, too, dumps the brakes. It's so close to instantaneous as you can get without actually being instantaneous. And you can't forget momentum. Once again we go back to the video tape (the tornado video) where it's quite obvious that the train line has parted (thus the car's brakes are in emergency), yet the remaining cars run smack into the locomotive with the camera. And I suspect that is why M636 sees limited value in ECP for track-caused derailments. If the track structure fails, the cars are derailing regardless of what the brakes do. At that point, the only value of brakes is to perhaps prevent some of the succeeding cars from becoming part of the pile. And since ECP is only marginally better than conventional brakes in an emergency application, that simply means that the number of cars in the pile will be marginally less.
Euclid But ECP also applies simultaneously whereas conventional air brakes apply sequentially car by car. The simultaneous application prevents derailments by limiting slack force.
I have seen many emergency applications, and they do propagate quite fast. All I said is emergency stopping is a little faster with ECP although not as much faster as service application stopping is. You seem to be saying that they are equal when you say conventional air brake application is as close to simultaneous as you can get. It is close to simultaneous, but close to simultaneous is not simultaneous. What I said is entirely accurate. I said ECP applies simultaneously whereas conventional air brakes apply sequentially car by car.
I don’t follow your point about the tornado wreck. The oncoming cars are in emergency and they still keep moving until they hit the engine. What does that prove? Nobody is claiming that ECP stops the train instantly just because it gets the train into emergency faster.
EuclidI don’t follow your point about the tornado wreck. The oncoming cars are in emergency and they still keep moving until they hit the engine. What does that prove? Nobody is claiming that ECP stops the train instantly just because it gets the train into emergency faster.
It speaks to M636C's point that for non-brake related derailments, ECP is of limited additional value. You asked why he drew that conclusion - this is one possibility. As you say - ECP would not have prevented that outcome.
I read one document (can't remember where) that stated that the cost to install ECP is something more that ten times it's return. Not much of an incentive. Little wonder the railroads haven't embraced the technology.
I don't doubt that the cost will be sky high. I don't know about ten times the return, but I would not be surpised if it is ten times the estimate. As far as the return goes, I see the industry not wanting to spend the money no matter what the return is. Not only are they reluctant to spend the money needed for the tank car mandate, but they are probably very aprehensive over the possibility of that mandate opening to door to a full system mandate. I have been reading everything I can find on the performance return on ECP, and it truely is a debate of positions diametrically opposed on every conceivable point. I think both sides have a strong argument. Basically, the industry seems to be arguing that ECP is completely worthless as it stands.
A lot of the context of this argument is like a political debate. But in the end, the argument is technical, and thus it is likely to become settled in the favor of one side or the other. So I may be a little risky to become firmly entrenched in one position.
The FRA found in 2007 that the cost would be $432 million to convert all locomotives and cars used for PRB coal and spelled out $170 millon in benefits. (http://www.transportation.northwestern.edu/docs/2007/2007.11.08.Murphy.Presentation.pdf)
The railroads say the cost would be more like $3 billion. The FRA estimate in the following article (2016) was $493 million.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/railroads-regulators-clash-over-braking-system-for-trains-carrying-flammable-liquids/2016/12/19/68071650-9ad4-11e6-b3c9-f662adaa0048_story.html?utm_term=.b7d5a47a3f78
Another 2006 estimate by Booz Allen put the total cost of conversion (all locomotives and cars in US) at $7.5 Billion. I can't find the specific article with the 10:1 ratio, but did encounter another that cited a 9:1 ratio of cost to benefit.
Either way, the idea is to have a positive cost benefit ratio, not a negative one.
Just as Westinghouse brakes were a progression from cranking on the brake wheel, ECP will be a progression from Westinghouse. Short of a mandate (which would have major impacts on the industry), it's probably going to be quite a few years before it gains widespread acceptance. The connector is just one roadblock.
On those impacts, one must remember that a significant number of the cars running on US rails are owned not by the railroads, but by companies that lease them to users. One must consider the effect on railroading if a major leaser decided to pull out of railroading instead of equipping all their cars...
