VerMontanan But there were horrible locomotive utilization inefficiencies with the Milwaukee operation. Consider this: When you see a photo of a Milwaukee freight or passenger train westward in Western Montana with only a Little Joe (or multiple such units) for power, know that the Little Joes had to be ready at Harlowton in time to protect the train inbound with diesel power, and diesel power would need be available at Avery in time to protect the train’s operation west of there. And, if electric power was used west of Othello, the same situation would be required. There is tremendous cost in modifying locomotives en route, and such would have been the case with the Milwaukee’s segments of electrification. The main costs are locomotive dwell – the amount of time the power is just sitting around waiting for its next assignment – or delay for power, caused by an inbound train being delayed.
Mark described "horrible inefficiencies" in how the Little Joes were deployed and used. For the sake of a discussion, I'll offer up a counter argument.
The following quotes come from a 1961 booklet history of the Milwaukee electrification. It is an independent publication, by the way -- not written by the company. These paragraph are about the Little Joes circa the time of writing (1961):
"These are probably the most useful locomotives on the entire Milwaukee Road today. Although in use on only 440 miles of line, the 12 "Joes," with GP-9 helpers, handle almost all freight traffic the road handles across the continental divide and two lesser but none-the-less impressive ranges.""Since the "Joes" can be operated MU, it was only natural that power would be concentrated at the head end. The common practice calls for two "Joes" and an Electro-Motive GP-9, or some 12,500 hp, on the point. The GP-9 adds just enough TE at a couple of critical points to allow a 3600 ton train to move west (Harlowton, Montana - Avery, Idaho) or 5800 ton train east, without set outs or helpers. Considering the scarcity of "Joes" (12 on 440 miles of railroad), the use of the diesel helper seems quite practical."
To sum up what the author says, circa 1961, a pair of Little Joes and a GP-9 could move a freight train non-stop (without stopping for helper sets) over a 440-mile run, which included three mountain ranges. Mark in his post described this run as an "exceptionally challenging profile," which included a "tortuous crossing of the Bitterroot Mountains."
So, with regards to efficiencies, since the train didn't have to stop for helpers, it seems to me that there was none of the associated cost of "dwell," nor the "tremendous cost in modifying locomotives en route," that Mark mentions -- at least for that 440 miles. So that seems like a positive to me.
Also, since the route was described by Mark as "exceptionally challenging," can I conclude, therefore, that the Little Joes were "exceptional" locomotives in being able to traverse it without stopping to add helper sets? It would seem to me that, yes, they definitely were. So another thumbs up.
What do you readers think?
- Rails West
Bob-Fryml [snip] Had the Milwaukee taken up General Electric's earlier offer to renew the entire infrastructure, including closing the gap between Othello and Avery, here would be a substantial capital investment - particularly in locomotives - that could not be deployed to a merger partner ... a merger partner that possibly could use some extra horsepower seasonally like during the fall harvest. [snip]
If the MILW's route would have been the superior route between the merged railroads, the ability to redeploy the motive power wouldn't matter as much, because more traffic would have been shifted to and concentrated on that route to take advantage of its efficiency. But it wasn't . . .
So your point echoes the choice faced by the N&W after the Virginian was merged into it - even though the Virginian's locomotives were mostly new E-44 types, its route wasn't the best one, so the electrification was scrapped.
- Paul North.
Going into the merger with N&W, Virginian's electrification was in great shape: new power plant, modern locomotives (EL-2B's and EL-C's) and well-maintained track. After the merger, N&W went to directional running with its parallel mains and the electrified lines became a one-way operation, which limited flexibility, leading to the abandonment of the electrification.
As I understand it, even worse is that the Virginian's electrified route was the more difficult one of the two available to the N&W for eastbound loads, so of course it used its own, and sent the empties back via the Virginian. There might also have been only portions of the VGN's route that was getting the traffic, too. The result was that the electrics were then out of a job - the task they had been built to do was no longer being done where they could work. I'll see if I can summarize Middleton's recounting of it later on, which has place names and route IDs that I can't reliably recall right now.
MILW was a poorly managed road in its final decades. They were at least 50 years ahead of everyone else on the electrification front, yet they chose to get rid of electrification during the oil crisis in the 70s...dumb decision but probably in keeping with the myoptic management of the day.
Had MILW been better managed they would have survived and electrification would have survived as well. In all likelihood, MILW would have been absorbed into one of the larger systems...and BNSF or UP would have an electried line today that could be used as a blueprint for expanding of electrification. Instead, we nolonger have railroads who have any experience with electrification on any scale, at least out West, and as a result, anything along those lines would have to be researched, designed, and built from scratch...
Paul_D_North_Jr If the MILW's route would have been the superior route between the merged railroads, the ability to redeploy the motive power wouldn't matter as much, because more traffic would have been shifted to and concentrated on that route to take advantage of its efficiency. But it wasn't . . .
Be careful about drawing conclusions about route superiority. The MILW route across Washington has always been under consideration by BN for use because it is faster or less steep than the NP route. The segment in eastern Wash still is under consideration today.
