Many history books say that one reason the Confederacy lost the war is because the Union had more railroad milage. Christopher Gabel in an article Rails to Oblivion disagrees. In 1860 the whole country had 30,000 miles of railroad of which 9,000 were in the soon to be Confederate states. The Confederacy was an agricultural area with a rural population. Dr. Gabel argues there were sufficient railroads for the Confederates to win the war.
In the early part of the war Confederate Generals used their railroads quite successfully to transport troops and equipment to battle. As the war went on the railroads wore out and there were inadequate or no efforts to to repair and maintain them. Yet as late as September, 1863 James Longstreet moved his men 800 miles from Virginia to Chickamauga to support Braxton Bragg and enabled Bragg to stop the Yankees. There were a lot of problems with the move and long delays. Half of Longstreet's men arrived too late to do any fighting. But enough got there to make a real difference. Without them Sherman would have reached Atlanta a year earlier.
In 1863 the smart money in Europe and Great Britain was betting the Confederacy would win the war. After all, the Union had to occupy and subdue a hugh area of hostile territory; the Confederacy only had to avoid losing the war. British merchants were selling all kinds of supplies to the Confederates, all of it on credit. At the end of the war warehouses in Wilmington, North Carolina were full of all kinds of supplies but by that time the Confederates were unable to distribute them on the worn out rail system.
In Gabel's view the Confederacy lost the war not because its rail system was inadequate but because it went to pieces from lack of care and maintenance.
Here is a link to the article: http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/gabel6.pdf
Dr. Gabel teaches and writes at the Combat Studies Institute.
Well, since I'm living here in "Civil War Central" there's no way I can stay out of this one!
Certainly, Gabel's correct when he says the Confederates lost because their railroads went to pieces because of lack of maintainance, but that's only part of the picture. The only factory in the South capable of producing railroad equipment and matierials was Richmonds Tredegar Iron Works, Tredegar was a great outfit, they could make anything, but not everything all at once. Tredegar was heavily involved in munitions and ordnance manufacturing and railroad supplies had to take a back seat. With the Yankees only 100 miles north, and General Lee's army the only thing keeping them out of Richmond, keeping that army supplied with the tools of the trade HAD to take precedence.
Another problem with Southern railroads is most didn't connect with one another. The Southern philosophy of railroad building was to build a 'road from the farms to the nearest river for trans-shipment of cargos (like cotton) to the nearest seaport. As a matter of fact the remnants of one of those 'roads is only two miles from my house. It ran from the farms of western Henrico County to the James River/ Kanawha Canal and no further. So, there was no cogent rail network in the South to form the basis of an efficient supply system.
AND you can throw the "States Rights" philosophy into the mix. The southern states were very jealous of their sovereignity and only grudgingly gave any consitant co-operation to the Confederate central government. That meant their local railroads were THEIRS, and THEIRS alone. The Confederates never had anything like the US Military Railroad system with a kick-butt, no-nonsense commander like General Herman Haupt running it. Jefferson Davis said it best when he said the Confederacy "died of a theory".
And it seems that when the war began all the best combat commanders from the fracturing US Army seemed to go south, while the best administrators stayed up north. Administrators don't get much publicity, but you can't have an army without them. So, if the food the Union soldier ate may have not been the best at times, he always had plenty of it. If his uniform wore out, he had another waiting for him. and he definately didn't have to worry about being paid on time. Johnny Reb wasn't so lucky, it's a tribute to him he prevailed as well as he did. As a matter of fact the only reason the Confederacy lasted as long as it did was because it was carried on the backs of its soldiers. When those backs finally broke, so did the Confederacy.
Oh, and those warehouses in Wilmington, North Carolina? Those were supplies for North Carolina troops! NC refused to share them with the other Confederate states and there was nothing the Confederate central government could do about it, so lack of rail transport didn't have much to do with those supplies staying in Wilmington.
I could go on and on and on but the fact is the Confederacy fell for a variety of reasons. A decrepit rail system was one reason, but not the only reason.
John WR [just to 'activate' that link] . . . Here is a link to the article: http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/gabel6.pdf Dr. Gabel teaches and writes at the Combat Studies Institute.
The Combat Studies Institute's web page is here: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/index.asp
A list of its publications is here: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/CSIPubs.asp
Looks like some interesting reading there, for those who are interested in such matters.
- Paul North.
Paul_D_North_JrHe [Christopher Gabel] also wrote "Railroad Generalship: Foundations of Civil War Strategy"
Yes he did. It looks like the use of railroads was an important but often overlooked part of the American Civil War.
