tdmidgetRegardless of what kind of bizarre rules and micromanaging goes on there, a cardinal rule of any organization and especially one like MM&A is that it is always easier to ask forgiveness than permission. Do your job, do it right, and there will always be less explaining to do.
Doing your job is doing what the company wants you to do. So what is right?
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
tdmidgetThe engineer had the responsibility of securing his train. That is what he should have done. He should have done it correctly and completely and then report to his dispatcher that it had been done. He was the captain of that ship. He should not have called and asked permission to do his job. Unless the brakes on the cars were released by someone, the engineer is at fault. You can't pass the buck to Burkhardt, a dispatcher, or anyone else.
Unless the brakes on the cars were released by someone, the engineer is at fault. You can't pass the buck to Burkhardt, a dispatcher, or anyone else.
tdmidget,
I disagree with your assertion that the engineer is at the top of the chain of command. Nobody has said that the engineer did not know what to do, and that he asked the dispatcher what to do; as you say. What has been reported is that one or more people with higher authority than the engineer ordered the engineer (against his better judgment) to leave the defective engine running, which jeopardized the health and safety of people nearby. So the engineer clearly was not the “captain of the ship” as you contend.
You say that the engineer had the responsibility to secure his train. Yet that responsibility is meaningless without a rule defining what “secure” means. It is the responsibility of the MM&A to provide that rule. So, the actions of the engineer are not the only component of making sure the train stayed put.
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada has said that they will look into the MM&A train securement special instructions and procedures to see if they played a role in the disaster. They also said that it would be unusual for the responsibility of such a large disaster to fall only on the actions of one person. So they have no preconceived notions about the engineer being the captain of a ship.
Bucyrus My comments about Burkhardt in my last post were not about his general demeanor or his insensitivity. They were about examples of SPECIFIC CONTENT of what he said in that news conference. That was not repetition. Specifically, I questioned his use of the term, tampering when referring to the firemen following MM&A procedures in shutting down the locomotive when responding to a report of it being on fire. Calling that action tampering is dishonest and scapegoating, not just a personality trait. I am surprised that people are so sensitive about criticizing Mr. Burkhardt while being totally oblivious to the gravity of the fact that he is destroying another man’s life. Criticizing Burkhardt’s position in this, at this point, is like throwing a lifeline to his victim. There is a lot more going on with Burkhardt besides is personality.
My comments about Burkhardt in my last post were not about his general demeanor or his insensitivity. They were about examples of SPECIFIC CONTENT of what he said in that news conference. That was not repetition. Specifically, I questioned his use of the term, tampering when referring to the firemen following MM&A procedures in shutting down the locomotive when responding to a report of it being on fire. Calling that action tampering is dishonest and scapegoating, not just a personality trait.
I am surprised that people are so sensitive about criticizing Mr. Burkhardt while being totally oblivious to the gravity of the fact that he is destroying another man’s life. Criticizing Burkhardt’s position in this, at this point, is like throwing a lifeline to his victim. There is a lot more going on with Burkhardt besides is personality.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
The word is tamper, and it has a clear definition. Tamper: to engage secretly or improperly in something.
If your house catches fire, you call the fire department, and they spray water on it, do you accuse them of tampering with your house?
Bucyrus The word is tamper, and it has a clear definition. Tamper: to engage secretly or improperly in something. If your house catches fire, you call the fire department, and they spray water on it, do you accuse them of tampering with your house?
Murphy Siding Irregardless of what you think, not all words spoken are used correctly.
Does that mean that whatever people say must be disregarded because we cannot be sure that they used the correct words?
By the way, “irregardless” is an erroneous word that, etymologically, means the exact opposite of what it is used to express. Are you using it for some special effect?
Bucyrus: Have you never, in a moment of crisis or panic, said or done things that with hindsight you realize should never have been done. Perhaps lashed out verbally at some jerk when it would have been better to stay silent. Mr. Burkhardt had just seen his dream of rescuing a railway utterly collapse into a disaster beyond his worst nightmares. That would still be very fresh in his mind at the news conference.
