I have to say a few things in response to what I read here.
1. Conductors are running trains ALL THE TIME. It happens far more than you think.
2. Horn buttons on the conductors side are at the option of the railroad. NONE of CN's GE's (with the ecpection of the ex BNSF/ATSF units) have a horn button on the conductor's side. Only the M-2's and the 4 ACe's have horn buttons on the conductors side.
3. Advancements in the type of air brake valves and better load/empty sensors greatly reduce the risk of derailment in an emergency application.
Railroads set their cabs up however they want.
10000 feet and no dynamics? Today is going to be a good day ...
Consider two extreme hypothetical situations with regard to emergency braking:
What do you think the engineer's reaction would - or should - be in each situation ?
Now consider what happens in any scenario between these two extremes. How does the engineer weigh and balance all the factors in about 1 - 2 seconds ?
The worst-case legal standard is that the engineer supposedly has the 'last clear chance' to prevent the collision. But that legal standard can vary greatly from state to state, depending on its laws regarding negligence and emergency situations (too complicated to explain here) - the same event could legitimately have 2 radically different legal standards applied in one state or another. Whether that will held to have been the case will also depend on the testimony of the engineer and any 'qualified experts', and then how the judge or jury weighs that testimony in light of the facts. It can and does go both ways.
In the case of a car approaching a crossing, an engineer might be inclined to testify that he was watching the track ahead like he's supposed to by company rules, and didn't see the car until the last second until it was on the crossing. Or if he did see it, that he expected it to stop like it's supposed to, until it was on the track; how can he be expected to anticipate reckless and illegal behavior by 1 random driver out of thousands at many crossings ? And if/ when it's on the track, that he expected the driver to do the sensible thing and get out and move away.
- Paul North.
Paul_D_North_JrLong heavy train of flammable and hazardous materials moving at track speed on a downhill grade in a densely populated town, in the middle of the night right after the bars close, and a car approaches a crossing with the driver swerving back-and-forth and hanging out of the window waving and yelling wildly.
Run 8 and sand.
Sorry Paul. The devil made me do it.
Norm
Paul_D_North_JrShort light train of empty bare-table intermodal cars moving at restricted speed on a level or upgrade in a farmland or desert area in the middle of the afternoon night right after the schools close, and a loaded school bus (or gasoline tank truck) is stalled on the crossing with the drvier outside and waving frantically for the train to stop.
Techincally, if you are running restricted, you should be able to stop in half your range of vision without having to dump the train. If you have to dump it, you were NOT running restricted*.
*- I call restricted speed "creepy crawly speed" for that reason.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
Paul,
For scenario #2, the engineer should use whatever braking is necessary to stop short of the crossing or reduce the speed as much as possible before reaching the crossing.
For scenario #1, I think it depends on how certain the engineer is that the car and train will collide. Despite the rather erratic driver behavior, I assume there is no requirement for an engineer to begin braking before the vehicle enters the crossing. Then if the vehicle does enter the crossing; and the train is say 100 feet away; and the vehicle is traveling 40 mph; it is certain that the vehicle will pass through the crossing and into the clear before the train reaches it; so no train brake application would be needed.
However, if the vehicle enters the crossing at the same time the train enters the crossing, it may be obvious that a collision will occur. This would justify an “Emergency” application. The point may be moot because the braking won’t take effect until after the collision occurs. Therefore some might say that it would be pointless take the risk of an “Emergency” application derailing the train because it will do nothing to prevent or lessen the severity of the collision.
However, it is possible for a driver to survive the initial impact and be killed by a secondary effect arising from the vehicle being pushed down the track for a long distance. So, considering that possibility, I would say that the proper course would be to make the “Emergency” application as the train and vehicle enter the crossing or a split second later upon impact.
Bucky - when you've got hundreds (or thousands) of hours "in the seat," you'll begin to understand what we're talking about.
Until then, you're just guessing. And so far you haven't come close.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
tree68Until then, you're just guessing. And so far you haven't come close.
It's easy to make these decisions sitting in front of a computer at your house.
tree68 Bucky - when you've got hundreds (or thousands) of hours "in the seat," you'll begin to understand what we're talking about. Until then, you're just guessing. And so far you haven't come close.
