WASHINGTON, D.C. ISSUED: July 8, 198.5 President Florida East Coast Railway Company 1 Malaga Street Post Office Drawer 1048 St. Augustine, Florida 32084 SAFETY RECOMMENDATION (S) R-85-74 .............................................
About 6:55 a.m., on September 27, 1984, a northbound Florida East Coast Railway Company freight train struck a westbound Indian River Academy schoolbus stalled at a grade crossing on Walton Road in Port St. Lucie, Florida. The grade crossing was a two-lane, asphalt-paved, county road intersecting a single railroad track with automatic flashing signals and gates. The 1968 Bluebird/Chevrolet 66-passenger schoolbus was occupied by the driver and four students. Two of the students fled the stopped schoolbus before impact and were not injured. In the collision, the schoolbus body separated from the chassis, and the three remaining occupants were ejected. The two students were killed, and the busdriver was injured seriously. Neither of the two train crewmembers was injured.
Northbound FEC freight train Extra 412 North was approaching the crossing at a reported speed of 38 miles per hour with its locomotive headlight illuminated. The engineer was operating the locomotive unit from the right side. The conductor was seated on the left side opposite the engineer. The engineer said he began sounding the standard whistle signal at the Riverview grade crossing, 2,688 feet south of Walton Road. According to the engineer, the schoolbus was in his view at that moment and the warning devices at the crossing were activated. The whistle post was located 2,620 feet south of the crossing at Walton Road.
The busdriver believed that the front of the schoolbus was too close to the track and attempted to shift the manual transmission into reverse gear in order to back up. One student said he believed the busdriver got the transmission into gear and stalled the engine. Another student said the schoolbus 'lurched" forward toward the track. According to the busdriver, the engine stalled and the schoolbus rolled forward. The parking brake was not applied.
The driver of a pickup truck behind the schoolbus stated that the schoolbus was stopped for 4 or 5 seconds as he approached it and that about the time he stopped to its rear and observed the approaching train, the schoolbus "lurched" forward an estimated 6 or 7 feet and stopped with the front bumper near the east rail. About 2 or 3 seconds later, the schoolbus "jerked" forward for a short distance and stopped for a third time. The front wheels were over the west rail and the schoolbus blocked the track. The pickup driver said the lights of the crossing warning device began flashing while the schoolbus was at its second stop or just as it moved forward to the third stop.
The crossing gate descended onto and came to rest upon the right roofline of the schoolbus 18 feet 9 inches from the front bumper. According to the pickup driver, the gate arm came to rest about the time the schoolbus reached its third stop. The train conductor stated that he saw the schoolbus move forward and appear to veer around the automatic gate arm as it descended. He said also that he was reaching for the emergency brake valve on his side of the locomotive cab when the engineer made an emergency application of the train brakes. After placing the automatic brake valve handle in the emergency position, the engineer immediately released the locomotive brake. Sand from the locomotive sanders was found on the track 628 feet from the center of the crossing. Placement of the automatic brake valve handle in the emergency position provides automatic power cutoff and instantaneous sanding.
The engineer had a clear view of the schoolbus when he first observed it from the Riverview grade crossing; the schoolbus was stopped short of the track at the Walton Road crossing at that time. Also, he observed the schoolbus move onto the track as the crossing gate descended, and he observed the schoolbus as it stopped astride the track. However, he did not place the automatic brake valve handle in the emergency position until more than 11 seconds later, and after the train had traveled another 612 feet closer to the Walton Road crossing. If the engineer had placed the automatic brake valve handle in the emergency position without hesitation when the schoolbus stopped astride the track, the severity of the accident probably would have been lessened.
The presence of the schoolbus, particularly when it moved forward from its initial stop and to a stopped position with its front bumper near the east rail of the track, should have prompted at least preparatory action by the engineer to slow the train. He had two options available: a service application of the brakes or immediate emergency application of the brakes. A service application of the train brakes would have conditioned the train for an emergency stop with reduced risk of derailment or other lading damage. A service application of the brakes would have slowed the train smoothly and set the brakes for an emergency application if it became necessary. It is reasonable to assume that if the engineer had handled the train in this manner, the velocity of the train at impact would have been reduced substantially.
