Expanding on speculation of only of the mechanics of the derailment itself on previous posts.
7. The boxcar should not have uncoupled from the first tank car as the shelf coupler on that tank car will most times keep it coupled.
8. With no shelf couplers on boxcars the boxcar probaably came loose from the rear loco ?
9. If any train cars had hand brakes engaged rolliing down the hill would have heated them up very much.!
10 Any vehicles, propane tanks, natural gas lines that the derailment broke open would have allowed that flamable to leak out whose flash point much lowerr than the dragging brakes temperatures on any cars.
11. The hot brakes would quickly cause a fire and that fire might have boiled the oil in tank cars --- causing them to vent or burn depeding whether they leaked --- then BOOM !!! ?
12. The loco(s) only traveling 1/2 mile further maybe indicates loco brakes engaged ?
Apparently an investigator from the TSB said the train was doing about 63 MPH when it derailed.
Story (originally from the AP) link:http://www.wbay.com/story/22778911/40-still-missing-in-deadly-canada-oil-train-crash
From the story -
TSB investigator Donald Ross said Canada's TSB has gone on record saying that it would like to see improvements on these tankers, though he acknowledged it's too early to say whether a different or modified tanker would have avoided this weekend's tragedy. The DOT-111 is a staple of the American freight rail fleet. But its flaws have been noted as far back as a 1991 safety study. Among other things, its steel shell is too thin to resist puncture in accidents, which almost guarantees the car will tear open in an accident, potentially spilling cargo that could catch fire, explode or contaminate the environment. "It's too early to tell. There's a lot of factors involved," Ross said. "There's a lot of energy here. The train came down on a fairly significant grade for 6.8 miles (10.9 kilometers) before it came into the town and did all the destruction it did." He said the train was moving at 63 mph (101 kph) when it derailed.
TSB investigator Donald Ross said Canada's TSB has gone on record saying that it would like to see improvements on these tankers, though he acknowledged it's too early to say whether a different or modified tanker would have avoided this weekend's tragedy.
The DOT-111 is a staple of the American freight rail fleet. But its flaws have been noted as far back as a 1991 safety study. Among other things, its steel shell is too thin to resist puncture in accidents, which almost guarantees the car will tear open in an accident, potentially spilling cargo that could catch fire, explode or contaminate the environment.
"It's too early to tell. There's a lot of factors involved," Ross said. "There's a lot of energy here. The train came down on a fairly significant grade for 6.8 miles (10.9 kilometers) before it came into the town and did all the destruction it did." He said the train was moving at 63 mph (101 kph) when it derailed.
Blame a "faulty" design now too? One story I read indicated that the "boxcar" between the tank cars and locos "detached" because it didn't have a shelf coupler. I admit not knowing much about couplers - but would that matter here? I thought the purpose of a "shelf' on a coupler was to keep the coupler on adjacent cars from "climbing" over and puncturing the shell of a tank car.
Dan
Burkhardt states that initially the Engineers statement of applying 11 hand brakes was believed - investigation of the equipment proved otherwise
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-23264397#sa-ns_mchannel=rss&ns_source=PublicRSS20-sa
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
BroadwayLion Schuylkill and SusquehannaIt would seem that Mr. Burkhard was either just hired, or he has a VERY short memory. I quote him again: "we've never had a significant mainline derailment." Now I would say that ANY mainline derailment is significant, unless it's on an HO layout. Also, it just to happens that MM&A has had 7 (7!!!!) derailments on the mainline between Bangor and Montreal, IN THE FIRST 6 MONTHS OF 2013. Drop down the stats box on this page. It is correct that the Railroad had no MAINLINE derailments and only one mainline collision in the past ten years. I think the record looks pretty good for a small rail operation. (Unless that data is restricted to Canadian operations) ROAR
Schuylkill and SusquehannaIt would seem that Mr. Burkhard was either just hired, or he has a VERY short memory. I quote him again: "we've never had a significant mainline derailment." Now I would say that ANY mainline derailment is significant, unless it's on an HO layout. Also, it just to happens that MM&A has had 7 (7!!!!) derailments on the mainline between Bangor and Montreal, IN THE FIRST 6 MONTHS OF 2013.