If ECP is going to be adopted, I think it should be strictly voluntary. Let the free market decide. I definitely oppose this being forced as a mandate. Not only is it likely to be driven by emotion, but it also greatly distorts the market. The mandate alone will force the cost much higher than need be. Also, if it weren’t for the mandate, railroads would not feel so defensive and feel the need to ward it off at all costs. Without the mandate, maybe something good could come of it. I believe it is the mandate that explains the apparent disconnect between ECP working in Australia, yet being unable to work here, even though the trains and conditions are very similar.
Euclideven though the trains and conditions are very similar.
A fair portion of the discussion here of late concerns how different the two are.
Climate is a major factor in North America. Cold and snow in the north, humidity in the south. The American west appears to be the closest to what they are operating with in Australia. I could be wrong.
And they are chiefly using ECP in unit trains. A significant portion of North American railroading is still loose car operations, and that looks to be where the issues will come with ECP.
The connectors may work well in unit trains (as has been noted), but not so much where they have to be regularly broken apart and reconnected. Railroaders can break pretty much anything...
One of the Booz Allen studies concerned PRB trains, where they found about a 3:1 cost benefit ratio. I would submit that short of a mandate, the railroads are going to have to see something closer to a 1:1 ratio before they get excited.
If we take the simulations at face value, we have four tank cars penetrated instead of five and a similarly smaller number derailed with the use of ECP brakes.
However, the cost of the ECP brakes is quite high and the AAR suggest that around twice as many cars as the FRA suggest will need to be converted.
Present operating practices mean that all the tank cars will need to be fitted with both Westinghouse and ECP braking. This will increase the cost further and if my interpretation of the GAO Report discussions is correct, wil substantially decrease the reliability of the the combined brake system to below that of either single system.
So even if the mandate was enforced, the railroads would convert as slowly as they could an empasise the additional failures of the combined system, so that the costs will increase and the benefits fall even further.
If on the other hand, the railroads were willing to accept new DOT-117 tank cars fitted only with ECP braking and run them as dedicated unit trains, I think the perceived reliability problems would disappear at the expense of operational flexibility. My question is: "Can the loss of flexibility by using only ECP equipped cars be justified by greater reliability and availability, but in a more restricted range of operation?
From the experience in Australia, I believe that would work, because that is how it worked in Australia.
People have indicated that use of emergency braking in the Westinghouse system gives an application time not significantly different from ECP braking in the same conditions.
My question is: do you ever want to use the emergency function in Westinghouse braking? I've described elsewhere that the only train I've been on when Emergency was used broke in five places, on a straight relatively gentle descending grade. If your train wasn't derailed before the Emergency application, there is a good chance that it would be afterwards, if any curves are involved. For a heavy train, the forces are huge. Ironically, that train had transducers for measuring force and draft gear travel, but the system had been turned of as we were approaching the yard at the end of the journey.
The feature of ECP that isn't discussed enough is: can a full service application of ECP braking stop a train clear of an obstacle or other problem that would otherwise require the use of Emergency with Westinghouse brakes. This has the potential to stop a train in a controlled manner causing no damage compared to the "all or nothing" capability of Emergency braking which will often result in flat wheels and broken couplers.
If the 70% improvement in stopping distance for service applications is true, there must be examples where a full service ECP application will stop a train in an orderly manner where the only option with Westinghouse is Emergency.
This I think is the point being missed by people who indicate how fast an emergency application can propagate. The emergency application is effectively uncontrolled except in initiation and the cure could be worse than the disease.
Peter
M636CThe feature of ECP that isn't discussed enough is: can a full service application of ECP braking stop a train clear of an obstacle or other problem that would otherwise require the use of Emergency with Westinghouse brakes. This has the potential to stop a train in a controlled manner causing no damage compared to the "all or nothing" capability of Emergency braking which will often result in flat wheels and broken couplers. If the 70% improvement in stopping distance for service applications is true, there must be examples where a full service ECP application will stop a train in an orderly manner where the only option with Westinghouse is Emergency.
That is a good point. With a service application of ECP, I suspect you can send air into the cylinders immediately without taking time to draw down the train line. You just connect the reservoirs to the brake cylinders by an electronic command that connects every cylinder to air at the same time.
