Murphy Siding schlimm Getting a CDL does not guarantee competence as a driver. The reopt clearly blamed the driver. As it occured in 2005, any criminal charges have long since been finished. I am quite certain the NTSB investigators thoroughly checked out data and mechanical conditions of train and bus. As I pointed out before, those teams are composed of experts with much experience in the relevant fields. It doesn't guarantee competence as a driver, but it does tend to weed out those applicants more likely to be incompetent.
schlimm Getting a CDL does not guarantee competence as a driver. The reopt clearly blamed the driver. As it occured in 2005, any criminal charges have long since been finished. I am quite certain the NTSB investigators thoroughly checked out data and mechanical conditions of train and bus. As I pointed out before, those teams are composed of experts with much experience in the relevant fields.
Getting a CDL does not guarantee competence as a driver. The reopt clearly blamed the driver. As it occured in 2005, any criminal charges have long since been finished.
I am quite certain the NTSB investigators thoroughly checked out data and mechanical conditions of train and bus. As I pointed out before, those teams are composed of experts with much experience in the relevant fields.
It doesn't guarantee competence as a driver, but it does tend to weed out those applicants more likely to be incompetent.
To respond to Norm 48328's statement:
"...Posted by Norm48327 on Wednesday, September 14, 2016 7:54 AM"
"I've often wondered if those who drive church busses are required to have a CDL and training. I've seen them do some pretty dumb things like blowing through a crossing without stopping.
Norm..."
Not trying to beat this topic to death, but as some one with a background in Transportation Safety, I think I can add some substance to the conversation.
The regulations would seem to have some minor variences [Church Busses(?) ] in each State as to the specifics that have been regulated in those jurisdictions.
Generally, Motor Vehicles are covered by operational weights, and passenger capacities. The Stattes wach handle this by 'Classing' their CDL required for operation of a specific vehicle. Buses generally, comply by capacities of passengers. Exemptions, usually are for a passenger capacity under 15 passenger+ the operastor.
Many States have exemptions issued to Government Employees who might have to operate a 'classsed' vehicle, as part of their job....Buses, may or may not, be covered specifically by these State authored exemptions. The largest group, generally covered by State Class Exemptions, are Fire Departments; although, those Fire Departments may have a designated operator certification process in place, within their particular organization instructiions.
My first CDL was obtained in Tennessee in 1993, and since the CDL Requirements have been updated to reflect expansions and additional coverages under the Link @
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/03/16/2016-05913/commercial-drivers-license-requirements-of-the-moving-ahead-for-progress-in-the-21st-century-act-
"Commercial Driver's License Requirements of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act and the Military Commercial Driver's License Act of 2012"
schlimm I am quite certain the NTSB investigators thoroughly checked out data and mechanical conditions of train and bus. As I pointed out before, those teams are composed of experts with much experience in the relevant fields.
As I have mentioned before I had one experience working with the NTSB in a derailment cause finding investigation. I was very shocked at the single mindedness of the lead investigator. It was clear he had an agenda. The information that the outside team produced was largely ignored even though it cast significant doubt on the NTSB investagator's focus on his main issue. (BTW he still plays a major role in the rail safety community).
Since that experience I have far less faith in the objectivity of the NTSB's cause finding.
Later I was offered a job with the NTSB but declined.
Even later I encountered the same individual in a derailment cause finding in Australia (he was now working as a consultant) and he was much more open minded.
I've often wondered if those who drive church busses are required to have a CDL and training. I've seen them do some pretty dumb things like blowing through a crossing without stopping.
Norm
Observed an empty ( fortunately ) school bus stop too close to tracks fouling distance. Talked to supervisor and he returnd call few days later saying driver got more training.
CDLs were not reqired of any driver until 1986 and existing commercial drivers were grandfathered until 1991.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
Getting a CDL does not guarantee competence as a driver. The report clearly blamed the driver. As it occured in 1984, any criminal/civil charges have long since been finished.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
schlimm samfp1943 In which case, it would seem that the responsibility for the 'incident' would reside with the School Bus Operator(?), and not the Train's crew. (?) Probable cause of the accident was the school bus driver and inadequate training. This bus was for a private school, where training standards for staff are often lax. The engineer did not cause the accident, but his delay in applying brakes contributed to the severity of the crash, i.e., the train hit the bus with greater force than if he had started slowing earlier and thus struck bus at a slower speed. The crash was multifactoral, as are most things in the real world.
samfp1943 In which case, it would seem that the responsibility for the 'incident' would reside with the School Bus Operator(?), and not the Train's crew. (?)