Also the MILW route across the continental divide is better than than the NP route over Homestake Pass, and I suspect is better than the NP route over Mullan Pass.
IIRC the MILW used Hydroelectric Power to genarate the Power for the electric Divisions. If so it would have been CHEAPER than any diesel compared to fuel costs. Even with Maintiance of the Cantery included. What happened was as usual the Bean counters getting in the way for a AShort Term looking at the Balance Sheets. They saw something they could sell for alot of Cash and did so. Not what it would save them in the LONG TERM. See that is where Businessmen get into Trouble nowadays they fail to plan for the LONGTERM. Everything is based on the Next Quarter Year Max and if that goal is not met Your gone.
edbenton See that is where Businessmen get into Trouble nowadays they fail to plan for the LONGTERM. Everything is based on the Next Quarter Year Max and if that goal is not met Your gone.
See that is where Businessmen get into Trouble nowadays they fail to plan for the LONGTERM. Everything is based on the Next Quarter Year Max and if that goal is not met Your gone.
Exactly!! And so much of executive compensation is based on stock options, it is no wonder that the short term is all that matters,
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
Rails West The following quotes come from a 1961 booklet history of the Milwaukee electrification. It is an independent publication, by the way -- not written by the company. These paragraph are about the Little Joes circa the time of writing (1961): "These are probably the most useful locomotives on the entire Milwaukee Road today. Although in use on only 440 miles of line, the 12 "Joes," with GP-9 helpers, handle almost all freight traffic the road handles across the continental divide and two lesser but none-the-less impressive ranges.""Since the "Joes" can be operated MU, it was only natural that power would be concentrated at the head end. The common practice calls for two "Joes" and an Electro-Motive GP-9, or some 12,500 hp, on the point. The GP-9 adds just enough TE at a couple of critical points to allow a 3600 ton train to move west (Harlowton, Montana - Avery, Idaho) or 5800 ton train east, without set outs or helpers. Considering the scarcity of "Joes" (12 on 440 miles of railroad), the use of the diesel helper seems quite practical." To sum up what the author says, circa 1961, a pair of Little Joes and a GP-9 could move a freight train non-stop (without stopping for helper sets) over a 440-mile run, which included three mountain ranges. Mark in his post described this run as an "exceptionally challenging profile," which included a "tortuous crossing of the Bitterroot Mountains." So, with regards to efficiencies, since the train didn't have to stop for helpers, it seems to me that there was none of the associated cost of "dwell," nor the "tremendous cost in modifying locomotives en route," that Mark mentions -- at least for that 440 miles. So that seems like a positive to me. Also, since the route was described by Mark as "exceptionally challenging," can I conclude, therefore, that the Little Joes were "exceptional" locomotives in being able to traverse it without stopping to add helper sets? It would seem to me that, yes, they definitely were. So another thumbs up. What do you readers think?
I think this is meaningless. If you built "a freight train" small enough, of course it's never going to have to stop for helpers. but there is a whole lot of locomotive power handling not much train here. Noel Holley's book "The Milwaukee Electrics" has Milwaukee Road tonnage charts for various grades and various locomotives. Westbound, the tonnage rating for two Little Joes and one GP9 is close to the 3,600 tons indicated above, or 3,760 tons (page 288 in the book). Interestingly, the book indicates that a similar consist eastbound would handle only 3,965 tons, not the 5,800 tons indicated above. This is because the grade from Avery to St. Paul Pass, though only 1.7 percent compared to the westbound steepest grade of 2.0 percent on Pipestone Pass, was exceptionally curvy.
So, if you had this locomotive consist and a westbound train, say, at 5,800 tons, a helper would still be required over Pipestone Pass and St. Paul Pass. Or, putting it another way: If, for the sake of argument, had the Great Northern chosen to electrify its railroad from Havre to Whitefish, and the same locomotive consist was used, the same three units could pull 7,300 tons westbound, or about twice as much. And, no helper.
In other words, there is nothing exceptional about the locomotives. My take is that prior to this, the Milwaukee didn't have a lot of very powerful locomotives, so trains previously required more individual locomotives and added and cut helpers at multiple locations. Using fewer locomotives cuts maintenance so this would be an improvement, but such would be the case with any locomotive that could out perform the older models, regardless of the topography.
And, I will add, that even in 1961, there were a lot of diesel locomotives running further than 440 miles without being changed out, but such wasn't the case per the example on the Milwaukee, because going one way or the other, the end of electrification was reached, and a change in locomotive power would then be required, and therefore also the expense and inefficiency of doing this day in and day out (with this particular locomotive consist, since the lone GP9 would be insufficient power to handle the train forward on non-electrified territory).
Mark Meyer
Rails West Be careful about drawing conclusions about route superiority. The MILW route across Washington has always been under consideration by BN for use because it is faster or less steep than the NP route. The segment in eastern Wash still is under consideration today. Also the MILW route across the continental divide is better than than the NP route over Homestake Pass, and I suspect is better than the NP route over Mullan Pass.
