WMATA ? Can you elaborate on this, and put it in context for me? Thanks
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
I wonder if this is a systemic thing. Something that has "Save the $$$$" written all over it.
Any argument carried far enough will end up in Semantics--Hartz's law of rhetoric Emerald. Leemer and Southern The route of the Sceptre Express Barry
I just started my blog site...more stuff to come...
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Hearings = political theatre in the U.S. - Toyota today, WMATA tomorrow . . . But who is going to really do anything constructive to correct/ improve the situation ? Exactly what will they do ? With what money ? By when ? Often, these things are well-known beforehand, at least to those on the inside - who then have to struggle to try to accomplish the mission - until something goes wrong - then the scape-goating begins . . .
Did the managers know about the importance of Original Equipment Manufacturer parts quality and performance certification requirements, and the like ? Who of us isn't, at least informally, and likely more strictly as part of training and policy, etc. ? If not, why were said managers even hired in the first place ? And who's responsible for that ?
Were the repair parts even available from the original manufacturer ? At a price WMATA could pay ? In a time frame that was needed ? Compare with the article in Trains a couple years ago about the inability to obtain parts to repair the toaster ovens on Amtrak's cafe cars.
Has no one here ever cobbled-together equivalent replacement or 'generic' parts, when the proper ones were not available ? Now, I too have been stymied by odd shapes, etc. and forced to find an original. So what parts were they replacing ? How is it that someone else's parts even fit ?
Of course, that the situation just happened to occur at the site of the fatal accident doesn't mean that it actually caused the accident - it might just be an unfortunate coincidence - or not.
And sadly - which fatal accident ? I presume you're referring to the rear-end crash a few months or a year ago - but WMATA has had so many over the years . . . Just within the last few days I read something about 2 experienced M-O-W employees being run over and killed by a hi-rail truck or similar vehicle. I just don't know how they managed to do that . . . I'd really like to hear that explanation . . .
- Paul North.
I wonder about that as well. When managers are trained is the issue of OEM parts even mentioned anymore? I remember that we got this clobbered into our heads that ALL equipment that is used in our field must be repaired with OEM parts---and et cetera and et cetera and...
sheeesh
There are people that I have as clients with who know this by heart. And we have "properly qualified" managers who have to be told again and again that ------
Paul_D_North_JrHearings = political theatre in the U.S. - Toyota today, WMATA tomorrow . . . But who is going to really do anything constructive to correct/ improve the situation ? Exactly what will they do ? With what money ? By when ? Often, these things are well-known beforehand, at least to those on the inside - who then have to struggle to try to accomplish the mission - until something goes wrong - then the scape-goating begins . . . Did the managers know about the importance of Original Equipment Manufacturer parts quality and performance certification requirements, and the like ? Who of us isn't, at least informally, and likely more strictly as part of training and policy, etc. ? If not, why were said managers even hired in the first place ? And who's responsible for that ? Were the repair parts even available from the original manufacturer ? At a price WMATA could pay ? In a time frame that was needed ? Compare with the article in Trains a couple years ago about the inability to obtain parts to repair the toaster ovens on Amtrak's cafe cars. Has no one here ever cobbled-together equivalent replacement or 'generic' parts, when the proper ones were not available ? Now, I too have been stymied by odd shapes, etc. and forced to find an original. So what parts were they replacing ? How is it that someone else's parts even fit ? Of course, that the situation just happened to occur at the site of the fatal accident doesn't mean that it actually caused the accident - it might just be an unfortunate coincidence - or not. And sadly - which fatal accident ? I presume you're referring to the rear-end crash a few months or a year ago - but WMATA has had so many over the years . . . Just within the last few days I read something about 2 experienced M-O-W employees being run over and killed by a hi-rail truck or similar vehicle. I just don't know how they managed to do that . . . I'd really like to hear that explanation . . . - Paul North.
The hearings are the NTSB public hearings, the parts are available from Alstom (successor to General Railway Signal).
Washington Post story on hearings
Washington (DC) Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Paul_D_North_JrHas no one here ever cobbled-together equivalent replacement or 'generic' parts, when the proper ones were not available ? Now, I too have been stymied by odd shapes, etc. and forced to find an original. So what parts were they replacing ? How is it that someone else's parts even fit ?
Johnny
WMATA appears to have a 'corporate culture' of a urban bus transit company, more than anything that is rail related. From the accident reports of Metro incidents I have read, it appears that Metro train operations personnel generally start their employment through the bus side of the organization and then get 'promoted' to the Metro train side of the operation. Their maintenance personnel also seem to progress from the bus side of the operation to the rail side.
