I don’t know if there was time to stop the oil train short of the derailed car. I see several factors in play here. The oil train appears at 1:07 on the basic clock for the running video. Then 18 seconds after that, the NTSB clock displays in the video and starts counting from 1 second. Then 75 seconds later on the NTSB clock, the oil train impacts the grain car. So the impact happened 1 min. 33 sec. after the oil train first came into view to the grain train.
However, since the grain train was moving during much of this time span, it was kicking up snow which probably obscured the derailed car from the oil train crew. The derailment had not even occurred until 20 seconds into this time span of 1 min. 33 sec.
So, the first indication of trouble was the undesired emergency application on the grain train. However, the engineer did not announce that until 31 seconds later. I do not know if he was prevented from announcing because of the signal maintainer commenting on what he had seen, as some have suggested. If not, it is unclear why the announcement was delayed 31 seconds. The engineer was accompanied by a traveling engineer, so there should have been sufficient knowledge and diligence to make a timely announcement.
In any case, the engineer of the oil train did not apply any braking when he received notice that the grain train had gone into emergency. He said that he made the emergency application of brakes when he first saw the grain hopper fouling his track. Assuming that the voice acknowledging that the grain train had gone into emergency was that of the oil train engineer, he had 18 seconds between that acknowledgement and the point where he put the oil train into emergency. From that point of seeing the obstruction and going into emergency, there was another 10 seconds until impact.
So, prior to impact, the engineer of the oil train had 28 seconds of warning that the grain train had gone into emergency. If the engineer of the grain train had not delayed the announcement of the UDE by 31 seconds, the engineer of the oil train would have had 59 seconds of total warning from the point where the grain train went into emergency.
I think there is a good chance that 59 seconds would have been enough time to stop the oil train short of the fouling car. But there was a 31 sec. delay in the announcement of the UDE, and an 18 sec. delay in reacting to the announcement which used up 49 of the 59 seconds available for stopping short of the obstruction. That left only 10 seconds to stop the oil train, and that was not enough time.
On my former carrier crews were required to announce over the road channel, engine number, direction, track and signal and/or block occupancy, as well as entry into work zones after receiving permission of the employee in charge and a number of other happenings. With Amtrak the Engineer would annonce the information and the Conductor (within the body of the train) would confirm that announcement. Passenger trains had to announce both their arrival and departure from scheduled station stops.
When it comes to announcing a UDE the crew is expected to announce 'EMERGENCY EMERGENCY EMERGENCY' Engine #, Track #, Mile Post and if it is a Key Train.
With the video of the Casselton incident, it did not sound like the Grain train crew was fully accustomed to the requirements of the rules and didn't preface any conversation with the EMERGENCY announcement and didn't announce anything until after the train came to a stop. While the Signal Maintainers conversation began before the train had the UDE, once the UDE was experienced the crew needed to have begun the EMERGENCY routine.
With all that having been said, the Oil train would have had to begun braking before the trains were visible to each other to have been able to stop short of the derailed car in the Grain train.
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As I understand it, whenever a train makes an emergency application of brakes, rules require the crew to make a radio announcement of the event. I assume that since such an announcement is required, there must be some requirement for crews on other trains to react to the announcement. What is type of reaction is required of train crews hearing the announcement that a train has gone into emergency?
According the report, after striking the hopper car, the engine derailed and traveled 200 feet on the ground. It appears from the video, that the engine basically turned to the right, away from the impact, and plowed its way out into deep snow roughly perpendicular to the track. Because the hopper car was fouling only the left half of the track, it would result in the engine deflecting to the right upon impact. This deflection may have done a lot to protect the engineer and conductor. A direct hit would have likely resulted in a lot more disintegration of the structure of both the hopper car and the locomotive.
Here is part of the report where the engineer of the oil train describes his experience of suddenly finding a loaded grain hopper fouling the left half of his track and knows he won’t be able to stop in time to avoid hitting the 143-ton obstacle. The engineer refers to the grain hopper as a “C-6.”