Spending a month parsing his every word from a news conference in front of a hostile audience shortly after the disaster is close to persecution. He was not directly involved in operating the railway, living and working something like a thousand miles away. We do not know what he had been told by his local management people, who at the time were probably focused on crisis management rather than a CSI type search for causes.
Schlimm: No doubt the cuts in wages and staff are exactly what happened when Mr. Burkhardt took on the task of running the MM&A. He did have alternatives. One was to throw his money down the drain subsidizing a money-losing operation. I can't imagine you were willing to cover any part of the losses yourself. The second alternative was abandonment, eliminating the staff entirely, selling the steel for scrap and the land to whomever wanted it. As events have shown, for 47 people in Megantic that might have been a better outcome. At the time however he would have been fiercely criticized for it.
Through cutting expenses to the bone and running a shoestring operation he enabled the railway to survive another 10 years, long enough for the new oil shipments to possibly make it a viable operation again. That oil traffic is the only reason that Irving has the slightest interest in the line surviving. They will have to weigh the cost of adding the MM&A to their New Brunswick railway versus the higher freight charges for alternative longer routes using CN to the north or Pan-Am to the south.
BucyrusBy the way, “irregardless” is an erroneous word
It used to be. It's not any more...sort of like iterate and reiterate.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
BucyrusYou say that the engineer had the responsibility to secure his train. Yet that responsibility is meaningless without a rule defining what “secure” means. It is the responsibility of the MM&A to provide that rule.
How do you know the MM&A has no such rule? GCOR 32.1 is rather explicit. Even if MM&A doesn't use GCOR, they no doubt have something functionally equivalent.
Bucyrus Murphy Siding Irregardless of what you think, not all words spoken are used correctly. Does that mean that whatever people say must be disregarded because we cannot be sure that they used the correct words? By the way, “irregardless” is an erroneous word that, etymologically, means the exact opposite of what it is used to express. Are you using it for some special effect?
oltmanndHow do you know the MM&A has no such rule?
I don't know that. What you quoted is my question to tgmidget asking how he knows what rules the engineer was supposed to follow in securring the train. I said the responsibility to secure the train is meaningless without a rule to define how the securement is done. Do you agree?
This thread has begun to trivialize a tragedy, but one thing seems clear: there is plenty of blame to pass around, from the decision to try to run a railroad in a substandard manner to negligent behavior by the engineer and operations staff. Burkhardt's after the event comments may be ill-tempered, but have nothing to do with the accident. His attempt to run an unsafe railroad, however, does. If you can't run a railroad using proper levels of staffing and paying competitive wages with properly working equipment, then perhaps you should close it down. We don't tolerate that with airlines; why should a railroad be immune?
Let me ask our professionals a question. If your line suddenly changed hand, your union was decertified and your wages cut 40% and your crew size cut to a one-man operation, do you think that would have some impact on you and your work standards?
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
Bucyrus oltmanndHow do you know the MM&A has no such rule? I don't know that. What you quoted is my question to tgmidget asking how he knows what rules the engineer was supposed to follow in securring the train. I said the responsibility to secure the train is meaningless without a rule to define how the securement is done. Do you agree?
Then you are speaking completely hypothetically.
Do we know if the locomotive wheels had flanges? Wouldn't you agree that a locomotive wheel without flanges is more likely to derail than one with?
MM&A likely uses GCOR or has a rule something very close to GCOR 32.1.
Now, can a train in compliance with GCOR 32.1 run away? Very highly unlikely, but yes. But something had to change from the time the brakes were applied to the time the run away occurred.
schlimmLet me ask our professionals a question. If your line suddenly changed hand, your union was decertified and your wages cut 40% and your crew size cut to a one-man operation, do you think that would have some impact on you and your work standards?
It depends on what I thought the alternative was. If it was RR unemployment (which is far worse than regular unemployment) followed by figuring out what to do next, then I don't think I'd be permanently unhappy with the pay cut - I might be happy that I still have a job. Of course I'd grouse about it ...I'm a RRer after all
Some questions.
