RME tree68 As I recall, both engines came off, which would have done some pretty significant damage in and of itself. Only one engine came off, although the other one lost most of its casing which included the bypass ducting, and that is a great deal of the visible 'mass' of the engine. The Hudson was so turbid that no one could see the engine still on the wing while the plane was in the water. Norm knows more about this than I do, but my understanding was that the engine mounts were intentionally designed NOT to overstress any part of the wing structure, but to fail cleanly and separate. In some cases this didn't happen quite as anticipated; there was a famous American crash (flight 191 in 1979) where improper maintenance caused an engine mount to let go at takeoff power, and the engine rotated itself forward and around the front of the wing ... where the control hydraulic lines were helpfully bunched. It was stressed in the accident investigation that control would not have been lost due to the engine departing in the manner it did (!) had it not taken out the controls at a critical phase of flight.
tree68 As I recall, both engines came off, which would have done some pretty significant damage in and of itself.
Only one engine came off, although the other one lost most of its casing which included the bypass ducting, and that is a great deal of the visible 'mass' of the engine. The Hudson was so turbid that no one could see the engine still on the wing while the plane was in the water.
Norm knows more about this than I do, but my understanding was that the engine mounts were intentionally designed NOT to overstress any part of the wing structure, but to fail cleanly and separate. In some cases this didn't happen quite as anticipated; there was a famous American crash (flight 191 in 1979) where improper maintenance caused an engine mount to let go at takeoff power, and the engine rotated itself forward and around the front of the wing ... where the control hydraulic lines were helpfully bunched. It was stressed in the accident investigation that control would not have been lost due to the engine departing in the manner it did (!) had it not taken out the controls at a critical phase of flight.
Some of the questions about the aircraft that was US AIR FLT 1549 in the following linked site @ http://www.carolinasaviation.org/commercial/miracle-on-the-hudson-flight-1549/travel-to-cam
that movie is on my rental list. He was a hero as far as I'm concerned, he did what needed to be done and no lives were lost. The military trains their pilots very well and it shows. And people are too much button pushers today, don't know what to do when something goes wrong. I drive a classic 1966 Chevy Bel Air that belonged to my Dad and it has no power steering, power brakes or a/c. I'd rather have a car without a lot of gadgets, more stuff to go wrong. It's what I'm used to and can deal without a/c as I never drive very far on a hot day.
sounded like that bus driver was not familiar with how to drive near RR tracks or didn't know that bus. He should never have kept trying to move and messing up, sounded like he was in the clear the first time and should have stayed put. Some school bus drivers are great, but others are not, we've had local accidents with school buses speeding, drivers drunk or high on drugs and causing accidents. Glad I didn't have to take a bus to school, could walk to grade school and high school I rode a local transit bus, not one from a school.
Today's Chicago Tribune has an article related to the NTSB report on USAir Flight 1549. The report made several safety recommendations to mitigate any possible recurrences. Most of them were rejected by the FAA and its European counterpart for a variety of reasons, some of them self-serving.
RMENorm knows more about this than I do, but my understanding was that the engine mounts were intentionally designed NOT to overstress any part of the wing structure, but to fail cleanly and separate. In some cases this didn't happen quite as anticipated; there was a famous American crash (flight 191 in 1979) where improper maintenance caused an engine mount to let go at takeoff power, and the engine rotated itself forward and around the front of the wing ... where the control hydraulic lines were helpfully bunched. It was stressed in the accident investigation that control would not have been lost due to the engine departing in the manner it did (!) had it not taken out the controls at a critical phase of flight.
Spot on, but I'm not familiar with the old DC-10's.
Norm
tree68As I recall, both engines came off, which would have done some pretty significant damage in and of itself.
Murphy Siding The NTSB report makes the damage on the plane seem to be not to intense. However, it sunk and had to be salvaged I presume. What becomes of the plane? Do they scrap it? Part it out? Patch it up and put it on the used lot for sale?
