Paul_D_North_Jr However, I'll suggest breaking that down a little bit between: A.) Making more uniform just the Aspects that are displayed, their Names, and Indications; as distinguished from - B.) Standardizing the signal systems and circuits themselves, that are in the "background" so to speak, and not visible to the train crews. This is all the province of the signal engineers only, and that's where the serious money would be spent if this had to happen.
However, I'll suggest breaking that down a little bit between:
A.) Making more uniform just the Aspects that are displayed, their Names, and Indications; as distinguished from -
B.) Standardizing the signal systems and circuits themselves, that are in the "background" so to speak, and not visible to the train crews. This is all the province of the signal engineers only, and that's where the serious money would be spent if this had to happen.
For about $1 billion or so, it would probably be feasible to degrade all the aspecfs nationwide to a lowest-common denominator, and for another $1 billion or so, replace the worst-case scenario installations with new equipment, so that the LCD wasn't rock-bottom low. If anyone wants to claim that it's possible to "write a couple new lines of software" or "move some wires around" in an instrument house, I invite him to put his money where is mouth is and bid the work.
First, the NTSB always finds something wrong. That is what they do. And the don't have any responisiiblity for finding solutions that work, let alone paying for them. I had one dealing with the NTSB years ago. I also knew two individuals who worked for the NTSB. On the basis of that experience and those associations, as well as reading a lot of their reports, I cannot respect either the agency or its people.
Second, most of us (all of us?) hate accepting responsibility for our mistakes. This is especially true if there could be severe consequences. I have read the ICC train accident reports that are/were on line. It is interesting that in the second decade of the 20th century train crew members accepted responsiibility for mistakes. Starting in the 20s they stopped and started blaming the railroad.
Third, often railroaders (and non-railroaders), and most especially, their attorneys, will use any little deficiency on the part of the railroad as an excuse to avoid responisibility -- and/or -- make a financial windfall out of the accident. In this case the engineers, depending on how the legal system broke for them, could be looking at jail time or being independlently wealtnhy.
Fourth, Highway traffic signals are not all that uniform. How about making a left turn at a controlled intersection? You can go on a green, but first yielding to opposing traffic. Sometimes there is a sign reminding you to yield; sometimes not. If there is a signal that tells you when you can turn left, sometimes it is a green light and other times it is a green arrow. Sometimes the stop signal is a red light and sometimes it is a red arrow. Sometimes traffic turning and traffic going straight both have greens. Sometimes they don't. Sometimes the signals are mounted to the right, sometimes to the left and sometimes overhead. Sometimes the signals have light bulbs, sometimes LEDs and sometimes those highly focused signals you can't see from other lanes.
Shall the government standardize signal aspect and indications? Recently on Youtube I took a "train trip" riding the head end from Leipsig, Germany, to Nuremburg. I observed Germany's different color light systems, the older Hp (west) or Hl (east) and the newer Ks. I even saw several locations with semaphores. This is on a passenger-intensive double track mainline. Not exactly standardized
Take a look at the Canadian system. It is a lot more complex than anything in the USA. Not only do they have limited (45 MPH), medium (30 MPH), and slow speeds (15 MPH), they also have a newer "diverging" speed, (25 MPH.) Red over flashing green over steady green means something different than Red over steady green over flashing green.
When you standardize something, you limit the possibility that someone (or some railroad) will come up with something better.
It would be impossable to make a signalimg system too meet the needs of all railroads. Besides PTC will take over all freight-passenger lines by 2015.
The road to to success is always under construction. _____________________________________________________________________________ When the going gets tough, the tough use duct tape.
petitnjWhat is their problem? NTSB just nailed them to the wall for having multiple signalling systems. It that not enough of a warning? Or is the multimillions of law suits that follow cause them to make things consistent. This is not a hard problem. Upgrade all the signal systems so that yellow over red means the same in every system.
Consider the title query: "Why are U.S. Railroads resisting standardized signals?"
This question implies that some amorphous, unnamed and all-knowing government agency has asked the several carriers to standardize their signal systems. The title query also implies ("railroads resisting") that the carriers are not just resisting this "request," but actively colluding with one another, to forestall having to do so.
To respond, if, say, FRA (or any government agency which likewise wishes to impose its will over a bunch of greedy, profit seeking corporations -- think FDA, OSHA, EPA and the like) would have publicly urged or prodded the sluggardly carriers to adopt their measures, it would have conducted a lengthy publicity campaign -- speeches to labor organizations, shipper groups, leaks to the media -- to keep their request before the public and, more important, an ignorant Congress. This has not happened. Why not? Probably because the 'crats at FRA do not perceive an absence of railway signalling systems to be all that important in their ceaseless efforts to keep the rails safe for all of us.
With respect to the railroad industry that I grew up in, the "not invented here" mentality was alive and well. If our competitor uses product or system X, then by gar, we'll use Z. The idea that the carriers would collude in an area this arcane to preserve their right to purchase and employ (the military say deploy) the system they like best is ludicrous. Hey! They couldn't even collude competently to set their own rates.