Drop down the stats box on this page. It is correct that the Railroad had no MAINLINE derailments and only one mainline collision in the past ten years. I think the record looks pretty good for a small rail operation. (Unless that data is restricted to Canadian operations)
ROAR
Hello "ROAR",
My information was from an article quoting information from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada and the U.S. Federal Railroad Administration’s Office of Safety Analysis. Here's the link. The data is buried in the text, but it's there. It could be that the 7 accidents occurred in the US, and it could also depend on your definition of main line. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-business/us-business/mmas-good-safety-record-demolished-by-runaway-train/article13103487/ The article was published this morning.
S&S
Modeling the Pennsy and loving it!
overall NPR is reporting that the engineer on this train has been "suspended without pay" for not setting enough hand brakes. I guess when it's all said and done, the railroad will be to blame and the whole industry will suffer for one man's lapse in judgement.
NPR is reporting that the engineer on this train has been "suspended without pay" for not setting enough hand brakes. I guess when it's all said and done, the railroad will be to blame and the whole industry will suffer for one man's lapse in judgement.
EDITED 7/11/2013 1:44PM
My dad is an auditor, and had a couple good comments. I will relay them.
First, the engineer is just another scapegoat. The railroad needs to get to the "root cause" of the accident. The train derailed. Why? The brakes weren't set. Why? The engineer did not properly set the brakes. Why? Was he improperly trained or not familiar with the equipment?
If he was improperly trained (this includes simply forgetting to set the brakes), then the railroad is responsible because they need a better training plan, or they need to make sure that the train crews are properly trained.
If he was not familiar with the equipment, then the railroad should have trained him on the equipment. Hand brakes are fairly basic in terms of training, so why wasn't he adequately trained.
Secondly, this seems to be the tip of the iceberg. The problems go much deeper than they appear.
Third, Mr. Burkhardt should have gone to the scene of the accident as soon as it happened.
Fourth, Mr. Burkhardt obviously didn't listen to his PR guys, as they would have known not to give out "what really happened" before he had all the information.
Fifth, MM&A does not seem to have a business climate where safety is a primary concern., the tracks are poor, and multiple people have made multiple mistakes. The engineer should have applied more hand brakes, the engineer should have properly locked out the train before going off duty, the dispatcher should have notified both train crews, and (unconfirmed) the dispatcher should have lined the switches in case the train rolled as the engineer asked.
It seems as if the managers of the MM&A are only concerned about the end of year books. They would rather spend say $10,000,000 on accident insurance premiums, instead of $20,000,000 on the back maintenance that would prevent the accident. Their one year only approach costs them more in the long run, because the back maintenance costs go up only slowly, but they pay large insurance premiums each year. After several years, it would have cost less to do the maintenance.
It would be interesting to see how other railroads owned by Rail World Inc. are managed for comparison. Mr. Burkhardt is not just the president of MM&A. He is the president of Rail World Inc., the president of MM&A, the president of The San Luis Central Railroad Company, serves on the Board of Directors of the Wheeling & Lake Erie Railway, Chairman of the Supervisory Board of AS Baltic Rail, and Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Rail Polska.
To expand on my speculation of the mechanics of the derailment.
1. For whatever reason the train started down hill, picking up speed as it descended the hill.
2. Apparently at a curve in town the top heavy tank cars tipped over to the outside ( ? )
3. With the tank car equipped with a shelf coupler it tipped the safety car ( boxcar ? ) as well.
4. Without a shelf coupler the boxcar coupler disengaged from the locomotive (S)
5. With what ever braking capability left the loco(s) slowed and finally stopped about 0.6 Miles beyond first car derailment..
6. The topo map shown on other posts showed a wye looking track arrangement near the river. Whether the derailment happened there or further west is not now known.
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The official M,M& A press release claims a release of the air brakes due to the shutdown of a locomotive caused the accident and makes no mention of hand brakes:
http://www.mmarail.com/sections/news/files/MMA_7.7.2013_Press%20Release_1415.EST.pdf
HOWEVER: the latest update is that Mr. Burkhardt himself stated in an interview today that the engineer did not set the proper number of hand brakes:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/10/us-train-missing-idUSBRE9690HJ20130710
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BroadwayLion Let's blame most of this misunderstanding on the reporters until the NTSB gets done with their investigation and make their report.