I have reformatted this to make it easier to read. The part in blue is stated by the interviewer when the engineer appears to have a difficult time thinking about the experience.
*************************************************
ENGINEER’S DESCRIPTION:
“I don't, you know, everything went so fuzzy then because within seconds, I came through the snow down and I saw a C-6 laying across my track.
And I, you know, I dumped the train. I knew though, I've been out here 9 years, I knew what was behind me. I knew we weren't stopping.
And I -- my conductor, you know, I think he's been out here almost 2 years, but newer, you know,… And I know what came out of his mouth was holy –-- what do we do? And I told him to hit the ground. And we both jumped on the cabin, the floor, and I don't know if it was, you know, an hour or 3 seconds. But I knew what was coming, and I honestly said a prayer. It was really quick. Excuse me.
[interviewer] Take your time. You need to stop? (No audible response)
[interviewer] All right. We're going to pause for a minute.
[interviewer] All right. We are going to pick up where we left off with the interview of Mr. Brian Thompson. So Brian, let's continue.
…like I said, I saw the C-6 laying in my track. And, you know, it was milliseconds, half a second, you know, I dumped the train immediately. But I -- like I said, I knew what I was hauling. I knew how long it takes to stop a train when you're hauling that much weight, especially on a day that's 20 below zero because your air doesn't work the same when it's 20 below zero than when it's 70 degrees outside.
And like I said, my conductor looked at me, he just as big as eyed as I was, and said, what? And I just told him, I said hit the ground, and we both hit the ground. And, you know, like it was seconds and bam, you know, this -- and I knew we weren't going to just, you know, I -- people would think with that much weight, you just throw that C-6, you know, toss it to the side and keep on going, and I knew that wasn't going to be the outcome of this. I had a fully loaded C-6 laying across your track, I knew we weren't blowing through that C-6.
And you know, it had crossed my mind, you know, do we jump, do we? And I thought better of that because I knew what we were hauling. I knew in my head them tanks were going to bust open, those tanks were going to come piling, you know, on top of everything.
So I knew the best, because like I said, I told him, I said get down and hold on. And it was like a thunderstorm when we hit that thing just crashing and noise and, you know, I – that part, you know what, I can't tell you what happened from the time we hit it 'til, you know, we came to a stop, just all the bang and boom and --
And we came to a stop and I looked at my conductor and obviously, you know, thought when I opened my eyes, are we alive or are we dead? And looked and looked to him, and I -- you know, are you okay? And he said yeah, and we both stood up and turned around.
And I don't know if it was him or me or whoever first one yelled that there's fire, there's a lot of fire. And I don't -- and he's, what do we do? And I think he was trying to gather stuff. I told him you get in your bag, you grab your cell phone, and you run.
And I know he, you know, it's instinct when -- at that time, I think it was him, he even said, he said, we are on fire also, our engine. And I, you know, the first action is to get away from the fire. So I know he tried to go out the front door and, obviously, you can't go off the front door, there was nothing left of the front engine.
And I, you know, he told me when he -- went running by me out the back door, he said the front door's jammed, front door's jammed, back, back, back. And, you know, that's the last place you wanted to go because ground was on fire, the engine was on fire -- but it was our only exit.
And I just, I reached in at this time. I know I grabbed my cell phone out of my bag because I know I needed to communicate with the world. I know I need to dial 9-1-1. And I don't remember this part, this comes from other guys and other trains, said, Brian, you got up and you switched the channel back to 72 and warned everybody on 70 to get out of there. And I don't -- I honestly can't remember that part. But I have talked to the engineer that was in the train in front of me, and he said Brian, you got on 70, yelled emergency out, told the dispatcher, I don't know, it's, the -- we had a crash and I don't know, it was something along the lines of we are on fire and we are a key train.