Well so far, you really haven't talked about much. Why don't you explain your response to Paul's hypothetical scenarios? Then maybe I will understand what you are talking about. I think I have made it clear what I am talking about.
Here is an interesting report about a FEC engineer's actions when approaching a loaded school bus stalled on the tracks and recognizing that the bus was stalled by the bus movement produced by the bus driver. I have highlighted in blue the most pertinent text. The rest is background information:
********************************************************
WASHINGTON, D.C. ISSUED: July 8, 198.5 President Florida East Coast Railway Company 1 Malaga Street Post Office Drawer 1048 St. Augustine, Florida 32084 SAFETY RECOMMENDATION (S) R-85-74 .............................................
About 6:55 a.m., on September 27, 1984, a northbound Florida East Coast Railway Company freight train struck a westbound Indian River Academy schoolbus stalled at a grade crossing on Walton Road in Port St. Lucie, Florida. The grade crossing was a two-lane, asphalt-paved, county road intersecting a single railroad track with automatic flashing signals and gates. The 1968 Bluebird/Chevrolet 66-passenger schoolbus was occupied by the driver and four students. Two of the students fled the stopped schoolbus before impact and were not injured. In the collision, the schoolbus body separated from the chassis, and the three remaining occupants were ejected. The two students were killed, and the busdriver was injured seriously. Neither of the two train crewmembers was injured.
Northbound FEC freight train Extra 412 North was approaching the crossing at a reported speed of 38 miles per hour with its locomotive headlight illuminated. The engineer was operating the locomotive unit from the right side. The conductor was seated on the left side opposite the engineer. The engineer said he began sounding the standard whistle signal at the Riverview grade crossing, 2,688 feet south of Walton Road. According to the engineer, the schoolbus was in his view at that moment and the warning devices at the crossing were activated. The whistle post was located 2,620 feet south of the crossing at Walton Road.
The busdriver believed that the front of the schoolbus was too close to the track and attempted to shift the manual transmission into reverse gear in order to back up. One student said he believed the busdriver got the transmission into gear and stalled the engine. Another student said the schoolbus 'lurched" forward toward the track. According to the busdriver, the engine stalled and the schoolbus rolled forward. The parking brake was not applied.
The driver of a pickup truck behind the schoolbus stated that the schoolbus was stopped for 4 or 5 seconds as he approached it and that about the time he stopped to its rear and observed the approaching train, the schoolbus "lurched" forward an estimated 6 or 7 feet and stopped with the front bumper near the east rail. About 2 or 3 seconds later, the schoolbus "jerked" forward for a short distance and stopped for a third time. The front wheels were over the west rail and the schoolbus blocked the track. The pickup driver said the lights of the crossing warning device began flashing while the schoolbus was at its second stop or just as it moved forward to the third stop.
The crossing gate descended onto and came to rest upon the right roofline of the schoolbus 18 feet 9 inches from the front bumper. According to the pickup driver, the gate arm came to rest about the time the schoolbus reached its third stop. The train conductor stated that he saw the schoolbus move forward and appear to veer around the automatic gate arm as it descended. He said also that he was reaching for the emergency brake valve on his side of the locomotive cab when the engineer made an emergency application of the train brakes. After placing the automatic brake valve handle in the emergency position, the engineer immediately released the locomotive brake. Sand from the locomotive sanders was found on the track 628 feet from the center of the crossing. Placement of the automatic brake valve handle in the emergency position provides automatic power cutoff and instantaneous sanding.
The engineer had a clear view of the schoolbus when he first observed it from the Riverview grade crossing; the schoolbus was stopped short of the track at the Walton Road crossing at that time. Also, he observed the schoolbus move onto the track as the crossing gate descended, and he observed the schoolbus as it stopped astride the track. However, he did not place the automatic brake valve handle in the emergency position until more than 11 seconds later, and after the train had traveled another 612 feet closer to the Walton Road crossing. If the engineer had placed the automatic brake valve handle in the emergency position without hesitation when the schoolbus stopped astride the track, the severity of the accident probably would have been lessened.