The NTSB report makes the damage on the plane seem to be not to intense. However, it sunk and had to be salvaged I presume. What becomes of the plane? Do they scrap it? Part it out? Patch it up and put it on the used lot for sale?
The Hudson is salt water at that point. Once an aircraft is dunked in salt water it is scrap. No chance of salvaging parts. The plane is in a museum in North Carolina.
Murphy SidingWhat becomes of the plane?
Flyguys are pretty fussy about what goes into their airplanes - I doubt anything got parted out.
As I recall, both engines came off, which would have done some pretty significant damage in and of itself. Too, at that point, the Hudson will be pretty brackish (salty) which won't do anything good to any of the parts.
I suspect that the only way much of anything got reused from the airplane was as recycled metal.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
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Electroliner 1935 In the movie, the NTSB was receiving input from Airbus telling them that simulation showed that the plane could have returned to Laguardia and until the one engine was recovered, that it could have supplied power. I thought that part of the film may have had some artistic liberty in it but in the end the NTSB got it right. I liked the film and two lines stick in my recollection: The one board member calling it a crash into the Hudson and being corrected that it was a LANDING in the Hudson; the other being the comment that the board doen't normally have the pilot testifying after a crash. Another thing I thought about was the proficiency of Sully. I recall riding on Patco from Philly to Lindenwold and noteing that the motorman was pushing a buttom to close the doors and a button to start the train which then automatically accelerated to speed and came to a stop at the next station with the doors opening. On the return back to Philly, he was using the throttle to operate the train accellerating and decelerating into the next station. As the motorman was in an open area (not a closed cab) I was able to ask him why. He explained that it was to maintain his proficiency, as the normal braking initiated by a track beacon was fine for dry rail but on wet rail the train would slide through the station. He wanted to be familiar with the operation of the equipment for when he needed it. Later on, I came across an article that Southwest Airlines chose not to use autopilot landing systems because they wanted their pilots to keep their proficiency. The movie gives credit to the ferry boats and the other people who assisted in the recovery of the passengers. A true story of things going right. Thankfully this didn't happen at night or in a fog. I highly recommend it.
In the movie, the NTSB was receiving input from Airbus telling them that simulation showed that the plane could have returned to Laguardia and until the one engine was recovered, that it could have supplied power. I thought that part of the film may have had some artistic liberty in it but in the end the NTSB got it right. I liked the film and two lines stick in my recollection: The one board member calling it a crash into the Hudson and being corrected that it was a LANDING in the Hudson; the other being the comment that the board doen't normally have the pilot testifying after a crash.
Another thing I thought about was the proficiency of Sully. I recall riding on Patco from Philly to Lindenwold and noteing that the motorman was pushing a buttom to close the doors and a button to start the train which then automatically accelerated to speed and came to a stop at the next station with the doors opening. On the return back to Philly, he was using the throttle to operate the train accellerating and decelerating into the next station. As the motorman was in an open area (not a closed cab) I was able to ask him why. He explained that it was to maintain his proficiency, as the normal braking initiated by a track beacon was fine for dry rail but on wet rail the train would slide through the station. He wanted to be familiar with the operation of the equipment for when he needed it.
Later on, I came across an article that Southwest Airlines chose not to use autopilot landing systems because they wanted their pilots to keep their proficiency.
The movie gives credit to the ferry boats and the other people who assisted in the recovery of the passengers. A true story of things going right. Thankfully this didn't happen at night or in a fog. I highly recommend it.
Proficiency is gained through recurrent training and those who fly the "heavy iron" as we in aviation call those big birds is simply a fact of life. The majority of that training happens in full motion flight simulators rather than aircraft that are very costly to fly. Such training reinforces the choice of actions in any given situation so much so it becomes reflexive rather than something that has to be thought out. I can picture the motorman doing the same to maintain his proficiency.
Most airliners today are capable of category III landings, aka "autoland". No pilot input required unless something is not right. That's where the constant training pays off. Witness Asians 214 were the pilots did not have the skills to save their ship from disaster. There is danger in becoming a "button pusher" and relying too heavily on automation. Pilots at most U.S. airlines are required to do so many manual landings per year in order to maintain that proficiency.