An approach to a schoolbus on the highway by a motorist usually results in heightened sense of a need to be prepared to stop. Although there are some adverse effects in braking a train which do not arise when braking a highway vehicle, observing a schoolbus stopped and blocking a track should result in an increased sense of readiness to stop by an engineer. Currently, there is little documented information about the effect of the many varying factors that may influence a train engineer's decisionmaking in such situations. The Safety Board believes that when an engineer sees that a schoolbus is blocking a track and possibly in jeopardy, there is no acceptable alternative to taking whatever action is necessary to stop short of collision. In this accident, the fact that the schoolbus stopped momentarily with the front bumper close to the east rail should have prepared the engineer for evasive action. When the schoolbus stopped, blocking the track, evasive action should have been executed immediately.
Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Florida
Use the results of the investigation of the accident in Port St. Lucie, Florida, on September 27, 1984, as a part of the railroad/highway grade crossing safety training given to engine crews. (Class 11, Priority Action) East Coast Railway Company: (R-85-74)
The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency with the statutory responsibility ‘I. . . to promote transportation safety by conducting independent accident investigations and by formulating safety improvement recommendations” (Public Law 93-633). The Safety Board is vitally interested in any actions taken as a result of its safety recommendations and would appreciate a response from you regarding action taken or contemplated with respect to the recommendation in this letter.
BIJRNETT, Chairman, GOLDMAN, Vice Chairman, and BURSLEY, Member, n concurred in this recommendation.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
In the other thread on this, Jeff had posted the following:
It says the crew first saw the bus at a preceding crossing 2688 feet from it. The report says the engr waited 11 seconds to place the train in emergency. In that time they travelled 612 feet towards the xing. Once in emergency, the engine put down sand for 628 feet. What happened to the other 1400 feet?
If you read it carefully, it seems to me that the NTSB wants the reader to think the crew had a half-mile view of the bus on the tracks. In reality, the train was closer when the bus rolled onto the tracks. The conductor says when he saw the bus move forward and stop for the final time he was reaching for the emergency valve when the engineer dumped the air before he could open it. The NTSB says the engineer waited 11 seconds before dumping the air after seeing the bus on the tracks. I freely admit math wasn't my strongest subject in school, but something here doesn't add up. I think the train was a lot closer to the bus when it ended up on the tracks.
The NTSB report also says he could have made a service application before the emergency application. I don't see anywhere the length or type of train or it's make-up. Since they say he took 11 seconds to decide to dump the air after seeing the bus, I doubt a service application would have done anything in that amount of time. They also don't say what type of service application. Do they mean a minimum reduction, a 10lbs reduction or a full service reduction?
It's almost like the NTSB wants to blame the crew, especially the engineer for the fatalities.
This is my response to Jeff’s comment above:
Jeff,
I agree that the NTSB report is incomprehensible in terms of the collision timeline. It is way too much stream of consciousness arithmetic to follow. I also think they have misstated some details.
The detail about the bus driver shifting gears, backing up, lurching forward, jerking forward, stopping for 5 or 5 seconds, stalling the engine, not using the parking brake, stopping for a third time, warning lights activating at the second stop-- all of that is way too hard to assimilate.
It is not clear to me where the train was when the NTSB says the engineer should have set the brakes. When the engineer first saw the bus, it was 2,688 ft. away from him, and bus was standing in the clear. So why should the engineer have begun braking at that point?
Then all of this other rigmarole began with the lurching, jerking, stopping, and stalling. The lights did not activate until well into that phase. The NTSB criticizes him for waiting 11 more seconds before applying the brakes. Therefore, I don’t see how the signals could have activated before that jerking and lurching phase even began.
So I conclude that the point where the engineer should have applied the brakes is considerably closer to the crossing than 2,888 ft. I also suspect that the signals activated considerably after the train was 2,888 ft. away; probably where the NTSB says he began his 11 second delay in taking action.
So, the report appears to contain errors.
What Euclid posted was actually only a letter sent to the FEC RR chair. In the probable cause portion of the reports, the primary cause is blamed on lack of training for the bus driver.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the inadequate standards for certifying nonpublic schoolbus drivers, insufficient training and testing programs, and the limited experience of the schoolbus driver, which led to the intrusion of the schoolbus onto the railroad track when the driver misshifted the transmission. [my bold] Contributing to the accident was the absence of a stop line on the westbound approach to the grade crossing. Contributing to the severity of the accident was the engineer's delay in applying the train brakes and the locked deadbolt on the rear emergency door of the schoolbus.
