VerMontanan So, if you had this locomotive consist and a westbound train, say, at 5,800 tons, a helper would still be required over Pipestone Pass and St. Paul Pass. Or, putting it another way: If, for the sake of argument, had the Great Northern chosen to electrify its railroad from Havre to Whitefish, and the same locomotive consist was used, the same three units could pull 7,300 tons westbound, or about twice as much. And, no helper. In other words, there is nothing exceptional about the locomotives. My take is that prior to this, the Milwaukee didn't have a lot of very powerful locomotives, so trains previously required more individual locomotives and added and cut helpers at multiple locations. Using fewer locomotives cuts maintenance so this would be an improvement, but such would be the case with any locomotive that could out perform the older models, regardless of the topography. And, I will add, that even in 1961, there were a lot of diesel locomotives running further than 440 miles without being changed out, but such wasn't the case per the example on the Milwaukee, because going one way or the other, the end of electrification was reached, and a change in locomotive power would then be required, and therefore also the expense and inefficiency of doing this day in and day out (with this particular locomotive consist, since the lone GP9 would be insufficient power to handle the train forward on non-electrified territory).
So, if you had this locomotive consist and a westbound train, say, at 5,800 tons, a helper would still be required over Pipestone Pass and St. Paul Pass. Or, putting it another way: If, for the sake of argument, had the Great Northern chosen to electrify its railroad from Havre to Whitefish, and the same locomotive consist was used, the same three units could pull 7,300 tons westbound, or about twice as much. And, no helper.
In other words, there is nothing exceptional about the locomotives. My take is that prior to this, the Milwaukee didn't have a lot of very powerful locomotives, so trains previously required more individual locomotives and added and cut helpers at multiple locations. Using fewer locomotives cuts maintenance so this would be an improvement, but such would be the case with any locomotive that could out perform the older models, regardless of the topography.
And, I will add, that even in 1961, there were a lot of diesel locomotives running further than 440 miles without being changed out, but such wasn't the case per the example on the Milwaukee, because going one way or the other, the end of electrification was reached, and a change in locomotive power would then be required, and therefore also the expense and inefficiency of doing this day in and day out (with this particular locomotive consist, since the lone GP9 would be insufficient power to handle the train forward on non-electrified territory).
Mark,I don't like your analysis, and here is why. Basically, you are drawing a conclusion about the economics of something, but without thoroughly studying the economics of it, or of the alternatives.
Your study looks at just two aspects of the Little Joes: (1) horsepower, and (2) the route they were restricted to. Your conclusion is that because a Little Joe was not as powerful as a Saturn rocket, that it was nothing special. And you conclude that because a Little Joe could not run the entire distance, Chicago to Tacoma, that it didn't make economic sense. It's interesting stuff to consider, but we need to study it in terms of costs (initial costs, long-term costs), and then compare it to all other alternatives.If I was a consultant given the job of answering Murphy's question, "were the Little Joes a good investment," I guess I would go through each alternative, and for each case would consider every aspect and cost I could think of. Then, in my report, I would discuss the alternatives and recommend the one that was the less costly overall. (At least, that's how they told us how to do it in school.)
- Rails West
narig01 As I recall from what I read Milwaukee Rd owned the generating stations for the electricity. What effect did this have? Both financially & operationally?
As I recall from what I read Milwaukee Rd owned the generating stations for the electricity.
What effect did this have? Both financially & operationally?
narig01 Next what did Milwaukee do with the money from scraping the electrification? Did they use the money elsewhere? or pay a dividend, or executive bonuses.
narig01 Also on the decision to scrap. By the 1970;s was not 3kv dc obsolete for the long distances?
- Paul North.
narig01As I recall from what I read, Milwaukee Rd owned the generating stations for the electricity.
My understanding is that the MILW purchased power from local power companies. From a reprint of a GE publication on the Milwaukee electrification (published 1927):
"The system of the Montana Power Company supplies an unusually reliable source of power for operating the Milwaukee Road's original 438-mile electric zone... It has been stated that energy is supplied by the Montana Power Company at the lowest rate per kilo-watt hour offered by any company doing a similar business."
The same publication also says that the high-voltage power line that followed the tracks was owned by the railroad. But since it was interconnected with the utility's transmission system grid, the line could if necessary be used to carry power to other utility customers.
Next what did Milwaukee do with the money from scraping the electrification? Did they use the money elsewhere? or pay a dividend, or executive bonuses.
Also on the decision to scrap. By the 1970;s was not 3kv dc obsolete for the long distances?