There was only one mistake made by Sully and Stiles. There are vent door that should be closed during a ditching. They didn't get that done in the short time available. Had they gotten them closed the plane would not have sunk. Still, in aviation circles, those two are regarded as heros.
Well, Chuck, It was pretty much cut-and-dried from square one. Geese enter and kill engines; three minutes later plane ditches in the Hudson. What else is there to say except to give accolades to the crew.
zugmannNext you'll tell me Tom Hanks wasn't really the pilot.
They sure made him up to look like Sully, though. Interesting that the main characters were played by actors who looked very much like the real people. During the credits at the end of the film, there was some footage of a reunion of passengers and crew and for a couple of seconds, I thought it was the cast until I heard some of the voices. Though, in at least one case, an actual participant was used, like the first ferry captain to arrive at the plane.
What I noticed about the NTSB angle was the rapid nature of the process in the film, as opposed to the normally glacial pace of the agency's investigations. The actual report was released 15 months or so after the incident, if I do the math in my head correctly.
Excerpt from NTSB Aircraft Accident Report, May 4, 2010
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1003.pdf
On January 15, 2009, about 1527 eastern standard time (EST), US Airways flight 1549, an Airbus Industrie A320-214, N106US, experienced an almost total loss of thrust in both engines after encountering a flock of birds and was subsequently ditched on the Hudson River about 8.5 miles from LaGuardia Airport (LGA), New York City, New York. The flight was en route to Charlotte Douglas International Airport (CLT), Charlotte, North Carolina, and had departed LGA about 2 minutes before the in-flight event occurred. The 150 passengers, including a lap-held child, and 5 crewmembers evacuated the airplane via the forward and overwing exits. One flight attendant and four passengers received serious injuries, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The scheduled, domestic passenger flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
The accident flight was the last flight of a 4-day trip sequence for the flight and cabin crewmembers and the second flight of the day in the accident airplane. The flight crew flew from Pittsburgh International Airport (PIT), Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to CLT on a different airplane and then flew the accident airplane from CLT to LGA. The flight crew reported that the flight from CLT to LGA was uneventful.
According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript, at 1524:54, the LGA air traffic control tower (ATCT) local controller cleared the flight for takeoff from runway 4. At this time, the first officer was the pilot flying (PF), and the captain was the pilot monitoring (PM). According to the accident flight crew and CVR and flight data recorder (FDR) data, the takeoff and initial portion of the climb were uneventful.
At 1525:45, the LGA ATCT local controller instructed the flight crew to contact the New York Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) LGA departure controller. The captain contacted the departure controller at 1525:51, advising him that the airplane was at 700 feet and climbing to 5,000 feet. The controller then instructed the flight to climb to and maintain 15,000 feet, and the captain acknowledged the instruction.
According to the CVR transcript, at 1527:10, the captain stated, “birds.” One second later, the CVR recorded the sound of thumps and thuds followed by a shuddering sound. According to FDR data, the bird encounter occurred when the airplane was at an altitude of 2,818 feet above ground level (agl) and a distance of about 4.5 miles north-northwest of the approach end of runway 22 at LGA. At 1527:13, a sound similar to a decrease in engine noise or frequency began on the CVR recording. FDR data indicated that, immediately after the bird encounter, both engines’ fan and core (N1 and N2, respectively) speeds started to decelerate. (See section 1.16.1.1 for more information about the airplane’s performance during the accident sequence.)
At 1527:14, the first officer stated, “uh oh,” followed by the captain stating, “we got one rol- both of ‘em rolling back.” At 1527:18, the cockpit area microphone (CAM) recorded the beginning of a rumbling sound. At 1527:19, the captain stated, “[engine] ignition, start,” and, about 2 seconds later, “I’m starting the APU [auxiliary power unit].” At 1527:23, the captain took over control of the airplane, stating, “my aircraft.”