And then I -- did I say, you said something along the line, you said I got to get out of here. And I went running out the back locomotive, exit it because we were tilted a little bit to the one side, and I went out the opposite side of the locomotive and took off running eastbound.”
~~~
Electroliner 1935Fascinating testimony. He was fortunate to come out of what could have been a tragedy. I have a question on what rules apply to pay for the time spent providing testimony?
I have a question on what rules apply to pay for the time spent providing testimony?
In 'most' cases it is viewed as a legal proceeding with employees testifying 'for the company' and such employees will be compensated at their normal rates and for any expenses incured for travel and/or lodging.
Fascinating testimony. He was fortunate to come out of what could have been a tragedy.
This is the interview with the engineer of the oil train. It is quite remarkable to hear his description of colliding with the grain car which he refers to as a “C-6.”
Open this PDF and scroll to page 13 for the start of the engineer’s statement about the collision, and the thoughts and conversation with the conductor as they rode out the crash and then tried to get away from the danger of the fire. It captures the emotion of such an experience. On page 16, he said he considered jumping prior to impact, but realized that all those tank cars would come piling in on them as soon as they hit. He also said he knew that they were not going to just blow through that grain car and keep going.
https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=425456&docketID=55926&mkey=88606
Euclid Shadow the Cats owner I looked at the first video from 2013 derailment is at the start of the video Emergency brake is not even applied until 17 seconds after the derailment. The collison is less than 20 seconds after that. The slack would still have been running in on the oil train when they hit. The collision was not 20 seconds after the emergency application. According to the video time sequence, the time span from the emergency application of brakes to the point of impact was 59 seconds. This time span is also confirmed in the NTSB report called Event and On-board Image Recorders.
Shadow the Cats owner I looked at the first video from 2013 derailment is at the start of the video Emergency brake is not even applied until 17 seconds after the derailment. The collison is less than 20 seconds after that. The slack would still have been running in on the oil train when they hit.
I looked at the first video from 2013 derailment is at the start of the video Emergency brake is not even applied until 17 seconds after the derailment. The collison is less than 20 seconds after that. The slack would still have been running in on the oil train when they hit.
The collision was not 20 seconds after the emergency application.
According to the video time sequence, the time span from the emergency application of brakes to the point of impact was 59 seconds. This time span is also confirmed in the NTSB report called Event and On-board Image Recorders.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
DERAILMENT VIDEO EVENT SEQUENCE TIMES
Grain train derails and drags without parting the air hoses.
Derailment commences at time stamp: 1 second.
Grain train Derailed-dragging condition evolves to point of parting air hoses or damage opening the brake pipe and causes an Emergency application of brakes.
Emergency application occurs at time stamp: 16 seconds.
With Emergency braking applied to grain train, while train slows, engineer announces “train in emergency.”
Announcement occurs at time stamp: 48 seconds.
Grain train stop occurs.
Stop occurs at time stamp: 54 seconds.
Video shifts from grain train to oil train.
Shift occurs at time stamp: 65 seconds.
Oil train initiates Emergency application of brakes.
Emergency application occurs at time stamp: 66 seconds.
Oil train impacts grain car.
Impact occurs at time stamp: 75 seconds
tree68 Euclid That timing that you quote from the report does not match what the video shows. So clearly, one or the other is wrong. That's why I'd like to see the official transcript/timeline. Were the radio transmissions simply dubbed into the video?
Euclid That timing that you quote from the report does not match what the video shows.
So clearly, one or the other is wrong.
That's why I'd like to see the official transcript/timeline.
Were the radio transmissions simply dubbed into the video?
