Village evacuated after Quebec train derailment

[Anonymous]

Here is how the Sierra Club is looking at the issue of shipping oil by rail:

http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/11/opinion/schafer-oil-by-railroad

From the link:

Rail is the most efficient way to move freight, and Sierra Club is a big fan of rail for transporting people and conventional freight. But moving extreme fossil fuels, like Bakken shale or Alberta tar sands, is a different story entirely.

These fuels are "extreme" because they are more toxic and more carbon intensive than conventional oil. They are also more dangerous to transport than conventional sources of oil. Production in the Bakken fields has increased nearly 10 times since 2011. To move all this crude, oil rail companies are running longer, heavier trains. And they are running them farther than ever before, bringing crude to refineries on the East, West and Gulf coasts.

The regulatory framework for train safety wasn't designed for crude oil trains, and the rail and safety infrastructure is out of date and not up to the task.

[zardoz]

I just wanted to be post #400.

[carnej1]

Bucyrus

Here is a predictable development in the wake of the disaster:

http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/railway-revolt-brews-as-lac-megantic-residents-confront-the-future-1.1367301

From the link: 

Railway revolt brews as Lac-Megantic residents confront the future

 

A key question on many locals' minds is whether the railway, seen by some as a regional economic lifeline and by others as the "train from hell," should ever pass through the downtown area again.

Many residents here are quick to explain that they don't want the trains back.

After the derailment, that defiance was spelled out in black upper-case letters on a handmade sign. It was posted at the railroad's edge, close to Clusiault's home.

"You, train from hell," reads the placard in French.

The anger in town has led to some discussions that residents should rip up the tracks themselves.

The catch is that many local businesses -- and jobs -- depend on those rails to survive, said the director of the region's economic-development centre.

Apparently there has been some discussion/planning of building a realignment of the M,M & A ROW to move it away from the downtown for a while, long before the accident.

 I would guess this will happen sooner rather than later..

[Anonymous]

Here is a predictable development in the wake of the disaster:

http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/railway-revolt-brews-as-lac-megantic-residents-confront-the-future-1.1367301

From the link: 

Railway revolt brews as Lac-Megantic residents confront the future

 

A key question on many locals' minds is whether the railway, seen by some as a regional economic lifeline and by others as the "train from hell," should ever pass through the downtown area again.

Many residents here are quick to explain that they don't want the trains back.

After the derailment, that defiance was spelled out in black upper-case letters on a handmade sign. It was posted at the railroad's edge, close to Clusiault's home.

"You, train from hell," reads the placard in French.

The anger in town has led to some discussions that residents should rip up the tracks themselves.

The catch is that many local businesses -- and jobs -- depend on those rails to survive, said the director of the region's economic-development centre.

[AgentKid]

Bucyrus

MMA has said its handbrake policy was adopted from safety guidelines set by a much larger railroad, Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd. Canadian Pacific declined comment.

I wondered what were the conditions like on this line back "in the good old days" or its "best day ever", so I looked at the book "Canadian Pacific in the East" by Omer Lavalée, and at an online copy of an ETT from 1951, posted on the Canadian Pacific Historical Association website.

My observations: It was a very Anglo world when the CPR was in charge. Lac-Mégantic was known as Megantic, Nantes(pronounced nance, rhymes with dance) was known as Spring Hill, and Laval Nord, as noted on the diagram in the National Post, was known as Echo Vale.

The maximum speed for freight trains was 40 mph. And the most interesting thing, the grade down to Megantic was not considered steep or curvy enough to have any Permanent Slow Orders. However, in Megantic, the B.T.C. (Board of Transport Commissioners, forerunner of the TSB) required that trains observe a maximum of 10 mph, and provide their own flagging, over the crossing at Frontenac St., now Rue Frontenac, because of the number of tracks. This is the street beside the switch for the wye to the line from the Quebec Central(abandoned in the 1980's), where the wreck seems to have started. In Mr. Lavalée's book, pp. 100, there is an eerie picture taken in 1954 of this crossing, which must have been only feet, if not inches, from where the derailment started.

Bruce

[petitnj]

BaltACD

To properly secure a train

1. Apply the number of hand brakes stated per rule.  release air brakes and see if train begins to roll.  If it stays stationary - without air or engine air brakes applied - train is secured. 

2. If it begins to roll, apply air brakes to stop it and apply additional hand brakes.  Repeat procedure identified in #1 to test.  Once train is secured then apply engine hand brakes and secure train air brakes as required by rule and Power Brake Law.

