Were the Little Joes a good investment for the Milwaukee Road?

[Murphy Siding]

     From what I've read, the Milwaukee Road got them at a bargain price, as the onset of the cold war precluded them from going to the Soviet Union.  Milwaukee Road got approximately 24 years of service out of them, 1950-1974.  When the Pacific Coast Extention was de-electrified( is that a word?) in 1974, presumeably Milwaukee Road had to purchase diesel power to replace them- something they could have done in 1950, and skipped buying the Little Joes.

     All things considered, was purchasing the 12 Little Joe electric locomotives a good investment for The Milwaukee Road?

[zugmann]

Close to the same question I always had, but replace Milwaukee with PRR, and Little Joe with E44. 

 

 

 

 

[BaltACD]

The bigger question in the Milwaukee's case is did electrification make sense in the first place.

Milwaukee management thought it did.  With that being the case, new locomotives at a bargain price was a no brainer.

[jrbernier]

  The 'Joes' kept the Rocky Mountain Division electrified until 1974.  There were some infrastructure upgrades that had to be done to support the operation of them(raise the power to 3300-3600 volts to keep the current draw within limits).  The original box cabs were worn out.  They had to piece together the box cab helper sets out of the dead line.  All of the good box cabs went to the other electric division.  The Milwaukee did not have funds to buy all of the Joe's and some went to Brazil and the South Shore.

  The big problem was not keeping the electrification.  The traffic over the Pacific Extension kept getting worse through the post war years.  261/262(Thinderhawk/XL) were the primary Chicago-Tacoma trains.  262/263 wound up as 'dead freights' towards the end.  There just was not enough traffic to keep the line running, electrified or diesel.

Jim

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

zugmann

  Close to the same question I always had, but replace Milwaukee with PRR, and Little Joe with E44.  

  

Absolutely.  The PRR never had a very good electric freight locomotive until the E44's came along.  By the 1950's the P5a's that were the prime freight haulers (with some GG1's) - which were supposed to have been the prime passenger power, but they couldn't cut it - were wearing out, and were obsolete.  PRR sampled a couple of different replacement prrototypes from GE and another Westinghouse, I think.  But in the meantime the Virginian and GE developed and implemented the ignitron rectifier, and all of a sudden high voltage AC transmission and catenary to DC motor drive as with diesels, and easy control was practical, more standardized, and more economical.  The E44's and E44a's (solid-state rectifier, I think) were rated at 4,400 HP for a C-C unit, but actually developed closer to 5,000 HP continuous and 6,000 HP short-term.  I think they paid for themselves within like 8 to 10 years - because their running costs were way less than any diesel.  They were the US units that everyone pointed to as the paradigm for the next generation of electric - simple, standardized, as much like a diesel road-switcher as possible, reliable, rugged, etc. - the Muskingum Electric coal line used essentially 2 more, onlly with newer rectifiers and more power rating.   There were several articles in Trains from the 1950's - 1970's about them and their economical operation.

Now, I'd ask the same question about the 4 or 6 Virginian electrics - EL-2-or-3-something's, I believe-  that were the predecessors of the E-44, and which went to the New Haven when the Virginian was merged into the N&W and both electrifications were shut down in the early 1960's . . .

- Paul North. 

[Bob-Fryml]

Yes, I would definitely agree that The Milwaukee Road made a good investment when they purchased a dozen Little Joes.  Here's why.

By the time General Electric built all 20-units and was ready to sell them to the USSR, the U.S. State Department said, "Nyet" to the deal.  So here's G.E., who's now stuck with some very specialized power, and along comes The Milwaukee Road  with an offer to buy all 20-units for a rock bottom price.  For what The Milwaukee Road was willing to pay, G.E. sold them 12.

By about 1950, the original box-cabs were approaching 30-to-35 years of hard service.  Looking at the economics of the electrification, management was quickly approaching one of those critical decision points:  do we keep the electrification or scrap it?  By spending a few dollars to upgrade the power of certain substations (like Janney, Mont.) and being able to spend a reasonable amount of money to purchase some brand new, big muscled electric engines, the Railroad extended the life of the electrification for nearly another quarter of a century.