At 1527:28, the captain instructed the first officer to “get the QRH [quick reference handbook] loss of thrust on both engines.” At 1527:33, the captain reported the emergency situation to the LGA departure controller, stating, “mayday mayday mayday…this is…Cactus fifteen thirty nine hit birds, we’ve lost thrust in both engines, we’re turning back towards LaGuardia.” The LGA departure controller acknowledged the captain’s statement and then instructed him to turn left heading 220°.
At 1527:50, the first officer began conducting Part 1 of the QRH ENG DUAL FAILURE checklist (Engine Dual Failure checklist), stating, “if fuel remaining, engine mode selector, ignition,” and the captain responded, “ignition.” The first officer then stated, “thrust levers confirm idle,” and the captain responded, “idle.” About 4 seconds later, the first officer stated, “airspeed optimum relight. three hundred knots. we don’t have that,” and the captain responded, “we don’t.”
At 1528:05, the LGA departure controller asked the captain if he wanted to try to land on runway 13 at LGA if it was available, and the captain responded, “we’re unable. we may end up in the Hudson [River].” The rumbling sound that the CVR started recording at 1527:18 ended at 1528:08. At 1528:14, the first officer stated, “emergency electrical power…emergency generator not online.” At 1528:19, the captain stated, “it’s online.” The first officer then stated, “ATC [air traffic control] notify.” At 1528:25, the captain stated, “The left one’s [engine] coming back up a little bit.”
At 1528:31, the LGA departure controller stated that it was going to be “left traffic for runway three one,” and the captain responded, “unable.” At 1528:36, the traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) on the airplane transmitted, “traffic traffic.” At 1528:46, the controller stated that runway 4 at LGA was available, and the captain responded, “I’m not sure we can make any runway. Uh what’s over to our right anything in New Jersey maybe Teterboro?” The controller replied, “ok yeah, off your right side is Teterboro Airport [TEB].” Subsequently, the departure controller asked the captain if he wanted to try going to TEB, and the captain replied, “yes.”
At 1528:45, while the captain was communicating with ATC, the first officer stated, “FAC [flight augmentation computer] one off, then on.” Fifteen seconds later, the first officer stated, “no relight after thirty seconds, engine master one and two confirm.” At 1529:11, the captain announced on the public address (PA) system, “this is the Captain, brace for impact.” At 1529:14.9, the CVR recorded the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) warning alert, “one thousand.” At 1529:16, the first officer stated, “engine master two, back on,” and the captain responded, “back on.”
At 1529:21, the CVR recorded the LGA departure controller instructing the captain to turn right 280° and stating that the airplane could land on runway 1 at TEB. At the same time, the CVR recorded the first officer asking the captain, “is that all the power you got? (wanna) number one? Or we got power on number one.” In response to the controller, the captain stated, “we can’t do it.” In response to the first officer, the captain stated, “go ahead, try [relighting] number 1 [engine].” FDR data indicated that engine master switch 1 was moved to the OFF position at 1529:27. The departure controller then asked the captain which runway at TEB he would like, and the captain responded, “we’re gonna be in the Hudson.”
At 1529:36, the first officer stated, “I put it [the engine master switch] back on,” and the captain replied, “ok put it back on…put it back on.” At 1529:44, the first officer stated, “no relight,” and the captain replied, “ok let’s go put the flaps out, put the flaps out.” At 1529:53, the LGA departure controller stated that he had lost radar contact with the airplane, but he continued trying to communicate with the captain, stating, “you also got Newark airport off your two o’clock in about seven miles.” See figure 1 for the flight track of the airplane.
At 1530:01, the first officer stated, “got flaps out,” and, at 1530:03, stated, “two hundred fifty feet in the air.” He then stated, “hundred and seventy knots…got no power on either one? Try the other one?” The captain responded, “try the other one.” At 1530:16, the first officer stated, “hundred and fifty knots,” and, at 1530:17, stated, “got flaps two, you want more?” The captain replied, “no, let’s stay at two,” and then asked the first officer, “got any ideas?” The first officer responded, “actually not.”