Probable cause of the accident was the school bus driver and inadequate training. This bus was for a private school, where training standards for staff are often lax.
The engineer did not cause the accident, but his delay in applying brakes contributed to the severity of the crash, i.e., the train hit the bus with greater force than if he had started slowing earlier and thus struck bus at a slower speed. The crash was multifactoral, as are most things in the real world.
Here is a link to a site which indicates that in Florida, a bus of the size involved in this incident [66 passengers] the DRIVER WOULD BE REQUIRED TO HAVE A State Issued CDL; for which he/she would further be required tio have passed a specific written test/ followed by an Inspection of Vehicle test, and Road test for that Class of CDL license [Class B]. See link for more information on the Florida CDL and some of their other Class of liscense requirements.
The fact, that the Driver was an employee of a Private Institution; would be seperate from the driver's need to have a State of Fla. CDL Class Certification. My guess would be that, that information might play into the mechanical condition of the bus(?)
Should this case get a court hearing, the various assignments for percentages of responsibility, will possibly be assigned by the appropriate court hearing this case. The breakdown of those responsibilities can be amazingly 'gymnastic'; Depending upon the lawyers involved.
Every Factor involved in the 'cause/results' of this incident can potentially be assigned a percentage by the Court. Those results sometimes can be confounding to those involved, and intersted observers.
Another set of factors that seems to have been lost in the original posted copy was the actual weight of the train, with number of locomotives operating. The speed of the train was reported as 38 mph. I have no idea as to the needed stopping distance of that train vs. the sight distance of the Engineer, position on the crossing of the buses incursion onto it.
samfp1943In which case, it would seem that the responsibility for the 'incident' would reside with the School Bus Operator(?), and not the Train's crew. (?)
As anyone can easily see, probable means the primary, main causes. Contributing means secondary and/or exaccerbating, as in this case.
Quote:
"In which case, it would seem that the responsibility for the 'incident' would reside with the School Bus Operator(?), and not the Train's crew. (?)"
Sam
_______________________________________
I would not assume that the probable cause is limited to just the first sentence, just because the part following is referred to as contributing. In any case, this detail still stands, (which is the relevant point where I posted it in the other thread conversation):
“Contributing to the severity of the accident was the engineer's delay in applying the train brakes…”
schlimm What Euclid posted was actually only a letter sent to the FEC RR chair. In the probable cause portion of the reports, the primary cause is blamed on lack of training for the bus driver. Probable Cause The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the inadequate standards for certifying nonpublic schoolbus drivers, insufficient training and testing programs, and the limited experience of the schoolbus driver, which led to the intrusion of the schoolbus onto the railroad track when the driver misshifted the transmission. [my bold] Contributing to the accident was the absence of a stop line on the westbound approach to the grade crossing. Contributing to the severity of the accident was the engineer's delay in applying the train brakes and the locked deadbolt on the rear emergency door of the schoolbus. http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/RHR8501.aspx
What Euclid posted was actually only a letter sent to the FEC RR chair. In the probable cause portion of the reports, the primary cause is blamed on lack of training for the bus driver.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the inadequate standards for certifying nonpublic schoolbus drivers, insufficient training and testing programs, and the limited experience of the schoolbus driver, which led to the intrusion of the schoolbus onto the railroad track when the driver misshifted the transmission. [my bold] Contributing to the accident was the absence of a stop line on the westbound approach to the grade crossing. Contributing to the severity of the accident was the engineer's delay in applying the train brakes and the locked deadbolt on the rear emergency door of the schoolbus.
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/RHR8501.aspx
From this linked site: http://drivinglaws.aaa.com/tag/railroad-crossing/
"AAA Digest of Motor Laws" [listed: all States and Canada]
"...FLORIDA: Any person driving a school bus and approaching a railroad-highway grade crossing shall stop within 50 feet but not less than 15 feet from the nearest rail of such railroad and shall not proceed until he or she can do so safely when a highway sign is indicating that a train is approaching or when the driver can hear or see an approaching train. Drivers of commercial vehicles shall slow before crossing the tracks and check that the tracks are clear of an approaching train..." [bold; my emphasis]
In which case, it would seem that the responsibility for the 'incident' would reside with the School Bus Operator(?), and not the Train's crew. (?)
