More Information from Railway Age.
The Route of the Broadway Lion The Largest Subway Layout in North Dakota.
Here there be cats. LIONS with CAMERAS
schlimm Paul_D_North_Jr It'll be a cold day in He-l-l before railroad managements will voluntarily agree to such an arrangement on a broad scale.
Paul_D_North_Jr It'll be a cold day in He-l-l before railroad managements will voluntarily agree to such an arrangement on a broad scale.
Euclid's "There was also news mentioning that special distant warning signals had been planned for that crossing because of unusually short sight lines to the crossing for road vehicles. That improvement had been funded, but the funding was pulled and redirected."
This is a complete red herring in the situation under discussion. The lady would have been well past any advance warning signal before it activated. That type of traffic signal can indeed be useful where a road user will not see the the crossing signals until he is very close. Then he may need to start slowing earlier, especially if exceeding the speed limit for that road or the surface is icy. In this case the lady could have, and should have, stopped before fouling the crossing.
Euclid had given this link back on page 1
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/nyregion/metro-north-train-crash.html
It says, as I've read a few times, that the eyewitness driver behind the SUV says the SUV was stopped before the gate came down, but doesn't say why. It's 2 track territory, other reports have said the SUV was clear of the near track, and the train was on the far track.
If she stopped the SUV because of traffic in front of her, that traffic must have been at least 1 car on the near track, otherwise how could she have been clear of the track, presumably with 1 or 2 other cars in front of them between or on the far track. Those cars of course must have cleared before the train came.
It just really boggles my mind to think that there were 2 to 4 automobiles that ventured onto the right of way. But it also boggles my mind to think that the SUV driver would have gone past the gate and stopped before the gate came down if there was nobody in front of her.
Patrick Boylan
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Euclid Lion, Your insight on these lines is most welcome. I was thinking that you would be familiar with them. Is the “rail” of the third rail composed of actual railroad running rail section, or is it just some sort of bar stock?
It is neither, it is estruded as third rail. I guess the profile of is specific to each railroad. AFIK, Chicago L rail, BMT/LIRR, and Sprague/MNCR are all different.
ROAR
oltmannd Euclid All I did was mention the so-called intelligent crossings under development to be used in conjunction with PTC. Clearly the plan is to stop rail traffic in case of distant obstructions on grade crossings.
Euclid
EuclidAll I did was mention the so-called intelligent crossings under development to be used in conjunction with PTC. Clearly the plan is to stop rail traffic in case of distant obstructions on grade crossings.
The current PTC plans to implement WABTEC I-ETMS as an overlay include nothing of the sort. All PTC will do is enforce existing rules.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
The safest thing they could do with that crossing is close it. It's unnecessary as the cemetery is easily accessable from Lakeview St.
Norm
Paul_D_North_JrIt'll be a cold day in He-l-l before railroad managements will voluntarily agree to such an arrangement on a broad scale.
Why not? Is not the safety of crew and passengers worth the short-term cost?
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
The Harlem Division was first electrified about 100 years ago as far north as North White Plains. I have ridden that section a few times, and there were few, if any, at-grade road crossings. The section north of NWP (Valhalla is the next station north) was only electrified in the 1980s. Apparently grade seperation was not a priority at that time.
I am sure that all of the reders of this thread are aware that if Situation A had been in effect, situation B would not have developed. However, situation A was not in effect, so situation B developed. The horse is dead.
Johnny
Did the conductor set enough brakes?
Maybe the crossing protection should take control of automobiles in the area of the crossing and apply their brakes?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NqrS-wMGKYM
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
tree68 Euclid Ed, I mentioned that in a following comment. I said: "I agree that tearing up the third rail and the resistance of shoving the vehicle would have added some deceleration. But there is still a fair margin in the numbers. So I conclude that there was at least a good chance that the PTC-based obstacle detection system would have prevented the crash." Note, however, that the engineer made an emergency application. I would presume that a PTC system would initially make a service application (or a penalty application), which would not slow the train anywhere near as quickly. That 950' would have been well over 1,000 feet. Said application would merely serve as notice to the engineer that there was an issue - which he (or she) may already know. It would then be up to the engineer to decide to override the service/penalty application with an emergency application.