The MILW route across Washington is not worse than the NP (or GN) route across Washington, but it's really not a lot better. The portion that should have been kept was Snoqualmie Pass for westward trains at only . 7 percent (versus 2.2 percent on GN or NP). A combination of the SP&S from Spokane to Pasco, the NP from Pasco to Easton, and the MILW in to the Puget Sound area would have allowed a route with a grade of less than 1 percent. However the Milwaukee's climb out of the Columbia River Valley at Beverly was also a westward 2.2 percent grade, and eastbound, Snoqualmie was 1.74 percent and east of Kittitas 1.6 percent. Two major grades compared to one on NP. NP did have more route miles.
In Montana, MILW's Pipestone Pass crossing of the Continental Divide (2 percent west, 1.66 percent east) was better than NP's Homestake Pass, But the NP ran no through freight over Homestake, and Homestake, like the Milwaukee, isn't used today and for many of the same reasons. NP's Mullan Pass - its main freight route - was probably a bit better than the MILW at 2.2 percent west but only 1.4 percent east. The MILW had the advantage in the central part of Montana with the grade to Loweth only being 1 percent east and 1.4 west, while NP was 1.9 east and 1.8 west over Bozeman Pass.
The clear inferiority of the Milwaukee comes from railroad west from the Continental Divide. All the way from the Continental Diviide (Mulllan tunnel) to Spokane, the NP's maximum grade was only .8; the MILW had the 1.7 (each way) of St. Paul Pass. If NP had an excessive amount of tonnage to move and not enough power, west from Spokane or Pasco, the answer was in its subsidiary, SP&S, which could handle the traffic to Vancouver, WA at river grade, and give it back to the NP where it could move it to Tacoma, Seattle, wherever on a profile not exceeding 1 percent. Not so with the Milwaukee. Only one route, and all traffic had to be moved over every single steep hill.
There were segments of the Milwaukee east of Snoqualmie Pass that were "ok" operationally, but these were far outweighed by the fact that there was no one home, or that the NP went there too. I found it fascinating that so much of the Milwaukee could have been abandoned in one fell swoop - clearly a testimony to the lack of intermediate business. In other words, Sixteen Mile canyon might have been moderately better than Bozeman Pass from locomotive requirement standpoint, but it was no faster than the NP - say, between Three Forks and Miles City - and foresaking cities like Bozeman, Livingston, Laurel, and Billings - not to mention the major interchange with ex-CB&Q routes in the Billings area - meant that the NP would be the clear choice, and indeed, it's still there today.
As I recall from what I read Milwaukee Rd owned the generating stations for the electricity.
What effect did this have? Both financially & operationally?
Next what did Milwaukee do with the money from scraping the electrification? Did they use the money elsewhere? or pay a dividend, or executive bonuses.
Also on the decision to scrap. By the 1970;s was not 3kv dc obsolete for the long distances?
Rgds IGN
narig01As I recall from what I read, Milwaukee Rd owned the generating stations for the electricity.
My understanding is that the MILW purchased power from local power companies. From a reprint of a GE publication on the Milwaukee electrification (published 1927):
"The system of the Montana Power Company supplies an unusually reliable source of power for operating the Milwaukee Road's original 438-mile electric zone... It has been stated that energy is supplied by the Montana Power Company at the lowest rate per kilo-watt hour offered by any company doing a similar business."
The same publication also says that the high-voltage power line that followed the tracks was owned by the railroad. But since it was interconnected with the utility's transmission system grid, the line could if necessary be used to carry power to other utility customers.
narig01 As I recall from what I read Milwaukee Rd owned the generating stations for the electricity. What effect did this have? Both financially & operationally?
narig01 Next what did Milwaukee do with the money from scraping the electrification? Did they use the money elsewhere? or pay a dividend, or executive bonuses.
narig01 Also on the decision to scrap. By the 1970;s was not 3kv dc obsolete for the long distances?
VerMontanan So, if you had this locomotive consist and a westbound train, say, at 5,800 tons, a helper would still be required over Pipestone Pass and St. Paul Pass. Or, putting it another way: If, for the sake of argument, had the Great Northern chosen to electrify its railroad from Havre to Whitefish, and the same locomotive consist was used, the same three units could pull 7,300 tons westbound, or about twice as much. And, no helper. In other words, there is nothing exceptional about the locomotives. My take is that prior to this, the Milwaukee didn't have a lot of very powerful locomotives, so trains previously required more individual locomotives and added and cut helpers at multiple locations. Using fewer locomotives cuts maintenance so this would be an improvement, but such would be the case with any locomotive that could out perform the older models, regardless of the topography. And, I will add, that even in 1961, there were a lot of diesel locomotives running further than 440 miles without being changed out, but such wasn't the case per the example on the Milwaukee, because going one way or the other, the end of electrification was reached, and a change in locomotive power would then be required, and therefore also the expense and inefficiency of doing this day in and day out (with this particular locomotive consist, since the lone GP9 would be insufficient power to handle the train forward on non-electrified territory).
Mark,I don't like your analysis, and here is why. Basically, you are drawing a conclusion about the economics of something, but without thoroughly studying the economics of it, or of the alternatives.