Rgds IGN
Rails West Be careful about drawing conclusions about route superiority. The MILW route across Washington has always been under consideration by BN for use because it is faster or less steep than the NP route. The segment in eastern Wash still is under consideration today. Also the MILW route across the continental divide is better than than the NP route over Homestake Pass, and I suspect is better than the NP route over Mullan Pass.
Be careful about drawing conclusions about route superiority. The MILW route across Washington has always been under consideration by BN for use because it is faster or less steep than the NP route. The segment in eastern Wash still is under consideration today.
Also the MILW route across the continental divide is better than than the NP route over Homestake Pass, and I suspect is better than the NP route over Mullan Pass.
The MILW route across Washington is not worse than the NP (or GN) route across Washington, but it's really not a lot better. The portion that should have been kept was Snoqualmie Pass for westward trains at only . 7 percent (versus 2.2 percent on GN or NP). A combination of the SP&S from Spokane to Pasco, the NP from Pasco to Easton, and the MILW in to the Puget Sound area would have allowed a route with a grade of less than 1 percent. However the Milwaukee's climb out of the Columbia River Valley at Beverly was also a westward 2.2 percent grade, and eastbound, Snoqualmie was 1.74 percent and east of Kittitas 1.6 percent. Two major grades compared to one on NP. NP did have more route miles.
In Montana, MILW's Pipestone Pass crossing of the Continental Divide (2 percent west, 1.66 percent east) was better than NP's Homestake Pass, But the NP ran no through freight over Homestake, and Homestake, like the Milwaukee, isn't used today and for many of the same reasons. NP's Mullan Pass - its main freight route - was probably a bit better than the MILW at 2.2 percent west but only 1.4 percent east. The MILW had the advantage in the central part of Montana with the grade to Loweth only being 1 percent east and 1.4 west, while NP was 1.9 east and 1.8 west over Bozeman Pass.
The clear inferiority of the Milwaukee comes from railroad west from the Continental Divide. All the way from the Continental Diviide (Mulllan tunnel) to Spokane, the NP's maximum grade was only .8; the MILW had the 1.7 (each way) of St. Paul Pass. If NP had an excessive amount of tonnage to move and not enough power, west from Spokane or Pasco, the answer was in its subsidiary, SP&S, which could handle the traffic to Vancouver, WA at river grade, and give it back to the NP where it could move it to Tacoma, Seattle, wherever on a profile not exceeding 1 percent. Not so with the Milwaukee. Only one route, and all traffic had to be moved over every single steep hill.
There were segments of the Milwaukee east of Snoqualmie Pass that were "ok" operationally, but these were far outweighed by the fact that there was no one home, or that the NP went there too. I found it fascinating that so much of the Milwaukee could have been abandoned in one fell swoop - clearly a testimony to the lack of intermediate business. In other words, Sixteen Mile canyon might have been moderately better than Bozeman Pass from locomotive requirement standpoint, but it was no faster than the NP - say, between Three Forks and Miles City - and foresaking cities like Bozeman, Livingston, Laurel, and Billings - not to mention the major interchange with ex-CB&Q routes in the Billings area - meant that the NP would be the clear choice, and indeed, it's still there today.
Mark Meyer
Rails West The following quotes come from a 1961 booklet history of the Milwaukee electrification. It is an independent publication, by the way -- not written by the company. These paragraph are about the Little Joes circa the time of writing (1961): "These are probably the most useful locomotives on the entire Milwaukee Road today. Although in use on only 440 miles of line, the 12 "Joes," with GP-9 helpers, handle almost all freight traffic the road handles across the continental divide and two lesser but none-the-less impressive ranges.""Since the "Joes" can be operated MU, it was only natural that power would be concentrated at the head end. The common practice calls for two "Joes" and an Electro-Motive GP-9, or some 12,500 hp, on the point. The GP-9 adds just enough TE at a couple of critical points to allow a 3600 ton train to move west (Harlowton, Montana - Avery, Idaho) or 5800 ton train east, without set outs or helpers. Considering the scarcity of "Joes" (12 on 440 miles of railroad), the use of the diesel helper seems quite practical." To sum up what the author says, circa 1961, a pair of Little Joes and a GP-9 could move a freight train non-stop (without stopping for helper sets) over a 440-mile run, which included three mountain ranges. Mark in his post described this run as an "exceptionally challenging profile," which included a "tortuous crossing of the Bitterroot Mountains." So, with regards to efficiencies, since the train didn't have to stop for helpers, it seems to me that there was none of the associated cost of "dwell," nor the "tremendous cost in modifying locomotives en route," that Mark mentions -- at least for that 440 miles. So that seems like a positive to me. Also, since the route was described by Mark as "exceptionally challenging," can I conclude, therefore, that the Little Joes were "exceptional" locomotives in being able to traverse it without stopping to add helper sets? It would seem to me that, yes, they definitely were. So another thumbs up. What do you readers think?