With a service application with Westinghouse brakes, not only is there a requirement to draw down the train line in order to begin charging the cylinders, but also that draw-down must proceed gradually enough to avoid triggering an emergency application.
It leads me to wonder what the practical difference is between a maximum service application of ECP, and an emergency application with ECP. Both are quick acting, unlike Westinghouse in which only the emergency application is quick acting.
The prefered braking method on my former carrier is use of extended range dynamic brakes. In specific locations the use of stretch air braking is permitted. Obviously, Emergency is never the prefered method. The reason dynamic braking is perferred is that there is little to no likelyhood of having a 'kicker' place the train in emergency as is possible when using air brakes at a service rate.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
The reason dynamic braking is preferred is because it is more fuel efficient. To get the most out of ECP for train handling you are going to be doing more power/stretchbraking. Whether they have thought that far out, I don't know.
Maybe it's the cynic in me, but I think the reason you aren't seeing more developement of ECP by the railroads is economic. Not technical. They don't want to spend the money for something that doesn't have a quick or substancial pay off. I can't blame them for that.
Jeff
EuclidOne way of taking the risk out of re-starting is to use a number of handbrakes set to hold the train back somewhat at the starting upon release of the air brakes. Ideally, the handbrakes would be released once the train is rolling under control of air brakes and dynamic brakes. But there is no way to release the hand brakes once the train is moving. One option would be to set the handbrakes so lightly that they could just drag without sliding wheels. But for proceeding with handbrakes set for supplementing air brakes, the handbrakes were probably set too tightly because they had been set originally for the purpose of securement. So reducing their set would have required the task of releasing each handbrake and re-setting them to a lighter application. CSX guidance on re-starting with handbrakes set was posted in one of the previous threads about this derailment, but it did not stipulate how tightly the handbrakes were to be set if used in this manner. It did stipulate that no handbrakes be set on empties. As I understand it, handbrakes were set on empties, which was okay for securement, but not for re-starting with handbrakes set. We have not been told what role the set handbrakes played in this derailment, but it is possible that they directly caused the derailment by causing wheels to slide. In any case, the use of handbrakes to aid in re-starting would have been unnecessary had the train been equipped with ECP brakes.
.
BigJim Euclid One way of taking the risk out of re-starting is to use a number of handbrakes set to hold the train back somewhat at the starting upon release of the air brakes. Ideally, the handbrakes would be released once the train is rolling under control of air brakes and dynamic brakes. But there is no way to release the hand brakes once the train is moving. One option would be to set the handbrakes so lightly that they could just drag without sliding wheels. But for proceeding with handbrakes set for supplementing air brakes, the handbrakes were probably set too tightly because they had been set originally for the purpose of securement. So reducing their set would have required the task of releasing each handbrake and re-setting them to a lighter application. CSX guidance on re-starting with handbrakes set was posted in one of the previous threads about this derailment, but it did not stipulate how tightly the handbrakes were to be set if used in this manner. It did stipulate that no handbrakes be set on empties. As I understand it, handbrakes were set on empties, which was okay for securement, but not for re-starting with handbrakes set. We have not been told what role the set handbrakes played in this derailment, but it is possible that they directly caused the derailment by causing wheels to slide. In any case, the use of handbrakes to aid in re-starting would have been unnecessary had the train been equipped with ECP brakes. For those of you who have come here seeking knowledge...Beware! The quote above is total BS and shows that the OP has absolutely no idea what he is talking about. If I remember correctly, we had gone over this myth a long time ago in a previous thread, yet he persists on perpetuating this crap!I am sorry to have had to open this can of worms this far into the discussion, but, it needed to be said in order to belay any wild rumors it may have started in the minds of unknowing readers. The use of hand brakes to controll the movement of a train over the road is totally unsafe and unacceptable!