The Little Joes have a 2-D+D-2 wheel arrangement, meaning that the eight powered axles are distributed evenly between two 4-axle trucks.  Those 4-axle trucks have a long wheel base, a feature which does not mix well with tight radius mountain curves.  Because of those long wheel bases, the flanges wore out quickly.  Like steam locomotive drive wheels, the powered axles had spoked wheels with steel tires.  Since the flanges on those steel tires ground to a dangerously sharp profile relatively quickly, the Deer Lodge shop was kept busy sweating-off and sweating-on new tires.

So this now begs a new question.  Instead of distributing the locomotive weight over 10-axles configured 2-D+D-2 (with 8-powered axles), would it have been economically possible to reconfigure the running gear into a B-C+C-B wheel arrangement with 10-powered axles and thus reduce the flange wear?   

 

[WSOR 3801]

MILW could've purchased all 20 Joes, plus spare parts for what they later paid for just the 12 they got.  Upper management delayed things until some of the others got sold.  A B-B-B-B motor would have been been better for the curves, similar to what VGN had, but they took what they could get. 

The electrification kept the operating costs down on the line.  When they shut off the juice, the employees knew the end was near.

[rixflix]

Milwaukee should have stuck to being a regional  instead of going transcon.I followed their path through the rockiiess on google earth and anyone sane would not invest in the westward expansion. They went to late.

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

Bob-Fryml

  [snip]  So this now begs a new question.  Instead of distributing the locomotive weight over 10-axles configured 2-D+D-2 (with 8-powered axles), would it have been economically possible to reconfigure the running gear into a B-C+C-B wheel arrangement with 10-powered axles and thus reduce the flange wear?   

Weight distribution over just 10 axles instead of the original 12 ? 

On the other hand, maybe the MILW's track, roadbed, and structures could have handled that better than the Russian's - that's why they needed the 12 axles ? 

 What was their gross weight ? 

- Paul North.

[Rails West]

Were the Little Joes a good investment for the MILW?  For the sake of argument, I will argue that in the larger picture of the company's future success, they were not a good investment.

Instead of purchasing the Little Joes -- thus re-investing in the electrification system -- perhaps the Milwaukee should have at that point, 1950, sold the entire electrification system for scrap.  The cash from the copper sale would have been significant.  They could have used the money from that sale, and from the money that was to go toward the Little Joes, toward significant track upgrade, track modernization, and purchase of new diesels.  Doing that would have made the Milwaukee main line to the west a first class property by 1960. 

The MILW transcontinental line needed modernization.  The fifties would have been a good time to start.  As it was, the transcontinental line never received much modernization.  When the Lines West died in 1980 it still had hand-throw switches, wobbly passing sidings, an antique signalling system, and sub-par gravel ballast that didn't hold up well under heavy trains.

One big reason to bring the property up to first-rate standards was to prepare for a merger.  It was obvious, even in the 1950's, that the future of railroading in the US involved consolidation.  The need for mergers was especially apparent in the over-built pacific northwest, where four major railroads served the twin ports of Seattle and Tacoma, with none of those railroads being very prosperous.  Two of the Milwaukee's competitors out west, the Northern Pacific and the Great Northern, had already been in merger discussions since before WWII.  So after WWII, it should have been obvious to the Milwaukee that it had make itself attractive for a merger partner.

And to make itself attractive for merger, it had to make itself modern:  better tracks and passing sidings, and modern power. 

It also had to make itself compatible with other railroads.  Ordering a fleet of new GP-9's instead of Little Joes would have made the Milwaukee more compatible with the merged railroad.  The diesels would have been able to mix with the merged railroads power pool.  The Little Joes were locked to one line in Montana.