Your study looks at just two aspects of the Little Joes: (1) horsepower, and (2) the route they were restricted to. Your conclusion is that because a Little Joe was not as powerful as a Saturn rocket, that it was nothing special. And you conclude that because a Little Joe could not run the entire distance, Chicago to Tacoma, that it didn't make economic sense. It's interesting stuff to consider, but we need to study it in terms of costs (initial costs, long-term costs), and then compare it to all other alternatives.If I was a consultant given the job of answering Murphy's question, "were the Little Joes a good investment," I guess I would go through each alternative, and for each case would consider every aspect and cost I could think of. Then, in my report, I would discuss the alternatives and recommend the one that was the less costly overall. (At least, that's how they told us how to do it in school.)
Rails West Your study looks at just two aspects of the Little Joes: (1) horsepower, and (2) the route they were restricted to. Your conclusion is that because a Little Joe was not as powerful as a Saturn rocket, that it was nothing special. And you conclude that because a Little Joe could not run the entire distance, Chicago to Tacoma, that it didn't make economic sense. It's interesting stuff to consider, but we need to do the cost study and compare it to other alternatives.If I was a consultant given the job of answering Murphy's question, "were the Little Joes a good investment," I would go through each alternative, and for each case would consider every aspect I could think of. It would start with a brain-storming exercise to think of what the alternatives and costs are. As I brain-storm costs and alternatives right now, some things that pop into mind include: cost of labor in places like Harlowton, Avery, Deer Lodge; cost of bulk diesel delivery to places like Deer Lodge; cost of electric power; useful life of electric equipment and diesel equipment; what combination of diesels and Little Joes was cheapest (0,1, 2, or 3 Little Joes); will more diesel exhaust create new problems in tunnels, etc; scrapping the whole system; etc.
Your study looks at just two aspects of the Little Joes: (1) horsepower, and (2) the route they were restricted to. Your conclusion is that because a Little Joe was not as powerful as a Saturn rocket, that it was nothing special. And you conclude that because a Little Joe could not run the entire distance, Chicago to Tacoma, that it didn't make economic sense. It's interesting stuff to consider, but we need to do the cost study and compare it to other alternatives.If I was a consultant given the job of answering Murphy's question, "were the Little Joes a good investment," I would go through each alternative, and for each case would consider every aspect I could think of. It would start with a brain-storming exercise to think of what the alternatives and costs are. As I brain-storm costs and alternatives right now, some things that pop into mind include:
cost of labor in places like Harlowton, Avery, Deer Lodge; cost of bulk diesel delivery to places like Deer Lodge; cost of electric power; useful life of electric equipment and diesel equipment; what combination of diesels and Little Joes was cheapest (0,1, 2, or 3 Little Joes); will more diesel exhaust create new problems in tunnels, etc; scrapping the whole system; etc.
No, I did not look at just two aspects of the Little Joes. My post on December 20 stated:
"There is tremendous cost in modifying locomotives en route, and such would have been the case with the Milwaukee’s segments of electrification. The main costs are locomotive dwell – the amount of time the power is just sitting around waiting for its next assignment – or delay for power, caused by an inbound train being delayed. Another expense would be paying hostlers to position the power at terminals or arbitraries paid to road crews to perform the locomotive work, which were commonplace on most railroads. In the days of the steam engine, locomotive changes en route were frequent. But with the implementation of a diesel-powered railroad, the greatest saving could be realized by utilizing the power from origin to destination, or with as few en route modifications as possible. "
You have also inaccurately stated my conclusion, which had nothing to do with how powerful the locomotives were. My point is simply that the Milwaukee or any railroad could have said that about any new power. For instance, when the SD40s were received, they could have said that three of them could move a 3,600-ton train from Chicago to Tacoma without power modification whatsoever, which would have sounded better than using twice as many GP9s or adding or subtracting power, electric or diesel or a comination, along the way. In other words, their statement about the Little Joes was just advertising, but could be spun about any newer or different locomotives. I also didn't state that horsepower had anything to do with the claim about the Little Joes; I simply am making the observation that if you assign enough power for the train to be pulled over the steepest point, you can make the claim that said power can handle the train from point A to point B without power modification. But that could be said about any kind of power. It is interesting to note, however, that the consist mentioned was two Little Joes and a GP9. Really does make one wonder why the GP9 was included; in other words, if you're trying to tout Little Joes, why not just 2 of them (period) and 3,200 tons? The obvious conclusion was that 3,200 tons isn't much of a train (although it was more of one in 1961), and does highlight the hefty amount of locomotive power needed to move trains on the Milwaukee Road.
I also earlier stated that I thought the Little Joes were a good investment for the Milwaukee Road given that the electrification was in place. The inefficiencies are due to the limits of electrification, given that electrification is the exception and not the rule.
Without doubt in today's railroading, the most cost-effective train operates from origin to destination without power modification, be it 100 miles or across the country on multiple railroads, which is today commonplace. An example of this is Amtrak's Northeast Corridor between New York and Boston. Amtrak was never really competitive with air travel until the segement from New Haven to Boston was electrified, eliminating the cumberson engine change in New Haven. Not only was there the actual delay for changing power, but there was the occasional waiting on locomotive power - either diesel or electric, depending on the direction of the train - when trains were running late. Never a problem when you don't have to worry about changing power en route.