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/RHR8501.aspx
schlimm What Euclid posted was actually only a letter sent to the FEC RR chair. In the probable cause portion of the reports, the primary cause is blamed on lack of training for the bus driver. Probable Cause The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the inadequate standards for certifying nonpublic schoolbus drivers, insufficient training and testing programs, and the limited experience of the schoolbus driver, which led to the intrusion of the schoolbus onto the railroad track when the driver misshifted the transmission. [my bold] Contributing to the accident was the absence of a stop line on the westbound approach to the grade crossing. Contributing to the severity of the accident was the engineer's delay in applying the train brakes and the locked deadbolt on the rear emergency door of the schoolbus. http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/RHR8501.aspx
From this linked site: http://drivinglaws.aaa.com/tag/railroad-crossing/
"AAA Digest of Motor Laws" [listed: all States and Canada]
"...FLORIDA: Any person driving a school bus and approaching a railroad-highway grade crossing shall stop within 50 feet but not less than 15 feet from the nearest rail of such railroad and shall not proceed until he or she can do so safely when a highway sign is indicating that a train is approaching or when the driver can hear or see an approaching train. Drivers of commercial vehicles shall slow before crossing the tracks and check that the tracks are clear of an approaching train..." [bold; my emphasis]
In which case, it would seem that the responsibility for the 'incident' would reside with the School Bus Operator(?), and not the Train's crew. (?)
Quote:
"In which case, it would seem that the responsibility for the 'incident' would reside with the School Bus Operator(?), and not the Train's crew. (?)"
Sam
_______________________________________
I would not assume that the probable cause is limited to just the first sentence, just because the part following is referred to as contributing. In any case, this detail still stands, (which is the relevant point where I posted it in the other thread conversation):
“Contributing to the severity of the accident was the engineer's delay in applying the train brakes…”
As anyone can easily see, probable means the primary, main causes. Contributing means secondary and/or exaccerbating, as in this case.
samfp1943In which case, it would seem that the responsibility for the 'incident' would reside with the School Bus Operator(?), and not the Train's crew. (?)
Probable cause of the accident was the school bus driver and inadequate training. This bus was for a private school, where training standards for staff are often lax.
The engineer did not cause the accident, but his delay in applying brakes contributed to the severity of the crash, i.e., the train hit the bus with greater force than if he had started slowing earlier and thus struck bus at a slower speed. The crash was multifactoral, as are most things in the real world.
schlimm samfp1943 In which case, it would seem that the responsibility for the 'incident' would reside with the School Bus Operator(?), and not the Train's crew. (?) Probable cause of the accident was the school bus driver and inadequate training. This bus was for a private school, where training standards for staff are often lax. The engineer did not cause the accident, but his delay in applying brakes contributed to the severity of the crash, i.e., the train hit the bus with greater force than if he had started slowing earlier and thus struck bus at a slower speed. The crash was multifactoral, as are most things in the real world.
samfp1943 In which case, it would seem that the responsibility for the 'incident' would reside with the School Bus Operator(?), and not the Train's crew. (?)
Here is a link to a site which indicates that in Florida, a bus of the size involved in this incident [66 passengers] the DRIVER WOULD BE REQUIRED TO HAVE A State Issued CDL; for which he/she would further be required tio have passed a specific written test/ followed by an Inspection of Vehicle test, and Road test for that Class of CDL license [Class B]. See link for more information on the Florida CDL and some of their other Class of liscense requirements.
The fact, that the Driver was an employee of a Private Institution; would be seperate from the driver's need to have a State of Fla. CDL Class Certification. My guess would be that, that information might play into the mechanical condition of the bus(?)
Should this case get a court hearing, the various assignments for percentages of responsibility, will possibly be assigned by the appropriate court hearing this case. The breakdown of those responsibilities can be amazingly 'gymnastic'; Depending upon the lawyers involved.
Every Factor involved in the 'cause/results' of this incident can potentially be assigned a percentage by the Court. Those results sometimes can be confounding to those involved, and intersted observers.
Another set of factors that seems to have been lost in the original posted copy was the actual weight of the train, with number of locomotives operating. The speed of the train was reported as 38 mph. I have no idea as to the needed stopping distance of that train vs. the sight distance of the Engineer, position on the crossing of the buses incursion onto it.
Getting a CDL does not guarantee competence as a driver. The report clearly blamed the driver. As it occured in 1984, any criminal/civil charges have long since been finished.
I am quite certain the NTSB investigators thoroughly checked out data and mechanical conditions of train and bus. As I pointed out before, those teams are composed of experts with much experience in the relevant fields.
schlimm Getting a CDL does not guarantee competence as a driver. The reopt clearly blamed the driver. As it occured in 2005, any criminal charges have long since been finished. I am quite certain the NTSB investigators thoroughly checked out data and mechanical conditions of train and bus. As I pointed out before, those teams are composed of experts with much experience in the relevant fields.