But, speaking of ystems that need upgrading, the government-owned and operated air traffic control system is 40-some years old, uses vaccuum tubes instaed of solid state electronic, and some Third World -- yup, Third World -- countries have purchased more advanced systems than we have. Food for thought, and just a thought to leave us with...
Well, maybe another "beautiful theory murdered by a gang of brutal facts", or at least those devil-infested details. However, appreciating the time and thought of this repsonse, and continuing the discussion a little further, allow me to clarify and revise some aspects of it:
- Doesn't have to be nationwide - that may fairly be implied by what I wrote, but I didn't intend that. I know - then it's not uniform - but I'm just suggesting "more uniform" (whatever that means) - not total or blanket uniformity. (In my track-oriented world, the analogy would be something like requiring replacing all of the older heavy and still serviceable but now non-standard rail sections that are still in track with new 136-RE so that all the rail is the same - nice idea, but not necessary or cost-effective, doesn't improve anything much, etc.) Don's point is well-taken that a crew 1,500 miles away from the NEC doesn't need to know about the Amtrak flashing green for a high-speed cross-over. I believe that few (if any) railroad operating crews are responsible for more than several hundred miles of track from their home terminal, so if the rules are different on BNSF in Chicago than in LA, is there a real potential for harm there ? What I'm thinking of is more on a regional basis, esp. around Chicago, NYC, St. Louis, places like that where a crew could realistically have to run on several different railroads with several different signal systems in the course of a normal days work. Beyond that - use pilots.
- Degrading all the aspects to a lowest common denominator is not quite what I had in mind, either - certainly not to any point that the railroads would lose freight capacity, economic activity, and jobs. I take it that the concern here is something like discarding a high-speed system that uses multiple blocks and multiple signal heads, etc. for even farther advanced approach signals, back down to a simple 3-block R-Y-G system. Again, I'm not suggesting that level of uniformity. Instead, I see a distinction between a signal system that is supplemented with additional Aspects and Indications or is more sophisticated, with a system that has a flat-out conflict or incocnsistency or incompatibility in the Aspect or Indication with another local system. Kind of like the difference between the old simple 4-direction single-head highway traffic stoplight hanging over the middle of the intersection, and the modern multiple-head, multiple-phase turning lane intersections common in busy suburban areas. Yellow means it's about to turn Red, whether it's a solid light or a turn arrow.
- "Replacing the worst-case scenario installations with new equipment" - that's more like what I have in mind.
- A little while ago it occurred to me that perhaps Andy's point above can be restated thusly: "We've been depending on the 'soft-fix' of flexible humans to be the "work-around" or adapter between different or inconsistent signal systems, instead paying for and installing the 'hard fix' expenditure of wires, software, and new equipment." That's OK to some point, but with the building volume of rail traffic increasing the extent and frequency of such reliance on fallible humans for that coordination between signal systems may be having the unseen effect of chipping away at any built-in assumed and unstated institutional margin of safety. Such a dependence on humans is also inconsistent with and compromises the integrity of the intent of a fail-safe control system. My point - and perhaps Andy's too - is that we should view the system more broadly or holistically - it's more than just track circuits, relay cases, signals, and rule books. It also includes the humans whom we ultimately depend on to interpret and implement the mechanical parts in all kinds of conditions and across multiple territories. Although those components don't appear on a circuit diagram, we ignore the reliability of their function in the signal system at our peril.
- Not prepared to discuss the costs, potential benefits, and methodology or analyses of same until I have a better understanding of what the root problem is and the scope of likely possible solutions, and I know I'm not there yet (and may never be). I do concur completely with your point 1. about alternatives (although there are inherent disconnects there between what the railroads can do vis-a-vis society at large). To illustrate: If we put all of that $2 Billion into grade crossing protection upgrades - flashers and gates - we could do that at something like 8,000 to 10,000 crossings. That would put quite a dent in the hazardous crossing count and annual death toll from same - probably more so than such "fixes" to the signal systems ever would.
- Has any railroad, consultant, or government agency recently (last 15 years or so) and competently studied and reported on the actual cost* of eliminating the worst of the inconsistencies between signal indications ? Don't need to know who or when or any confidential or proprietary information - just curious what the NTSB or FRA may be getting us into if those recommendations are ever proposed to be implemented. If not, it might be a good idea for such a study to be done - if only as a defensive, self-preservation measure - to have "on the shelf" to be able to credibly argue the technical details and the cost-benefit problem to the FRA if it ever decides to mandate such a thing.
[* - Not challenging the basis or veracity of your figures, either.]
Enough for now - got to head off to something else. Good discussion - thanks for participating.
- Paul North.
The call for a standardized national railroad signal system is a straw dog being used to advance a political agenda. Making an analogy to the case for the national system of highway traffic control devices is weak because railroad trainmen do not circulate over the entire U.S. railroad system as highway users do on the national highway system. And even at that, the national highway system varies state by state. For that matter, systems vary from county to county, and motorists travel roads all around the world.
Carl
Railroader Emeritus (practiced railroading for 46 years--and in 2010 I finally got it right!)