The following quotes come from a 1961 booklet history of the Milwaukee electrification. It is an independent publication, by the way -- not written by the company. These paragraph are about the Little Joes circa the time of writing (1961):
"These are probably the most useful locomotives on the entire Milwaukee Road today. Although in use on only 440 miles of line, the 12 "Joes," with GP-9 helpers, handle almost all freight traffic the road handles across the continental divide and two lesser but none-the-less impressive ranges.""Since the "Joes" can be operated MU, it was only natural that power would be concentrated at the head end. The common practice calls for two "Joes" and an Electro-Motive GP-9, or some 12,500 hp, on the point. The GP-9 adds just enough TE at a couple of critical points to allow a 3600 ton train to move west (Harlowton, Montana - Avery, Idaho) or 5800 ton train east, without set outs or helpers. Considering the scarcity of "Joes" (12 on 440 miles of railroad), the use of the diesel helper seems quite practical."
To sum up what the author says, circa 1961, a pair of Little Joes and a GP-9 could move a freight train non-stop (without stopping for helper sets) over a 440-mile run, which included three mountain ranges. Mark in his post described this run as an "exceptionally challenging profile," which included a "tortuous crossing of the Bitterroot Mountains."
So, with regards to efficiencies, since the train didn't have to stop for helpers, it seems to me that there was none of the associated cost of "dwell," nor the "tremendous cost in modifying locomotives en route," that Mark mentions -- at least for that 440 miles. So that seems like a positive to me.
Also, since the route was described by Mark as "exceptionally challenging," can I conclude, therefore, that the Little Joes were "exceptional" locomotives in being able to traverse it without stopping to add helper sets? It would seem to me that, yes, they definitely were. So another thumbs up.
What do you readers think?
I think this is meaningless. If you built "a freight train" small enough, of course it's never going to have to stop for helpers. but there is a whole lot of locomotive power handling not much train here. Noel Holley's book "The Milwaukee Electrics" has Milwaukee Road tonnage charts for various grades and various locomotives. Westbound, the tonnage rating for two Little Joes and one GP9 is close to the 3,600 tons indicated above, or 3,760 tons (page 288 in the book). Interestingly, the book indicates that a similar consist eastbound would handle only 3,965 tons, not the 5,800 tons indicated above. This is because the grade from Avery to St. Paul Pass, though only 1.7 percent compared to the westbound steepest grade of 2.0 percent on Pipestone Pass, was exceptionally curvy.
edbenton See that is where Businessmen get into Trouble nowadays they fail to plan for the LONGTERM. Everything is based on the Next Quarter Year Max and if that goal is not met Your gone.
See that is where Businessmen get into Trouble nowadays they fail to plan for the LONGTERM. Everything is based on the Next Quarter Year Max and if that goal is not met Your gone.
Exactly!! And so much of executive compensation is based on stock options, it is no wonder that the short term is all that matters,
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
IIRC the MILW used Hydroelectric Power to genarate the Power for the electric Divisions. If so it would have been CHEAPER than any diesel compared to fuel costs. Even with Maintiance of the Cantery included. What happened was as usual the Bean counters getting in the way for a AShort Term looking at the Balance Sheets. They saw something they could sell for alot of Cash and did so. Not what it would save them in the LONG TERM. See that is where Businessmen get into Trouble nowadays they fail to plan for the LONGTERM. Everything is based on the Next Quarter Year Max and if that goal is not met Your gone.
Paul_D_North_Jr If the MILW's route would have been the superior route between the merged railroads, the ability to redeploy the motive power wouldn't matter as much, because more traffic would have been shifted to and concentrated on that route to take advantage of its efficiency. But it wasn't . . .
If the MILW's route would have been the superior route between the merged railroads, the ability to redeploy the motive power wouldn't matter as much, because more traffic would have been shifted to and concentrated on that route to take advantage of its efficiency. But it wasn't . . .
MILW was a poorly managed road in its final decades. They were at least 50 years ahead of everyone else on the electrification front, yet they chose to get rid of electrification during the oil crisis in the 70s...dumb decision but probably in keeping with the myoptic management of the day.
Had MILW been better managed they would have survived and electrification would have survived as well. In all likelihood, MILW would have been absorbed into one of the larger systems...and BNSF or UP would have an electried line today that could be used as a blueprint for expanding of electrification. Instead, we nolonger have railroads who have any experience with electrification on any scale, at least out West, and as a result, anything along those lines would have to be researched, designed, and built from scratch...