Good point. After setting car hand brakes, we release air brakes and push on the train with the locomotive to see if it is secured (if it rolls at all or if the rolling stops after the push). That is about  the same as seeing if the train will roll, but  breaks the static friction of the brakes to the lesser dynamic friction. We do park our trains on a siding with about 0.8% grade but the siding is protected by a derail and we normally set at least 50% of the hand brakes and put down wood and steel wheel chocks. 

i suspect this test will be a highlight of our training messages this week. 

[schlimm]

It certainly sounds like common sense was lacking.

[Anonymous]

It was the height of irresponsibility to routinely park loaded oil trains at the top of a 7-mile grade leading to a 10 mph curve in the middle of a town; with the only protection being a hodgepodge of rules, procedures, perception, and judgment about winding up 10-40 hand brakes to a certain extent.  Anybody with an ounce of common sense could see that the risk was unreasonable.

[BroadwayLion]

tree68

Setting every nth car would be a massive PITA, as a relieving crew would have to check the brakes on every single car to see what the relieved crew set.  For a 100 car train, with a one man crew, in the dark...

So! They do NOT inspect the train before departing.

NYCT requires the crew putting the train in for the day to walk around both sides checking brakes and that all of the wheels are on the rails. Of course the train is only 600' long. (LIRR trans can be 1020' long). They must also walk through the train checking roll signs, air conditioning, and BTW: the hand brakes are set and released from INSIDE of the train. I guess nobody really wants to walk through an oil train, but there it is.

ROAR

[BaltACD]

To properly secure a train

1. Apply the number of hand brakes stated per rule.  release air brakes and see if train begins to roll.  If it stays stationary - without air or engine air brakes applied - train is secured. 

2. If it begins to roll, apply air brakes to stop it and apply additional hand brakes.  Repeat procedure identified in #1 to test.  Once train is secured then apply engine hand brakes and secure train air brakes as required by rule and Power Brake Law.

Just applying X number of hand brakes, without testing their effectiveness is not securing the train.

It is not ROCKET SCIENCE nor is it intended to be.

[Anonymous]

Here is an article that details some guidelines for setting hand brakes to hold a train:

http://news.yahoo.com/insight-quebec-train-set-too-few-brakes-deadly-013726461.html

From the link:

 

HOW MANY HAND BRAKES ARE ENOUGH?

MMA has said its handbrake policy was adopted from safety guidelines set by a much larger railroad, Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd. Canadian Pacific declined comment.

Earlier this week, Burkhardt told Reuters he believed the MMA engineer had complied with company rules and standard rail industry practices in securing the train. On Wednesday, he told reporters the worker likely failed to set enough handbrakes, violated company policy, and was now suspended without pay. He did not detail what caused his revised views.

An online copy of Canadian Pacific's General Operating Instructions said at least nine handbrakes must be set on a parked train of 70 to 79 cars, but additional brakes "may be required" if the train is parked on a grade.

Rival railroad Canadian National provides more specific instructions, recommending that crews activate the handbrakes on 40 percent of all railcars when a train is idled on a 1-1.4 percent grade, according to a Transportation Safety Board report in April.

If MMA's engineer had followed the 40 percent guidance, he would have had to activate about 29 brakes.

"There's always some amount of judgment. It's a balancing act between what will hold the train and what is operationally feasible," said Rob Mangels, senior mechanical associate at R.L. Banks & Associates and a locomotive engineer and trainer.

Mangels said handbraking 20 to 30 cars on a 72-car oil train would be typical. A longtime Canada-based locomotive engineer and brakeman, Doug Finnson, said he might activate handbrakes on 25 railcars before leaving a train of that length on a flat surface, or more brakes if it was on a decline.

In the United States, freight train operators generally apply handbrakes on every fourth car, another expert said.

Other experts questioned whether MMA's engineer took enough time to secure the train. According to investigators, the train pulled onto the tracks at Nantes around 11 p.m. local time. MMA said that the engineer had secured the train by 11:25 p.m.

"That seems like a short period of time to secure the train," Colorado-based railroad consultant Robert Stout said, adding that to activate a brake, a worker must walk between the railcars, climb up a ladder and turn the brake wheel, sometimes up to forty times.

MMA's Burkhardt said it may be impossible to verify how many handbrakes were set before the disaster, due to extensive damage to the rail cars. Police say 200 investigators are sifting through the charred wreckage.

[Anonymous]

petitnj

Having the front set of cars not accordioned is not much evidence for hand brake conditions.