Aside from making itself attractive for a merger, infrastructure upgrades in the 1950's paid in part by sale of the electrification copper would also have saved the Milwaukee from its disastrous derailment problem of the 1970's.  The Milwaukee lost a lot of their overseas business because the track structure failed, causing derailments, which ruined their schedules.  The Union Pacific and BN were able to handle the trains, so that's where the business went.

As things turned out, the Milwaukee never found a merger partner, and when the company pulled out of the west, the track looked like it hadn't been upgraded since the 1950's.  Hmmm.  It makes you wonder.  Instead of buying the Little Joes in 1950, maybe they should have scrapped the copper, fixed the track, and found a merger partner.  Had they done that, maybe things would have turned out better for them. 

So in the big picture, perhaps the Little Joes were not a good investment.

 

[schlimm]

1. Lines West was doomed from the start because there was not sufficient Pac NW traffic to Chicago to warrant  four separate routes.  Even now most of the traffic is managed on two.

2.  But if the Milwaukee needed to persist in running Lines West, the bargain-priced Little Joes were a lot cheaper than the number of GP-9's that would have been needed to do the same job.

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

Paul_D_North_Jr

  Bob-Fryml:

  [snip]  So this now begs a new question.  Instead of distributing the locomotive weight over 10-axles configured 2-D+D-2 (with 8-powered axles), would it have been economically possible to reconfigure the running gear into a B-C+C-B wheel arrangement with 10-powered axles and thus reduce the flange wear?   

Weight distribution over just 10 axles instead of the original 12 ? 

On the other hand, maybe the MILW's track, roadbed, and structures could have handled that better than the Russian's - that's why they needed the 12 axles ? 

 What was their gross weight ?  

Wm. Middleton says the Little Joes were 273 tons total - but no 'per axle' breakdown provided.  So if we assume that weight would be equally distributed over the 10 axles proposed, that would be 27.3 tons = 54,600 lb. axle-loading, which is very reasonable.  Even allowing for lighter loads on the former leading trucks of say 36,000 lbs. per axle, that would still be only around 67,000 lbs. on the main axles - again, still pretty reasonable, and comparable with diesel practice. 

  But you do realize, of course, that what you're proposing is essentially an updated version of the PRR's GG1 - a 2-C+C-2 that weighed 235 - 239 tons with a similar weight distribution, but just with the leading trucks now powered . . .   

- Paul North. 

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

Rails West

  [snip] . . . -- perhaps the Milwaukee should have at that point, 1950, sold the entire electrification system for scrap.  The cash from the copper sale would have been significant.  They could have used the money from that sale, and from the money that was to go toward the Little Joes, toward significant track upgrade, track modernization, and purchase of new diesels. [snip; emphasis added - PDN]

 

Interesting thesis - but can you support it with actual $ figures, either then or today's equivalent ?  I doubt if that would work out - the copper scrap might have barely paid for the spikes, bolts, and tie plates, but no more - certainly not the rails, ties, ballast, new signals, and new diesels, etc.  The relative proportions don't seem right to me - it's only copper, not gold . . .

For comparison, note that in the early 1980's, ConRail didn't realize that kind of a windfall when it scrapped its freight catenary system after it lost reasonably-priced and convenient access to the NorthEast Corridor main lines controlled by Amtrak.  CR's upgrading started years before and continued for years afterwards - the copper salvage value was just a drop in the bucket as compared to that. 

Although, that CR decision may support your overall thesis, because it too was then faced with an "upgrade it or scrap it" decision for the electrification.  But I think the MILW made the right decision in the 1950's with the Little Joes, because they were almost enough to replace the entire fleet and operation.

Otherwise, the rest of your proposition seems to make sense to me.

- Paul North. 

[Rails West]

Paul_D_North_Jr

Interesting thesis - but can you support it with actual $ figures, either then or today's equivalent ?  I doubt if that would work out - the copper scrap might have barely paid for the spikes, bolts, and tie plates, but no more - certainly not the rails, ties, ballast, new signals, and new diesels, etc.  The relative proportions don't seem right to me - it's only copper, not gold . . .