As I understand it, even worse is that the Virginian's electrified route was the more difficult one of the two available to the N&W for eastbound loads, so of course it used its own, and sent the empties back via the Virginian. There might also have been only portions of the VGN's route that was getting the traffic, too. The result was that the electrics were then out of a job - the task they had been built to do was no longer being done where they could work. I'll see if I can summarize Middleton's recounting of it later on, which has place names and route IDs that I can't reliably recall right now.
Going into the merger with N&W, Virginian's electrification was in great shape: new power plant, modern locomotives (EL-2B's and EL-C's) and well-maintained track. After the merger, N&W went to directional running with its parallel mains and the electrified lines became a one-way operation, which limited flexibility, leading to the abandonment of the electrification.
Bob-Fryml [snip] Had the Milwaukee taken up General Electric's earlier offer to renew the entire infrastructure, including closing the gap between Othello and Avery, here would be a substantial capital investment - particularly in locomotives - that could not be deployed to a merger partner ... a merger partner that possibly could use some extra horsepower seasonally like during the fall harvest. [snip]
So your point echoes the choice faced by the N&W after the Virginian was merged into it - even though the Virginian's locomotives were mostly new E-44 types, its route wasn't the best one, so the electrification was scrapped.
VerMontanan But there were horrible locomotive utilization inefficiencies with the Milwaukee operation. Consider this: When you see a photo of a Milwaukee freight or passenger train westward in Western Montana with only a Little Joe (or multiple such units) for power, know that the Little Joes had to be ready at Harlowton in time to protect the train inbound with diesel power, and diesel power would need be available at Avery in time to protect the train’s operation west of there. And, if electric power was used west of Othello, the same situation would be required. There is tremendous cost in modifying locomotives en route, and such would have been the case with the Milwaukee’s segments of electrification. The main costs are locomotive dwell – the amount of time the power is just sitting around waiting for its next assignment – or delay for power, caused by an inbound train being delayed.
Mark described "horrible inefficiencies" in how the Little Joes were deployed and used. For the sake of a discussion, I'll offer up a counter argument.
I don't have any particular earthshaking insights on this question. But, in reading these posts, it seems to me the question facing MILW management at the time was relatively simple. Are we better off (i) getting new electric locos at bargain prices and keeping the electrification, or (ii) scrapping the electrification and replacing all of the locos we need for the service with new diesels (in other words, buying new diesels to replace both the existing electrics and the new capacity represented by the Joes). In order to choose de-electrification, they would have had to conclude that the anticipated net salvage value of the electrification would exceed the costs of the additional diesels needed to replace the existing electric locos plus the spread between the cost of new diesels and the price of the Joes. And, if the net salvage value wouldn't cover these costs, you don't even get to the question of whether the money would have been better spent on track upgrades, because the money wouldn't have been there in the first place.
Of course, relative operating costs electric v diesel would also factor in this equation, but it's difficult to see how diesels in 1950 could have been markedly superior to electrics, at least on MILW. The electrics could easily match or exceed the performance of diesels of the era unit for unit. On the other hand, locomotive utilization issues arising from a sepatate locomotive fleet could theoretically offset any unit for unit advantages of electric locomotives. But was this really such a big factor for MILW at the time? My impression is that, in the late 40's, railroads still tended to utilize diesels like steam locos. In other words, they often remained captive to a particular district or territory, and were changed rather than run through from origin to destination as they are today. If that were the case on the MILW at the time of the decision to buy the Joes, utilization may not have been seen as a major factor, particularly since the electrification districts were relatively long (as opposed to the GN electrification).
From the standpoint of 20-20 hindsight, the best decision would probably have been not to make any additional investment in the western lines - locomotives, track or otherwise . But I doubt this could have reasonably been foreseen in 1950.
Another factor to consider when discussing the electrification is this: Although B.N. came into existence in March 1970, the MILW was still holding out for the possibility of a merger with someone in 1972 (when the Coast Lines de-electrified) and in 1974 (when the remaining subdivisions retired their electric operations).
Had the Milwaukee taken up General Electric's earlier offer to renew the entire infrastructure, including closing the gap between Othello and Avery, here would be a substantial capital investment - particularly in locomotives - that could not be deployed to a merger partner ... a merger partner that possibly could use some extra horsepower seasonally like during the fall harvest.