Euclid Ed, I mentioned that in a following comment. I said: "I agree that tearing up the third rail and the resistance of shoving the vehicle would have added some deceleration. But there is still a fair margin in the numbers. So I conclude that there was at least a good chance that the PTC-based obstacle detection system would have prevented the crash."
Ed, I mentioned that in a following comment. I said:
"I agree that tearing up the third rail and the resistance of shoving the vehicle would have added some deceleration. But there is still a fair margin in the numbers. So I conclude that there was at least a good chance that the PTC-based obstacle detection system would have prevented the crash."
Note, however, that the engineer made an emergency application. I would presume that a PTC system would initially make a service application (or a penalty application), which would not slow the train anywhere near as quickly. That 950' would have been well over 1,000 feet.
Said application would merely serve as notice to the engineer that there was an issue - which he (or she) may already know. It would then be up to the engineer to decide to override the service/penalty application with an emergency application.
Generally, I think the whole point would be to react to an emergency obstruction, and therefore apply the maximum stoppering effort as early as possible. This overrides the engineer because it can see farther.
However, if the obstruction were detected say 40 miles ahead, then I can see it starting with a service application.
If this system were in place at the Valhalla crossing, it would have put the train into emergency at the first detection of the obstruction.
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Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
MNRC third rail is shaped like a sideways H with a top and bottom shaped more or less like an ordinary rail head. The top is held by the insulation, in turn held by the brackets. The actual rail is smaller in section than an overrunning third rail. Brackets are screwed to extra-length ties about every 15-20 feet. The rails' breakaway characteristics compare favorably to overrunning third rail.
What almost everyone is overlooking is that this is more or less the first accident in which the design of the third rail was really involved, and then only with a scoop in the form of an SUV shoved into the end. For something that's been around over 100 years, the Sprage-Wilgus underrunning third rail has a fantastic safety record.
BaltACD Darwin candidates 'outwit' any system designed to prevent their candidacy.
Darwin candidates 'outwit' any system designed to prevent their candidacy.
That false belief is the entire problem that is holding up progress in making things safer.
Euclid BaltACD ...and revise your calculations. While the lights began at 39 seconds prior to impact - the gates began their decent some, unspecified, seconds after the lights began operating and then would have contacted the rear of the vehicle at some seconds after the gates begand their decent. I am going to guess, that the gates began their decent 8 seconds after the lights started flashing and would have come into contact with the vehicle 2 to 3 seconds after the decent started, so the gate would have contacted the rear of the vehicle approximately 10 seconds after the lights started flashing or 29 seconds before impact (and it could very well have been less than 29 seconds as I believe the FRA minimum requirement is 20 seconds). Okay, say the vehicle became a fouling obstacle when the train was 20 seconds away. At 58 mph, that would mean that the train was 1701 ft. away. It required 950 ft. to stop, so if it was warned by a PTC-based obstacle detection system, the train would have stopped 751 ft. short of the crossing and six people would not have been killed. Add Quote to your Post
BaltACD ...and revise your calculations. While the lights began at 39 seconds prior to impact - the gates began their decent some, unspecified, seconds after the lights began operating and then would have contacted the rear of the vehicle at some seconds after the gates begand their decent. I am going to guess, that the gates began their decent 8 seconds after the lights started flashing and would have come into contact with the vehicle 2 to 3 seconds after the decent started, so the gate would have contacted the rear of the vehicle approximately 10 seconds after the lights started flashing or 29 seconds before impact (and it could very well have been less than 29 seconds as I believe the FRA minimum requirement is 20 seconds).
23 17 46 11
BaltACDTrain was in emergency prior to striking the vehicle - how long before hasn't been discolosed. The train stopped 950 feet after striking the vehicle while the train brakes were in emergency, undoubtly getting additional retardation from pushing the vehicle along the right of way as well as having the 3rd rail entering the rail car and providing additional retardation. The 'unaided' stopping distance of the train from 58 MPH has not been disclosed in either normal service braking or emergency braking condition.