The presence of the schoolbus, particularly when it moved forward from its initial stop and to a stopped position with its front bumper near the east rail of the track, should have prompted at least preparatory action by the engineer to slow the train. He had two options available: a service application of the brakes or immediate emergency application of the brakes. A service application of the train brakes would have conditioned the train for an emergency stop with reduced risk of derailment or other lading damage. A service application of the brakes would have slowed the train smoothly and set the brakes for an emergency application if it became necessary. It is reasonable to assume that if the engineer had handled the train in this manner, the velocity of the train at impact would have been reduced substantially.
An approach to a schoolbus on the highway by a motorist usually results in heightened sense of a need to be prepared to stop. Although there are some adverse effects in braking a train which do not arise when braking a highway vehicle, observing a schoolbus stopped and blocking a track should result in an increased sense of readiness to stop by an engineer. Currently, there is little documented information about the effect of the many varying factors that may influence a train engineer's decisionmaking in such situations. The Safety Board believes that when an engineer sees that a schoolbus is blocking a track and possibly in jeopardy, there is no acceptable alternative to taking whatever action is necessary to stop short of collision. In this accident, the fact that the schoolbus stopped momentarily with the front bumper close to the east rail should have prepared the engineer for evasive action. When the schoolbus stopped, blocking the track, evasive action should have been executed immediately.
Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Florida
Use the results of the investigation of the accident in Port St. Lucie, Florida, on September 27, 1984, as a part of the railroad/highway grade crossing safety training given to engine crews. (Class 11, Priority Action) East Coast Railway Company: (R-85-74)
The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency with the statutory responsibility ‘I. . . to promote transportation safety by conducting independent accident investigations and by formulating safety improvement recommendations” (Public Law 93-633). The Safety Board is vitally interested in any actions taken as a result of its safety recommendations and would appreciate a response from you regarding action taken or contemplated with respect to the recommendation in this letter.
BIJRNETT, Chairman, GOLDMAN, Vice Chairman, and BURSLEY, Member, n concurred in this recommendation.
Paul_D_North_Jr1. Long heavy train of flammable and hazardous materials moving at track speed on a downhill grade in a densely populated town, in the middle of the night right after the bars close, and a car approaches a crossing with the driver swerving back-and-forth and hanging out of the window waving and yelling wildly.
Tangent or curve?
Either way, I'm probably not going to dump the brakes. I'll certainly make a fairly heavy application, but my primary goal is not to avoid hitting the drunk(s) in the car (who may be out of the way by the time the train gets there anyhow), but to to keep my train intact so the methyl ethyl awful I'm hauling doesn't kill dozens, or hundreds of people if the train derails.
This is also an engineer experience issue - if the engineer knows that there's the possibility of such an occurance at this time of the morning, odds are he's actually already taken a little off his speed, and probably has a set on with air.
Paul_D_North_Jr2. Short light train of empty bare-table intermodal cars moving at restricted speed on a level or upgrade in a farmland or desert area in the middle of the afternoon night right after the schools close, and a loaded school bus (or gasoline tank truck) is stalled on the crossing with the drvier outside and waving frantically for the train to stop.
So you're talking virtually unlimited sight distance, and I'm running my train at restricted speed. As noted before, restricted speed requires that I be able to stop my train in half the sight distance - and on our railroad, not to exceed 20 MPH (10 MPH in certain cases). That the vehicle in question has been on the crossing long enough for the driver to dismount and attempt to flag the train tells me that I should have been able to see it for some distance in the first place, and will be able to stop well short of the obstacle. Too easy.