The top brass in Chicago thought that a fully dieselized Milwaukee Road would be a more attractive merger partner than one with a mixed stable of diesels and electrics.
blue streak 1 An item I've waited to be posted is the fuel savings of the electrification. Several articles I've read stated that Milwaukee saved much money on electrical power by using regenerative braking. By MU ing a diesel behind the electrics MLKE achieved the extra power to go up hills and the used regenerative to recover that diesel effort (partially) going down hill? Although I have no actual cites maybe someone can enlighten? Certainly if the electrification was still in place today and the track structure decent I would believe that electrification would not be considered for abandonment especially if the gap has been filled in?.
An item I've waited to be posted is the fuel savings of the electrification. Several articles I've read stated that Milwaukee saved much money on electrical power by using regenerative braking. By MU ing a diesel behind the electrics MLKE achieved the extra power to go up hills and the used regenerative to recover that diesel effort (partially) going down hill? Although I have no actual cites maybe someone can enlighten? Certainly if the electrification was still in place today and the track structure decent I would believe that electrification would not be considered for abandonment especially if the gap has been filled in?.
The figures I've seen were for the Milw recovering about 15 to 17% of the energy though regeneration. While the savings in energy were nice, the main cost savings with regenerative braking were most likely in improved train handling. The latter benefit is also achieved with dynamic braking.
- Erik
Murphy Siding Rails West: .........................Now, here is today's contribution to the thread.Paul, tell me if the following is a valid approach or not. Just to keep things simple, imagine that in 1950, the Milwaukee was able to sell their copper trolley wire for the same amount, in real dollars, that they sold it for in 1974. That should be a conservative guess. The 1974 sale price was, according to the quote above, $5 million. Next I put the $5 million dollar figure from 1974 into an inflation adjusting calculator set for 1950. The calculator told me that in 1950 dollars, that copper sale was equal to about $2.5 million. Is this a valid approach so far?Assuming the figure of $2.5 million in 1950 dollars is valid, the question to me now is, how much track improvement and new diesel locomotives would $2.5 million buy?Do we have a good figure yet for the 1950 price of a new GP-7, or F-7 diesel? Plus the $1 million paid for the 12 Little Joes.
Rails West: .........................Now, here is today's contribution to the thread.Paul, tell me if the following is a valid approach or not. Just to keep things simple, imagine that in 1950, the Milwaukee was able to sell their copper trolley wire for the same amount, in real dollars, that they sold it for in 1974. That should be a conservative guess. The 1974 sale price was, according to the quote above, $5 million. Next I put the $5 million dollar figure from 1974 into an inflation adjusting calculator set for 1950. The calculator told me that in 1950 dollars, that copper sale was equal to about $2.5 million. Is this a valid approach so far?Assuming the figure of $2.5 million in 1950 dollars is valid, the question to me now is, how much track improvement and new diesel locomotives would $2.5 million buy?Do we have a good figure yet for the 1950 price of a new GP-7, or F-7 diesel?
.........................Now, here is today's contribution to the thread.Paul, tell me if the following is a valid approach or not. Just to keep things simple, imagine that in 1950, the Milwaukee was able to sell their copper trolley wire for the same amount, in real dollars, that they sold it for in 1974. That should be a conservative guess. The 1974 sale price was, according to the quote above, $5 million. Next I put the $5 million dollar figure from 1974 into an inflation adjusting calculator set for 1950. The calculator told me that in 1950 dollars, that copper sale was equal to about $2.5 million. Is this a valid approach so far?Assuming the figure of $2.5 million in 1950 dollars is valid, the question to me now is, how much track improvement and new diesel locomotives would $2.5 million buy?Do we have a good figure yet for the 1950 price of a new GP-7, or F-7 diesel?
Plus the $1 million paid for the 12 Little Joes.
The two of you are forgetting a few things in regards to the cost/benefits of the Milwaukee de-electrifying in 1950. First thing is that the electric locomotive fleet was pretty much intact as of 1950, although scrapping of the Westinghouse motors would start in a few years. The original GE boxcabs were roughly equivalent to a GP7 in both tractive effort and power per unit. Assuming that better utilization of the GP7's would allow for a 1 to 2 replacement of the boxcabs, that would require a price of $100,000 for the GP7's for the copper salvage to pay for the replacement GP7's.
The Joe's were at least equivalent to 1.5 GP7's in tractive effort and 3.5 GP7's in rail horsepower. The Joe's could produce their continuous tractive effort rating of 77,000 lbs at 24 MPH, which came in handy when the Milwaukee was trying to compete on freight train speed.