I suspect that by the early 1970s as diesel power was becoming more powerful, more reliable, and runthrough trains with other railroads more commonplace, the Milwaukee looked at their isolated electric operations and their aging assets with limited geographic range and decided that the restrictions were too costly and did away with them.Note to all: The software weirds out sometimes and makes things hard to read. When I opened this up, it was written in teeny-tiny font with no breaks. I enlarged the font and put in some artificial paragraph breaks to make it easier to read on a computer screen.-Norris user/moderator
Thanks for further explaning. I don't have a good sense of train tonnage. How heavy would a train be, say, in 1970? 1980?
Paul_D_North_Jr narig01: I don't know, but see the book The Nation Pays Again by Thomas H. Ploss, who was a MILW staff lawyer at the time - it's pretty scathing from what I understand, and may address that topic. narig01: - Paul North.
narig01: I don't know, but see the book The Nation Pays Again by Thomas H. Ploss, who was a MILW staff lawyer at the time - it's pretty scathing from what I understand, and may address that topic.
I don't know, but see the book The Nation Pays Again by Thomas H. Ploss, who was a MILW staff lawyer at the time - it's pretty scathing from what I understand, and may address that topic.
narig01: - Paul North.
I knew Tom Ploss. Tom had a real chip on his shoulder over business decisions being made by the Milwaukee around the time of its bankruptcy, and also with the bankruptcy trustee's decision to settle litigation against BN related to BN merger conditions. He got himself into deep doo-doo with MILW management and his own legal superiors over this issue, apparently forgetting that business decisions are made by the business people, not the lawyers. I reviewed an advance copy of his book when Tom was trying to get an organization I was associated with to publish it. I recommended against publication,because the book seemed to be very nearly slanderous. Given Tom's rather strong biases, I don't think the book can be taken as authoritative. It is useful, however, as the viewpoint of an internal dissenter.
Paul_D_North_Jr I understand that the MILW bought a lot of land and water rights that were intended to be used for hydo-power generation, as there was no good coal on-line and it was expensive to haul in. Also, a lot of the route was in National Forests, and oil was required to be used to prevent forest fires, and that was expensive, too. So the hydropower - "white coal" - looked like it could have saved the MILW some fuel money. But when the electrification was constructed, there were a lot of transactions with a guy named Ryan, who ran Anaconda Copper and also the Montana power company, so I'm not sure what and how all that happened . . .
I understand that the MILW bought a lot of land and water rights that were intended to be used for hydo-power generation, as there was no good coal on-line and it was expensive to haul in. Also, a lot of the route was in National Forests, and oil was required to be used to prevent forest fires, and that was expensive, too. So the hydropower - "white coal" - looked like it could have saved the MILW some fuel money. But when the electrification was constructed, there were a lot of transactions with a guy named Ryan, who ran Anaconda Copper and also the Montana power company, so I'm not sure what and how all that happened . . .
The Milwaukee did have a large source of fairly decent coal at Roundup, from what I understand is of better quality than what the NP mined from Colstrip (prior to ca 1923, the NP was getting its coal from Red Lodge). This is the pretty much the same coal being carried by the recently built branch connecting to the GN's Laurel - Great Falls line, had those mines been developed in the mid-70's, the Milwaukee line between Roundup and Terry would probably still be in service, it is a much better route than the line through Laurel.
Johnston, in his book on the Puget Sound/Pacific Coast extension of the Milwaukee stated that one reason that the extension was built was to provide competing rail service to Butte and Anaconda. Many of the Milwaukee directors were also directors of Anaconda Copper Mining...
narig01: Also on the decision to scrap. By the 1970;s was not 3kv dc obsolete for the long distances? Oh, yeah - since at least 1920-1930, when several northeastern US railroads settled on 11KV 25 Hz for their electrifications - PRR, NYNH&H, and RDG. And then again by 1974, when the BM&LP opened with a 50 KV 60 Hz system, and in those years many studies of other long-distance Class I RR main-line electrifications were undertaken. By then the Muskingum Electric coal mine line was also running a 25 KV 60 Hz demonstration, and a few years later the same was used by BCR's Tumbler Ridge coal branch electrification. So no real research or design would have been needed to upgrade the MILW's system - just a lot of $ to basically replace it all.
narig01: Also on the decision to scrap. By the 1970;s was not 3kv dc obsolete for the long distances?
Oh, yeah - since at least 1920-1930, when several northeastern US railroads settled on 11KV 25 Hz for their electrifications - PRR, NYNH&H, and RDG. And then again by 1974, when the BM&LP opened with a 50 KV 60 Hz system, and in those years many studies of other long-distance Class I RR main-line electrifications were undertaken. By then the Muskingum Electric coal mine line was also running a 25 KV 60 Hz demonstration, and a few years later the same was used by BCR's Tumbler Ridge coal branch electrification. So no real research or design would have been needed to upgrade the MILW's system - just a lot of $ to basically replace it all.