Why should we blame the reporters for misunderstanding when there is no evidence that a misunderstanding exists?
Mr. Burkhardt has made many incredible comments, and many are directly quoted. If all of these comments were a misinterpretation of what he said, I should think he would make one more comment saying that he has been misinterpreted. Yet he has made no such remark.
So until proven that Mr. Burkhardt has been misunderstood, I will take his comments as they are reported.
LION thinks that much of what is being attributed to Mr. Burkhardt is a reporters misunderstanding of what he actually said or tried to say. Let's blame most of this misunderstanding on the reporters until the NTSB gets done with their investigation and make their report.
---ok, the Cannuck equivalent of the NTSB---
Bucyrus Ulrich Blaming the Nantes fire chief doesn't help either. The best thing he could have done right after this happened is to take FULL and complete responsibility for what happened, apologize, and get the wheels rolling on what can be done for the victims and the town. Yes, even if the fire chief was at fault, Burkhardt would have been better off not saying so at this point. Everybody knows that these big accidents need some time to be investigated. Burkhadt should not be expected to explain the cause the next day. But the worse thing is that Burkhardt comes right out of the box blaming it on the fire chief, and it appears that Burkhardt's case is full of holes. And because his blaming of the fire chief is based on a technical issue involving air brakes and running locomotives, those issues will be sorted out by the experts. So if Burkhardt is blowing smoke, it is not going to escape the technical expertise of the investigation. And if Burkhardt's excuse is proven to be false, he is going to look very bad for trying to blame the fire chief before the investigation even began.
Ulrich Blaming the Nantes fire chief doesn't help either. The best thing he could have done right after this happened is to take FULL and complete responsibility for what happened, apologize, and get the wheels rolling on what can be done for the victims and the town.
Blaming the Nantes fire chief doesn't help either. The best thing he could have done right after this happened is to take FULL and complete responsibility for what happened, apologize, and get the wheels rolling on what can be done for the victims and the town.
Yes, even if the fire chief was at fault, Burkhardt would have been better off not saying so at this point. Everybody knows that these big accidents need some time to be investigated. Burkhadt should not be expected to explain the cause the next day.
But the worse thing is that Burkhardt comes right out of the box blaming it on the fire chief, and it appears that Burkhardt's case is full of holes. And because his blaming of the fire chief is based on a technical issue involving air brakes and running locomotives, those issues will be sorted out by the experts.
So if Burkhardt is blowing smoke, it is not going to escape the technical expertise of the investigation. And if Burkhardt's excuse is proven to be false, he is going to look very bad for trying to blame the fire chief before the investigation even began.
It's inconceivable to me that responding firefighters would release handbrakes which, according to one story I read, where set on all 5 locomotives as well a 7 of the tank cars (although now there are reports that the engineer may not have set the proper number)...
I hate to pass judgement on someone as well respected in the Industry asMr. Burkardt but he seems to be using the same "How not to respond to a Company Emergency" playbook used by Robert Murray, former operator of the Crandall Canyon Mine in Utah, when a collapse at that facility killed 6 miners and later 3 rescuers trying to dig them out. Murray gave media interviews were he repeatedly insisted that the collapse was the result of a naturally occuring earthquake even as evidence mounted that it was the result of unsafe prectices at the mine.
Mr. Murray was able to continue as CEO of his group of Companies, time will tell if Ed Burkhardt will be able to do the same....
I agree with Ulrich. Mr Burkhardt seems inept this time around. I remember when he was running the Wisconsin Central, they had an incident that led to an evacuation of a town up there whose name escapes me at the moment. Anyway, as best as I remember, he was very good at handling that incident. He had great success with the WC and was well respected in the industry. Contrast that with what we see today. It is very sad.
Burkhardt should be a little smarter and not comment so much until the investigation is completed. Now he's blaming the engineer. Quite likely the engineer is at fault, but he shouldn't comment on that publicly until the investigation runs its course. His comments should be restricted to an apology and to something in the way of compensating the victims and the town. The blame game he's playing makes him look stupid and does not reflect well on the railway.
NOTE: this line is the former Canadian Pacific from Montreal to New Brunswick and not the BAR....MMA does operate some parts of the BAR east of Brownsville and Millenocket.