EuclidThat timing that you quote from the report does not match what the video shows.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
[quote user="tree68"]
From the linked report:
The NTSB investigation found that after 13 cars from the westbound grain train derailed, the train’s emergency brakes were applied. At that point, the eastbound oil train was 18 seconds away, traveling at 42 mph. The oil train was likely moving at about that speed when it hit the grain car lying across the track, the NTSB said.[/unquote] I would opine that the crew of the grain train didn't know they'd derailed (ie, everything was still upright) until the derailed car apparently hit the switch (as reported by the signalman), at which time it went cattywhampus, breaking the trainline (initiating the emergency application) and fouling the adjacent track. The linked report itself says that at the time of the emergency application, the oil train was a mere 18 seconds away, doing 42 MPH. The collision was going to occur. Period. Give the crew of the grain train several seconds to recognize the brake pipe was headed for zero, plus time to reach for the radio and make the emergency broadcast. There is no way that broadcast would have changed the outcome, even if the oil train had dumped their air.
I would opine that the crew of the grain train didn't know they'd derailed (ie, everything was still upright) until the derailed car apparently hit the switch (as reported by the signalman), at which time it went cattywhampus, breaking the trainline (initiating the emergency application) and fouling the adjacent track.
The linked report itself says that at the time of the emergency application, the oil train was a mere 18 seconds away, doing 42 MPH. The collision was going to occur. Period.
Give the crew of the grain train several seconds to recognize the brake pipe was headed for zero, plus time to reach for the radio and make the emergency broadcast. There is no way that broadcast would have changed the outcome, even if the oil train had dumped their air.
That timing that you quote from the report does not match what the video shows. Clearly the video captions 32 seconds from the point the grain train went into emergency to the point where its engineer announced that on the radio. The video continues counting time after the grain train stops and continues counting into the sequence shown from the oil train. So after the engineer anounced being in emergency, the video counted out 27 more seconds to impact. So the total time from the emergency application of the grain train to the point of impact for the oil train was 59 seconds. I don't know where they get 18 seconds as the report states.
There may have been time to stop the oil train with the 59 seconds avaiable. The grain train stopped in 32 seconds and it was only about 10 mph less speed that the oil train when the braking began.
BaltACDThe point I was making was that the Oil train would have had to start stopping BEFORE the Grain train derailed, let alone before the Grain train crew could have 'suspected' they were derailed because of the UDE; and even then they may have struck the derailed grain car.
One can be reasonably certain the grain train crew had no idea a car had derailed and certain it was fouling the eastbound track. Trains go into emergency on a regular basis; Simple as a brake hose connection parting. "Some days are diamonds, some days are stones.". Emergency brake actions happen on a regular basis, and most of them are benign occurrences, just an inconvenience for dispatchers and conductors who have to walk the train to find the problem.
Norm
CShaveRRI'm sure that all of this information that we weren't privy to was available to the NTSB in the course of their investigation.
I'd like to see the transcribed timeline, including radio transmissions and the "tale of the tape" from the event recorder... Sound from the cab of the grain train would be handy, too, as I doubt the two crew members were silent throughout.
[quote]The NTSB investigation found that after 13 cars from the westbound grain train derailed, the train’s emergency brakes were applied. At that point, the eastbound oil train was 18 seconds away, traveling at 42 mph. The oil train was likely moving at about that speed when it hit the grain car lying across the track, the NTSB said.[/unquote]
CShaveRRWe don't have any idea of the speed, or time of brake application of the oil train, at least not from the video. I'm with whoever said that prompt notification of the emergency might have allowed the oil train to slow down significantly, perhaps reducing the extent of the damage.
Carl,
I agree with your views on this.
The oil train struck the grain car 59 seconds after the grain train went into emergency, giving the first indication of a possible fouling of the track the oil train was on. So, the earliest possible warning for the oil train was 59 seconds before impact.
However, 32 of those 59 seconds were lost by the delay in the oil train receiving the warning about the emergency application of the grain train. So the oil train was left with only a 27-second warning of those original 59 seconds starting with the emergency application of the grain train.