So it seems, except by most railroad historians, and perhaps some military/ logistics historians. I especially liked the "FOREWORD" on the 2nd page of that monograph, which is too long for me to retype here this afternoon - though it can be found at:
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/gabel4.pdf
(25 pages; 32 pages in the 'PDF" version, approx. 847 KB electronic file size)
John WR It looks like the use of railroads was an important but often overlooked part of the American Civil War.
It looks like the use of railroads was an important but often overlooked part of the American Civil War.
How about "The Great Locomotive Chase"?
In addition to the railroads, the telegraph as radically changed the way the war was fought in comparison to previous wars. Note that the transcontinental telegraph line was a high priority item in the first few months of the war.
- Erik
erikem How about "The Great Locomotive Chase"? In addition to the railroads, the telegraph as radically changed the way the war was fought in comparison to previous wars. Note that the transcontinental telegraph line was a high priority item in the first few months of the war.
How about "The Great Locomotive Chase?" It is a charming story but I'm not sure it has a lot to do with the outcome of the war.
And yes, the telegraph was pretty important too. But with Abe Lincoln sending him telegrams I bet George McClellan wished it had never been invented.
I'll suggest "Railroads in The Civil War; The Impact of Management on Victory and Defeat" by John E. Clark Jr.
The Confederacy may have had an adequate rail network, but they failed to grasp the importance of logistics.
They didn't improve or maintain their rail capacity. Some southern towns had passed laws that prohibited rail lines from connecting. This benefited those particular towns at the expense of the overall economy. Through freight had to be unloaded from the rail cars of one railroad, drayed by team and wagon to the other rail line, and then reloaded. This "created" jobs and profits in that town, but it was at the expense of economic growth and efficiency. Overall, it cost more jobs and profits than it ever created.
This was an economic burden in peace time. But when it came to a war for survival it was a disaster. Nobody in the Confederacy ever directed that the rail lines be connected in order to facilitate the war effort. Nobody understood the need to do so. They just didn't grasp the importance of logistics.
The northern army was driving on Atlanta but was turned back at Chickamauga. (I was told my great-grandfather fought at Chickamauga with an Illinois regiment.) It fell back to Chattanooga and fell under siege. Both sides shifted a large number of troops from the eastern theater to the Chattanooga area by rail.
The Union had a much more difficult task. They had exterior lines of communication while the Confederacy had interior lines of communication. But the Union did a much better job, largely because they understood the whole logistics thing much better than the Confederacy did.
The Union moved two complete Army Corps. They were pulled out of the line in Virginia and loaded on the Baltimore and Ohio. Moved west to Indianapolis where there was a break in gauge. South to Louisville and on past via the L&N to break the siege at Chattanooga. Nothing like it had ever been done before.
The Confederacy also shifted troops from Virgina to the Chatanooga area by rail, but they fumbled the move while the Union executed the move very well.
Clark's chapter of the nothing like it ever done before rail movement of the Federal Army's 11th and 12th Corps is a real page turner. (If you're interested in this sort of thing.)
It wasn't that the Confederacy didn't have the rail resources. It was that they didn't understand the importance of using the rail resources to the full advantage.
To this day, the US Army consists primarily of support troops. Most soldiers aren't infantrymen, tank crews, or artillery gun crews. Most soldiers support the infantrymen, tank crews and artillerymen by driving trucks delivering food, fuel, batteries and bullets, repairing equipment, cooking meals, treating wounds, etc. The US Army understood this early on and has never forgotten the importance of good logistics.
greyhounds [snipped - PDN] . . . To this day, the US Army consists primarily of support troops. Most soldiers aren't infantrymen, tank crews, or artillery gun crews. Most soldiers support the infantrymen, tank crews and artillerymen by driving trucks delivering food, fuel, batteries and bullets, repairing equipment, cooking meals, treating wounds, etc. The US Army understood this early on and has never forgotten the importance of good logistics.
A truism is that "Amateurs study weapons and tactics; professional soldiers study logistics." Often it's not about guns and troops, but about fuel, ammo - and intelligence. Note that Gus Pagonis Pagano [corrected] was promoted to Major General as a result of his logistics performance during the 1991 Gulf War.
greyhoundsI'll suggest "Railroads in The Civil War; The Impact of Management on Victory and Defeat" by John E. Clark Jr.
Funny you suggest Railroads in The Civil War Greyhounds. That is the book I am reading right now. It has such a wealth of detail that I am struggling to take it all in and since I haven't finished I didn't want to mention it. But so far it is everything you say it is.