While the limited stretches of the electrification didn't help with utilization, the equivalent diesel power may not have been much better. The line between Harlowton and Morbridge had WB grades less than 0.6%, and EB grades were less than 0.6% with the exception of a 6 mile stretch of 1% just east of Marmarth, ND. The electrified portions had ruling grades ranging from 1.6 to 2.2%, so it would make sense to dispatch enough power for the "flatland' districts and couple on electric helpers in the mountain districts.
The Milwaukee would have been better off if the Joe's were B-B+B-B's instead of the 2-D+D-2's for operation on 10 degree curves. Having said that, the majority of 10 degree curves on the Rocky Mountain electrification was in the westernmost 65 mile stretch between Avery and St Regis, with the others at the low end of Sixteen Mile canyon. Pipestone Pass had several 8 degree curves and the sharpest curves in the balance of the Rocky Mountain electrification were 3 to 4 degrees or broader. With the exception of a set of 4 degree curves across the river from Forsyth and a 3+ degree curve halfway between Forsyth and Miles City, the sharpest curves between Morbridge and Harlowton were 2 degrees.
My conclusion was that the Little Joe's were a good investment for the Milwaukee.
Rails West .........................Now, here is today's contribution to the thread.Paul, tell me if the following is a valid approach or not. Just to keep things simple, imagine that in 1950, the Milwaukee was able to sell their copper trolley wire for the same amount, in real dollars, that they sold it for in 1974. That should be a conservative guess. The 1974 sale price was, according to the quote above, $5 million. Next I put the $5 million dollar figure from 1974 into an inflation adjusting calculator set for 1950. The calculator told me that in 1950 dollars, that copper sale was equal to about $2.5 million. Is this a valid approach so far?Assuming the figure of $2.5 million in 1950 dollars is valid, the question to me now is, how much track improvement and new diesel locomotives would $2.5 million buy?Do we have a good figure yet for the 1950 price of a new GP-7, or F-7 diesel?
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
RE: Scrap value of Milwaukee Road copper trolley in 1950To recap the discussion, I originally posted that in 1950, perhaps the Milwaukee should have sold the entire electrification system for scrap, and used the cash to invest in new diesels and track improvements. I thought it might have been better off for the company in the long run to do that.Paul North came back with the reply: "Interesting thesis - but can you support it with actual $ figures, either then or today's equivalent ?"I replied that I had searched the internet and found a dollar scrap value for the actual sale in 1974 of $5 million. Here is the quote from that internet site again:
"At one point the price [of copper] soared, and it was estimated that the Milwaukee's overhead wire was worth $10 million as scrap... But in the end the price dropped, and they got only $5 million."
Now, here is today's contribution to the thread.Paul, tell me if the following is a valid approach or not. Just to keep things simple, imagine that in 1950, the Milwaukee was able to sell their copper trolley wire for the same amount, in real dollars, that they sold it for in 1974. That should be a conservative guess. The 1974 sale price was, according to the quote above, $5 million. Next I put the $5 million dollar figure from 1974 into an inflation adjusting calculator set for 1950. The calculator told me that in 1950 dollars, that copper sale was equal to about $2.5 million. Is this a valid approach so far?Assuming the figure of $2.5 million in 1950 dollars is valid, the question to me now is, how much track improvement and new diesel locomotives would $2.5 million buy?Do we have a good figure yet for the 1950 price of a new GP-7, or F-7 diesel?
Paul and Murphy,
The GN's electic segment over the Cascade mountains was about 75 miles, via the new tunnel. It extended from Skykomish to Appleyard, which is a couple of miles east of Wenatchee proper.
I grew up in Wenatchee but am just young enough to have missed the electrics which were replaced by run through diesels in 1956. Mark Meyer explained the whys of that perfectly wll, albeit in the MILW context.
Mac
Paul_D_North_Jr My 'SWAG' at the price of comparable diesels back then would be around $100,000 for a 1,500 HP GP7, and off the top of my head, - Paul North.
My 'SWAG' at the price of comparable diesels back then would be around $100,000 for a 1,500 HP GP7, and off the top of my head,
Maybe less. A GP38 in the late 60's were in the $125,000 range.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
The Little Joes were probably a good investment in that they were often used as additional power over the Milwaukee’s many steep grades. In the diesel era, Little Joes could MU with the diesel power and the Little Joes could just be added for the Harlowton-to-Avery segment, for instance, with the diesel power handling the train to Harlowton and west from Avery. The fact that the electrification was in place meant that these were an option that other (non-electrified) railroads wouldn’t consider.
What is often not discussed with regard to the worthiness of the Milwaukee’s electrification is the inefficiencies of changing power en route. This was exacerbated by the fact that the Milwaukee had “The Gap,” which was the non-electrified portion between Avery, Idaho and Othello, Washington, which basically separate electrified railroads.