It probably would have been more economical for the Milwaukee to extend the electrification with 3kV than to try to upgrade it to 25kV/60Hz (Michael Sol said that GE quoted $66,000 per mile for filling "the gap" in 1969). Using DC eliminates the problem of phase balancing. The downside is that trains would be limited to about 12MW (~16,000hp). The high voltage DC electric locomotives would probably have been slightly more expensive than an equivalent AC locomotive. One other advantage of 3kV is that clearances are less of an issue at 3kV than 25kV (not to mention 50kV).
(added note) A couple of other issues of AC vs DC are inductive reactance and skin effect. For 25 Hz, the impedance of the overhead is roughly 1.5 times the DC case, and the impedance of the rails is about 6.6 times the DC case (both figures from Chap 20 pages 22-23 of Electric Railway Engineering by Francis H. Doane. Assuming that the impedance increase for the overhead is dominated by inductance and the rails by skin effect, I'd guess at 60 Hz, the overhead impedance would be about 2.2 times DC resistance and rail impedance would be 10 times DC resistance. This means that an AC line needs substantially higher voltages than a DC line.
The first AC electrification that matched the flexibility in speed and regenerative braking found in the Milwaukee's electrification was the GN's Cascade electrification of 1927-29. GN's original three phase Cascade electrification as well as the N&W's and VGN's phase converter locomotives had regerative braking, but operated at fixed speeds. The AC locomotives operated by the PRR and NYNH&H were not capable of regenerative braking.
- Erik
VerMontananNoel Holley's book "The Milwaukee Electrics" has Milwaukee Road tonnage charts for various grades and various locomotives. Westbound, the tonnage rating for two Little Joes and one GP9 is close to the 3,600 tons indicated above, or 3,760 tons (page 288 in the book). Interestingly, the book indicates that a similar consist eastbound would handle only 3,965 tons, not the 5,800 tons indicated above. This is because the grade from Avery to St. Paul Pass, though only 1.7 percent compared to the westbound steepest grade of 2.0 percent on Pipestone Pass, was exceptionally curvy.
I took a look through the tonnage rating tables in Holley's and also noted that the Joe's had the same rating for EB St Paul Pass as for WB on Pipestone Pass. The other locomotives listed had a slightly higher rating for St Paul Pass, so the curves make a difference. Most likely culprit was the 20' rigid wheelbase on the Joe's. Both passes could be ascended within about an hour with the Joe's, and they would be able to make use of the hourly rating.
In 1969, GE proposed building C-C's with model 750 motors. These would have had continuous tractive effort ratings equal to the 1 hour ratings of the Joe's and at the same speed - presumably the use of Kapton insulation led to the much higher continuous current rating. The C-C arrangement would have been a much better match to the St Paul Pass approaches. The asking price was $500,000 each, which most likely would not have been a good investment. Would have been interesting to see those in action.
From 1915 -so it would not cover the 1920's - 1930's developments of the motors that led to the PRR's fleet of electric locomotives. About $27 from Amazon as a reprint from a scan, to around $45 for a used copy. Although the cover and subtitle appear to refer to mainly trolleys and interurbans, it also appears to cover "electric freight locomotives":
http://www.amazon.com/Electric-Railway-Engineering-Francis-Doane/dp/1935327992
Thanks for that reference, Erik.
I do not have the inclination to research the financial records to buttress this hypothesis ... it's just inference drawn from the business press of the era.
The hypothesis is that the Milwaukee Road's promoters in the early 1900s had a substantial investment in Montana copper production and felt that James J. Hill's control of the rail lines in Montana skimmed off more of the profits than they preferred. To reduce that "excess tax" they needed a competing railroad that would force Hill to lower rates. Even more clever, they anticipated regulation of railroads would, once that competing railroad was constructed, would either (a) lock in a lower rate structure than Hill would otherwise have offered, or (b) lock in such a high rate structure that the copper consortium could extract its due profit from the Milwaukee Road's transportation service rather than just FOB refinery. Either way, they win. Even better, given the very foolish belief of most investors of the era thinking that railroads were a magic ticket to riches, they could use other people's money to build the railroad. Again, a winning outcome -- if the railroad was a financial success, it would compete for their copper business and increase their profits. If the railroad was not, well, it wasn't their money, and it could be someone else's problem. As it turned out the ICC locked in long-term noncompensatory rates and their copper profits were protected. But had they not built the Milwaukee Road, the regulated rate might have been higher.
I don't think that Rockefeller, H.H. Rogers and the rest of that crowd put their time into building the Milwaukee Road because they thought it was going to be a money maker on its own merits. I don't think they had delusions that the Northwest needed the capacity of yet another transcon, or that sterile regions would magically blossom when kissed by the steel rail, or that the Milwaukee Road would have superior operating performance, or to serve the sketchy quantity of transcontinental traffic that was offered or likely. I think they were too smart for that. They built it as a useful tool in their much bigger competition against Morgan and Hill.
Anyway, just a hypothesis.
RWM
RWM: Interesting!! Perhaps some economic historian should do the lengthy research to confirm that intriguing hypothesis, which on the face of it looks fairly plausible.