Getting a CDL does not guarantee competence as a driver. The reopt clearly blamed the driver. As it occured in 2005, any criminal charges have long since been finished.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
CDLs were not reqired of any driver until 1986 and existing commercial drivers were grandfathered until 1991.
Observed an empty ( fortunately ) school bus stop too close to tracks fouling distance. Talked to supervisor and he returnd call few days later saying driver got more training.
I've often wondered if those who drive church busses are required to have a CDL and training. I've seen them do some pretty dumb things like blowing through a crossing without stopping.
Norm
schlimm I am quite certain the NTSB investigators thoroughly checked out data and mechanical conditions of train and bus. As I pointed out before, those teams are composed of experts with much experience in the relevant fields.
As I have mentioned before I had one experience working with the NTSB in a derailment cause finding investigation. I was very shocked at the single mindedness of the lead investigator. It was clear he had an agenda. The information that the outside team produced was largely ignored even though it cast significant doubt on the NTSB investagator's focus on his main issue. (BTW he still plays a major role in the rail safety community).
Since that experience I have far less faith in the objectivity of the NTSB's cause finding.
Later I was offered a job with the NTSB but declined.
Even later I encountered the same individual in a derailment cause finding in Australia (he was now working as a consultant) and he was much more open minded.
Murphy Siding schlimm Getting a CDL does not guarantee competence as a driver. The reopt clearly blamed the driver. As it occured in 2005, any criminal charges have long since been finished. I am quite certain the NTSB investigators thoroughly checked out data and mechanical conditions of train and bus. As I pointed out before, those teams are composed of experts with much experience in the relevant fields. It doesn't guarantee competence as a driver, but it does tend to weed out those applicants more likely to be incompetent.
It doesn't guarantee competence as a driver, but it does tend to weed out those applicants more likely to be incompetent.
To respond to Norm 48328's statement:
"...Posted by Norm48327 on Wednesday, September 14, 2016 7:54 AM"
"I've often wondered if those who drive church busses are required to have a CDL and training. I've seen them do some pretty dumb things like blowing through a crossing without stopping.
Norm..."
Not trying to beat this topic to death, but as some one with a background in Transportation Safety, I think I can add some substance to the conversation.
The regulations would seem to have some minor variences [Church Busses(?) ] in each State as to the specifics that have been regulated in those jurisdictions.
Generally, Motor Vehicles are covered by operational weights, and passenger capacities. The Stattes wach handle this by 'Classing' their CDL required for operation of a specific vehicle. Buses generally, comply by capacities of passengers. Exemptions, usually are for a passenger capacity under 15 passenger+ the operastor.
Many States have exemptions issued to Government Employees who might have to operate a 'classsed' vehicle, as part of their job....Buses, may or may not, be covered specifically by these State authored exemptions. The largest group, generally covered by State Class Exemptions, are Fire Departments; although, those Fire Departments may have a designated operator certification process in place, within their particular organization instructiions.
My first CDL was obtained in Tennessee in 1993, and since the CDL Requirements have been updated to reflect expansions and additional coverages under the Link @
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/03/16/2016-05913/commercial-drivers-license-requirements-of-the-moving-ahead-for-progress-in-the-21st-century-act-
"Commercial Driver's License Requirements of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act and the Military Commercial Driver's License Act of 2012"
"probable cause of this accident was the inadequate standards for certifying nonpublic schoolbus drivers, insufficient training and testing programs, and the limited experience of the schoolbus driver, which led to the intrusion of the schoolbus onto the railroad track when the driver misshifted the transmission. "
So the standards for certifying private school and church bus drivers must have been less rigorous in FL at the time of the accident.
The Palm Beach Post, Aug. 24, 1985
Father sues former wife for accident
Couple's son perished in train-bus collision
The father of a 10-year-old boy killed when an Indian River Academy school bus was hit by a train last September has filed suit against his ex-wife, who was driving the bus when their son was killed. Stephen M. Douthitt is acting as personal representative of the estate of Jonathan Douthitt, 10, and Raimie Finn, 12, who died when the bus driven by Jonathan's mother was struck by a train. Raimie's parents filed a $1 million suit over the accident in March, but did not name the bus driver as a defendant.
Douthitt also named the school, Florida East Coast Railway and two FEC employees as defendants. The suit seeks payment for medical and funeral expenses, compensation for pain and suffering and punitive damages. Douthitt and his ex-wife Cindy Burnett were divorced in January. Divorce proceedings were started in March 1984, before the accident.