At 1530:24, the GPWS issued a “terrain, terrain” warning followed by “pull up,” which repeated to the end of the CVR recording. At 1530:38 The first officer then stated, “switch?” The captain replied, “yes.” At 1530:41.1, the GPWS issued a 50-foot warning. The CVR recording ended at 1530:43.7., the captain stated, “we’re gonna brace.”
Eastwood has made a lot of fine films, but in this case it appears his script supports an anti-government agenda rather than stick more closely to reality.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
This is from WIKIPEDIA's article on SULLY.
The film generated controversy surrounding its depiction of the National Transportation Safety Board as "prosecutorial and closed-minded".[52] In a promotional video preceding the film's release, director Clint Eastwood claimed that the NTSB was "railroading" Sullenberger and "was trying to paint the picture that he had done the wrong thing."[52][53] Upon the film's release, NTSB investigators objected to the film's portrayal of them as inaccurate.[54] After reviewing the factual record and viewing the film, The New York Times wrote that "the film’s version of the inquiry veers from the official record in both tone and substance" and "depicts the investigators as departing from standard protocol in airline accident inquiries."[52] NTSB lead investigator John Balzano disputed the film's depiction, saying that investigators "weren't out to embarrass anybody at all", and a former NTSB investigator also expressed concern that the depiction would be taken by moviegoers as evidence of "government incompetence".[53]
The Guardian wrote that "In depicting government investigators as petty and clueless, the Hudson plane crash film trumpets a libertarian worldview at the expense of passenger safety",[55]noting that "It’s not hard to see why this tack appealed to strident libertarian Eastwood" and explaining that
Around the world, the NTSB’s investigations are regarded as setting the gold standard for impartiality, perceptiveness and making recommendations with important safety benefits. The NTSB has saved countless lives. Yet the NTSB has no regulatory ability: to turn its recommendations into practice, the board relies solely on a moral authority founded on its reputation for diligence. The stakes are high – the board currently has a list of 10 critical safety improvements that it’s trying to get implemented, including, for example, positive train control, something that would have spared 243 people last year from a deadly Amtrak derailment. Sully has smeared this reputation for the sake of a hero who needed no defending. It will create a headwind in the minds of the public and policymakers that the NTSB will be struggling against for years to come.[55]
Around the world, the NTSB’s investigations are regarded as setting the gold standard for impartiality, perceptiveness and making recommendations with important safety benefits. The NTSB has saved countless lives. Yet the NTSB has no regulatory ability: to turn its recommendations into practice, the board relies solely on a moral authority founded on its reputation for diligence. The stakes are high – the board currently has a list of 10 critical safety improvements that it’s trying to get implemented, including, for example, positive train control, something that would have spared 243 people last year from a deadly Amtrak derailment.
Sully has smeared this reputation for the sake of a hero who needed no defending. It will create a headwind in the minds of the public and policymakers that the NTSB will be struggling against for years to come.[55]
In an interview about the controversy, actor Tom Hanks told the Associated Press that Sullenberger reviewed an early draft of the film's script, which identified NTSB investigators in the story by their real names, and asked that the investigators' names be removed. According to Hanks, Sullenberger felt that the real-life investigators "were not prosecutors" and it was not fair to associate them with changes in the story depicting "more of a prosecutorial process."[53]
schlimmThank you. As usual, movies are for entertainment, taking artistic license.
Next you'll tell me Tom Hanks wasn't really the pilot.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
RMEactually provided a link to what the NTSB actually said i
Thank you. As usual, movies are for entertainment, taking artistic license.
Norm48327 It looks like [the filmmakers] are trying to pin it on Sully for not returning to the airport. Seems relevant in light of earlier posts herein. Seems the film makers took license as they usually do and painted the NTSB folks as the bad guys. NTSB has commented on that saying they were not trying to hang Sully at all.
It looks like [the filmmakers] are trying to pin it on Sully for not returning to the airport. Seems relevant in light of earlier posts herein.