The ideas of big money movers & shakers on how to manipulate markets....oil, gold, silver, copper, coal, transportation etc. are far beyond what those of us who are basic wage slaves can really comprehend.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
That is the most interesting hypothesis about the Pacific Extension I have ever seen. If the Rockerfeller crowd was as smart as you hypothesize I am surprised that they did not see the impact of the Hepburn Act of 1906, which as you know, froze rates at 1906 levels during the inflationary run up to WW I and into the first couple of years. They could have saved hundreds of millions of dollars, when gold was $16 an oz. if they had been that smart and let the Government bleed the carriers for them.
True at the time Hill controlled both the GN and NP which served Butte, so he could have had both work together to raise their rates. The problem with that scenario is that Butte was also served by the UP, which would have tended to moderate any tendenct for Hill to price gouge. Hill, by the way, had the well deserved reputation as a rate cutter.
Finally, if the real objective was Butte, why go on to Tacoma? The copper market in the east was much bigger than in the west, since virtually all of American manufacturing was in Official Territory.
It would be interesting to research. First question would be what were actual published rates via GN, NP, UP and MILW in period 1900-1915? Second question is the degree of shareholder and director overlap as between Anaconda Copper and MILW? Third, was that overlap sufficient to carry the MILW board, either as a block or with help from expansion minded directors looking for an outlet on the Pacific?
Thought provoking.
Merry Christmas
Mac McCulloch
Paul_D_North_Jr From 1915 -so it would not cover the 1920's - 1930's developments of the motors that led to the PRR's fleet of electric locomotives. About $27 from Amazon as a reprint from a scan, to around $45 for a used copy. Although the cover and subtitle appear to refer to mainly trolleys and interurbans, it also appears to cover "electric freight locomotives": http://www.amazon.com/Electric-Railway-Engineering-Francis-Doane/dp/1935327992
I got my copy of the reprint from Karen's Books, not quite as low price as Amazon, but being local, the delivery is prompt. The Association of Railway Museums did a re-print of the 1924 edition of McGraw-Hill's Electric Railway Handbook about 20 years ago, which covers a bit more on heavy electric RR technology. Another good source for technology used by the PRR is CERA bulletin 118, Westinghouse Electric Railway Transportation.
Paul_D_North_Jr From 1915 -so it would not cover the 1920's - 1930's developments of the motors that led to the PRR's fleet of electric locomotives.
From 1915 -so it would not cover the 1920's - 1930's developments of the motors that led to the PRR's fleet of electric locomotives.
Paul,
A good start would be to get a copy of CERA's Bulletin 118, for which a library may be the best bet as the book has been out of print for a while. The two sections of particular interest are on the development of the single phase system (which includes honest comments on the advantages and disadvantages of single phase) and the long article on the NYNH&H electrification - the design of the Pennsy's locomotives owe much to the design of the New Haven's fleet, including the twin-motored geared quill drive. The motors for the New Haven electrification were larger versions of the motors designed for AC interurbans. 25 Hz was chosen as that gave better commutation than 60 Hz and was a standard frequency used for systems with large rotary converter loads.
Some of the disadvantages of the AC series motors used by the New Haven and Pennsy are: The motors are larger, heavier and less efficient than DC series motors of the same HP rating. The motors were probably more expensive and fragile than an equivalent DC motor sue to the laminated frames and poles. The motors may not have had more problems with sustained overloads than equivalent DC motors. Regenerative braking would have been extremely difficult to implement. AC series motors have a pulsating torque due to current going between maximum and zero twice per cycle. One way of reducing torque pulsations is to put a spring between the motor and driven wheel axle, if the resonant frequency of the rotational inertia of the motor (and gearing) and the spring is substantially less than the twice the line frequency, then the combination will act as a low pass filter and smooth the torque. One way to put springs into the system is to use a quill drive, which has the advantage of lowering unsprung weight.
The advantages of single phase include: much higher practical lines voltages, allowing for more power to trains and longer spacing between substations; Cheaper substations as they are basically a transformer and circuit breaker; Less problems with electrolytic corrosion; A much larger range of running speeds.
The lack of regenerative braking with AC series motors was probably the reason why Westinghouse had proposed phase splitter locomotives (N&W and VGN) for the Milwaukee. The M-G locomotives would have worked very nicely on the Milwaukee, but those didn't come into the picture until decade after the Milwaukee picked GE's proposal. For a given power, the M-G locomotives were probably heavier and more expensive than either an AC series motor locomotive or a 3kVDC locomotive. The extra weight and cost are probably the main reasons the Pennsy or New Haven never bothered with MG equipped locomotives, with the exception of the second hand GN's for the Pennsy.
Erik, thanks much for that insightful comment. I believe you've just doubled what little I knew about motor characteristics. And that's the best - actually only - explanation for the quill drive that I've ever read. The next time Middleton's book When the Steam Railroads Electrified is reprinted, they should get you to either edit or supplement the appendix about the "Technology of Electrification" (or whatever it's called).