1. Was there a west bound parked at the same location as the runaway ?
2. If so how long was the west boud parked there before the arrival of the oil train ?
3. If so was the west bound engineer scheduled to run the oil train once that engineer was rested ?
4. If so was there an understanding between engineers that they would always apply so many hand brakes ?
5. That begs the question how does a relieving crew(s) know how many hand brakes have been applied ? That is especially important if one or more cars hand brakes would not apply so the next car(s) would have to be applied ?
oltmannd Bucyrus oltmanndHow do you know the MM&A has no such rule? I don't know that. What you quoted is my question to tgmidget asking how he knows what rules the engineer was supposed to follow in securring the train. I said the responsibility to secure the train is meaningless without a rule to define how the securement is done. Do you agree? Then you are speaking completely hypothetically. Do we know if the locomotive wheels had flanges? Wouldn't you agree that a locomotive wheel without flanges is more likely to derail than one with? MM&A likely uses GCOR or has a rule something very close to GCOR 32.1. Now, can a train in compliance with GCOR 32.1 run away? Very highly unlikely, but yes. But something had to change from the time the brakes were applied to the time the run away occurred.
Don,
Previously I listed item #3 as one of my FOUR POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR THE RUNAWAY as follows:
3) The train securement rules of the MM&A at Nantes are inadequate, or non-existent.
Is it a hypothetical premise? Sure it is. Is it irrelevant like your example question of whether a wheel without a flange is more likely to derail than a flanged wheel? I don’t think so.
While it may be hypothetical, the point is that if that hypothetical happens to be fact, then it diminishes or eliminates the engineer’s responsibility and places it on the defective rule. Therefore, it is critically important to find out whether the hypothetical point happens to be fact.
Apparently the Lac-Megantic accident investigators agree with me because they are asking the TSB to review their CRPR Rule 113 to check whether it is adequate.
This is detailed in this link:
http://www.canadianunderwriter.ca/news/transport-canada-may-wish-to-review-rail-rules-agency-investigating-lac-megantic-derailment/1002482141/
From the link, here is a transcription of a letter from Robert Johnston asking the TSB to review Rule 112, and expressing his doubts about the sufficiency of the rule:
CROR Rule 112 ensures that hand brakes are applied to prevent unwanted movement of the train while providing flexibility for a railway’s operational needs. However, CROR Rule 112 is not specific enough in that it does not indicate the number of hand brakes necessary to hold a given train tonnage on various grades and it continues to be left up to the operating employee to determine the number of hand brakes to apply. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that the push-pull test is not always a good indicat0or of whether an adequate number of hand brakes have been applied and not handbrakes are effective even when properly applied. Considering all these risk, Transport Canada may wish to review CROR Rule 112 and all related railway special instructions to ensure that equipment and trains left unattended are properly secured in order to prevent unintended movements.
Yours sincerely,
Original signed by
Robert Johnston
Acting Director
Investigation Operations Rail/Pipeline
schlimm This thread has begun to trivialize a tragedy, but one thing seems clear: there is plenty of blame to pass around, from the decision to try to run a railroad in a substandard manner to negligent behavior by the engineer and operations staff. Burkhardt's after the event comments may be ill-tempered, but have nothing to do with the accident. His attempt to run an unsafe railroad, however, does. If you can't run a railroad using proper levels of staffing and paying competitive wages with properly working equipment, then perhaps you should close it down. We don't tolerate that with airlines; why should a railroad be immune? Let me ask our professionals a question. If your line suddenly changed hand, your union was decertified and your wages cut 40% and your crew size cut to a one-man operation, do you think that would have some impact on you and your work standards?
A few questions in return. What is the proper level of staffing? Are you suggesting that we should go back to 6-man crews, as certain States required for many years? Only one person can actually run a train at a time, and any additional bodies are just riding along, maybe doing paperwork or dozing half the time. The VIA train that went through a crossover at four times the maximum speed a couple of years ago had three men in the cab, well maintained track and working CTC signals.
As for competitive wages, what is the competition? In that fairly rural area the wages were likely still competitive, even if they were considerably less than the unions negotiated for the big roads. But lower housing costs and quite likely more regular working hours could offset the lower earnings and result in a better lifestyle. Those three deceased Via engineers were union members and certainly paid what you consider a "competitive wage".