Thanks for the reply, Paul!

Of course, I have no idea what the Milwaukee could have gotten in cash for scrapping the copper trolley wires, ...or for their existing fleet of electric locomotives, ...or for the substation equipment in the 1950's. 

Just out of curiousity, I did a quick internet search on the historical price of copper and ran across the following chart.  (Source:  USGS)

As far as the substation equipment, possibly it had value to other electric railroads?

Searching the internet, I also ran across a dollar value for what the Milwaukee Road earned (circa ~1975) from scrapping electric trolley wires.  (Information not verified.)

"At one point the price [of copper] soared, and it was estimated that the Milwaukee's overhead wire was worth $10 million as scrap... But in the end the price dropped, and they got only $5 million."

[Bob-Fryml]

Paul_D_North_Jr

Bob-Fryml:

  [snip]  So this now begs a new question.  Instead of distributing the locomotive weight over 10-axles configured 2-D+D-2 (with 8-powered axles), would it have been economically possible to reconfigure the running gear into a B-C+C-B wheel arrangement with 10-powered axles and thus reduce the flange wear?   

Weight distribution over just 10 axles instead of the original 12 ? 

On the other hand, maybe the MILW's track, roadbed, and structures could have handled that better than the Russian's - that's why they needed the 12 axles ? 

 What was their gross weight ?   - Paul North. 

Paul:-  You're quite right.  When I awoke this morning the first thing I realized was that I miscounted the axles.  The Little Joes had 12, not the 10 I wrote mistakenly.  My bad.

So readers, whadda you think?  Could the Joes have been modified to run with a C-C+C-C  wheel arrangement (12 powered axles distributed among four 3-axle trucks)?  Or, how about something even more exotic like 1-B-C+C-B-1 (10 powered axles with a pair of pony wheels at each end)?   

[blue streak 1]

An item I've waited to be posted is the fuel savings of the electrification. Several articles I've read stated that Milwaukee saved much money on electrical power by using regenerative braking. By MU ing a diesel behind the electrics MLKE achieved the extra power to go up hills and the used regenerative to recover that diesel effort (partially) going down hill?  Although I have no actual cites maybe someone can enlighten? Certainly if the electrification was still in place today and the track structure decent I would believe that electrification would not be considered for abandonment especially if the gap has been filled in?. 

[CSSHEGEWISCH]

Modifying the Joes to a  C-C+C-C or any other wheel arrangement would have meant building new underframes, which would have driven up the original cost.  B-D+D-B (like GN's W-1's) might have been feasible, though.

Another comment about the Joes,  South Shore's management admitted that the Joes were bigger than what they needed, but the price was tough to beat.

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

CSSHEGEWISCH

[snip]  B-D+D-B (like GN's W-1's) might have been feasible, though.  [snip] 

Yeah - I was thinking the same thing earlier this morning.  That would be an interesting comparison. 

blue streak 1 - I have both Middleton's book and the Woods' book on Milwaukee Road West.  Perhaps surprisingly, the latter has better data on the electrification, including the regenerative savings, as they appear to have referred to a lot of primary sources.  Give me a couple days to peruse it and maybe some other references and I'll see if I can answer some of those questions.

- Paul North.

[Murphy Siding]

BaltACD

The bigger question in the Milwaukee's case is did electrification make sense in the first place.

Milwaukee management thought it did.  With that being the case, new locomotives at a bargain price was a no brainer.

     The electrification makes sense to me, as far as trying to deal with smoke from steam locomotives in long tunnels in the mountains.  Didn't  GN have some electrified portions of trackage through the mountains as well?

     As far as the bargain price goes...  I've read that the Milwaukee Road engineering department wanted to buy all 20 locomotives and spare parts from GE, for $1 million, but the Board of Directors wouldn't go for it.  Later, when the B.o.D.  would go for it, 8 had been sold, along with the spare parts.  Milwaukee Road ended up paying  $1 million for the remaining 12 units.  That's $83,333.33 each.  I wonder what comparible diesels would have cost at that time.?