Euclid One way of taking the risk out of re-starting is to use a number of handbrakes set to hold the train back somewhat at the starting upon release of the air brakes. Ideally, the handbrakes would be released once the train is rolling under control of air brakes and dynamic brakes. But there is no way to release the hand brakes once the train is moving. One option would be to set the handbrakes so lightly that they could just drag without sliding wheels. But for proceeding with handbrakes set for supplementing air brakes, the handbrakes were probably set too tightly because they had been set originally for the purpose of securement. So reducing their set would have required the task of releasing each handbrake and re-setting them to a lighter application. CSX guidance on re-starting with handbrakes set was posted in one of the previous threads about this derailment, but it did not stipulate how tightly the handbrakes were to be set if used in this manner. It did stipulate that no handbrakes be set on empties. As I understand it, handbrakes were set on empties, which was okay for securement, but not for re-starting with handbrakes set. We have not been told what role the set handbrakes played in this derailment, but it is possible that they directly caused the derailment by causing wheels to slide. In any case, the use of handbrakes to aid in re-starting would have been unnecessary had the train been equipped with ECP brakes.
For those of you who have come here seeking knowledge...Beware! The quote above is total BS and shows that the OP has absolutely no idea what he is talking about. If I remember correctly, we had gone over this myth a long time ago in a previous thread, yet he persists on perpetuating this crap!I am sorry to have had to open this can of worms this far into the discussion, but, it needed to be said in order to belay any wild rumors it may have started in the minds of unknowing readers. The use of hand brakes to controll the movement of a train over the road is totally unsafe and unacceptable!
If you were really worried that unknowing readers were going to have their minds warped by me starting wild rumors, then you would explain why the train came down the grade at Hyndman with many handbrakes left set after the train had been stopped for an airbrake problem earlier. In the thread about that, some people did post that this was totally unsafe and unacceptable. However, BaltACD posted CSX instructions that permitted moving a train with hand brakes set after they had been originally set for securement. So which way is it?
BigJimFor those of you who have come here seeking knowledge...Beware! The quote above is total BS and shows that the OP has absolutely no idea what he is talking about. If I remember correctly, we had gone over this myth a long time ago in a previous thread, yet he persists on perpetuating this crap! I am sorry to have had to open this can of worms this far into the discussion, but, it needed to be said in order to belay any wild rumors it may have started in the minds of unknowing readers. The use of hand brakes to controll the movement of a train over the road is totally unsafe and unacceptable!
Big Jim,
Those of us who have perused the forum for a few years know who is posting fact and who is blowing smoke.
Bucky claims to have experience but when asked what that is all you hear is crickets. I would guess that by Bucky's standards I could compare my experience doing brain surgery to that of Dr. Ben Carson.
Norm
EuclidSo which way is it?
Obviously, both. It's not a desired practice, as many have already pointed out, but CSX has apparently determined that there are times when it may be necessary.
I realize that does not square well with your black and white world, but that's the way it is.
Cue the incredulity.
tree68 Euclid So which way is it? Obviously, both. It's not a desired practice, as many have already pointed out, but CSX has apparently determined that there are times when it may be necessary. I realize that does not square well with your black and white world, but that's the way it is. Cue the incredulity.
Euclid So which way is it?
I think your argument is with Big Jim, not me. I was the one that said it can be done and sometimes is done, as in the example the Big Jim quoted from my original post here. Big Jim said: "The use of hand brakes to controll the movement of a train over the road is totally unsafe and unacceptable!" If he is right, it is not true that sometimes it is used and sometimes it is not, as you are saying above.
According to Big Jim, running with handbrakes set is never done. He said it is unacceptable. If it is unacceptable, how can it sometimes be acceptable? How can it sometimes be necessary, as you say.
EuclidHow can it sometimes be necessary, as you say.
You'd have to ask CSX.
And you just repeated the question (that you asked) that I answered.
There are many things that should not be done and are against various rules as a matter of routine. That being said - there are times and situations where only the 'rules violation' action will permit the train to move with any degree of safety. Such actions are never undertaken 'lightly'.
Rightfully or wrongfully, when such actions are specified as permissible in Timetable Special Instructions - those actions have been reviewed and approved by the 'brain trust' at the highest levels of the company - levels well beyond the local Trainmaster or top Division officer.