"I have nothing I want to say," Douthitt said yesterday when contacted about the suit. Ms. Burnett could not be reached for comment.
Jonathan Douthitt and Raimie Finn died when the bus driven by Jonathan's mother was struck by a train at the Walton Road crossing. Raimie left the bus, then returned to awaken Jonathan who was sleeping in the back. Their escape was thwarted by a deadbolt lock on the emergency exit, according to a Florida Highway Patrol report on the accident.
Raimie's parents filed a $1 million suit over the accident in March, but did not name the bus driver as a defendant. Their attorney said at the time they excluded Ms. Burnett from the suit because she had lost her own son and "has been through hell."
Douthitt's suit, filed by West Palm Beach attorney Fred Hazouri, claims Ms. Burnett was negligent in allowing the bus to stall on the tracks that morning.
A National Transportation Safety Board report cited inadequate driver training as the likely cause of the accident. The report said Ms. Burnett attempted to back the bus off the tracks, but incorrectly shifted gears, causing it to lurch forward.
Douthitt's suit charges the FEC train crew, Leslie Davis and James Kennard, were traveling at an excessive speed and did not keep a proper lookout for vehicles on the tracks. FEC officials are accused in the suit of having an inadequate brake system on the train and of failing to properly maintain the grade crossing.
The suit also charges Indian River Academy was negligent by allowing the deadbolt lock to be installed on the rear exit and by allowing an inadequately trained driver on the bus.
The suit filed by Raimie's parents contained similar allegations against the school and the FEC. Circuit Judge Jack Fennelly will hear pretrial motions in the Finns' suit Monday. Defendants want the judge to toss out a claim for punitive damages in the case.
http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?page=gr&GRid=21392
wanswheel Douthitt also named the school, Florida East Coast Railway and two FEC employees as defendants. The suit seeks payment for medical and funeral expenses, compensation for pain and suffering and punitive damages. Douthitt and his ex-wife Cindy Burnett were divorced in January. Divorce proceedings were started in March 1984, before the accident. "I have nothing I want to say," Douthitt said yesterday when contacted about the suit. Ms. Burnett could not be reached for comment. Jonathan Douthitt and Raimie Finn died when the bus driven by Jonathan's mother was struck by a train at the Walton Road crossing. Raimie left the bus, then returned to awaken Jonathan who was sleeping in the back. Their escape was thwarted by a deadbolt lock on the emergency exit, according to a Florida Highway Patrol report on the accident. Raimie's parents filed a $1 million suit over the accident in March, but did not name the bus driver as a defendant. Their attorney said at the time they excluded Ms. Burnett from the suit because she had lost her own son and "has been through hell." Douthitt's suit, filed by West Palm Beach attorney Fred Hazouri, claims Ms. Burnett was negligent in allowing the bus to stall on the tracks that morning. A National Transportation Safety Board report cited inadequate driver training as the likely cause of the accident. The report said Ms. Burnett attempted to back the bus off the tracks, but incorrectly shifted gears, causing it to lurch forward. Douthitt's suit charges the FEC train crew, Leslie Davis and James Kennard, were traveling at an excessive speed and did not keep a proper lookout for vehicles on the tracks. FEC officials are accused in the suit of having an inadequate brake system on the train and of failing to properly maintain the grade crossing.
I highly recommend the new movie SULLY about Chesley Sullenberger's landing in the Hudson River and the investigation into the event by the STB. It is excellent. It looks like they are trying to pin it on Sully for not returning to the airport. Seems relevant in light of earlier posts herein.
Electroliner 1935 I highly recommend the new movie SULLY about Chesley Sullenberger's landing in the Hudson River and the investigation into the event by the STB. It is excellent. It looks like they are trying to pin it on Sully for not returning to the airport. Seems relevant in light of earlier posts herein.
There's a lot of discussion of the film in aviation forums. Seems the film makers took license as they usually do and painted the NTSB folks as the bad guys. NTSB has commented on that saying they were not trying to hang Sully at all. The movie folks ,on the other hand, need to have a plot of sorts. Hard to cram a few minutes of flight into an hour-and-a-half movie without some friction between the sides.
schlimm Getting a CDL does not guarantee competence as a driver. The report clearly blamed the driver. As it occured in 1984, any criminal/civil charges have long since been finished. I am quite certain the NTSB investigators thoroughly checked out data and mechanical conditions of train and bus. As I pointed out before, those teams are composed of experts with much experience in the relevant fields.
Yup.