[samfp1943]

Murphy Siding

 

BaltACD:

 

The bigger question in the Milwaukee's case is did electrification make sense in the first place.

Milwaukee management thought it did.  With that being the case, new locomotives at a bargain price was a no brainer.

 

     The electrification makes sense to me, as far as trying to deal with smoke from steam locomotives in long tunnels in the mountains.  Didn't  GN have some electrified portions of trackage through the mountains as well?

     As far as the bargain price goes...  I've read that the Milwaukee Road engineering department wanted to buy all 20 locomotives and spare parts from GE, for $1 million, but the Board of Directors wouldn't go for it.  Later, when the B.o.D.  would go for it, 8 had been sold, along with the spare parts.  Milwaukee Road ended up paying  $1 million for the remaining 12 units.  That's $83,333.33 each.  I wonder what comparible diesels would have cost at that time.?

 

This link may provide some relevent information about the MILW RR's EF-70's [Little Joe's]   (Information from the Clayton County Chamber of Commerce website)

http://www.powellcountymontana.com/little_joe.html

FTL: "...Engineering, design and manufacture of this order was contracted to General Electric's locomotive plant in Erie, Pa. The locomotives were to cost $270.000 each. (Cost the U. S. Taxpayers). By September 1948, G.E. had completed eight locomotives, but the State Department held up shipping permits because the Berlin crisis and the cold war were causing very strained relations. In October 1948, President Truman ordered an embargo on all strategic materials and equipment to the Soviet Union and the State Department canceled the contract for the 20 locomotives. By this time 14 had been completed. Because most of the major components that were sub-contracted, such as frames, wheels and materials were being delivered by the subcontractors and because you can't change plant schedules that easily, General Electric completed the last six to American gauge of 4' 8 1/2" instead of the Russian gauge of 5'. It was hoped the order could be sold to an American railroad, namely the Milwaukee..."

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

Murphy Siding

  The electrification makes sense to me, as far as trying to deal with smoke from steam locomotives in long tunnels in the mountains.  Didn't  GN have some electrified portions of trackage through the mountains as well?

 [snip]  Milwaukee Road ended up paying  $1 million for the remaining 12 units.  That's $83,333.33 each.  I wonder what comparible diesels would have cost at that time.? 

 

Yes, but GN had a much shorter stretch - just the 7+ mile Cascade Tunnel and its approaches, maybe 20 - 30 miles altogether.  That's what the W-1's that  the 'other' Paul noted above were built for.

But I don't recall that the MILW had any tunnels anywhere near that long for smoke to be the driving force.  Instead, the bitter cold winter weather and steep grades made even the best Mallet steam power of the day not very effective, and the MILW was getted killed with the high operating costs and delays of them.  It's all described pretty well in the Woods' book that I referenced above - I'll take a look at that aspect, too.

My 'SWAG' at the price of comparable diesels back then would be around $100,000 for a 1,500 HP GP7, and off the top of my head, I suspect the Little Joes were equal to about 2 of them, on both a HP and TE basis.  Again, a look at some statistics for each and prices from back then would be instructive.  But if I'm anywhere close, the MILW got them for about 1/3 of their market value and about 1/2 of the capital costs of equivalent diesel HP - not a bad deal at all.

- Paul North.     

[VerMontanan]

The Little Joes were probably a good investment in that they were often used as additional power over the Milwaukee’s many steep grades.  In the diesel era, Little Joes could MU with the diesel power and the Little Joes could just be added for the Harlowton-to-Avery segment, for instance, with the diesel power handling the train to Harlowton and west from Avery.  The fact that the electrification was in place meant that these were an option that other (non-electrified) railroads wouldn’t consider.

 

What is often not discussed with regard to the worthiness of the Milwaukee’s electrification is the inefficiencies of changing power en route.  This was exacerbated by the fact that the Milwaukee had “The Gap,” which was the non-electrified portion between Avery, Idaho and Othello, Washington, which basically separate electrified railroads.