I get the feeling, that Metro's safety emphasis is more in tune with the 'relatively' forgiving nature of bus accidents that occur with a relatively high frequency and relatively low injury rates, rather than a rail based safety emphasis where most accidents end up with potentially catastrophic results.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Paul_D_North_Jr Did the managers know about the importance of Original Equipment Manufacturer parts quality and performance certification requirements, and the like ? Performance certification is certainly the most important. YOu have no idea how hard it is for aftermarket suppliers to get parts certified for airplanes! OEMs almost always have to get involved. Who of us isn't, at least informally, and likely more strictly as part of training and policy, etc. ? If not, why were said managers even hired in the first place ? And who's responsible for that ? Were the repair parts even available from the original manufacturer ? Most important - since this portion of WAMATA is so old I imagine all patents have expired and Alstom may have discontinued manufacture. At a price WMATA could pay ? In a time frame that was needed ? Compare with the article in Trains a couple years ago about the inability to obtain parts to repair the toaster ovens on Amtrak's cafe cars. Has no one here ever cobbled-together equivalent replacement or 'generic' parts, when the proper ones were not available ? Now, I too have been stymied by odd shapes, etc. and forced to find an original. So what parts were they replacing ? How is it that someone else's parts even fit ? This is the difference between a mechanical part that can be easily duplicated and a part that may have software that is hardwired into the part. If there is 100K lines of software code built in. exact duplication will be almost impossible. Of course, that the situation just happened to occur at the site of the fatal accident doesn't mean that it actually caused the accident - it might just be an unfortunate coincidence - or not. And sadly - which fatal accident ? I presume you're referring to the rear-end crash a few months or a year ago - but WMATA has had so many over the years . . . Just within the last few days I read something about 2 experienced M-O-W employees being run over and killed by a hi-rail truck or similar vehicle. I just don't know how they managed to do that . . . I'd really like to hear that explanation . . . I believe that this came about from Alstom testimony at the hearing by the NTSB that is referrd to in todays train newswire. I agree though until the technical people testify and the NTSB comes to a conclusion that it is premature to jump to any conclustions. - Paul North.
Did the managers know about the importance of Original Equipment Manufacturer parts quality and performance certification requirements, and the like ?
Performance certification is certainly the most important. YOu have no idea how hard it is for aftermarket suppliers to get parts certified for airplanes! OEMs almost always have to get involved.
Who of us isn't, at least informally, and likely more strictly as part of training and policy, etc. ? If not, why were said managers even hired in the first place ? And who's responsible for that ?
Were the repair parts even available from the original manufacturer ?
Most important - since this portion of WAMATA is so old I imagine all patents have expired and Alstom may have discontinued manufacture.
At a price WMATA could pay ? In a time frame that was needed ? Compare with the article in Trains a couple years ago about the inability to obtain parts to repair the toaster ovens on Amtrak's cafe cars.
This is the difference between a mechanical part that can be easily duplicated and a part that may have software that is hardwired into the part. If there is 100K lines of software code built in. exact duplication will be almost impossible.
I believe that this came about from Alstom testimony at the hearing by the NTSB that is referrd to in todays train newswire. I agree though until the technical people testify and the NTSB comes to a conclusion that it is premature to jump to any conclustions.
beaulieuUnder hearings into WMATA management, the technical competence of various managers is taking a beating. Such as using parts to repair the custom train control system from a different manufacturer that are not designed for the use to which they are being put. Damningly this situation occurred at the site of the fatal accident.
I would definitely reserve judgment on the OEM parts issue. As some one else has already pointed out, the issue about using non-OEM replacement parts for the signal system came from a representative of the company that sells the OEM parts. That company has an obvious financial interest in suggesting that the products of other manufacturers are inferior to their own. Also, as the company responsible for the original signal system, it also has a strong interest in suggesting that the cause of the signal problems was something they are not responsible for. Now, maybe they are right. But I've learned to be a little cynical in situations like this. Let's see what NTSB has to say.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
blownout cylinder "I wonder if this is a systemic thing. Something that has "Save the $$$$" written all over it."
"I wonder if this is a systemic thing. Something that has "Save the $$$$" written all over it."
Barry:
I think you may have nailed the issue/problem... MONEY always seems to be not only the excuse, but the systemic problem that leads to use of "the cheaper the better" as a resolution for problematic availibilities of OEM parts.
Washington,D.C. seems to be the epicenter for this kind of thinking.
Political correctness running amuck.
samfp1943 blownout cylinder "I wonder if this is a systemic thing. Something that has "Save the $$$$" written all over it." Barry: I think you may have nailed the issue/problem... MONEY always seems to be not only the excuse, but the systemic problem that leads to use of "the cheaper the better" as a resolution for problematic availibilities of OEM parts. Wall St. seems to be the epicenter for this kind of thinking. Bottom Line running amuck.
Wall St. seems to be the epicenter for this kind of thinking.
Bottom Line running amuck.
When it comes to money, the epicenter of the money world is Wall Street and their cheaper is better bring it to the bottom line THIS QUARTER thinking. This carries over to the public sector (WMATA) where they are expected to accomplish $100M of project with $50M of funding. The pressures of funding occur in all levels of all institutions, both public and private. The trade offs between OEM and After Market parts are done in all levels of all projects. When done, however, the vetting process must insure that the After Market part does have the same function, on all levels, as the OEM parts.