I don't see an attempt to run an unsafe railroad. In most respects the operation was typical of just about every spin-off short line on this continent, and even some minor branch lines on the Class 1s. Slower speeds safely compensate for the older equipment and lesser track condition, that you see as running a railroad in "a substandard manner". Perhaps a second man might have made a difference but that is pure speculation. Mistakes are made and accidents happen. Which mistakes, and how many, were made to create this tragedy have yet to be revealed. Some may even trace back to the original point of loading.
John
cx500 schlimm This thread has begun to trivialize a tragedy, but one thing seems clear: there is plenty of blame to pass around, from the decision to try to run a railroad in a substandard manner to negligent behavior by the engineer and operations staff. Burkhardt's after the event comments may be ill-tempered, but have nothing to do with the accident. His attempt to run an unsafe railroad, however, does. If you can't run a railroad using proper levels of staffing and paying competitive wages with properly working equipment, then perhaps you should close it down. We don't tolerate that with airlines; why should a railroad be immune? Let me ask our professionals a question. If your line suddenly changed hand, your union was decertified and your wages cut 40% and your crew size cut to a one-man operation, do you think that would have some impact on you and your work standards? A few questions in return. What is the proper level of staffing? Are you suggesting that we should go back to 6-man crews, as certain States required for many years? Only one person can actually run a train at a time, and any additional bodies are just riding along, maybe doing paperwork or dozing half the time. The VIA train that went through a crossover at four times the maximum speed a couple of years ago had three men in the cab, well maintained track and working CTC signals. As for competitive wages, what is the competition? In that fairly rural area the wages were likely still competitive, even if they were considerably less than the unions negotiated for the big roads. But lower housing costs and quite likely more regular working hours could offset the lower earnings and result in a better lifestyle. Those three deceased Via engineers were union members and certainly paid what you consider a "competitive wage". I don't see an attempt to run an unsafe railroad. In most respects the operation was typical of just about every spin-off short line on this continent, and even some minor branch lines on the Class 1s. Slower speeds safely compensate for the older equipment and lesser track condition, that you see as running a railroad in "a substandard manner". Perhaps a second man might have made a difference but that is pure speculation. Mistakes are made and accidents happen. Which mistakes, and how many, were made to create this tragedy have yet to be revealed. Some may even trace back to the original point of loading. John
This is really a stretch, a false dichotomy, the only option is a one person train crew or a six-person train crew? Quebec has a low cost of living? Compared to what- Nebraska? Or do you mean Manhattan? I have mostly kept silent about remarks like this one, but it reminds me of one of your American singers, Woody Guthrie, in "Waiting at the gate":
The inspector told the owner
it was more than a year ago
you're risking those men's lives in #5
that mine's full of fumes and dust
full of high explosive gas
but the boss says "we'll just have to take the chance"
Canada has decided that we aren't going to take any more chances on one person, who is his own relief crew the next day (thus the train has to be parked) and thus discouraged from tieing down too many cars or venting the brake pipe for a full set becasue he will be required to release the hand brakes and do a terminal inspection the next day by himself, which is nearly impossible. The crew just sits there most of the time, except when they are responsible for tieing down enough hand brakes to keep a 70-car train of crude oil from incinerating a town. The epitome of an accident waiting to happen.
Count on no more American low-cost outfits operating in Canada.
Here is a well detailed article on train securement with substantial information and insight provided by an ex-MM&A engineer, James Goodrich. It also includes some comments about a one-person crew:
http://www.montrealgazette.com/M%C3%A9gantic+clear+rules+train+hand+brakes/8679004/story.html
All of the following is from the article:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It’s unclear if the fact that he was the only MMA employee on the train contributed to the accident. MMA is one of only two railways in Canada using one-person crews.
For one person “to do the job right, requires a lot of extra effort,” said Paul-André Larose, a former Canadian National transportation engineer.
“There’s a tendency to cut corners — you get away with it today, and tomorrow you cut a few more corners and, eventually, tragedy strikes.”
Cutting corners could involve not setting enough hand brakes or not tightening them as securely as possible.
Larose said there can also be peer pressure to not set too many hand brakes because that creates more work for the replacement crew that will have to prepare the train for departure later.
“The most critical question is what was (Harding’s) on-duty time when he arrived at Nantes,” Goodrich [ex-MM&A engineer] said. “How much time did he have left to work, what was he legally able to do?”