 

Much-touted by proponents of electrification is its energy efficiency, which just considering how the locomotive is powered, is hard to deny, considering that anything from water to nuclear to squirrels on a treadmill can power an electric train; and then there’s the regeneration aspect of such trains on descending grades.

 

But there were horrible locomotive utilization inefficiencies with the Milwaukee operation.  Consider this:  When you see a photo of a Milwaukee freight or passenger train westward in Western Montana with only a Little Joe (or multiple such units) for power, know that the Little Joes had to be ready at Harlowton in time to protect the train inbound with diesel power, and diesel power would need be available at Avery in time to protect the train’s operation west of there.  And, if electric power was used west of Othello, the same situation would be required.

 

There is tremendous cost in modifying locomotives en route, and such would have been the case with the Milwaukee’s segments of electrification.  The main costs are locomotive dwell – the amount of time the power is just sitting around waiting for its next assignment – or delay for power, caused by an inbound train being delayed.  Another expense would be paying hostlers to position the power at terminals or arbitraries paid to road crews to perform the locomotive work, which were commonplace on most railroads.  In the days of the steam engine, locomotive changes en route were frequent.  But with the implementation of a diesel-powered railroad, the greatest saving could be realized by utilizing the power from origin to destination, or with as few en route modifications as possible. 

 

This is the main limitation of electrification, even today.  It’s easy to imagine the efficiencies of electrification on the very busiest main lines, like the UP through North Platte, or BNSF between Chicago and California.  But the stark reality is that the not all trains on these routes run from point A to point Z; indeed they go on multiple routes and even on routes that are relatively lightly-trafficked.  So unless that all the interconnecting routes are electrified, it would be necessary to diesel power at all junction or power change locations to handle the train on the non-electrified territory, and have a plan to move the electric power on some other train on the electrified railroad.  In other words, a very complex and costly operation.  In addition to the expense of stringing wires and buying huge numbers of locomotives, the limited scope of utilization has to be a top reason that widespread electrification has not occurred.  The Milwaukee had an exceptionally challenging profile (five major grades over 1 percent between Harlowton and Portland westbound and four eastbound); as the trains were getting heavier, and the electric power was getting older (including the Little Joes), it made little sense to invest in power that would be restricted to only part of the railroad and could not operate on other railroads.  In addition, the Milwaukee’s torturous crossing of the Bitterroot Mountains and lack of a  water-level route through the Cascades that BN and UP enjoyed (along the Columbia River) for the increasingly heavier trains - and the huge amount of power it would have required - is a good reason that railroad is not there – electrified or not – today.

 

[oltmannd]

Paul_D_North_Jr

 

My 'SWAG' at the price of comparable diesels back then would be around $100,000 for a 1,500 HP GP7, and off the top of my head, 

- Paul North.     

Maybe less.  A GP38 in the late 60's were in the $125,000 range.  

[PNWRMNM]

Paul and Murphy,

The GN's electic segment over the Cascade mountains was about 75 miles, via the new tunnel.  It extended from Skykomish to Appleyard, which is a couple of miles east of Wenatchee proper.

I grew up in Wenatchee but am just young enough to have missed the electrics which were replaced by run through diesels in 1956.  Mark Meyer explained the whys of that perfectly wll, albeit in the MILW context.

Mac

[Rails West]

RE:  Scrap value of Milwaukee Road copper trolley in 1950

To recap the discussion, I originally posted that in 1950, perhaps the Milwaukee should have sold the entire electrification system for scrap, and used the cash to invest in new diesels and track improvements.  I thought it might have been better off for the company in the long run to do that.

Paul North came back with the reply:  "Interesting thesis - but can you support it with actual $ figures, either then or today's equivalent ?"

I replied that I had searched the internet and found a dollar scrap value for the actual sale in 1974 of $5 million.  Here is the quote from that internet site again:

"At one point the price [of copper] soared, and it was estimated that the Milwaukee's overhead wire was worth $10 million as scrap... But in the end the price dropped, and they got only $5 million."