Much-touted by proponents of electrification is its energy efficiency, which just considering how the locomotive is powered, is hard to deny, considering that anything from water to nuclear to squirrels on a treadmill can power an electric train; and then there’s the regeneration aspect of such trains on descending grades.
But there were horrible locomotive utilization inefficiencies with the Milwaukee operation. Consider this: When you see a photo of a Milwaukee freight or passenger train westward in Western Montana with only a Little Joe (or multiple such units) for power, know that the Little Joes had to be ready at Harlowton in time to protect the train inbound with diesel power, and diesel power would need be available at Avery in time to protect the train’s operation west of there. And, if electric power was used west of Othello, the same situation would be required.
There is tremendous cost in modifying locomotives en route, and such would have been the case with the Milwaukee’s segments of electrification. The main costs are locomotive dwell – the amount of time the power is just sitting around waiting for its next assignment – or delay for power, caused by an inbound train being delayed. Another expense would be paying hostlers to position the power at terminals or arbitraries paid to road crews to perform the locomotive work, which were commonplace on most railroads. In the days of the steam engine, locomotive changes en route were frequent. But with the implementation of a diesel-powered railroad, the greatest saving could be realized by utilizing the power from origin to destination, or with as few en route modifications as possible.
This is the main limitation of electrification, even today. It’s easy to imagine the efficiencies of electrification on the very busiest main lines, like the UP through North Platte, or BNSF between Chicago and California. But the stark reality is that the not all trains on these routes run from point A to point Z; indeed they go on multiple routes and even on routes that are relatively lightly-trafficked. So unless that all the interconnecting routes are electrified, it would be necessary to diesel power at all junction or power change locations to handle the train on the non-electrified territory, and have a plan to move the electric power on some other train on the electrified railroad. In other words, a very complex and costly operation. In addition to the expense of stringing wires and buying huge numbers of locomotives, the limited scope of utilization has to be a top reason that widespread electrification has not occurred. The Milwaukee had an exceptionally challenging profile (five major grades over 1 percent between Harlowton and Portland westbound and four eastbound); as the trains were getting heavier, and the electric power was getting older (including the Little Joes), it made little sense to invest in power that would be restricted to only part of the railroad and could not operate on other railroads. In addition, the Milwaukee’s torturous crossing of the Bitterroot Mountains and lack of a water-level route through the Cascades that BN and UP enjoyed (along the Columbia River) for the increasingly heavier trains - and the huge amount of power it would have required - is a good reason that railroad is not there – electrified or not – today.
Murphy Siding The electrification makes sense to me, as far as trying to deal with smoke from steam locomotives in long tunnels in the mountains. Didn't GN have some electrified portions of trackage through the mountains as well? [snip] Milwaukee Road ended up paying $1 million for the remaining 12 units. That's $83,333.33 each. I wonder what comparible diesels would have cost at that time.?
Yes, but GN had a much shorter stretch - just the 7+ mile Cascade Tunnel and its approaches, maybe 20 - 30 miles altogether. That's what the W-1's that the 'other' Paul noted above were built for.
But I don't recall that the MILW had any tunnels anywhere near that long for smoke to be the driving force. Instead, the bitter cold winter weather and steep grades made even the best Mallet steam power of the day not very effective, and the MILW was getted killed with the high operating costs and delays of them. It's all described pretty well in the Woods' book that I referenced above - I'll take a look at that aspect, too.
My 'SWAG' at the price of comparable diesels back then would be around $100,000 for a 1,500 HP GP7, and off the top of my head, I suspect the Little Joes were equal to about 2 of them, on both a HP and TE basis. Again, a look at some statistics for each and prices from back then would be instructive. But if I'm anywhere close, the MILW got them for about 1/3 of their market value and about 1/2 of the capital costs of equivalent diesel HP - not a bad deal at all.
Murphy Siding BaltACD: The bigger question in the Milwaukee's case is did electrification make sense in the first place. Milwaukee management thought it did. With that being the case, new locomotives at a bargain price was a no brainer. The electrification makes sense to me, as far as trying to deal with smoke from steam locomotives in long tunnels in the mountains. Didn't GN have some electrified portions of trackage through the mountains as well? As far as the bargain price goes... I've read that the Milwaukee Road engineering department wanted to buy all 20 locomotives and spare parts from GE, for $1 million, but the Board of Directors wouldn't go for it. Later, when the B.o.D. would go for it, 8 had been sold, along with the spare parts. Milwaukee Road ended up paying $1 million for the remaining 12 units. That's $83,333.33 each. I wonder what comparible diesels would have cost at that time.?