I don’t know how existing rules pertain to this kind is situation, but there is certainly rule precedent for a requirement to immediately protect adjacent tracks any time a train goes into emergency. As you know, the reason is that any time a train experiences an emergency application; there is a fair chance that it has been caused by a derailment. If there has been a derailment and there are adjacent tracks, there is also a possibility of the derailment fouling an adjacent track, posing a risk to trains on the adjacent track.
This is why CN in Canada does it right. We tone and talk to the dispatcher on a serparate channel.
We would announce the emergency broadcast on the standby channel, go over to the RTC channel and do the emergency tone. If the RTC answers right away, the rtc will then protect other trains that may not have heard our initial call.
If the RTC doesn't answer we have to repeat the emergency call on the standby until the RTC answers.
If for whatever reason the RTC doesn't answer at all, you go flagging.
Our rules state that you must stop if you hear a train call emergency on a track beside yours. We also have to slow down and be prepared to stop when passing a train that tripped a dragging equipment alarm.
10000 feet and no dynamics? Today is going to be a good day ...
It's a pity that there was no sound from the cab video itself. Some of those cameras do have sound (I never worked with them, but the oft-shared video of the UP train encountering a tornado had full sound from the unoccupied cab). We could have heard when the emergency application occurred (if no sound from the application itself the PC valve would have shut the throttle).The engineer of the grain train did not comply with radio procedures in the event of an emergency application. He should have been saying "Emergency, emergency, emergency!" as soon as the train dynamited. He had the time to get that out before the maintainer called him...or, if he was still grasping the situation at that point, have said the "Emergency" code instead of acknowledging the mantainer (he knew he was in emergency by then). The engineer of the oil train said "Emergency, emergency, emergency", in a tone that suggests that he was chiding the engineer of the grain train for not saying it. The quiet tone also suggests that he could not see the mayhem ahead of him at that point.We don't have any idea of the speed, or time of brake application of the oil train, at least not from the video. I'm with whoever said that prompt notification of the emergency might have allowed the oil train to slow down significantly, perhaps reducing the extent of the damage.I'm sure that all of this information that we weren't privy to was available to the NTSB in the course of their investigation.
Carl
Railroader Emeritus (practiced railroading for 46 years--and in 2010 I finally got it right!)
CAACSCOCOM--I don't want to behave improperly, so I just won't behave at all. (SM)
Norm48327 BaltACD Couple of notes - Trains are required to monitor the Road Radio Channel for the territory they are operating on. ie. Both the Grain train and the Oil train should have been monitoring the same channel - if they could hear each other from the first words of any converstation is unknown. If the Oil train had begun stopping at the time the video identifies it (and I could not see it in the video at that point in time), it may have been able to stop prior to impacting the derailed car - or it may not have. "If" is a word that conotates other possibilities. Prettty useless in an emergency.
BaltACD Couple of notes - Trains are required to monitor the Road Radio Channel for the territory they are operating on. ie. Both the Grain train and the Oil train should have been monitoring the same channel - if they could hear each other from the first words of any converstation is unknown. If the Oil train had begun stopping at the time the video identifies it (and I could not see it in the video at that point in time), it may have been able to stop prior to impacting the derailed car - or it may not have.
Couple of notes - Trains are required to monitor the Road Radio Channel for the territory they are operating on. ie. Both the Grain train and the Oil train should have been monitoring the same channel - if they could hear each other from the first words of any converstation is unknown.
If the Oil train had begun stopping at the time the video identifies it (and I could not see it in the video at that point in time), it may have been able to stop prior to impacting the derailed car - or it may not have.
"If" is a word that conotates other possibilities. Prettty useless in an emergency.
The point I was making was that the Oil train would have had to start stopping BEFORE the Grain train derailed, let alone before the Grain train crew could have 'suspected' they were derailed because of the UDE; and even then they may have struck the derailed grain car.
(nevermind)
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
zugmannYou can play the what-if game until the cows come home. But we don't live in a perfect world, so the endless word games we play on this forum aren't going to mean jack. Best we can do is learn from it and move on.