The more I read about this the more I am inclined to believe that Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee were victims of their own education. Both went to West Point were they learned about interior lines taught by David Mahan and read Henri Jomini. And they never were able to see beyond that. Abe Lincoln with about a third grade education could and did see the importance of railroads and used them. The Union didn't do a perfect job but it did work at the right job which was to use rail roads effectively. The Confederates never tried. Davis's and Lee's education prevented them from understanding the importance of maintaining their railroads, to their war effort.
Davis and Lee not being able to see beyond their educations? I'm not so sure about that. Neither Davis or Lee, hold it, let's clear up a misconception before I go to far. Robert E. Lee was an army commander, specifically the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee didn't make Confederate war policy although I'm sure Jeff Davis listened when Lee had something to say. General Samuel Cooper was the top Confederate general through most of the war, although his duties were mainly administrative. Lee didn't become the top Confederate general with war planning responsibilities until February of 1865, far too late for him to do any good.
OK, back to where I was going. Even if Davis and other Confederates saw the importance of railroads, and I have to believe they did, they weren't stupid men, we get back to the States Rights thing and the Confederate government's inability to really force its will on the individual Confederate states. And that's the lesson they REALLY missed.
The American Revolution nearly failed because of the lack of a strong central government able to call the shots and enforce its will. The Confederate government should have realized that lesson but apparantly they forgot it or ignored it. The result was disaster. Like Jeff Davis said, the Confederacy "died of a theory", the theory being blind adherance to an extreme States Rights doctrine and the inability to put it on the "back burner" for the duration.
Firelock76Davis and Lee not being able to see beyond their educations? I'm not so sure about that. Neither Davis or Lee, hold it, let's clear up a misconception before I go to far. Robert E. Lee was an army commander, specifically the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee didn't make Confederate war policy although I'm sure Jeff Davis listened when Lee had something to say.
Firelock,
Let me try to respond to your first section and later get back to the other sections which deserve response too.
I know when I blame the West Point Education both these men have for the loss of the war I'm stirring up a hornet's nest.
Lee beleived from the first to the last that you win the Civil War by winning battles and you win in a way that will punish the Yankees for even thinking they should make war. He did this again and again and again. And in the short run it worked. By the fall of 1862 Union morale was at a low ebb. But in the long run it was inadequate. To smash the Yankees Lee took calculated risks and, while he came out ahead, he couldn't afford those loses. But because of the advantage of interior lines he thought he could hold out long enough. That is what a West Point education meant to him. I wonder if he ever thought about railroads other then using them when he needed to. The railroads were civilian; it was not part of Lee's job to concern himself with their operation.
Jefferson Davis had much broader experience. After the military he went into the Congress and became the leader of the Southern Democrats. He was Secretary of War under Franklin PIerce. He was a courtly gentleman and got along well with northern Senators, especially with Senator William Seward who led the Republicans and became Lincoln's Secretary of State.
Davis was also a Democrat and faithful to the Democratic ideology. Part of that ideology was that the National Government had no business creating internal improvements. For the government to run the railroads would be to benefit a few wealthy people at the expense of the citizens as a whole. Somehow the realization that this was war and first of all he had to win the war and control of the railroads was an important part of it never seems to have occurred to him.
And so Davis too relied on the advantage he was sure of, the advantage he learned about from Dennis Mahan, interior lines. All he had to do was to outlast the Yankees. They would become war weary and the Confederacy would win.
Davis's vision, Lee's vision of winning the war with interior lines was what they learned at West Point. And had railroads never come to the US their vision would be right. But railroads had come. What appeared to be their vision was in fact their blindness to the march of technological advancement. Their educaton blinded them to the importance of railroads and ultimately that cost them the war.
John WR erikem How about "The Great Locomotive Chase"? In addition to the railroads, the telegraph as radically changed the way the war was fought in comparison to previous wars. Note that the transcontinental telegraph line was a high priority item in the first few months of the war. How about "The Great Locomotive Chase?" It is a charming story but I'm not sure it has a lot to do with the outcome of the war. And yes, the telegraph was pretty important too. But with Abe Lincoln sending him telegrams I bet George McClellan wished it had never been invented.
The whole point of "The Great Locomotive Chase" was that stealing a locomotive and sabotaging the rail lines was thought of as having a major negative impact on the South's war efforts. OTOH, I doubt if anyone under 50 is even aware of that movie.
Sherman apparently hated the telegraph as well, one of tehe points of his March to the Sea was being unreachable by telegraph.