I did not mean to suggest that the head nine cars not being accordioned was an indication of whether or not hand brakes had been set.  My point was that the non-accordioned condition would make them relatively less damaged than the accordioned cars.  And the lesser damage might make it more likely that the hand brakes had not been released by forces in the crash. 

[tree68]

BroadwayLion

??? They just set the required number of brakes from the front of the train?

LION thunked that they would set every 5th or 7th car.

Brakes would be set on the downhill end of the train - not necessarily the front.

If the brakes are properly set, in the necessary number (which may differ from the required number), you're essentially creating a bumper for the rest of the train to come up against.

Setting every nth car would be a massive PITA, as a relieving crew would have to check the brakes on every single car to see what the relieved crew set.  For a 100 car train, with a one man crew, in the dark...

Besides, that might mean having to walk unwalkable areas along the ROW (see the bridge thread).

[petitnj]

Normal procedure is to set enough cars on the convenient end of the train. That is  normally the end connected to the locomotives. Alternating cars (like every 5th car) has no advantage and would just take extra time. Setting the locomotives and 10 of the cars would easily hold the train. 

The handbrakes shouldn't release just because of the wreck. The are ratchet systems connected to a chain and the position of the chain would indicate the status of the hand brakes. 

Having the front set of cars not accordioned is not much evidence for hand brake conditions. The first few cars blasted thru town and some later car skipped the rails and started to go off the right-of-way. This physically ground the wheels into the ballast and started to slow everything down. The derailed cars behind then zig zagged into the front cars. 

The evidence should be obvious. 

[BroadwayLion]

Bucyrus

There is even a chance that the cars in the heap might still show hand brakes having been set, but their greater damage would be more likely to have caused a set hand brake to release.  But, in any case, those heaped cars are mostly beyond the eleventh car, which is the number of cars on which the engineer claims to have set hand brakes.

??? They just set the required number of brakes from the front of the train?

LION thunked that they would set every 5th or 7th car.

Maybe him kneads more thunking.

ROAR

[Anonymous]

That graphic posted earlier about the wreck details shows some information that has not been revealed elsewhere.  That is that all cars on the head end of the wreck derailed.  Hand brakes would have been applied to the head end cars, if they were applied. 

If it so happened that some of those head end cars were still upright and on the rails, and if the hand brakes on them had been applied, the brakes would still be applied after the wreck.  And that would be evidence proving that the brakes had been applied as the engineer says.  And conversely, if head end cars were on the rails with no hand brakes applied, that would be nearly conclusive evidence that they were not applied before the runaway. 

All of the head end cars are derailed, but the first nine cars at the head end, while being derailed, are not heaped together as the ones further back.  Instead, they are derailed, but separated from each other, and not zigzagged into an accordion pileup.  So there is a fair chance that those head end cars might still show applied hand brakes if they had been applied; even if they are derailed. 

There is even a chance that the cars in the heap might still show hand brakes having been set, but their greater damage would be more likely to have caused a set hand brake to release.  But, in any case, those heaped cars are mostly beyond the eleventh car, which is the number of cars on which the engineer claims to have set hand brakes.

So those first nine cars should have been immediately checked by investigators as soon as they had cooled enough.  Once they became cool enough to touch, there would have been strong motivations for someone to tamper, and set released hand brakes, or release set hand brakes.      

Mr. Burkhardt stated that his company’s investigation indicated that no brakes had been applied to the cars.  However, he did not say what evidence indicated that finding.        

[Anonymous]

BroadwayLion

Bucyrus

The total solution for securing unintended trains would be a power brake acting on all cars simultaneously from a single control that could be locked with the security of the locking system detailed in the BRT report. 

Well, this is all well and good, and it applies to trains. But it cannot apply to railcars. Railcars must be moved by plant personnel for loading and repositioning equipment. Once a car is set out from a train, its air pipe is open to the atmosphere, and the pressure tank is bleed so that the brakes will release so the car can be moved within a plant. Once here only hand brakes can hold the car.

I am proposing the type of powered, all inclusive, and simultaneous parking brake only for the new breed of high performance, crude oil unit trains that will soon be the law of the land.  You set these parking brakes by setting the air brakes and then throwing a switch in the cab to set the brake locks.  You release them by throwing the switch to release. 

Once you bring all this control to one switch, you can connect that switch to any number of different authorizations that may lock or unlock the switch.  The switch will be wired to also tell the world whether it is locked or unlocked.

You can still equip these special trains with hand brakes if you want to, but these unit trains will be a semi-permanently coupled, non-interchange consist, so there is no need for hand brakes for dealing with individual cars or cuts of cars.  The main point is that these new oil trains will not rely on manually winding up several hand brakes, or making sure they stay wound up in order to prevent the trains from wiping out towns.    