Under strict Transport Canada rules, a railway employee’s single tour of duty cannot exceed 12 hours.
“What if he didn’t have time, what if he was being told: ‘You’re dead under hours of service — get in the cab and go to the hotel,’ ” Goodrich added.
In such a case, MMA should have known and sent a relief crew to complete any remaining tasks, he said.
A veteran locomotive engineer who works for a major Canadian railway who spoke on condition of not being identified wonders if MMA “put (Harding) in a situation where he couldn’t perform his job properly.
“After 12 hours, we’re not allowed to touch the equipment,” the engineer said. “If (Harding) gets there and he’s got 20 minutes to tie down his train, maybe he cut corners.”
I have a friend on Facebook who is a retired BNSF engineer and he said the crew should have set multiple hand brakes on the cars if they were leaving the engine in that situation. That should have prevented the cars from rolling after the fire dept shut down the lead engine because of supposed fire. I did not know who shut it off until I read this, thought maybe the crew had before they left. The engineer was concerned about leaving it, but someone higher up than him made a decision and he's the one who should be in trouble, not the engineer who only did what they told him.
I had never seen engines smoke and fire coming out of the stack like the video, it seems like the engine would catch on fire with this going on. I'll have to ask my friend about this latest development.
Sunnyland,
Contrary to his own judgment, the engineer left the smoking engine running per instructions from his supervisor. He told the cab driver that he was going to re-contact his supervisor to see if he would reconsider the decision to leave the smoking engine running.
After the engineer had left, the public called the fire department and they arrived and shut down the engine according to the rules of the railroad. Contrary to what Mr. Burkhardt said, the MM&A had been fully informed of the fire and the call to the fire department. But then, Mr. Burkhardt might have been speaking in shades of gray rather than black and white when he told the public that the fire department never notified the railroad company.
After the fire department left, the engineer had several conversations with his supervisor about the fire and the supervisor informed the engineer that the fire was out and that everything was okay. It is unclear why these conversations did not resolve the issue of leaving no engines running to pump air. Certainly, the engineer’s supervisor knew that the one running engine had been shut down by the fire department because they told him that after they had finished their response at the scene.
This is really getting silly.
Yes, it's hard for a one man crew to tie down a train. Not impossible. Hard. Maybe extremely hard in some circumstances. If he cut corners, it's on him.
Would it be easier to have two man crews? Sure. So?
If the one man crew expires before he gets the train tied down, then he needs to be relieved to have someone else finish the job. He can't just walk away and say nothing. If he did, it's on him. If there was a two man crew and they did the same, it'd be on them.
Are rules perfect? No. Nothing is. Could the rule be better? Maybe. Tie'em all down? That would be best. Okay. How hard? Issue everyone a torque wrench? A test after their set? What? A dynomometer coupler in every engine so you can measure the pull or push against the handbrakes? What if it rains, or snows or fire and brimestones after the test? Would the test still be valid?
Ridiculous. GCOR 32.1 is enough. Everything else is irrelevant. It's way more likely that someone with evil in their heart would turn and angle cock, dump the air, bleed the cars and knock of the hand brakes and create a runaway on purpose than a better test preventing another runaway.
oltmannd This is really getting silly. Ridiculous. GCOR 32.1 is enough. Everything else is irrelevant.
Ridiculous. GCOR 32.1 is enough. Everything else is irrelevant.
In Canada, they use CROR Rule 112, and the investigator of the MM&A runaway is not convinced that it is enough.
oltmanndThis is really getting silly.
The families of those who died don't think it is silly
oltmanndYes, it's hard for a one man crew to tie down a train. Not impossible. Hard. Maybe extremely hard in some circumstances. If he cut corners, it's on him.