School Bus Driver training consists of a few test drives around the area while being supervised, maybe one or two test route drives (if your lucky). If you don't grind the gears too much and can turn the bus at an intersection without having the rear tires go up on a curb........your hired.
Very little is covered about railroad crossings or railroad crossing clearences. They presume you obtained that information for your regular state drivers test.
CDL, is required for School bus charters that cross state lines, it's nothing more than a slightly more rigid written test. Won't have an impact on RR crossing safety.
School Bus companies and dispatchers will say anything to the press or NTSB to protect the School Bus company. I would not trust them if they promised more training, rather I would do a follow-up because most School Bus companies are setup to be penny-pinching operations in order to meet those low bids that the districts accept.
As a School Bus regular driver right after my Army service waiting for college to start lost my brakes twice due to shoe-string maintenence both times the bus was empty of kids and one of the two times I was going down a steep hill............and this was in SE Wisconsin where you would think the regulators would be all over the school bus companies but.....nope. I got back to the bus depot and they had all sorts of explanations as to why the brakes went out. I told them in three years of Active Duty Army I never lost brakes on 5 ton or 2.5 ton troop transports or even the armored vehicles and they didn't want to hear that.
Biggest Danger at a Railroad Crossing for a School Bus is having the crossing up a slight embankment from the road grade and then popping the clutch as you shift into first from a dead stop.........bus will leap up across the tracks and stall on part of the tracks about 80% of the time. If the engine kills on some of the older buses it might take 2 or 3 attempts to get it started again.
Anyways, this was all back in the late 1980's. To me it looks like most school buses are fully automatic tranmission now and most school bus fleets are a lot newer than they used to be............so maybe times have changed for the better.
Norm48327 It looks like [the filmmakers] are trying to pin it on Sully for not returning to the airport. Seems relevant in light of earlier posts herein. Seems the film makers took license as they usually do and painted the NTSB folks as the bad guys. NTSB has commented on that saying they were not trying to hang Sully at all.
It looks like [the filmmakers] are trying to pin it on Sully for not returning to the airport. Seems relevant in light of earlier posts herein.
Seems the film makers took license as they usually do and painted the NTSB folks as the bad guys. NTSB has commented on that saying they were not trying to hang Sully at all.
And neither of you did what you should have done: actually provided a link to what the NTSB actually said instead of starting up the he said she said yivshish.
Everybody please read, and then start discussing where the filmmakers might have exaggerated for political effect. Referring to specific language in the specific report. Thanks in advance.
RMEactually provided a link to what the NTSB actually said i
Thank you. As usual, movies are for entertainment, taking artistic license.
schlimmThank you. As usual, movies are for entertainment, taking artistic license.
Next you'll tell me Tom Hanks wasn't really the pilot.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.
This is from WIKIPEDIA's article on SULLY.
The film generated controversy surrounding its depiction of the National Transportation Safety Board as "prosecutorial and closed-minded".[52] In a promotional video preceding the film's release, director Clint Eastwood claimed that the NTSB was "railroading" Sullenberger and "was trying to paint the picture that he had done the wrong thing."[52][53] Upon the film's release, NTSB investigators objected to the film's portrayal of them as inaccurate.[54] After reviewing the factual record and viewing the film, The New York Times wrote that "the film’s version of the inquiry veers from the official record in both tone and substance" and "depicts the investigators as departing from standard protocol in airline accident inquiries."[52] NTSB lead investigator John Balzano disputed the film's depiction, saying that investigators "weren't out to embarrass anybody at all", and a former NTSB investigator also expressed concern that the depiction would be taken by moviegoers as evidence of "government incompetence".[53]
The Guardian wrote that "In depicting government investigators as petty and clueless, the Hudson plane crash film trumpets a libertarian worldview at the expense of passenger safety",[55]noting that "It’s not hard to see why this tack appealed to strident libertarian Eastwood" and explaining that
Around the world, the NTSB’s investigations are regarded as setting the gold standard for impartiality, perceptiveness and making recommendations with important safety benefits. The NTSB has saved countless lives. Yet the NTSB has no regulatory ability: to turn its recommendations into practice, the board relies solely on a moral authority founded on its reputation for diligence. The stakes are high – the board currently has a list of 10 critical safety improvements that it’s trying to get implemented, including, for example, positive train control, something that would have spared 243 people last year from a deadly Amtrak derailment. Sully has smeared this reputation for the sake of a hero who needed no defending. It will create a headwind in the minds of the public and policymakers that the NTSB will be struggling against for years to come.[55]
Around the world, the NTSB’s investigations are regarded as setting the gold standard for impartiality, perceptiveness and making recommendations with important safety benefits. The NTSB has saved countless lives. Yet the NTSB has no regulatory ability: to turn its recommendations into practice, the board relies solely on a moral authority founded on its reputation for diligence. The stakes are high – the board currently has a list of 10 critical safety improvements that it’s trying to get implemented, including, for example, positive train control, something that would have spared 243 people last year from a deadly Amtrak derailment.