EuclidHere is an interesting report about a FEC engineer's actions when approaching a loaded school bus stalled on the tracks and recognizing that the bus was stalled by the bus movement produced by the bus driver. I have highlighted in blue the most pertinent text. The rest is background information: ******************************************************** WASHINGTON, D.C. ISSUED: July 8, 198.5 President Florida East Coast Railway Company 1 Malaga Street Post Office Drawer 1048 St. Augustine, Florida 32084 SAFETY RECOMMENDATION (S) R-85-74 ............................................. About 6:55 a.m., on September 27, 1984, a northbound Florida East Coast Railway Company freight train struck a westbound Indian River Academy schoolbus stalled at a grade crossing on Walton Road in Port St. Lucie, Florida. The grade crossing was a two-lane, asphalt-paved, county road intersecting a single railroad track with automatic flashing signals and gates. The 1968 Bluebird/Chevrolet 66-passenger schoolbus was occupied by the driver and four students. Two of the students fled the stopped schoolbus before impact and were not injured. In the collision, the schoolbus body separated from the chassis, and the three remaining occupants were ejected. The two students were killed, and the busdriver was injured seriously. Neither of the two train crewmembers was injured. Northbound FEC freight train Extra 412 North was approaching the crossing at a reported speed of 38 miles per hour with its locomotive headlight illuminated. The engineer was operating the locomotive unit from the right side. The conductor was seated on the left side opposite the engineer. The engineer said he began sounding the standard whistle signal at the Riverview grade crossing, 2,688 feet south of Walton Road. According to the engineer, the schoolbus was in his view at that moment and the warning devices at the crossing were activated. The whistle post was located 2,620 feet south of the crossing at Walton Road. The busdriver believed that the front of the schoolbus was too close to the track and attempted to shift the manual transmission into reverse gear in order to back up. One student said he believed the busdriver got the transmission into gear and stalled the engine. Another student said the schoolbus 'lurched" forward toward the track. According to the busdriver, the engine stalled and the schoolbus rolled forward. The parking brake was not applied. The driver of a pickup truck behind the schoolbus stated that the schoolbus was stopped for 4 or 5 seconds as he approached it and that about the time he stopped to its rear and observed the approaching train, the schoolbus "lurched" forward an estimated 6 or 7 feet and stopped with the front bumper near the east rail. About 2 or 3 seconds later, the schoolbus "jerked" forward for a short distance and stopped for a third time. The front wheels were over the west rail and the schoolbus blocked the track. The pickup driver said the lights of the crossing warning device began flashing while the schoolbus was at its second stop or just as it moved forward to the third stop. The crossing gate descended onto and came to rest upon the right roofline of the schoolbus 18 feet 9 inches from the front bumper. According to the pickup driver, the gate arm came to rest about the time the schoolbus reached its third stop. The train conductor stated that he saw the schoolbus move forward and appear to veer around the automatic gate arm as it descended. He said also that he was reaching for the emergency brake valve on his side of the locomotive cab when the engineer made an emergency application of the train brakes. After placing the automatic brake valve handle in the emergency position, the engineer immediately released the locomotive brake. Sand from the locomotive sanders was found on the track 628 feet from the center of the crossing. Placement of the automatic brake valve handle in the emergency position provides automatic power cutoff and instantaneous sanding. The engineer had a clear view of the schoolbus when he first observed it from the Riverview grade crossing; the schoolbus was stopped short of the track at the Walton Road crossing at that time. Also, he observed the schoolbus move onto the track as the crossing gate descended, and he observed the schoolbus as it stopped astride the track. However, he did not place the automatic brake valve handle in the emergency position until more than 11 seconds later, and after the train had traveled another 612 feet closer to the Walton Road crossing. If the engineer had placed the automatic brake valve handle in the emergency position without hesitation when the schoolbus stopped astride the track, the severity of the accident probably would have been lessened. The presence of the schoolbus, particularly when it moved forward from its initial stop and to a stopped position with its front bumper near the east rail of the track, should have prompted at least preparatory action by the engineer to slow the train. He had two options available: a service application of the brakes or immediate emergency application of the brakes. A service application of the train brakes would have conditioned the train for an emergency stop with reduced risk of derailment or other lading damage. A service application of the brakes would have slowed the train smoothly and set the brakes for an emergency application if it became necessary. It is reasonable to assume that if the engineer had handled the train in this manner, the velocity of the train at impact would have been reduced substantially. An approach to a schoolbus on the highway by a motorist usually results in heightened sense of a need to be prepared to stop. Although there are some adverse effects in braking a train which do not arise when braking a highway vehicle, observing a schoolbus stopped and blocking a track should result in an increased sense of readiness to stop by an engineer. Currently, there is little documented information about the effect of the many varying factors that may influence a train engineer's decisionmaking in such situations. The Safety Board believes that when an engineer sees that a schoolbus is blocking a track and possibly in jeopardy, there is no acceptable alternative to taking whatever action is necessary to stop short of collision. In this accident, the fact that the schoolbus stopped momentarily with the front bumper close to the east rail should have prepared the engineer for evasive action. When the schoolbus stopped, blocking the track, evasive action should have been executed immediately. Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Florida Use the results of the investigation of the accident in Port St. Lucie, Florida, on September 27, 1984, as a part of the railroad/highway grade crossing safety training given to engine crews. (Class 11, Priority Action) East Coast Railway Company: (R-85-74) The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency with the statutory responsibility ‘I. . . to promote transportation safety by conducting independent accident investigations and by formulating safety improvement recommendations” (Public Law 93-633). The Safety Board is vitally interested in any actions taken as a result of its safety recommendations and would appreciate a response from you regarding action taken or contemplated with respect to the recommendation in this letter. BIJRNETT, Chairman, GOLDMAN, Vice Chairman, and BURSLEY, Member, n concurred in this recommendation.