BaltACD: The bigger question in the Milwaukee's case is did electrification make sense in the first place. Milwaukee management thought it did. With that being the case, new locomotives at a bargain price was a no brainer.
The bigger question in the Milwaukee's case is did electrification make sense in the first place.
Milwaukee management thought it did. With that being the case, new locomotives at a bargain price was a no brainer.
The electrification makes sense to me, as far as trying to deal with smoke from steam locomotives in long tunnels in the mountains. Didn't GN have some electrified portions of trackage through the mountains as well? As far as the bargain price goes... I've read that the Milwaukee Road engineering department wanted to buy all 20 locomotives and spare parts from GE, for $1 million, but the Board of Directors wouldn't go for it. Later, when the B.o.D. would go for it, 8 had been sold, along with the spare parts. Milwaukee Road ended up paying $1 million for the remaining 12 units. That's $83,333.33 each. I wonder what comparible diesels would have cost at that time.?
This link may provide some relevent information about the MILW RR's EF-70's [Little Joe's] (Information from the Clayton County Chamber of Commerce website)
http://www.powellcountymontana.com/little_joe.html
FTL: "...Engineering, design and manufacture of this order was contracted to General Electric's locomotive plant in Erie, Pa. The locomotives were to cost $270.000 each. (Cost the U. S. Taxpayers). By September 1948, G.E. had completed eight locomotives, but the State Department held up shipping permits because the Berlin crisis and the cold war were causing very strained relations. In October 1948, President Truman ordered an embargo on all strategic materials and equipment to the Soviet Union and the State Department canceled the contract for the 20 locomotives. By this time 14 had been completed. Because most of the major components that were sub-contracted, such as frames, wheels and materials were being delivered by the subcontractors and because you can't change plant schedules that easily, General Electric completed the last six to American gauge of 4' 8 1/2" instead of the Russian gauge of 5'. It was hoped the order could be sold to an American railroad, namely the Milwaukee..."
BaltACD The bigger question in the Milwaukee's case is did electrification make sense in the first place. Milwaukee management thought it did. With that being the case, new locomotives at a bargain price was a no brainer.
CSSHEGEWISCH [snip] B-D+D-B (like GN's W-1's) might have been feasible, though. [snip]
Yeah - I was thinking the same thing earlier this morning. That would be an interesting comparison.
blue streak 1 - I have both Middleton's book and the Woods' book on Milwaukee Road West. Perhaps surprisingly, the latter has better data on the electrification, including the regenerative savings, as they appear to have referred to a lot of primary sources. Give me a couple days to peruse it and maybe some other references and I'll see if I can answer some of those questions.
Modifying the Joes to a C-C+C-C or any other wheel arrangement would have meant building new underframes, which would have driven up the original cost. B-D+D-B (like GN's W-1's) might have been feasible, though.
Another comment about the Joes, South Shore's management admitted that the Joes were bigger than what they needed, but the price was tough to beat.
Paul_D_North_Jr Bob-Fryml: [snip] So this now begs a new question. Instead of distributing the locomotive weight over 10-axles configured 2-D+D-2 (with 8-powered axles), would it have been economically possible to reconfigure the running gear into a B-C+C-B wheel arrangement with 10-powered axles and thus reduce the flange wear? Weight distribution over just 10 axles instead of the original 12 ? On the other hand, maybe the MILW's track, roadbed, and structures could have handled that better than the Russian's - that's why they needed the 12 axles ? What was their gross weight ? - Paul North.
Bob-Fryml: [snip] So this now begs a new question. Instead of distributing the locomotive weight over 10-axles configured 2-D+D-2 (with 8-powered axles), would it have been economically possible to reconfigure the running gear into a B-C+C-B wheel arrangement with 10-powered axles and thus reduce the flange wear?
Weight distribution over just 10 axles instead of the original 12 ?
On the other hand, maybe the MILW's track, roadbed, and structures could have handled that better than the Russian's - that's why they needed the 12 axles ?
What was their gross weight ? - Paul North.
Paul:- You're quite right. When I awoke this morning the first thing I realized was that I miscounted the axles. The Little Joes had 12, not the 10 I wrote mistakenly. My bad.
So readers, whadda you think? Could the Joes have been modified to run with a C-C+C-C wheel arrangement (12 powered axles distributed among four 3-axle trucks)? Or, how about something even more exotic like 1-B-C+C-B-1 (10 powered axles with a pair of pony wheels at each end)?
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