BaltACD There are many things that should not be done and are against various rules as a matter of routine. That being said - there are times and situations where only the 'rules violation' action will permit the train to move with any degree of safety. Such actions are never undertaken 'lightly'. Rightfully or wrongfully, when such actions are specified as permissible in Timetable Special Instructions - those actions have been reviewed and approved by the 'brain trust' at the highest levels of the company - levels well beyond the local Trainmaster or top Division officer.
If it happens to be totally unsafe and unaceptable except for some very special, rare, and exotic circumstances; well then it still agrees with what I said in post #1. So I have no disagreement with anybody here on this point except for Big Jim. That is why I asked him what he meant.
Euclid, have you ever done anything that was against the rules and was succesful and thought the rule didn't provide you with a means to achive what you needed to do without violating it? It's like being asked "HAVE YOU STOPPED BEATING YOUR WIFE? YES OR NO"
So you have stated that the rule says don't apply hand brakes on empty cars and run in a train. And that hand brakes must be applied to secure a train on a grade when there is insuffient air to maintain a train on a grade. And that hand brakes can not be released on a moving train. And that releasing hand brakes on a stopped train with insufficient motive power to keep the train from rolling after a number of hand brakes are released is a receipe for problems, What do you suggest a crew is to do?
I don't know why hand brakes were left applied on an empty car but it appears that occurred. It has not been determined that that was the cause of the derailment. Should the train been put out on the rails as it was.I think not. I think it was an accident waiting to happen and it did. I also suspect that many times, trains like it have succesfully gotten over the road and so the practice of sending high tunnage trains down grades continues. If you watch the video
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9IABM8UPplY
of the Southern RR's Saluda Grade, you will see what they did and how they treated it. It can be done but they used retainers as well as dynmic brakes. They also respect the hill. I an not saying that CSX people don't but obviously, the crew was put into a situation that they couldn't handle. Time in service. The train had to be recrewed. Why? Should they have been required to start down the grade with OOS running out? I don't think EHH's precision operating plan had anything to do with this but the RR's drive to maximize train length might.
tree68but CSX has apparently determined that there are times when it may be necessary.
BigJimThat shows you how intelligent the folks at CSX are! Totally irresponsible that they (both operating and management) don't have enough knowledge in proper train handling!!!
We don't know that CSX wrote that. I'm not familiar with the line, so I don't know who the predecessors are. It's possible this is a long-standing solution to a specific problem.
tree68It's possible this is a long-standing solution to a specific problem.
In a discussion of this wreck over a month ago, it was stated that CSX does not train employees on the use of retainers. It seems to me that retainers were invented precisely to handle this type of situation, so why would they abandon their use?
_____________
"A stranger's just a friend you ain't met yet." --- Dave Gardner
Procedures for Sand Patch is specified in B&O 1955 Pittsburgh Division Timetable Special instructions
13 OPERATION OF AIR BRAKES. Passing Rockwood, Engineers of Eastward freiglt trains will set up brake pipe pressure to 90 pounds, which will be carried through to Cumberland. Eastward freight trains will stop at Yoder or Sand Patch for adjustment of retainers and will stop East of Hyndman Interlocking plant and place all retainers in release position. If stopped by either absolute signal, West of Hyndman Tower, retainers may then be placed in release position. Eastward freight trains will stop at FO Tower for inspection except when handled by Diesels equipped with dynamlc brake. In event dynamic brake becomes inoperative, train will stop at FO Tower for inspection. Eastward freight trains via Sand Patch, except those operated as 92. 94. 96. 194. 396. Livetock trains and Time Savers will make retainer test in terminal or at point where train is picked up. If picked up at difierent place, retainer test will be made before passing Sand Patch, under the supervision of the conduotor. When train stop on descenditrg grade, and flagman is recalled proceed sigdal will not be given until it is known brake pipe is properly charged. Trains will stop to adlust retainers. When retainers are used they must be turned up consecutively from engine, rearwards. Turning up retainers on the front and rear pordon of a train allowing the middle cars to run loose is prohiblted. Grade ........................................ Minimum % RetainersSand Patch - Hyndman (Coal Trains) 100Sand Patch - Hyndman (All Others) 90 On above mentioned grades and trains standerd air pressure will be: Main Reservoir...... 130 pounds Brake Pipe... 90 pounds Empty trains will carry the prescribed standard pressure as follows: Main Reservoir...... 130 pounds. Brake Pipe... 70 pounds. When Engineers deem additional rotainers necessary, they will notify trainmen who will comply with their request.