Damn - he should have swerved the train away from the school bus....what is that law of physics? - laws of physics don't apply to political appointees. 38 MPH at the whistle post - train isn't getting stopped by the crossing with any kind of brake application....except a political brake application that defies the laws of physics.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
BaltACDDamn - he should have swerved the train away from the school bus....what is that law of physics? - laws of physics don't apply to political appointees. 38 MPH at the whistle post - train isn't getting stopped by the crossing with any kind of brake application....except a political brake application that defies the laws of physics.
Regarding your comment about the NTSB report I posted above detailing collision between a Florida East Coast train and a school bus:
It is absurd for you to conclude that the NTSB is suggesting that the engineer should have violated the laws of physics. They did no such thing, as you can clearly see if you read what they said.
They criticized the engineer for delaying his reaction after the observable details called for that reaction. They said: “if the engineer had handled the train in this manner, the velocity of the train at impact would have been reduced substantially.”
Here are the essential points of the report which I have edited down for clarity:
The engineer … observed the schoolbus move onto the track as the crossing gate descended, and he observed the schoolbus as it stopped astride the track. However, he did not place the automatic brake valve handle in the emergency position until more than 11 seconds later, and after the train had traveled another 612 feet closer to the Walton Road crossing. If the engineer had placed the automatic brake valve handle in the emergency position without hesitation when the schoolbus stopped astride the track, the severity of the accident probably would have been lessened.
The presence of the schoolbus,… should have prompted at least preparatory action by the engineer to slow the train.
He had two options available: A service application of the brakes or immediate emergency application of the brakes.
A service application of the brakes would have slowed the train smoothly and set the brakes for an emergency application if it became necessary. It is reasonable to assume that if the engineer had handled the train in this manner, the velocity of the train at impact would have been reduced substantially.
…observing a schoolbus stopped and blocking a track should result in an increased sense of readiness to stop by an engineer.
The Safety Board believes that when an engineer sees that a schoolbus is blocking a track and possibly in jeopardy, there is no acceptable alternative to taking whatever action is necessary to stop short of collision.
In this accident, the fact that the schoolbus stopped momentarily with the front bumper close to the east rail should have prepared the engineer for evasive action. When the schoolbus stopped, blocking the track, evasive action should have been executed immediately.
Euclid BaltACD Regarding your comment about the NTSB report I posted above detailing collision between a Florida East Coast train and a school bus: It is absurd for you to conclude that the NTSB is suggesting that the engineer should have violated the laws of physics. They did no such thing, as you can clearly see if you read what they said. They criticized the engineer for delaying his reaction after the observable details called for that reaction. They said: “if the engineer had handled the train in this manner, the velocity of the train at impact would have been reduced substantially.” Here are the essential points of the report which I have edited down for clarity: The engineer … observed the schoolbus move onto the track as the crossing gate descended, and he observed the schoolbus as it stopped astride the track. However, he did not place the automatic brake valve handle in the emergency position until more than 11 seconds later, and after the train had traveled another 612 feet closer to the Walton Road crossing. If the engineer had placed the automatic brake valve handle in the emergency position without hesitation when the schoolbus stopped astride the track, the severity of the accident probably would have been lessened. The presence of the schoolbus,… should have prompted at least preparatory action by the engineer to slow the train. He had two options available: A service application of the brakes or immediate emergency application of the brakes. A service application of the brakes would have slowed the train smoothly and set the brakes for an emergency application if it became necessary. It is reasonable to assume that if the engineer had handled the train in this manner, the velocity of the train at impact would have been reduced substantially. …observing a schoolbus stopped and blocking a track should result in an increased sense of readiness to stop by an engineer. The Safety Board believes that when an engineer sees that a schoolbus is blocking a track and possibly in jeopardy, there is no acceptable alternative to taking whatever action is necessary to stop short of collision. In this accident, the fact that the schoolbus stopped momentarily with the front bumper close to the east rail should have prepared the engineer for evasive action. When the schoolbus stopped, blocking the track, evasive action should have been executed immediately.