In the other thread on this, Jeff had posted the following:
It says the crew first saw the bus at a preceding crossing 2688 feet from it. The report says the engr waited 11 seconds to place the train in emergency. In that time they travelled 612 feet towards the xing. Once in emergency, the engine put down sand for 628 feet. What happened to the other 1400 feet?
If you read it carefully, it seems to me that the NTSB wants the reader to think the crew had a half-mile view of the bus on the tracks. In reality, the train was closer when the bus rolled onto the tracks. The conductor says when he saw the bus move forward and stop for the final time he was reaching for the emergency valve when the engineer dumped the air before he could open it. The NTSB says the engineer waited 11 seconds before dumping the air after seeing the bus on the tracks. I freely admit math wasn't my strongest subject in school, but something here doesn't add up. I think the train was a lot closer to the bus when it ended up on the tracks.
The NTSB report also says he could have made a service application before the emergency application. I don't see anywhere the length or type of train or it's make-up. Since they say he took 11 seconds to decide to dump the air after seeing the bus, I doubt a service application would have done anything in that amount of time. They also don't say what type of service application. Do they mean a minimum reduction, a 10lbs reduction or a full service reduction?
It's almost like the NTSB wants to blame the crew, especially the engineer for the fatalities.
This is my response to Jeff’s comment above:
Jeff,
I agree that the NTSB report is incomprehensible in terms of the collision timeline. It is way too much stream of consciousness arithmetic to follow. I also think they have misstated some details.
The detail about the bus driver shifting gears, backing up, lurching forward, jerking forward, stopping for 5 or 5 seconds, stalling the engine, not using the parking brake, stopping for a third time, warning lights activating at the second stop-- all of that is way too hard to assimilate.
It is not clear to me where the train was when the NTSB says the engineer should have set the brakes. When the engineer first saw the bus, it was 2,688 ft. away from him, and bus was standing in the clear. So why should the engineer have begun braking at that point?
Then all of this other rigmarole began with the lurching, jerking, stopping, and stalling. The lights did not activate until well into that phase. The NTSB criticizes him for waiting 11 more seconds before applying the brakes. Therefore, I don’t see how the signals could have activated before that jerking and lurching phase even began.
So I conclude that the point where the engineer should have applied the brakes is considerably closer to the crossing than 2,888 ft. I also suspect that the signals activated considerably after the train was 2,888 ft. away; probably where the NTSB says he began his 11 second delay in taking action.
So, the report appears to contain errors.
WASHINGTON, D.C. ISSUED: July 8, 198.5 President Florida East Coast Railway Company 1 Malaga Street Post Office Drawer 1048 St. Augustine, Florida 32084 SAFETY RECOMMENDATION (S) R-85-74 .............................................
About 6:55 a.m., on September 27, 1984, a northbound Florida East Coast Railway Company freight train struck a westbound Indian River Academy schoolbus stalled at a grade crossing on Walton Road in Port St. Lucie, Florida. The grade crossing was a two-lane, asphalt-paved, county road intersecting a single railroad track with automatic flashing signals and gates. The 1968 Bluebird/Chevrolet 66-passenger schoolbus was occupied by the driver and four students. Two of the students fled the stopped schoolbus before impact and were not injured. In the collision, the schoolbus body separated from the chassis, and the three remaining occupants were ejected. The two students were killed, and the busdriver was injured seriously. Neither of the two train crewmembers was injured.
Northbound FEC freight train Extra 412 North was approaching the crossing at a reported speed of 38 miles per hour with its locomotive headlight illuminated. The engineer was operating the locomotive unit from the right side. The conductor was seated on the left side opposite the engineer. The engineer said he began sounding the standard whistle signal at the Riverview grade crossing, 2,688 feet south of Walton Road. According to the engineer, the schoolbus was in his view at that moment and the warning devices at the crossing were activated. The whistle post was located 2,620 feet south of the crossing at Walton Road.