13 OPERATION OF AIR BRAKES.
Passing Rockwood, Engineers of Eastward freiglt trains will set up brake pipe pressure to 90 pounds, which will be carried through to Cumberland. Eastward freight trains will stop at Yoder or Sand Patch for adjustment of retainers and will stop East of Hyndman Interlocking plant and place all retainers in release position. If stopped by either absolute signal, West of Hyndman Tower, retainers may then be placed in release position.
Eastward freight trains will stop at FO Tower for inspection except when handled by Diesels equipped with dynamlc brake. In event dynamic brake becomes inoperative, train will stop at FO Tower for inspection.
Eastward freight trains via Sand Patch, except those operated as 92. 94. 96. 194. 396. Livetock trains and Time Savers will make retainer test in terminal or at point where train is picked up. If picked up at difierent place, retainer test will be made before passing Sand Patch, under the supervision of the conduotor. When train stop on descenditrg grade, and flagman is recalled proceed sigdal will not be given until it is known brake pipe is properly charged.
Trains will stop to adlust retainers. When retainers are used they must be turned up consecutively from engine, rearwards. Turning up retainers on the front and rear pordon of a train allowing the middle cars to run loose is prohiblted.
Grade ........................................ Minimum % RetainersSand Patch - Hyndman (Coal Trains) 100Sand Patch - Hyndman (All Others) 90
On above mentioned grades and trains standerd air pressure will be:
Main Reservoir...... 130 pounds Brake Pipe... 90 pounds
Empty trains will carry the prescribed standard pressure as follows:
Main Reservoir...... 130 pounds. Brake Pipe... 70 pounds.
When Engineers deem additional rotainers necessary, they will notify trainmen who will comply with their request.
Paul of Covington In a discussion of this wreck over a month ago, it was stated that CSX does not train employees on the use of retainers. It seems to me that retainers were invented precisely to handle this type of situation, so why would they abandon their use?
I suspect there is no one in today's world of operating railroads that KNOWS how to use retainers. Ever since the development of effective dynamic braking, the need to use air brakes on grades has decreased, let alone use retainers. The use of air braking and the many manifestations of using air brakes don't appear to be a priority in the training of new engineers.
BaltACD The prefered braking method on my former carrier is use of extended range dynamic brakes. In specific locations the use of stretch air braking is permitted. Obviously, Emergency is never the prefered method. The reason dynamic braking is perferred is that there is little to no likelyhood of having a 'kicker' place the train in emergency as is possible when using air brakes at a service rate.
Electroliner 1935 Euclid, have you ever done anything that was against the rules and was succesful and thought the rule didn't provide you with a means to achive what you needed to do without violating it? It's like being asked "HAVE YOU STOPPED BEATING YOUR WIFE? YES OR NO" So you have stated that the rule says don't apply hand brakes on empty cars and run in a train. And that hand brakes must be applied to secure a train on a grade when there is insuffient air to maintain a train on a grade. And that hand brakes can not be released on a moving train. And that releasing hand brakes on a stopped train with insufficient motive power to keep the train from rolling after a number of hand brakes are released is a receipe for problems, What do you suggest a crew is to do? I don't know why hand brakes were left applied on an empty car but it appears that occurred. It has not been determined that that was the cause of the derailment. Should the train been put out on the rails as it was.I think not. I think it was an accident waiting to happen and it did. I also suspect that many times, trains like it have succesfully gotten over the road and so the practice of sending high tunnage trains down grades continues. If you watch the video might.
might.
It appears that nothing about operating the train that derailed at Hyndman was against the rules, except possibly leaving handbrakes applied on one or more empty cars. I understand that brakes were left applied on 58 cars once the train restarted down the grade. I understand that this was done because the second crew thought that the train might still have air brake issues. I interpret that to mean that the second crew was not willing to completely trust that air brakes would perform properly, so the left handbrakes applied on 58 cars to provide supplemental braking effort in case the air brakes were not capable of providing their normal braking effort. I do not know if this was decided solely by the crew or approved by someone higher.