Seems the film makers took license as they usually do and painted the NTSB folks as the bad guys. NTSB has commented on that saying they were not trying to hang Sully at all.
And neither of you did what you should have done: actually provided a link to what the NTSB actually said instead of starting up the he said she said yivshish.
Everybody please read, and then start discussing where the filmmakers might have exaggerated for political effect. Referring to specific language in the specific report. Thanks in advance.
schlimm Getting a CDL does not guarantee competence as a driver. The report clearly blamed the driver. As it occured in 1984, any criminal/civil charges have long since been finished. I am quite certain the NTSB investigators thoroughly checked out data and mechanical conditions of train and bus. As I pointed out before, those teams are composed of experts with much experience in the relevant fields.
Getting a CDL does not guarantee competence as a driver. The report clearly blamed the driver. As it occured in 1984, any criminal/civil charges have long since been finished.
I am quite certain the NTSB investigators thoroughly checked out data and mechanical conditions of train and bus. As I pointed out before, those teams are composed of experts with much experience in the relevant fields.
Yup.
School Bus Driver training consists of a few test drives around the area while being supervised, maybe one or two test route drives (if your lucky). If you don't grind the gears too much and can turn the bus at an intersection without having the rear tires go up on a curb........your hired.
Very little is covered about railroad crossings or railroad crossing clearences. They presume you obtained that information for your regular state drivers test.
CDL, is required for School bus charters that cross state lines, it's nothing more than a slightly more rigid written test. Won't have an impact on RR crossing safety.
School Bus companies and dispatchers will say anything to the press or NTSB to protect the School Bus company. I would not trust them if they promised more training, rather I would do a follow-up because most School Bus companies are setup to be penny-pinching operations in order to meet those low bids that the districts accept.
As a School Bus regular driver right after my Army service waiting for college to start lost my brakes twice due to shoe-string maintenence both times the bus was empty of kids and one of the two times I was going down a steep hill............and this was in SE Wisconsin where you would think the regulators would be all over the school bus companies but.....nope. I got back to the bus depot and they had all sorts of explanations as to why the brakes went out. I told them in three years of Active Duty Army I never lost brakes on 5 ton or 2.5 ton troop transports or even the armored vehicles and they didn't want to hear that.
Biggest Danger at a Railroad Crossing for a School Bus is having the crossing up a slight embankment from the road grade and then popping the clutch as you shift into first from a dead stop.........bus will leap up across the tracks and stall on part of the tracks about 80% of the time. If the engine kills on some of the older buses it might take 2 or 3 attempts to get it started again.
Anyways, this was all back in the late 1980's. To me it looks like most school buses are fully automatic tranmission now and most school bus fleets are a lot newer than they used to be............so maybe times have changed for the better.
Electroliner 1935 I highly recommend the new movie SULLY about Chesley Sullenberger's landing in the Hudson River and the investigation into the event by the STB. It is excellent. It looks like they are trying to pin it on Sully for not returning to the airport. Seems relevant in light of earlier posts herein.
I highly recommend the new movie SULLY about Chesley Sullenberger's landing in the Hudson River and the investigation into the event by the STB. It is excellent. It looks like they are trying to pin it on Sully for not returning to the airport. Seems relevant in light of earlier posts herein.
There's a lot of discussion of the film in aviation forums. Seems the film makers took license as they usually do and painted the NTSB folks as the bad guys. NTSB has commented on that saying they were not trying to hang Sully at all. The movie folks ,on the other hand, need to have a plot of sorts. Hard to cram a few minutes of flight into an hour-and-a-half movie without some friction between the sides.