BaltACD
It is easy to 'Engineer' a keyboard - for both you and the NTSB - without any of you having been operating a locomotive and the train behind it. If trains stopped every time a potential situation came into view - NOTHNG WOULD MOVE.
"evasive action" ?? (stated twice in the last quoted paragraph)
Paul_D_North_Jr "evasive action" ?? (stated twice in the last quoted paragraph)
What is wrong with evasive action?
Evasive--
Definition: done to avoid harm, an accident, etc.
Euclid blah blah blah......It is absurd for you to conclude that the NTSB is suggesting that the engineer should have violated the laws of physics......blah blah blah....
blah blah blah......It is absurd for you to conclude that the NTSB is suggesting that the engineer should have violated the laws of physics......blah blah blah....
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
BaltACDIt is easy to 'Engineer' a keyboard - for both you and the NTSB - without any of you having been operating a locomotive and the train behind it.
1. Your experience operating a locomotive?
2. Evidence that no one on the NTSB investigations has any experience operating locomotives?
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
Murphy Siding Euclid blah blah blah......It is absurd for you to conclude that the NTSB is suggesting that the engineer should have violated the laws of physics......blah blah blah.... and yet you seem to be doing just that.
and yet you seem to be doing just that.
Well then you are not comprehending what I wrote. Nor are you comprehending what the NTSB wrote.
from NTSB
"In surface accident investigations, teams are smaller and working groups fewer, but the team technique is the same. Locomotive engineers, signal system specialists and track engineers head working groups at railroad accidents."
Your statement is not based on facts. The NTSB Go Teams (investigation teams) are composed of experts with experience in the field.
BaltACDIt is easy to 'Engineer' a keyboard - for both you and the NTSB - without any of you having been operating a locomotive and the train behind it. If trains stopped every time a potential situation came into view - NOTHNG WOULD MOVE.
Your dismissal of my experience seems a little too desperate when you have to dismiss the NTSB in order to make it work. What I find interesting about the report is that it goes into all the things we have been talking about regarding when and if the brakes should be dynamited when approaching a crossing that presents a good potential for a collision. The report talks about the risk of derailing the train, and provides some thoughts about mitigating that risk by starting with a service application.
However, the NTSB then seems to override the action of mitigating the risk of derailment by starting with a service application. Starting with a service application would consume some of the valuable time in available for stopping, and the Safety Board believes that when an engineer sees that a schoolbus is blocking a track and possibly in jeopardy, there is no acceptable alternative to taking whatever action is necessary to stop short of collision.
To me, the choice of whatever action is necessary to stop short would demand the “Emergency” application without losing time to start with a service application. So in such instances, the NTSB dismisses the risk of derailment in favor of the quickest stopping. I doubt they would have concluded otherwise had the train been carrying crude oil or other explosive materials. They did not mention anything regarding the derailment risk being affected by nature of what the train was hauling.
Note too that while the NTSB states the goal to be that of stopping short of a collision, that does not mean they are ignorant of the fact that sometimes, stopping short is impossible. They clearly make the point that even if stopping short is impossible; there is benefit in slowing down as much as possible prior to impact.
EuclidYour dismissal of my experience seems a little too desperate when you have to dismiss the NTSB in order to make it work.
Gee, Bucky, why don't you tell us what your experience is? You have been asked that several times and have never answered. Therefore, it's safe to assume you have no practical hands on experience. You tell professional railroaders they are wrong but have nothing to back it up with. Time to put up or.................