[jeffhergert]

Paul_D_North_Jr

While looking for something else, I found this PowerPoint presentation (32 pages/ slides, approx. 1.47 MB electronic file size in ".pdf" format) by the BLET in June 2006 which advocates key-type locks for air brake controls - a "locking air brake valve".  It is sub-captioned as "RSAC V-1" (the FRA's Railroad Safety Advisory Committee is "RSAC"):

"Securing Train Air Brakes" - https://rsac.fra.dot.gov/document.php?type=meeting&date=20060518&name=BLETair+brake+RSAC_v1.pdf 

See especially slides/ pages 8 - 10 regarding "Unattended Trains", and then 31-32; draw your own conclusions. 

- Paul North. 

A locking air brake valve is only good as long as keys don't "leak" into unauthorized hands.  Switch keys aren't supposed to be out there in unauthorized hands either, but they are.  Just as the page with the switch keys on an internet auction site illustrates.

They have just started to issue us keys for the locks that many engines have for the front nose door.  Rules require that on engines so equipped, the crew will lock the cab back door (assuming that lock works) and after leaving the locomotive, locking the front door.  This is to be done when leaving a train unattended outside of a yard or terminal area.  (Someone asked rhetorically, "What constitutes the yard/terminal limits?"  I said, "It depends on the contingency of the moment.  When they don't want you to make an outbound crew have to use extra time in boarding a train, it's in the 'terminal' area.  The next time you do the same thing at the same place and something bad happens, it won't be a 'terminal' area.")

Some guys are telling the same thing when being issued the keys.  They are being told, "Don't use them, especially in winter weather.  The locks in cold temperatures will freeze hard enough that a fusee won't thaw them."  The first engine I got on after getting my key, both I and the condr tried the key in the lock.  Neither one of us could get the lock to work.  It almost looked like the lock had been welded closed. 

Jeff 

[BroadwayLion]

Bucyrus

The total solution for securing unintended trains would be a power brake acting on all cars simultaneously from a single control that could be locked with the security of the locking system detailed in the BRT report. 

Well, this is all well and good, and it applies to trains. But it cannot apply to railcars. Railcars must be moved by plant personnel for loading and repositioning equipment. Once a car is set out from a train, its air pipe is open to the atmosphere, and the pressure tank is bleed so that the brakes will release so the car can be moved within a plant. Once here only hand brakes can hold the car.

How to do this safely and to prevent vandalism, terrorism, or other unauthorized access?

1) LION thinks that any person should be able to set the brake at any time to a standing car.

2) ONLY a person with proper access can release the car. Keys are just too common. LION has keys. What can you do about it?

LION THINKS that the hand brakes should be able to be released from the locomotive once the brake line is properly charged. How? I do not know. And electrical portion on a coupler makes this a gimme, but using air pressure in a single pipe? Could a jolt of 200 psi be used to release hand brakes? Somebody would have to invent that valve--and then retrofit it to existing equipment.

In an industrial setting, could shop air be required to release a hand brake? Some other electric connection? Put on the old thinking caps! LION thinks maybe security at a loading or unloading facility that moves cars must provide their own security, and the hand brakes can be set or released by anybody present on the property.

For TRAINS parked away from home where no movement is to be expected, (and equipped with N2a couplers and electronics) it could be arranged that only the dispatcher (In Ft. Worth or wherever) can unlock the parking brakes. The engineer phones home, the dispatcher electronically inspects the train and then releases the parking brakes.

Security can be built in, but it is more difficult to retrofit it to an existing fleet of equipment. This is why LION thinks that it can be first implemented on new unit trains.

ROAR

[Anonymous]

Paul_D_North_Jr

While looking for something else, I found this PowerPoint presentation (32 pages/ slides, approx. 1.47 MB electronic file size in ".pdf" format) by the BLET in June 2006 which advocates key-type locks for air brake controls - a "locking air brake valve".  It is sub-captioned as "RSAC V-1" (the FRA's Railroad Safety Advisory Committee is "RSAC"):

"Securing Train Air Brakes" - https://rsac.fra.dot.gov/document.php?type=meeting&date=20060518&name=BLETair+brake+RSAC_v1.pdf 

See especially slides/ pages 8 - 10 regarding "Unattended Trains", and then 31-32; draw your own conclusions. 

- Paul North. 