Sully has smeared this reputation for the sake of a hero who needed no defending. It will create a headwind in the minds of the public and policymakers that the NTSB will be struggling against for years to come.[55]
In an interview about the controversy, actor Tom Hanks told the Associated Press that Sullenberger reviewed an early draft of the film's script, which identified NTSB investigators in the story by their real names, and asked that the investigators' names be removed. According to Hanks, Sullenberger felt that the real-life investigators "were not prosecutors" and it was not fair to associate them with changes in the story depicting "more of a prosecutorial process."[53]
Eastwood has made a lot of fine films, but in this case it appears his script supports an anti-government agenda rather than stick more closely to reality.
Excerpt from NTSB Aircraft Accident Report, May 4, 2010
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1003.pdf
On January 15, 2009, about 1527 eastern standard time (EST), US Airways flight 1549, an Airbus Industrie A320-214, N106US, experienced an almost total loss of thrust in both engines after encountering a flock of birds and was subsequently ditched on the Hudson River about 8.5 miles from LaGuardia Airport (LGA), New York City, New York. The flight was en route to Charlotte Douglas International Airport (CLT), Charlotte, North Carolina, and had departed LGA about 2 minutes before the in-flight event occurred. The 150 passengers, including a lap-held child, and 5 crewmembers evacuated the airplane via the forward and overwing exits. One flight attendant and four passengers received serious injuries, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The scheduled, domestic passenger flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
The accident flight was the last flight of a 4-day trip sequence for the flight and cabin crewmembers and the second flight of the day in the accident airplane. The flight crew flew from Pittsburgh International Airport (PIT), Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to CLT on a different airplane and then flew the accident airplane from CLT to LGA. The flight crew reported that the flight from CLT to LGA was uneventful.
According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript, at 1524:54, the LGA air traffic control tower (ATCT) local controller cleared the flight for takeoff from runway 4. At this time, the first officer was the pilot flying (PF), and the captain was the pilot monitoring (PM). According to the accident flight crew and CVR and flight data recorder (FDR) data, the takeoff and initial portion of the climb were uneventful.
At 1525:45, the LGA ATCT local controller instructed the flight crew to contact the New York Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) LGA departure controller. The captain contacted the departure controller at 1525:51, advising him that the airplane was at 700 feet and climbing to 5,000 feet. The controller then instructed the flight to climb to and maintain 15,000 feet, and the captain acknowledged the instruction.
According to the CVR transcript, at 1527:10, the captain stated, “birds.” One second later, the CVR recorded the sound of thumps and thuds followed by a shuddering sound. According to FDR data, the bird encounter occurred when the airplane was at an altitude of 2,818 feet above ground level (agl) and a distance of about 4.5 miles north-northwest of the approach end of runway 22 at LGA. At 1527:13, a sound similar to a decrease in engine noise or frequency began on the CVR recording. FDR data indicated that, immediately after the bird encounter, both engines’ fan and core (N1 and N2, respectively) speeds started to decelerate. (See section 1.16.1.1 for more information about the airplane’s performance during the accident sequence.)
At 1527:14, the first officer stated, “uh oh,” followed by the captain stating, “we got one rol- both of ‘em rolling back.” At 1527:18, the cockpit area microphone (CAM) recorded the beginning of a rumbling sound. At 1527:19, the captain stated, “[engine] ignition, start,” and, about 2 seconds later, “I’m starting the APU [auxiliary power unit].” At 1527:23, the captain took over control of the airplane, stating, “my aircraft.”
At 1527:28, the captain instructed the first officer to “get the QRH [quick reference handbook] loss of thrust on both engines.” At 1527:33, the captain reported the emergency situation to the LGA departure controller, stating, “mayday mayday mayday…this is…Cactus fifteen thirty nine hit birds, we’ve lost thrust in both engines, we’re turning back towards LaGuardia.” The LGA departure controller acknowledged the captain’s statement and then instructed him to turn left heading 220°.