I think it's quite a stretch to blame the Confederacy's lack of understanding of the importance of logistics on the fact that Lee and Davis went to West Point.
Important Union generals went to West Point too and they "Got It". Grant, Meade, Thomas, Sheridan, Sherman were all USMA grads and they used railroads well. Thomas in particular had a focus on securing the rail line from Nashville to Cattanooga to supply his army.
It is important to note that Grant primarlily served as a quartermaster (supply) prior to the Civil War. When Sherman took off from Atlanta to march through Georgia he had one wagon for every 20 soldiers. The West Point guys, at least on the Union side, understood logistics.
greyhounds I think it's quite a stretch to blame the Confederacy's lack of understanding of the importance of logistics on the fact that Lee and Davis went to West Point. Important Union generals went to West Point too and they "Got It". Grant, Meade, Thomas, Sheridan, Sherman were all USMA grads and they used railroads well. Thomas in particular had a focus on securing the rail line from Nashville to Cattanooga to supply his army. It is important to note that Grant primarlily served as a quartermaster (supply) prior to the Civil War. When Sherman took off from Atlanta to march through Georgia he had one wagon for every 20 soldiers. The West Point guys, at least on the Union side, understood logistics.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
schlimm Some of the worst officers were the political appointees, often with no previous training or experience.
Some of the worst officers were the political appointees, often with no previous training or experience.
AMEN!! Lincoln made many political appointments to field commands, with sometimes-disastrous results. Davis probably did too, but they were either not so spectacularly inept or were appointed to positions where they couldn't do much harm. I've often thought that if the generals in place on both sides at the beginning of the war had been switched, the Confederacy would have lasted about six months.
greyhoundsI think it's quite a stretch to blame the Confederacy's lack of understanding of the importance of logistics on the fact that Lee and Davis went to West Point.
I don't suggest that all Confederate generals failed to see the importance of railroads or that Dennis Mahan taught that technological advances should be ignored. However, I do think that both Davis and Lee were so focused on the importance of interior lines that they failed to see how railroads modified that theory.
I agree that Lincoln appointed some officers for political reasons. One example of a political appointment is General Alexander Schimmelpfennig. Lincoln was looking to bolster support in the German community. I have also seen these appointments defended, notably by James McPherson, as necessary to the national strategy.
A brilliant engineer and highly capable organizer, George B. McClellan just wasn't an army commander. In that position he proved the weakness of West Point in its early years; the academy was simply geared to the production of engineers and company officers for a small, pre-Civil War regular army.....
He worked for the Illinois Central-as chief engineer and vice president and just before the Civil War became a division president for the Ohio & Mississippi. Despite his success in the private field he was happy to reenter the military in 1862.....
Initially appointed by Ohio's Governor William Dennison, he was soon made second only to Scott by a former attorney for the Illinois Central-Abraham Lincoln.
http://www.civilwarhome.com/macbio.htm
McClellan may have known how to build and run a railroad better than a battle. Credited with building up the army that went onto victory under Grant, what role did McClellan play creating the understanding of using railroads to support an army in the field?
As stated, McClellan's Commander in Chief had some legal expertise when it came to railroads. Would legal research and representation of railroads have given Lincoln a better understanding of the railroads importance in war.
How many of the Confederacy's top leaders could claim prior experience with railroads?
You might also want to read Dixie Betrayed: How the South Really Lost the Civil War by David Eicher. While not concentrating on railroads it does shoe a rather disfunctional Confederate leadership. Here's a brief review: http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/2009/06/25/review-dixie-betrayed-how-the-south-really-lost-the-civil-war/
Victrola1 Would legal research and representation of railroads have given Lincoln a better understanding of the railroads importance in war. How many of the Confederacy's top leaders could claim prior experience with railroads?
Would legal research and representation of railroads have given Lincoln a better understanding of the railroads importance in war.
If anything gave Lincoln an understanding of the importance of railroads during war time I think the fact that he regularly rode on them as a passenger would. When he became a lawyer he started riding circuit on horseback along with his fellow lawyers. The court would be in session many weeks; the lawyers would share beds and bad food while they were away from home. When the railroads came Lincoln was able to get home to Springfield every weekend. That must have impressed him with the speed railroads made possible.
When he was Secretary of War Jefferson Davis was in charge of the surveys made for a transcontinental railroad. While in Washington I would think he would use railroads when he went home to Brierfield Plantation at Davis Bend on the Mississippi River. He certainly could have taken a train to the Ohio River and then traveled by steamboat the rest of the way. In the summer of 1860 he went to Maine to recover from a painful bout of neuralgia. Much of his travel would have been by train. All of this would have shown him the speed that was now possible with the railroad.