The Sprauge type rail (under-running as on MNRC) is wrapped in ain insulated cocoon with only the bottome of the rail exposed. Brackets told it from the top.
The angled end of the rail permits the shoe (and aught else for that matter) to slide under the rail and perhaps lift it. The insulated cocoon and the brackets holds the rail together as it is pushed up.
The type of rail otherwise used (I am told that Culver was the first to put a protective board over it) slopes down at the end to lift the shoe up and onto the rail. Now the Brentwood accident on the LIRR demonstrates that things can still push under the rail or make contact with the rail, but the rail is not held by brackets as the Sprague rail. It is basically just sitting on the insulator seats with very little other than gravity to keep it there. In the event of an impact against the rail, it is usually just pushed off of its seats and is shoved to the ground.
Whatever. That is the LION's Story and him sticks to it
Euclid BaltACD ...and revise your calculations. While the lights began at 39 seconds prior to impact - the gates began their decent some, unspecified, seconds after the lights began operating and then would have contacted the rear of the vehicle at some seconds after the gates begand their decent. I am going to guess, that the gates began their decent 8 seconds after the lights started flashing and would have come into contact with the vehicle 2 to 3 seconds after the decent started, so the gate would have contacted the rear of the vehicle approximately 10 seconds after the lights started flashing or 29 seconds before impact (and it could very well have been less than 29 seconds as I believe the FRA minimum requirement is 20 seconds). Okay, say the vehicle became a fouling obstacle when the train was 20 seconds away. At 58 mph, that would mean that the train was 1701 ft. away. It required 950 ft. to stop, so if it was warned by a PTC-based obstacle detection system, the train would have stopped 751 ft. short of the crossing and six people would not have been killed.
Train was in emergency prior to striking the vehicle - how long before hasn't been discolosed. The train stopped 950 feet after striking the vehicle while the train brakes were in emergency, undoubtly getting additional retardation from pushing the vehicle along the right of way as well as having the 3rd rail entering the rail car and providing additional retardation. The 'unaided' stopping distance of the train from 58 MPH has not been disclosed in either normal service braking or emergency braking conditions.
BaltACD...and revise your calculations. While the lights began at 39 seconds prior to impact - the gates began their decent some, unspecified, seconds after the lights began operating and then would have contacted the rear of the vehicle at some seconds after the gates begand their decent. I am going to guess, that the gates began their decent 8 seconds after the lights started flashing and would have come into contact with the vehicle 2 to 3 seconds after the decent started, so the gate would have contacted the rear of the vehicle approximately 10 seconds after the lights started flashing or 29 seconds before impact (and it could very well have been less than 29 seconds as I believe the FRA minimum requirement is 20 seconds).
Read -
http://ten90solutions.com/confessions_of_a_heartsick_man and revise your calculations. While the lights began at 39 seconds prior to impact - the gates began their decent some, unspecified, seconds after the lights began operating and then would have contacted the rear of the vehicle at some seconds after the gates begand their decent. I am going to guess, that the gates began their decent 8 seconds after the lights started flashing and would have come into contact with the vehicle 2 to 3 seconds after the decent started, so the gate would have contacted the rear of the vehicle approximately 10 seconds after the lights started flashing or 29 seconds before impact (and it could very well have been less than 29 seconds as I believe the FRA minimum requirement is 20 seconds). Emergency is not the desired braking method for trains as it can, for a variety of reasons, cause catastrophic accidents on it's own.
and revise your calculations. While the lights began at 39 seconds prior to impact - the gates began their decent some, unspecified, seconds after the lights began operating and then would have contacted the rear of the vehicle at some seconds after the gates begand their decent. I am going to guess, that the gates began their decent 8 seconds after the lights started flashing and would have come into contact with the vehicle 2 to 3 seconds after the decent started, so the gate would have contacted the rear of the vehicle approximately 10 seconds after the lights started flashing or 29 seconds before impact (and it could very well have been less than 29 seconds as I believe the FRA minimum requirement is 20 seconds).
Emergency is not the desired braking method for trains as it can, for a variety of reasons, cause catastrophic accidents on it's own.
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