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Here is an interesting comment by Mr. Burkhardt:
“The company has previously called the train engineer, Quebecer Tom Harding, a hero for apparently rushing to the scene and managing to stop some of the ghost cars.”
How was that possible? The end-of-train device shows on the last car of the train standing in the fire at the derailment site.
It is just one more bizarre comment by Ed Burkhardt.
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/07/10/lac-megantic-explosion_n_3571341.html#slide=2670967
Before being bought by Rail World Inc. in 2003, the Montreal, Maine, and Atlantic railway was known as the Bangor and Aroostook Railroad. The BAR was bought by Iron Road Railways in 1995, before having its assets bought by Rail World in 2003.
Mr. Burkhardt has defended MM&A's "good safety record", saying that we "never had a mainline derailment." The US FRA seems to show that MM&A does not have a "good safety record" at all. Since 2003, when it was bought by Rail World Inc. (coincidence anyone?), the MM&A has had 143 accidents! More than 4 have had damage totaling more than $100,000. My question is this: how can you have so much damage without having a "mainline accident"?
It would seem that Mr. Burkhard was either just hired, or he has a VERY short memory. I quote him again: "we've never had a significant mainline derailment." Now I would say that ANY mainline derailment is significant, unless it's on an HO layout. Also, it just to happens that MM&A has had 7 (7!!!!) derailments on the mainline between Bangor and Montreal, IN THE FIRST 6 MONTHS OF 2013.
Obviously, Mr. Burkhard must have been hired in the last month. (Sorry for the sarcasm, but Mr. Burkhardt's repeated un-truths are getting on my nerves.)
Since the accident, Mr. Burkhardt has blamed, vandals, the fire department, and now railroad officials believe that there may have been "tampering" that caused the accident. It seems that he does not want to accept responsibility, and does not want to wait for the facts to become apparent before proposing a scenario for the accident.
Now 15 people are confirmed dead, and 60 are missing.
Bucyrus, I did not see your most recent post as I was typing my reply to rcdrye.
This latest comment attributed to Mr. Burkhardt would appear to be so impossible that I believe the media must have totally misunderstood what he was saying.
One problem I have had in following this story is that often new information is added to a story and older information is overwritten. But everything I have read comes down to an EB oil train was parked at Nantes, QC. For reasons unknown, after a locomotive fire, said EB train rolled away EB from Nantes toward Lac Megantic, derailed and exploded, at which point the locomotives broke loose from that train, and came to rest east of Lac Megantic.
I think whether they were found .25 mi., or 0.6 mi. east of Lac Megantic is a matter of speculation, until the TSB gets out their tape measure and issues a finding.
Bruce
So shovel the coal, let this rattler roll.
"A Train is a Place Going Somewhere" CP Rail Public Timetable
"O. S. Irricana"
. . . __ . ______
AgentKidAs has been noted already, the locomotives did not detach from the cars until after the derailment, and they were found 1 km. (6/10th of a mile) beyond the wreck site, east of Lac Megantic.
Well, that would put the locomotives 7.6 miles east of where they were originally parked prior to the runaway. The article I referenced says the locomotives were found .25 miles from where they were originally parked. So that is a discrepancy of 7.35 miles.
rcdryeif the cars weren't attached to a locomotive.
As has been noted already, the locomotives did not detach from the cars until after the derailment, and they were found 1 km. (6/10th of a mile) beyond the wreck site, east of Lac Megantic.
What I wanted to post was an amazing photo issued by NASA of the fire, about 1 hour after the wreck, as seen from a satellite.
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/NaturalHazards/view.php?id=81581
Still, we cannot get a clear explanation of what the locomotive did when the train ran away (quoted):
His engineer reported having deployed the hand brakes on a number of tanker cars and on the engines. The brakes on the locomotives eventually held, he said.
They stopped a quarter of a mile away from their original parking spot in Nantes, he said. They did not make it to Lac-Megantic.
I thought the locomotives were on the head end of the train, and the train was headed toward Lac Megantic prior to the runaway. And I thought that train stopped 7 miles before reaching Lac Megantic, and then ran way for those 7 miles into Lac Megantic. So how did the locomotives end up behind the runaway?