Euclid likely has no more rail experience than you or I. But at least one professional railroader posting here has zero experience operating a locomotive and makes inaccurate, pejorative remarks about the NTSB. At least Euclid posted an NTSB report for us to read.
Bottom line:
Damned if you do, damned if you don't. Welcome to railroading.
But of what benefit is it to make posts that show one's lack of experience/knowkedge and claim you are indeed experienced? It simply shows the poster for what he is; an uninformed person who is trying to BS his way through a subject. It accomplishes absolutely nothing toward enhancing one's credibility. Anyone can post an NTSB report they find on line.
That type of conduct is nothing more than seeking attention in the form of replies; AKA Trolling.
Norm48327 But of what benefit is it to make posts that show one's lack of experience/knowkedge and claim you are indeed experienced? It simply shows the poster for what he is; an uninformed person who is trying to BS his way through a subject. It accomplishes absolutely nothing toward enhancing one's credibility. Anyone can post an NTSB report they find on line. That type of conduct is nothing more than seeking attention in the form of replies; AKA Trolling.
Norm,
What exactly is this grievance about me saying things that are incorrect? Please elaborate in detail, and I will respond. Otherwise, you are the one doing the trolling here with your constant snide remarks about undefined generalities. What is your experience that makes you so darn sure of which side to be on? You know nothing about my credibility.
All I did here was pose a question about what someone earlier said about withholding an emergency application for fear of derailing the train. I think that is an interesting point. So I asked a simple question and was informed that my simple question can’t exist because there are 10,000 variables that must be weighed and carefully calculated in about two seconds of time available. Therefore the answer to my question is so complex that it cannot be given.
I do disagree with that. It may be true of another question, but not of the one I asked. Actually, the question I asked was framed to carefully detach from the requirement to weigh every variable under the sun. I explained that, but it did not matter.
So I recognized the NTSB report as addressing that very point of my question. I noticed that they did so quite handily without sinking into an impossible morass of 10,000 questions that only professionals can process in two seconds.
The NTSB reported that the engineer was remiss in wasting precious time to prevent possible fatalities. Actually, in reading between the lines, I see the strong possibility that professional railroaders in the NTSB team of experts thought the engineer might have hesitated to make an “Emergency” application because he worried about it derailing his train. I say that because the NTSB acknowledged that possibility of derailing the train. But then, as a whole, they rejected it as being a valid excuse.
So then when I post this highly relevant NTSB report, I am told by one of the professionals that the NTSB does not know what they are talking about because they expected the engineer to steer the train around the stalled bus, or somehow stop the train short of the collision when the laws of physics made that impossible.
But of course, the NTSB said or implied no such thing. It is simply an absurd exaggeration to win an imagined argument. The NTSB clearly made the point that it is important to slow down as much as possible before an impending collision even if you can’t get fully stopped by then. It makes sense to me. Does it make sense to you?
If you are going to hurl all these personal insults, I think you ought to back them up with specifics instead of acting like a spoiled child. I am trying to be reasonable, so let me know what your problem is in specific terms, and I will set you face to face with the facts.
So, Bucky. We'll assume you drive a motor vehicle.
Would you find it reasonable to expect you to lock up your brakes (at least as far as anti-lock brakes allow it) every time it looked like someone might pull out in front of you?
I'm talking both feet on the brake pedal, push-it-to-the-floor panic braking.
You're only allowed one of two answers here - yes or no. Black and white and all that.
If you want to know the personal thoughts of an engineer concerning when to dump it or not, or anything concerning crossing collisions, it's best done in person, preferably at a bar over a beer. Not on a forum like this.
There's reasons we don't give black and white answers.
tree68 So, Bucky. We'll assume you drive a motor vehicle. Would you find it reasonable to expect you to lock up your brakes (at least as far as anti-lock brakes allow it) every time it looked like someone might pull out in front of you? I'm talking both feet on the brake pedal, push-it-to-the-floor panic braking. You're only allowed one of two answers here - yes or no. Black and white and all that.
Fine.
Would you find it reasonable to expect you to lock up your brakes (at least as far as anti-lock brakes allow it) if it looked like someone might pull out in front of you?
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