 

Well, one obvious conclusion is that the BRT does not dismiss the possibility of tampering or sabotage just because they don’t see any at the moment.

I note that while this lock system would prevent releasing the air brakes, it would not prevent air brakes from inadvertently releasing on their own, or losing holding pressure over time. 

The total solution for securing unintended trains would be a power brake acting on all cars simultaneously from a single control that could be locked with the security of the locking system detailed in the BRT report. 

 

[Norm48327]

edblysard

No, no other suggested scenarios, and on that note, I think I will bow out of this conversation, simply because it seems this tragedy has become a form of entertainment, and I think we (me) have lost sight of the fact that, not only have all those people in the town lost their lives, friends and everything important to them, everyone on the railroad has pretty much lost everything they have worked all their lives for.

Lots of lives destroyed.

Like the Mookie says, it seems like enough.

Well said Ed. Having been involved in aviation for the past thirty years I've watched all kinds of speculation on accidents, and that's what this thread has become. The truth will be known only after the investigators have finished their job.

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

While looking for something else, I found this PowerPoint presentation (32 pages/ slides, approx. 1.47 MB electronic file size in ".pdf" format) by the BLET in June 2006 which advocates key-type locks for air brake controls - a "locking air brake valve".  It is sub-captioned as "RSAC V-1" (the FRA's Railroad Safety Advisory Committee is "RSAC"):

"Securing Train Air Brakes" - https://rsac.fra.dot.gov/document.php?type=meeting&date=20060518&name=BLETair+brake+RSAC_v1.pdf 

See especially slides/ pages 8 - 10 regarding "Unattended Trains", and then 31-32; draw your own conclusions. 

- Paul North. 

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

Virginia Creeper

The National Post published an infographic that illustrates many of the topics discussed here: timeline, elevations, speeds, maps, air brake diagrams, and more.

http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/07/12/graphic-the-lac-megantic-runaway-train-disaster/

Excellent, informative graphic and expert commentary, especially the profile and train speed simulation.  That newspaper has done a superb job of finding and presenting facts - and yes, some informed speculation by the professors - in a coherent way, as it ought to be done more often.  Thanks for sharing !!!       

- Paul North. 

[daveklepper]

I must reply to Greyhound;:   The evidence that it MAY be a deliverate attack is that Canadian Security forces foiled two attempts against railways in the past four months.   

The perpertrator may have set the loco fire as a diversion.

Were any tank cars on fire before the derailment?

Why were one or more cars leaking?

[BigJim]

Ed,
You and Mookie put it in words much better than I could.

Thank you.

[Anonymous]

It is understandable why this would be a popular topic on the forum.  And I must say that I do not consider this discussion to be a form of entertainment.  Yes, what happened is a terrible tradgedy. 

But you can bet the people of Lac-Megantic are talking about it.  They are asking the same questions we are, and coming to some of the same conclusions about the characters and their roles in this story. 

I don't believe the people of Lac-Megantic would be offended by our discussion or feel that we are using it for entertainment.  But that is only my personal opinion.  Others are free to look at this any way they choose.  I would make no judgment about how they look at this this discussion or topic.     

 

[edblysard]

No, no other suggested scenarios, and on that note, I think I will bow out of this conversation, simply because it seems this tragedy has become a form of entertainment, and I think we (me) have lost sight of the fact that, not only have all those people in the town lost their lives, friends and everything important to them, everyone on the railroad has pretty much lost everything they have worked all their lives for.

Lots of lives destroyed.

Like the Mookie says, it seems like enough.

[Mookie]

Yeah - everyone involved in this was on some kind of drugs or drunk.  I don't think that has been covered from 93 angles.  

[petitnj]

"Where have you gone Joe DiMaggio? A nation turns its lonely eyes to you." (Obviously, another  call for help from someone who is dead). 

Logic is just one of the ways to solve a problem:

Make a hypothesis, apply logic, see if the hypothesis is consistent. 

We have to make the following consistent:

Statement of the engineer (no reason to doubt, except for the stupid statements of Burkhardt)

Rules that apply to the train operation.

Actions of the fire department (again just facts)

Timing of the runaway train. 

Now, all the hypotheses may not be correct. In fact, most are incorrect. But, we can go thru many scenarios and see which fit. 

Any other suggested scenarios? 

[Mookie]

edblysard

And logic seems to have become lost in the mix.

Logic isn't the only thing lost in here.  I think a whole group of us are lost, too!  

Maybe a group from the forum ought to take a trip to the accident site to see things first hand and then make a determination? Then we could end all the speculation and get on with beating another subject to death.  

Moo....