Now, here is today's contribution to the thread.

Paul, tell me if the following is a valid approach or not.  Just to keep things simple, imagine that in 1950, the Milwaukee was able to sell their copper trolley wire for the same amount, in real dollars, that they sold it for in 1974.  That should be a conservative guess.  The 1974 sale price was, according to the quote above, $5 million.

Next I put the $5 million dollar figure from 1974 into an inflation adjusting calculator set for 1950.  The calculator told me that in 1950 dollars, that copper sale was equal to about $2.5 million.

Is this a valid approach so far?

Assuming the figure of $2.5 million in 1950 dollars is valid, the question to me now is, how much track improvement and new diesel locomotives would $2.5 million buy?

Do we have a good figure yet for the 1950 price of a new GP-7, or F-7 diesel?

[Murphy Siding]

Rails West

.........................Now, here is today's contribution to the thread.

Paul, tell me if the following is a valid approach or not.  Just to keep things simple, imagine that in 1950, the Milwaukee was able to sell their copper trolley wire for the same amount, in real dollars, that they sold it for in 1974.  That should be a conservative guess.  The 1974 sale price was, according to the quote above, $5 million.

Next I put the $5 million dollar figure from 1974 into an inflation adjusting calculator set for 1950.  The calculator told me that in 1950 dollars, that copper sale was equal to about $2.5 million.

Is this a valid approach so far?

Assuming the figure of $2.5 million in 1950 dollars is valid, the question to me now is, how much track improvement and new diesel locomotives would $2.5 million buy?

Do we have a good figure yet for the 1950 price of a new GP-7, or F-7 diesel?

  Plus the $1 million paid for the 12 Little Joes.

[erikem]

Murphy Siding

 

Rails West:

 

.........................Now, here is today's contribution to the thread.

Paul, tell me if the following is a valid approach or not.  Just to keep things simple, imagine that in 1950, the Milwaukee was able to sell their copper trolley wire for the same amount, in real dollars, that they sold it for in 1974.  That should be a conservative guess.  The 1974 sale price was, according to the quote above, $5 million.

Next I put the $5 million dollar figure from 1974 into an inflation adjusting calculator set for 1950.  The calculator told me that in 1950 dollars, that copper sale was equal to about $2.5 million.

Is this a valid approach so far?

Assuming the figure of $2.5 million in 1950 dollars is valid, the question to me now is, how much track improvement and new diesel locomotives would $2.5 million buy?

Do we have a good figure yet for the 1950 price of a new GP-7, or F-7 diesel?

 

  Plus the $1 million paid for the 12 Little Joes.

 

The two of you are forgetting a few things in regards to the cost/benefits of the Milwaukee de-electrifying in 1950. First thing is that the electric locomotive fleet was pretty much intact as of 1950, although scrapping of the Westinghouse motors would start in a few years. The original GE boxcabs were roughly equivalent to a GP7 in both tractive effort and power per unit. Assuming that better utilization of the GP7's would allow for a 1 to 2 replacement of the boxcabs, that would require a price of $100,000 for the GP7's for the copper salvage to pay for the replacement GP7's.

The Joe's were at least equivalent to 1.5 GP7's in tractive effort and 3.5 GP7's in rail horsepower. The Joe's could produce their continuous tractive effort rating of 77,000 lbs at 24 MPH, which came in handy when the Milwaukee was trying to compete on freight train speed.

While the limited stretches of the electrification didn't help with utilization, the equivalent diesel power may not have been much better. The line between Harlowton and Morbridge had WB grades less than 0.6%, and EB grades were less than 0.6% with the exception of a 6 mile stretch of 1% just east of Marmarth, ND. The electrified portions had ruling grades ranging from 1.6 to 2.2%, so it would make sense to dispatch enough power for the "flatland' districts and couple on electric helpers in the mountain districts.