You are reducing the whole question to a technical issue, of whether or not it is technically possible for one person to set sufficient brakes, without any other presumptions. But that isn't enough. It isn't simply CAN one person safely park the train, it is also WILL that person safely park the train, every single time, even when he is at the end of his shift, in the dark at midnight, when he is his own relief crew the next morning and thus every minute he is setting brakes is cutting into the amount of sleep he gets, and every extra brake set will be one he will need to release himself the next day. And, I might add, without anyone monitoring the train while it is parked, nor apparently any mechanical staff to check on why an engine was reported to be on fire. If you add all of the hidden assumptions you are making, then we have this: One person can safely set enough brakes (if he is not out of hours, if he is not fatigued, if he is not being pressured to cut corners so as to get the train moving quickly the next morning, etc.). Every single time, because failure of any of these causes a tragedy.
oltmanndRidiculous. GCOR 32.1 is enough. Everything else is irrelevant.
No it isn't if it were we wouldn't be talking about it and the families of the people burned alive wouldn't be mourning the loss of their loved ones. As I have said, this was an accident waiting to happen.
cp8905 This is really a stretch, a false dichotomy, the only option is a one person train crew or a six-person train crew? Quebec has a low cost of living? Compared to what- Nebraska? Or do you mean Manhattan? I have mostly kept silent about remarks like this one, but it reminds me of one of your American singers, Woody Guthrie, in "Waiting at the gate": ...... Canada has decided that we aren't going to take any more chances on one person, who is his own relief crew the next day (thus the train has to be parked) and thus discouraged from tieing down too many cars or venting the brake pipe for a full set becasue he will be required to release the hand brakes and do a terminal inspection the next day by himself, which is nearly impossible. The crew just sits there most of the time, except when they are responsible for tieing down enough hand brakes to keep a 70-car train of crude oil from incinerating a town. The epitome of an accident waiting to happen. Count on no more American low-cost outfits operating in Canada.
......
I was never suggesting that six man crews were needed, merely pointing out that the number required is a matter of opinion. The unions fought as the typical crew size dropped from 4 men to three, and then two as the caboose disappeared, on the grounds of safety. I think the results show that particular argument to have been unfounded. In this case even with a 2-man crew there is a high probability that the train would have been left in exactly the same manner. Only the conductor would be tieing down the freight cars while the engineer dealt with the engines. Both would be equally anxious to head for the motel and sleep.
And I believe you are in error saying he would be his own relief crew. The engineer would take the next westbound back to Farnham while a crew from Brownville Junction in Maine would take the crude oil train eastwards into the US.
I will point out that I am also Canadian. Unlike you, I am waiting for the results of the TSB investigation before jumping to the conclusion that shortcuts by the engineer are solely responsible. I agree that it seems the most obvious possibility, but I would like to have facts to prove it, not opinions. Other contributing factors, including some that may not have been considered by we amateurs, may turn out to be far more critical.
And while comparing Manhattan with rural Nebraska is a stretch, you can't deny that housing is generally much more affordable in a small rural town than in a big city. A smaller mortgage means less income is required for the same lifestyle. Walk to work, so a second car is not needed. National payscales help some people, penalize others quite severely.
And various American outfits are already operating short lines in Canada. That will continue, and I am happy to welcome them if it keeps a rail line from being abandoned. The MM&A used technical innovation to be able to operate safely with one man, and the CTA recognized that when they gave their approval. The recent change by the CTA is partly adding a few more needed safety measures, and partly knee-jerk reaction to public and political pressure.
cp8905 oltmanndRidiculous. GCOR 32.1 is enough. Everything else is irrelevant. No it isn't if it were we wouldn't be talking about it and the families of the people burned alive wouldn't be mourning the loss of their loved ones. As I have said, this was an accident waiting to happen.
I think it was an accident waiting to happen.
Life is death waiting to happen.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
BaltACD Life is death waiting to happen.
Would you say that railroads don’t need any safety rules because everybody will die one day?
I would say (my carrier) they have all the Safety, Train Handling and Operating Rules that crewmen have the strength to heft on and off the locomotives during their tour of duty. All of those rules being written in 'legalize gotcha' rather than simple declarative 3rd grade English that does not invite misunderstanding of meaning.
I have had to add one more item to my list of possible causes for the runaway, revising it as follows:
FIVE POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR THE RUNAWAY:
1) The engineer failed to set sufficient handbrakes per the train securement rules governing the MM&A.
2) Somebody released the handbrakes after the engineer set them.
4) The engineer was unable to complete the train securement because he was told to quit working by his supervisors.
5) CROR Rule 112 is inadequate.
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