If the Oil train had begun stopping at the time the video identifies it (and I could not see it in the video at that point in time), it may have been able to stop prior to impacting the derailed car - or it may not have. The Oil train according to the video was 'sighted' 15 seconds before the derailment was indicated as having occured and it took another 17 seconds for the UDE to happen - by which time the Oil train was virtually 'on top' of the Grain train.
EuclidGranted, the oil train may have been traveling faster than the grain train, but the grain train was able to stop only 38 seconds after going into emergency. So an extra 32 seconds of lost warning for the oil train would have been of great help in reducing the collision impact.
You can play the what-if game until the cows come home. But we don't live in a perfect world, so the endless word games we play on this forum aren't going to mean jack. Best we can do is learn from it and move on.
Euclid The point is for a first train to notify an opposing train on the other track as soon as possible after the first train goes into emergency just in case the first train has derailed and fouled the track of the opposing train. The un-commanded emergency application alone is a call to action to stop the opposing train even without knowing why the first train has gone into emergency. It is a matter of taking evasive action just because of the possibility of the first train derailing and fouling the track of the opposing train. The oil train lost 32 seconds of warning about the emergency application of the grain train. After the warning came, the oil train consumed another 27 seconds prior to impact. So had they been warned as early as possible, the oil train had 59 seconds to stop before impact. Granted, the oil train may have been traveling faster than the grain train, but the grain train was able to stop only 38 seconds after going into emergency. So an extra 32 seconds of lost warning for the oil train would have been of great help in reducing the collision impact.
The point is for a first train to notify an opposing train on the other track as soon as possible after the first train goes into emergency just in case the first train has derailed and fouled the track of the opposing train. The un-commanded emergency application alone is a call to action to stop the opposing train even without knowing why the first train has gone into emergency. It is a matter of taking evasive action just because of the possibility of the first train derailing and fouling the track of the opposing train.
The oil train lost 32 seconds of warning about the emergency application of the grain train. After the warning came, the oil train consumed another 27 seconds prior to impact. So had they been warned as early as possible, the oil train had 59 seconds to stop before impact.
Granted, the oil train may have been traveling faster than the grain train, but the grain train was able to stop only 38 seconds after going into emergency. So an extra 32 seconds of lost warning for the oil train would have been of great help in reducing the collision impact.
Let's analyze this from the point of view of the grain train Engineer and an objective observer: Train goes into emergency. The first logical reaction is to notify the dispatcher, which, I believe, is in compliance with the rules and best practices.
He keys up his mic and advises the dispatcher but his transmission is blocked by a signal maintainer's transmission telling him there is debris from his train on the track. The engineer doesn't know the dispatcher did not receive his message. Nor, unless the oil train is within visual range, does he know how long it will take before the oil train will encounter the derailed car if indeed he knows it is fouling the eastward track, which he likely doesn't.
Radio conversation at that point is likely to be heavy considering the dispatcher wants to know the particulars of the situation and his transmissions may block any transmission the grain train is making to advise the oil train.
There is a degree of panic that will set in for those who are not trained to observe and evaluate the situation like airline pilots are. They will seldom go into the panic mode due to their training even though they know in their minds the situation is dire. The engineer of the grain train has done his job in good faith and according to the rule book and best practices but circumstances have negated his best efforts to avoid catastrophy.
It falls under the category of "best laid plans of mice and men". Stuff happens that we have no control of despite our best efforts. All that could have been done to prevent the situation appears to have been done but, as fate would have it, nothing worked.
I just watched the videos in the NTSB report the grain train could NOT broadcast he was in Emergency due to the Signal Maintainer being on the same channel telling him he saw a bunch of debris from his train on the ground. It is kinda hard to tell someone to look out when the radio is blocked from use by another person. The engineer wanted to tell his dispatcher he had an UDE however the Signalman blocked him from doing so.
And here we.....go!
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