The Milwaukee would have been better off if the Joe's were B-B+B-B's instead of the 2-D+D-2's for operation on 10 degree curves. Having said that, the majority of 10 degree curves on the Rocky Mountain electrification was in the westernmost 65 mile stretch between Avery and St Regis, with the others at the low end of Sixteen Mile canyon. Pipestone Pass had several 8 degree curves and the sharpest curves in the balance of the Rocky Mountain electrification were 3 to 4 degrees or broader. With the exception of a set of 4 degree curves across the river from Forsyth and a 3+ degree curve halfway between Forsyth and Miles City, the sharpest curves between Morbridge and Harlowton were 2 degrees.

My conclusion was that the Little Joe's were a good investment for the Milwaukee.

- Erik

[erikem]

blue streak 1

An item I've waited to be posted is the fuel savings of the electrification. Several articles I've read stated that Milwaukee saved much money on electrical power by using regenerative braking. By MU ing a diesel behind the electrics MLKE achieved the extra power to go up hills and the used regenerative to recover that diesel effort (partially) going down hill?  Although I have no actual cites maybe someone can enlighten? Certainly if the electrification was still in place today and the track structure decent I would believe that electrification would not be considered for abandonment especially if the gap has been filled in?. 

The figures I've seen were for the Milw recovering about 15 to 17% of the energy though regeneration. While the savings in energy were nice, the main cost savings with regenerative braking were most likely in improved train handling. The latter benefit is also achieved with dynamic braking.

- Erik

[Bob-Fryml]

Another factor to consider when discussing the electrification is this:  Although B.N. came into existence in March 1970, the MILW was still holding out for the possibility of a merger with someone in 1972 (when the Coast Lines de-electrified) and in 1974 (when the remaining subdivisions retired their electric operations).  

Had the Milwaukee taken up General Electric's earlier offer to renew the entire infrastructure, including closing the gap between Othello and Avery, here would be a substantial capital investment - particularly in locomotives - that could not be deployed to a merger partner ... a merger partner that possibly could use some extra horsepower seasonally like during the fall harvest.  

The top brass in Chicago thought that a fully dieselized Milwaukee Road would be a more attractive merger partner than one with a mixed stable of diesels and electrics.

[Falcon48]

I don't have any particular  earthshaking insights on this question.  But, in reading these posts, it seems to me the question facing MILW management at the time was relatively simple.  Are we better off (i) getting new electric locos at bargain prices and keeping the electrification, or (ii) scrapping the electrification and replacing all of the locos we need for the service with new diesels (in other words, buying new diesels to replace both the existing electrics and the new capacity represented by the Joes). In order to choose de-electrification, they would have had to conclude that the anticipated net salvage value of the electrification would exceed the costs of the additional diesels needed to replace the existing electric locos plus the spread between the cost of new diesels and the price of the Joes.  And, if the net salvage value wouldn't cover these costs, you don't even get to the question of whether the money would have been better spent on track upgrades, because the money wouldn't have been there in the first place. 

Of course, relative operating costs electric v diesel would also factor in this equation, but it's difficult to see how diesels in 1950 could have been markedly superior to electrics, at least on MILW. The electrics could easily match or exceed the performance of diesels of the era unit for unit.  On the other hand, locomotive utilization issues arising from a sepatate locomotive fleet could theoretically offset any unit for unit advantages of electric locomotives.  But was this really such a big factor for MILW at the time? My impression is that, in the late 40's, railroads still tended to utilize diesels like steam locos.  In other words, they often remained captive to a particular district or territory, and were changed rather than run through from origin to destination as they are today.  If that were the case on the MILW at the time of the decision to buy the Joes, utilization may not have been seen as a major factor, particularly since the electrification districts were relatively long (as opposed to the GN electrification).  

From the standpoint of 20-20 hindsight, the best decision would probably have been not to make any additional investment in the western lines - locomotives, track or otherwise .  But I doubt this could have reasonably been foreseen in 1950.