wanswheel Douthitt also named the school, Florida East Coast Railway and two FEC employees as defendants. The suit seeks payment for medical and funeral expenses, compensation for pain and suffering and punitive damages. Douthitt and his ex-wife Cindy Burnett were divorced in January. Divorce proceedings were started in March 1984, before the accident. "I have nothing I want to say," Douthitt said yesterday when contacted about the suit. Ms. Burnett could not be reached for comment. Jonathan Douthitt and Raimie Finn died when the bus driven by Jonathan's mother was struck by a train at the Walton Road crossing. Raimie left the bus, then returned to awaken Jonathan who was sleeping in the back. Their escape was thwarted by a deadbolt lock on the emergency exit, according to a Florida Highway Patrol report on the accident. Raimie's parents filed a $1 million suit over the accident in March, but did not name the bus driver as a defendant. Their attorney said at the time they excluded Ms. Burnett from the suit because she had lost her own son and "has been through hell." Douthitt's suit, filed by West Palm Beach attorney Fred Hazouri, claims Ms. Burnett was negligent in allowing the bus to stall on the tracks that morning. A National Transportation Safety Board report cited inadequate driver training as the likely cause of the accident. The report said Ms. Burnett attempted to back the bus off the tracks, but incorrectly shifted gears, causing it to lurch forward. Douthitt's suit charges the FEC train crew, Leslie Davis and James Kennard, were traveling at an excessive speed and did not keep a proper lookout for vehicles on the tracks. FEC officials are accused in the suit of having an inadequate brake system on the train and of failing to properly maintain the grade crossing.
Douthitt also named the school, Florida East Coast Railway and two FEC employees as defendants. The suit seeks payment for medical and funeral expenses, compensation for pain and suffering and punitive damages. Douthitt and his ex-wife Cindy Burnett were divorced in January. Divorce proceedings were started in March 1984, before the accident.
"I have nothing I want to say," Douthitt said yesterday when contacted about the suit. Ms. Burnett could not be reached for comment.
Jonathan Douthitt and Raimie Finn died when the bus driven by Jonathan's mother was struck by a train at the Walton Road crossing. Raimie left the bus, then returned to awaken Jonathan who was sleeping in the back. Their escape was thwarted by a deadbolt lock on the emergency exit, according to a Florida Highway Patrol report on the accident.
Raimie's parents filed a $1 million suit over the accident in March, but did not name the bus driver as a defendant. Their attorney said at the time they excluded Ms. Burnett from the suit because she had lost her own son and "has been through hell."
Douthitt's suit, filed by West Palm Beach attorney Fred Hazouri, claims Ms. Burnett was negligent in allowing the bus to stall on the tracks that morning.
A National Transportation Safety Board report cited inadequate driver training as the likely cause of the accident. The report said Ms. Burnett attempted to back the bus off the tracks, but incorrectly shifted gears, causing it to lurch forward.
Douthitt's suit charges the FEC train crew, Leslie Davis and James Kennard, were traveling at an excessive speed and did not keep a proper lookout for vehicles on the tracks. FEC officials are accused in the suit of having an inadequate brake system on the train and of failing to properly maintain the grade crossing.
The Palm Beach Post, Aug. 24, 1985
Father sues former wife for accident
Couple's son perished in train-bus collision
The father of a 10-year-old boy killed when an Indian River Academy school bus was hit by a train last September has filed suit against his ex-wife, who was driving the bus when their son was killed. Stephen M. Douthitt is acting as personal representative of the estate of Jonathan Douthitt, 10, and Raimie Finn, 12, who died when the bus driven by Jonathan's mother was struck by a train. Raimie's parents filed a $1 million suit over the accident in March, but did not name the bus driver as a defendant.
The suit also charges Indian River Academy was negligent by allowing the deadbolt lock to be installed on the rear exit and by allowing an inadequately trained driver on the bus.
The suit filed by Raimie's parents contained similar allegations against the school and the FEC. Circuit Judge Jack Fennelly will hear pretrial motions in the Finns' suit Monday. Defendants want the judge to toss out a claim for punitive damages in the case.
http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?page=gr&GRid=21392
"probable cause of this accident was the inadequate standards for certifying nonpublic schoolbus drivers, insufficient training and testing programs, and the limited experience of the schoolbus driver, which led to the intrusion of the schoolbus onto the railroad track when the driver misshifted the transmission. "
So the standards for certifying private school and church bus drivers must have been less rigorous in FL at the time of the accident.
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