At 1527:50, the first officer began conducting Part 1 of the QRH ENG DUAL FAILURE checklist (Engine Dual Failure checklist), stating, “if fuel remaining, engine mode selector, ignition,” and the captain responded, “ignition.” The first officer then stated, “thrust levers confirm idle,” and the captain responded, “idle.” About 4 seconds later, the first officer stated, “airspeed optimum relight. three hundred knots. we don’t have that,” and the captain responded, “we don’t.”
At 1528:05, the LGA departure controller asked the captain if he wanted to try to land on runway 13 at LGA if it was available, and the captain responded, “we’re unable. we may end up in the Hudson [River].” The rumbling sound that the CVR started recording at 1527:18 ended at 1528:08. At 1528:14, the first officer stated, “emergency electrical power…emergency generator not online.” At 1528:19, the captain stated, “it’s online.” The first officer then stated, “ATC [air traffic control] notify.” At 1528:25, the captain stated, “The left one’s [engine] coming back up a little bit.”
At 1528:31, the LGA departure controller stated that it was going to be “left traffic for runway three one,” and the captain responded, “unable.” At 1528:36, the traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) on the airplane transmitted, “traffic traffic.” At 1528:46, the controller stated that runway 4 at LGA was available, and the captain responded, “I’m not sure we can make any runway. Uh what’s over to our right anything in New Jersey maybe Teterboro?” The controller replied, “ok yeah, off your right side is Teterboro Airport [TEB].” Subsequently, the departure controller asked the captain if he wanted to try going to TEB, and the captain replied, “yes.”
At 1528:45, while the captain was communicating with ATC, the first officer stated, “FAC [flight augmentation computer] one off, then on.” Fifteen seconds later, the first officer stated, “no relight after thirty seconds, engine master one and two confirm.” At 1529:11, the captain announced on the public address (PA) system, “this is the Captain, brace for impact.” At 1529:14.9, the CVR recorded the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) warning alert, “one thousand.” At 1529:16, the first officer stated, “engine master two, back on,” and the captain responded, “back on.”
At 1529:21, the CVR recorded the LGA departure controller instructing the captain to turn right 280° and stating that the airplane could land on runway 1 at TEB. At the same time, the CVR recorded the first officer asking the captain, “is that all the power you got? (wanna) number one? Or we got power on number one.” In response to the controller, the captain stated, “we can’t do it.” In response to the first officer, the captain stated, “go ahead, try [relighting] number 1 [engine].” FDR data indicated that engine master switch 1 was moved to the OFF position at 1529:27. The departure controller then asked the captain which runway at TEB he would like, and the captain responded, “we’re gonna be in the Hudson.”
At 1529:36, the first officer stated, “I put it [the engine master switch] back on,” and the captain replied, “ok put it back on…put it back on.” At 1529:44, the first officer stated, “no relight,” and the captain replied, “ok let’s go put the flaps out, put the flaps out.” At 1529:53, the LGA departure controller stated that he had lost radar contact with the airplane, but he continued trying to communicate with the captain, stating, “you also got Newark airport off your two o’clock in about seven miles.” See figure 1 for the flight track of the airplane.
At 1530:01, the first officer stated, “got flaps out,” and, at 1530:03, stated, “two hundred fifty feet in the air.” He then stated, “hundred and seventy knots…got no power on either one? Try the other one?” The captain responded, “try the other one.” At 1530:16, the first officer stated, “hundred and fifty knots,” and, at 1530:17, stated, “got flaps two, you want more?” The captain replied, “no, let’s stay at two,” and then asked the first officer, “got any ideas?” The first officer responded, “actually not.”
At 1530:24, the GPWS issued a “terrain, terrain” warning followed by “pull up,” which repeated to the end of the CVR recording. At 1530:38 The first officer then stated, “switch?” The captain replied, “yes.” At 1530:41.1, the GPWS issued a 50-foot warning. The CVR recording ended at 1530:43.7., the captain stated, “we’re gonna brace.”
zugmannNext you'll tell me Tom Hanks wasn't really the pilot.
They sure made him up to look like Sully, though. Interesting that the main characters were played by actors who looked very much like the real people. During the credits at the end of the film, there was some footage of a reunion of passengers and crew and for a couple of seconds, I thought it was the cast until I heard some of the voices. Though, in at least one case, an actual participant was used, like the first ferry captain to arrive at the plane.
What I noticed about the NTSB angle was the rapid nature of the process in the film, as opposed to the normally glacial pace of the agency's investigations. The actual report was released 15 months or so after the incident, if I do the math in my head correctly.
Well, Chuck, It was pretty much cut-and-dried from square one. Geese enter and kill engines; three minutes later plane ditches in the Hudson. What else is there to say except to give accolades to the crew.
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