This is *NOT* a case of "aftermarket" parts being substituted. Here's the situation on the bonds according to the testimony I've read (and we might want to move this thread to the Transit forum).
There is an ongoing project to replace the 40-year-old ATC equipment made by GRS (Alstom) with new equipment made by US&S. There are bonds and modules. First the ATC crews replace the bonds with US&S bonds and try to get them working, this often can only be done by raising the current in the GRS module. The US&S bond has a different impedance than the original GRS bond. Then, at some future date, the CIC crews replace the old GRS module with a new US&S module. Their idea was to keep ahead of the US&S replacement crew because they evidently need the entire room to work.
On top of all this, there are no checks/balances, no feedback loop to management, and most chillingly NO DOCUMENTED PROCEDURE on how to test the US&S bond with the GRS modules. There are several lines that use US&S modules with US&S bonds with no problems.
The accident is apparently in a place where the GRS bond was replaced with a US&S bond and was then replaced again with the original GRS bond. There is some confusing and conflicting testimony on that, as it implies it's possible the GRS bond couldn't handle the power-up that the US&S bond required of the GRS module (which was not yet replaced). It's all messed up.
Alstom (now owner of GRS) has expressed verbally and in writing that this should not ever have been done. The ATC crews were actually out there with voltmeters and ohmmeters trying to get the GRS module to recognize the US&S bond, with someone at the module turning a pot to "up" the current. Unbelievable. The workers themselves say "this is wrong, we must stop" but management says "shut up."
samfp1943 blownout cylinder "I wonder if this is a systemic thing. Something that has "Save the $$$$" written all over it." Barry: I think you may have nailed the issue/problem... MONEY always seems to be not only the excuse, but the systemic problem that leads to use of "the cheaper the better" as a resolution for problematic availibilities of OEM parts. Washington,D.C. seems to be the epicenter for this kind of thinking. Political correctness running amuck.
BaltAC:
OK! I stand corrected. I can live with that as well! I guess I was trying to say away from the PC mine field..Thanks.
P.S. Love that Cat!
Remember WMATA is Government in a government town. US&S and GRS are both reputable signal manufacturers.
aegrotatio This is *NOT* a case of "aftermarket" parts being substituted. Here's the situation on the bonds according to the testimony I've read (and we might want to move this thread to the Transit forum). There is an ongoing project to replace the 40-year-old ATC equipment made by GRS (Alstom) with new equipment made by US&S. There are bonds and modules. First the ATC crews replace the bonds with US&S bonds and try to get them working, this often can only be done by raising the current in the GRS module. The US&S bond has a different impedance than the original GRS bond. Then, at some future date, the CIC crews replace the old GRS module with a new US&S module. Their idea was to keep ahead of the US&S replacement crew because they evidently need the entire room to work. On top of all this, there are no checks/balances, no feedback loop to management, and most chillingly NO DOCUMENTED PROCEDURE on how to test the US&S bond with the GRS modules. There are several lines that use US&S modules with US&S bonds with no problems. The accident is apparently in a place where the GRS bond was replaced with a US&S bond and was then replaced again with the original GRS bond. There is some confusing and conflicting testimony on that, as it implies it's possible the GRS bond couldn't handle the power-up that the US&S bond required of the GRS module (which was not yet replaced). It's all messed up. Alstom (now owner of GRS) has expressed verbally and in writing that this should not ever have been done. The ATC crews were actually out there with voltmeters and ohmmeters trying to get the GRS module to recognize the US&S bond, with someone at the module turning a pot to "up" the current. Unbelievable. The workers themselves say "this is wrong, we must stop" but management says "shut up."
A thread of serveral weeks ago was about how all the US Railroads should standardize their signal indications.....Signal systems that were originally designed and implemented by hundreds of railroads over generations of railroad managment and technological innovations. Some thought such standardization should be as simple to pull off as falling off a log.
http://cs.trains.com/trccs/forums/t/122674.aspx?PageIndex=1
The WMATA signal changes being attempted in this project are 'simple' when compared to the desire of standardized signal indications on all the carriers. The project deals with the change from one vendors product to another vendors similar product, with both vendors still being in business.
http://cs.trains.com/trccs/forums/t/155830.aspx?PageIndex=6
beaulieu [ snip] They finally got the circuit to work by boosting the power input. What would be the effect on the track circuit impedence bonds of operating at higher power than designed? [snip]
Heck, I've done that kind of dumb thing lots of times - though usually on smaller scale stuff, HO and O - so I can tell you the likely outcome: A small puff of smoke, and non-functionality. What more do they need to know ?
Spoke with the electronics repairman yesterday about my latest foray into such things, too - my stereo receiver/ amp will cost about $135 to fix - although, I had help with that one. Now you know why I stick with concrete and steel civil engineer kinds of things . . .
Yes it is a shame.
Other parts of the system were built using US&S modules and US&S bonds with no problems. It will eventually come out that this was a problem caused by conversion between the old system and the new system. The intermediary system with "new system bonds" and "old system modules" will be the cause of this accident.
It's very sad. Engineering simply was not done.
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