If I'm understanding you correctly: The PRR and NH didn't go for the added weight and expense of Motor-Generator locomotives - which could have had regenerative braking capability - but instead used and stuck with AC series motors, which couldn't do that. My comment to that is: Probably because without major grades on most of their electrified routes - they were both essentially flat 'coastal plain' lines, all the way from New Haven to Washington, D.C. (except for some short portions of the PRR's original "Main Line" route west of Philadelphia to Lancaster, which did have helper service from time to time) there wasn't much opportunity for those roads to use regenerative braking on their regular freight operations, or the high-speed passenger trains. So that was a capability that they wouldn't have gotten as much return on as the N&W, VGN, or MILW.
I'll have to try and get those books/ issues, or copies of them. Thanks again for thsoe references and comments.
While regenerative braking was impossible with AC commutator motors, dynamic braking is possible and was done in Europe.
erikem A good start would be to get a copy of CERA's Bulletin 118 . . . the long article on the NYNH&H electrification - the design of the Pennsy's locomotives owe much to the design of the New Haven's fleet, including the twin-motored geared quill drive. The motors for the New Haven electrification were larger versions of the motors designed for AC interurbans. 25 Hz was chosen as that gave better commutation than 60 Hz and was a standard frequency used for systems with large rotary converter loads. Some of the disadvantages of the AC series motors used by the New Haven and Pennsy are: The motors are larger, heavier and less efficient than DC series motors of the same HP rating. The motors were probably more expensive and fragile than an equivalent DC motor sue to the laminated frames and poles. The motors may not have had more problems with sustained overloads than equivalent DC motors. Regenerative braking would have been extremely difficult to implement. AC series motors have a pulsating torque due to current going between maximum and zero twice per cycle. One way of reducing torque pulsations is to put a spring between the motor and driven wheel axle, if the resonant frequency of the rotational inertia of the motor (and gearing) and the spring is substantially less than the twice the line frequency, then the combination will act as a low pass filter and smooth the torque. One way to put springs into the system is to use a quill drive, which has the advantage of lowering unsprung weight. [snip] . - Erik
Some of the disadvantages of the AC series motors used by the New Haven and Pennsy are: The motors are larger, heavier and less efficient than DC series motors of the same HP rating. The motors were probably more expensive and fragile than an equivalent DC motor sue to the laminated frames and poles. The motors may not have had more problems with sustained overloads than equivalent DC motors. Regenerative braking would have been extremely difficult to implement. AC series motors have a pulsating torque due to current going between maximum and zero twice per cycle. One way of reducing torque pulsations is to put a spring between the motor and driven wheel axle, if the resonant frequency of the rotational inertia of the motor (and gearing) and the spring is substantially less than the twice the line frequency, then the combination will act as a low pass filter and smooth the torque. One way to put springs into the system is to use a quill drive, which has the advantage of lowering unsprung weight. [snip] .
The twin motors in the geared quill drive: Would they have been 1/4 cycle out of sync with each other - kind of like the quartering of steam locomotive drivers for timing the cylinder strokes - to prevent both motors from being at zero torque at the same instant ? With that (presumably) sinusoidal variation of torque on each motor being offset by the 1/4 cycle, the sum of the torque from both motors at any instant would always be in a higher and narrower range, around 0.7 of the max. torque of any 1 motor as i'm recalling those kinds of things.
This kind of explanation is what's sadly lacking from almost all of the 'stuffed and mounted' displays of locomotives. When I was too young to fully appreciate it, i was on a tour of the PRR's Electric Locomotive Shop in Wilmington as part of an NMRA Mid-Eastern Region convention. There were many parts spread out over the floor and well-labeled, and people to answer questions . . . Something like that should be done with the displays of the 'guts' from the electric locomotives. None of the GG1's would be less for having one of their axles with the twin motors and quill drive pulled out from underneath and set in front with signs and labels. [end rant]
Paul_D_North_Jr motors in the geared quill drive: Would they have been 1/4 cycle out of sync with each other - kind of like the quartering of steam locomotive drivers for timing the cylinder strokes - to prevent both motors from being at zero torque at the same instant ? With that (presumably) sinusoidal variation of torque on each motor being offset by the 1/4 cycle, the sum of the torque from both motors at any instant would always be in a higher and narrower range, around 0.7 of the max. torque of any 1 motor as i'm recalling those kinds of things. - Paul North.
motors in the geared quill drive: Would they have been 1/4 cycle out of sync with each other - kind of like the quartering of steam locomotive drivers for timing the cylinder strokes - to prevent both motors from being at zero torque at the same instant ? With that (presumably) sinusoidal variation of torque on each motor being offset by the 1/4 cycle, the sum of the torque from both motors at any instant would always be in a higher and narrower range, around 0.7 of the max. torque of any 1 motor as i'm recalling those kinds of things.
PDN: You bring up a very good point. I am now wondering as well. A follow on may indicate why present day 3 phase AC diesel and electric traction motors work when the older ACs did not work as well. Makes one wonder how much more efficient todays motive power is compared to the NHs and PRRs electrics? Also the ability to regenerate or run dynamic braking?
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