Victrola1A brilliant engineer and highly capable organizer, George B. McClellan just wasn't an army commander.
Was it that he wasn't an army commander or was it that at heart he was a peace Democrat, a man who believed that the war was not worth all of the lives that were taken? There were a lot of northerners who, while they did not agree with secession, did not think it was worth fighting a war over.
greyhounds t wasn't that the Confederacy didn't have the rail resources. It was that they didn't understand the importance of using the rail resources to the full advantage.
t wasn't that the Confederacy didn't have the rail resources. It was that they didn't understand the importance of using the rail resources to the full advantage.
In those two short sentences I think you sum up the railroad situation in the Confederacy. And much of the advantage of interior lines was negated by the railroads.
The only other thing I have to ask about is your Great Grandfather. Did he make it back from Chickamauga? I sure hope so. He must make the Civil War a lot more real to you.
John WR greyhounds t wasn't that the Confederacy didn't have the rail resources. It was that they didn't understand the importance of using the rail resources to the full advantage. In those two short sentences I think you sum up the railroad situation in the Confederacy. And much of the advantage of interior lines was negated by the railroads. The only other thing I have to ask about is your Great Grandfather. Did he make it back from Chickamauga? I sure hope so. He must make the Civil War a lot more real to you.
Yes, my great grandfather came home alive. The stories my father told me about him did make the Civil War more real to me. As did my being born and raised in the "Lincoln Country" of central Illinois.
Wasn't there more instances of rail guage changes in the south than the north ? I know there was one close to where I now live.
blue streak 1 Wasn't there more instances of rail guage changes in the south than the north ? I know there was one close to where I now live.
Early in the war (spring of 1862) General T.J. Jackson used railroads to move his men from the Shenadoah Valley to help stem General McClellan's advance on Richmond.
As to the failure of McClellan's Peninsula Campaign, his spies in Richmond gave him exaggerated accounts of General Johnston's force, and he thought that he would be overwhelmed--and retreated in the Seven Days' Battle (as the victors called it). That battle was my father's father's first major encounter with the invaders, and my grandfather (joined by his younger brother) went on through the war, first in General Jackson's II Corps and then in General A.P. Hill's III Corps after the battle of Chancellorsville. (there was another General Hill, D.H. Hill, who had married General Jackson's sister-in-law).
I never knew my paternal grandfather, as he died, 84 years old, nine years before I was born.
Johnny
I too first learned of my interest in Lincoln and the Civil War from stories my father told me. However, no one in my family was remotely involved in the war.
I don't have a number, either an absolute number or a per centage. Conventional wisdom is that that there were more changes of gauge in the south but I have also read the opposite, that there were many changes of gauge in the north too.
In 1860 there were about 30,000 miles of railroad track in the U. S. Of that about 7,000 miles were in the Confederate states and the rest (23,000 miles) was in the Union states in both the east and the west. There was a north south transcontinental. The Illinois Central ran from Chicago to the Ohio River and the Mobile and Ohio ran from Mobile Bay to the Ohio River. The Confederates had the only route connecting the Atlantic Ocean (at Charleston) with the Mississippi River (at Memphis). The line ran through Atlanta, a city that was created by railroads. I've also read that Union Railroads were generally built to higher standards with 30 or 60 pound T rail. In the Confederacy there was strap rail, U rail and 30 pound T rail. However, Confederate railroads were used mainly for shipping cotton to ports while Union railroads were used for shipping things like coal and iron ore which are much heavier.
Certainly, the Union had a lot more miles of railroad than the Confederacy. Christopher Gabel argues the Confederacy had enough miles of railroads for its needs.
The rebel states sought to preserve a primarily agricultural economy based heavily on unpaid involuntary labor. In such an economy, the railroads in those states were aptly suited for their role. One should note the similarity of the rail routes in those states with the rail routes in many third-world countries, also oriented to hauling raw materials to tidewater.
Deggesty Are you referring to the change at West Point, Georgia, from five foot to standard gauge as you went from Atlanta to Montgomery? The line between West Point and Montgomery is the only one that I know of in the South built to standard gauge.
Are you referring to the change at West Point, Georgia, from five foot to standard gauge as you went from Atlanta to Montgomery? The line between West Point and Montgomery is the only one that I know of in the South built to standard gauge.
Yep ! wonder if Montgomery could have gotten supplies quicker to Atlanta what the outcome of the battle of ATLANTA would have turned out ?
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