The busdriver believed that the front of the schoolbus was too close to the track and attempted to shift the manual transmission into reverse gear in order to back up. One student said he believed the busdriver got the transmission into gear and stalled the engine. Another student said the schoolbus 'lurched" forward toward the track. According to the busdriver, the engine stalled and the schoolbus rolled forward. The parking brake was not applied.
The driver of a pickup truck behind the schoolbus stated that the schoolbus was stopped for 4 or 5 seconds as he approached it and that about the time he stopped to its rear and observed the approaching train, the schoolbus "lurched" forward an estimated 6 or 7 feet and stopped with the front bumper near the east rail. About 2 or 3 seconds later, the schoolbus "jerked" forward for a short distance and stopped for a third time. The front wheels were over the west rail and the schoolbus blocked the track. The pickup driver said the lights of the crossing warning device began flashing while the schoolbus was at its second stop or just as it moved forward to the third stop.
The crossing gate descended onto and came to rest upon the right roofline of the schoolbus 18 feet 9 inches from the front bumper. According to the pickup driver, the gate arm came to rest about the time the schoolbus reached its third stop. The train conductor stated that he saw the schoolbus move forward and appear to veer around the automatic gate arm as it descended. He said also that he was reaching for the emergency brake valve on his side of the locomotive cab when the engineer made an emergency application of the train brakes. After placing the automatic brake valve handle in the emergency position, the engineer immediately released the locomotive brake. Sand from the locomotive sanders was found on the track 628 feet from the center of the crossing. Placement of the automatic brake valve handle in the emergency position provides automatic power cutoff and instantaneous sanding.
The engineer had a clear view of the schoolbus when he first observed it from the Riverview grade crossing; the schoolbus was stopped short of the track at the Walton Road crossing at that time. Also, he observed the schoolbus move onto the track as the crossing gate descended, and he observed the schoolbus as it stopped astride the track. However, he did not place the automatic brake valve handle in the emergency position until more than 11 seconds later, and after the train had traveled another 612 feet closer to the Walton Road crossing. If the engineer had placed the automatic brake valve handle in the emergency position without hesitation when the schoolbus stopped astride the track, the severity of the accident probably would have been lessened.
The presence of the schoolbus, particularly when it moved forward from its initial stop and to a stopped position with its front bumper near the east rail of the track, should have prompted at least preparatory action by the engineer to slow the train. He had two options available: a service application of the brakes or immediate emergency application of the brakes. A service application of the train brakes would have conditioned the train for an emergency stop with reduced risk of derailment or other lading damage. A service application of the brakes would have slowed the train smoothly and set the brakes for an emergency application if it became necessary. It is reasonable to assume that if the engineer had handled the train in this manner, the velocity of the train at impact would have been reduced substantially.
An approach to a schoolbus on the highway by a motorist usually results in heightened sense of a need to be prepared to stop. Although there are some adverse effects in braking a train which do not arise when braking a highway vehicle, observing a schoolbus stopped and blocking a track should result in an increased sense of readiness to stop by an engineer. Currently, there is little documented information about the effect of the many varying factors that may influence a train engineer's decisionmaking in such situations. The Safety Board believes that when an engineer sees that a schoolbus is blocking a track and possibly in jeopardy, there is no acceptable alternative to taking whatever action is necessary to stop short of collision. In this accident, the fact that the schoolbus stopped momentarily with the front bumper close to the east rail should have prepared the engineer for evasive action. When the schoolbus stopped, blocking the track, evasive action should have been executed immediately.
Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Florida
Use the results of the investigation of the accident in Port St. Lucie, Florida, on September 27, 1984, as a part of the railroad/highway grade crossing safety training given to engine crews. (Class 11, Priority Action) East Coast Railway Company: (R-85-74)
The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency with the statutory responsibility ‘I. . . to promote transportation safety by conducting independent accident investigations and by formulating safety improvement recommendations” (Public Law 93-633). The Safety Board is vitally interested in any actions taken as a result of its safety recommendations and would appreciate a response from you regarding action taken or contemplated with respect to the recommendation in this letter.
BIJRNETT, Chairman, GOLDMAN, Vice Chairman, and BURSLEY, Member, n concurred in this recommendation.
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