I do not know if the crew was put into a situation that they could not handle, as you say. I don’t think it is obvious that they were. I do not know if leaving 58 handbrakes applied contributed to the derailment. I have speculated that the derailment may have been caused by excessive dynamic braking that may have been performed in overcompensating for lowering the reliance on air braking. It is just a wild guess, but the derailment did occur just after the engineer reduced power and began dynamic braking; and there is also evidence that the derailment was caused by excessive buff force which can be produced by excess dynamic braking.
Regarding the question of what the crew should have done if they had been placed in a dilemma of whether to handle a train that may be unsafe. I do not know if the train was unsafe or if the crew believed they were in a dilemma. I do not know if this was “an accident waiting to happen.” But if the crew believed that the train was not safe to run, they should have refused to run it—even without a rule prohibiting running with handbrakes. If there had been such a rule, and the crew felt the train was unsafe to run, I believe it would be a very bad move to decide that breaking the rule was justified because there was no ready alternative, and the train must move. If a crew were faced with that kind of dilemma, then they should have someone higher up make the decision. When in doubt, take the safest course.
Euclid Electroliner 1935 Euclid, have you ever done anything that was against the rules and was succesful and thought the rule didn't provide you with a means to achive what you needed to do without violating it? It's like being asked "HAVE YOU STOPPED BEATING YOUR WIFE? YES OR NO" So you have stated that the rule says don't apply hand brakes on empty cars and run in a train. And that hand brakes must be applied to secure a train on a grade when there is insuffient air to maintain a train on a grade. And that hand brakes can not be released on a moving train. And that releasing hand brakes on a stopped train with insufficient motive power to keep the train from rolling after a number of hand brakes are released is a receipe for problems, What do you suggest a crew is to do? I don't know why hand brakes were left applied on an empty car but it appears that occurred. It has not been determined that that was the cause of the derailment. Should the train been put out on the rails as it was.I think not. I think it was an accident waiting to happen and it did. I also suspect that many times, trains like it have succesfully gotten over the road and so the practice of sending high tunnage trains down grades continues. If you watch the video might. It appears that nothing about operating the train that derailed at Hyndman was against the rules, except possibly leaving handbrakes applied on one or more empty cars. I understand that brakes were left applied on 58 cars once the train restarted down the grade. I understand that this was done because the second crew thought that the train might still have air brake issues. I interpret that to mean that the second crew was not willing to completely trust that air brakes would perform properly, so the left handbrakes applied on 58 cars to provide supplemental braking effort in case the air brakes were not capable of providing their normal braking effort. I do not know if this was decided solely by the crew or approved by someone higher. I do not know if the crew was put into a situation that they could not handle, as you say. I don’t think it is obvious that they were. I do not know if leaving 58 handbrakes applied contributed to the derailment. I have speculated that the derailment may have been caused by excessive dynamic braking that may have been performed in overcompensating for lowering the reliance on air braking. It is just a wild guess, but the derailment did occur just after the engineer reduced power and began dynamic braking; and there is also evidence that the derailment was caused by excessive buff force which can be produced by excess dynamic braking. Regarding the question of what the crew should have done if they had been placed in a dilemma of whether to handle a train that may be unsafe. I do not know if the train was unsafe or if the crew believed they were in a dilemma. I do not know if this was “an accident waiting to happen.” But if the crew believed that the train was not safe to run, they should have refused to run it—even without a rule prohibiting running with handbrakes. If there had been such a rule, and the crew felt the train was unsafe to run, I believe it would be a very bad move to decide that breaking the rule was justified because there was no ready alternative, and the train must move. If a crew were faced with that kind of dilemma, then they should have someone higher up make the decision. When in doubt, take the safest course.
Train make up was the proximate cause of the derailment and rules (or Special Instructions) were violated. Special instructions do not permit the moving of EMPTY cars with hand brakes applied. The head end of the train that derailed had a high percentage of empty cars in the head end 58 cars which had hand brakes applied.
Gravity is a fearsome enemy when it comes to moving tonnage trains down mountains.
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