In the meantime, Burkhardt says he hopes he will not get shot when he visits Lac Megantic.
http://www.wptv.com/dpp/news/world/edward-burkhardt-rail-ceo-to-visit-lac-megantic-quebec-hopes-he-doesnt-get-shot-by-residents
The failure (or not) of air brakes shouldn't be an issue if the cars weren't attached to a locomotive. Rules require hand brakes to be set in sufficient number to keep the cars from moving.
CROR Rule 112(a) When equipment is left at any point a sufficient number of hand brakes must be applied to prevent it from moving. Special instructions will indicate the minimum hand brake requirements for all locations where equipment is left. If equipment is left on a siding, it must be coupled to other equipment if any on such track unless it is necessary to provide separation at a public crossing at grade or elsewhere.
112(b) and 112(c) cover making sure the hand brakes applied are effective before leaving equipment.
Bucyrus Here is a recent quote summarizing the explanation for the runaway: Burkhardt told the daily La Presse that Nantes firefighters "showed up and put out the fire with a fire extinguisher. To do that they also shut down the first locomotive's engines. This is what led to the disaster." He explained that the train's brakes were powered by the locomotive and would have disengaged when it was shut down, causing the driverless train to start rolling downhill towards Lac-Megantic. As I understand the explanation that has been given in this thread, the explanation given above by Mr. Burkhardt cannot possibly be accurate. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130710/railway-blames-firefighters-canada-train-disaster
Here is a recent quote summarizing the explanation for the runaway:
Burkhardt told the daily La Presse that Nantes firefighters "showed up and put out the fire with a fire extinguisher. To do that they also shut down the first locomotive's engines. This is what led to the disaster."
He explained that the train's brakes were powered by the locomotive and would have disengaged when it was shut down, causing the driverless train to start rolling downhill towards Lac-Megantic.
As I understand the explanation that has been given in this thread, the explanation given above by Mr. Burkhardt cannot possibly be accurate.
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130710/railway-blames-firefighters-canada-train-disaster
I would have expected a more robust and intelligent response from him. Also, this happened on Saturday and he's only now arriving in Lac - Megantic. He should have been on site by Monday morning at the very latest. I also heard him state that apart from this disaster, his railroad is as safe as any other. I appreciate that he's in damage control, but his comments do nothing more than infuriate those who were affected. Blaming the Nantes fire chief doesn't help either. The best thing he could have done right after this happened is to take FULL and complete responsibility for what happened, apologize, and get the wheels rolling on what can be done for the victims and the town.
Just some context. MM&A is a small railroad, owning 510 miles of track and 26 locomotives. 15 trains are operated daily, and the MM&A employs 170 people. (Found on the MM&A web site.)
On their home page, I found a link to a press release from the 7th - the day after the accident.
From what I've heard, it now sounds like the dispatcher didn't notify both train crews of the fire.
I also heard that they didn't do a push-pull test after securing the cars.
There are also some problems with MM&A. Since 2003, there have been over 100 "incidents", and over 80 derailments. It sounds like some of those were due to negligence. The example I heard was that they found a cracked rail and did nothing, and a train ended up derailing because of the rail.
Yeah, someone is in BIG trouble.
1. I learned a lot about the ability of modern freight equipment to maintain brake cylinder pressure without recharging from the locomotive's compressor. This is different than 60 years ago! And my most recent experience has been with museum equipment., even that over 17 years ago.
2. I am still surprised that railroads allow loaded trains of any type to be left without any supervision, in a post-11-Sep.-01 envirionment. Is this a practice on the NS? Possibly excepting coal? What about pilferage?
3. If there is one action that would have averted the tragedy, it would have been for the track maintainer to awaken the crew, who would have secured the train and then gone back to bed. Hours of service law or no, if I were an engineer and the fire department doused a fire on my enngine, I would want to know about it as soon as possible and inspect it after they left. If hours of service laws prevented the dispatcher from instructing the track maintainer to wake up the crew, then the dispatcher should have insured that some other responsible person got to the scene as quickly as possible.
Or if loco fires are so routine, then something higher up is amiss.
BucyrusSo why did they even leave the engine running in the first place?
Also, old, locomotives can be very hard to start when cold. So leaving one running gives you power to start the others. (If necessary)
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