CAACSCOCOM--I don't want to behave improperly, so I just won't behave at all. (SM)
There is no real such real thing as consistant natianal signal rules in large countries, exept possibly if the railway is government run nationaly and things have been fixed at ANY cost. Sure SMALL individual nations in Europe but collectively it still doesn't work there.
The railway network is NOT supposed to be at the cost of sending people to space with no return. It's supposed to be an ecconomical form of transport. In the USA it means large volumes of slower freight. In other countrys like Japan it may have a different meaning.,
I'm still agianst the "restriceing signal" indication for loaded passenger trains.
Also what if someone invents a better signal/control system then PTC before the entire network is completed? Do you complete the status plan or improve ther rest of the lines immediately making an inconsistant system again ?
Dumb question. If you do not have a standard signal system, Why not develop a data base on each rail line and the signal used on that line so that A strip map of signals could be displayed on a laptop. The crew would then be responsible for entering in the signal indications as they approached the signals and data base would in clear language state what the signal indication required and would also show track speed restrictions. This would be especially helpful for RR crews new to an area.
Rgds IGN
Railway Man Estimated costs for PTC have doubled in the last year, and then some; I would not be surprised to see the eventual cost in excess of $15 billion. Many people do not grasp that train-control systems are supposed to deliver efficiency as well as safety. It doesn't do much good to make the system so safe that the efficiency results in bankruptcy of the railways, unless, that happens to be your goal. The Class Is are determined to extract efficiency value from their multibillion dollar investment in PTC. That is going to be an interesting challenge. I haven't decided yet whether I'm having fun yet, though. RWM
Estimated costs for PTC have doubled in the last year, and then some; I would not be surprised to see the eventual cost in excess of $15 billion.
Many people do not grasp that train-control systems are supposed to deliver efficiency as well as safety. It doesn't do much good to make the system so safe that the efficiency results in bankruptcy of the railways, unless, that happens to be your goal. The Class Is are determined to extract efficiency value from their multibillion dollar investment in PTC. That is going to be an interesting challenge. I haven't decided yet whether I'm having fun yet, though.
RWM
Great. Just freaking great.
We've now got another government imposed very expensive solution in search of a problem. It isn't like the wealth needed to install this PTC boondogle is just laying there. It has to be created. Wasting the wealth (which you create through your work and investments) on projects such as PTC, which may or may not produce efficiencies to pay for itself, is not good economic sense. It will make us less well off.
Let's see, in this particular case a government employed locomotive engineer didn't understand a signal indication. A second government employed locomotive engineer was present and flat out told him he was wrong. He disregarded her, and in doing so blatently violated railroading's first commandment: "When in doubt, take the safe course of action." (If any part of his "reason" for disregarding her was based on the fact that she was "just a girl", it's sickening. Any man who thinks that way doesn't belong in any position of responsibility.)
The proposed solution to the government putting a less than adequate person in control of a loaded passenger train is, of course, a government mandated, very expensive, very wasteful, system that will reduce to an extent, but not totally eliminate, train collisions.
$15 billion is a lot of wealth to risk on an untried system that may or may not produce significant efficiencies. I think the goal may well be, as noted above, to bankrupt the railroads through this mandate. Then they will need government (as in our) money. This means governmet control. Not our control, although it will be our money (wealth). We won't have a thing to say about things. The connected power brokers will be in charge.
The neo-fascists will cheer.
We have a rulebook that outlines the signals we use. It is part of our job to KNOW what the signals mean. We run on the same territories over and over, so there aren't really "new crews" to an area. There comes a time when you have to stop dumbing down the craft and start hiring smarter people.
As far as standardizing: NS in the former conrail areas recently went from NORAC (a standardized rulebook for several RRs) to their own "hillbilly" rulebook. But it had to have extra pages added to take into account the former Conrail signals. Sigh.
narig01 Dumb question. If you do not have a standard signal system, Why not develop a data base on each rail line and the signal used on that line so that A strip map of signals could be displayed on a laptop. The crew would then be responsible for entering in the signal indications as they approached the signals and data base would in clear language state what the signal indication required and would also show track speed restrictions. This would be especially helpful for RR crews new to an area. Rgds IGN
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.
Paul d north I have read your rants on here for 2 pages now like a teenager know-it-all and not listening to anything. Then you stated above that your not wanting standardization country wide just maybe in places like chicago st.louis nyc bla bla bla. Listen up. the signals are standard and when you get into yard limits its is really more standard. I said in my post ( if you cared to read it) that im qualified on over 350 miles of trackage, and run over 7 differant railroads and the signal systems they use. I run in st.louis and I cant recall any big wrecks due to signals. and that is the first in chicago i ever heard of. Now about 2 years ago the trra in st.louis changed the signals on thier property. it took 1 trip to get familar with the indications they use. they use basic abs then tc control and now a system that the UP uses ( gcor maybe) regaurdless ive past the test 100% conductors ive worked with and listen to on the radio still dont call them right and they have the know - it - all mentality ( meaning you cant tell them anything) . Now For what people are missing here. You can have signals for anything and that your blaming the signals for the wreck. but when you run on someone elses road they have time table instructions, and if you remeber there is a thing called a rule book ( I know you know what im saying you recited from that bible several times) In that rule book there is a rule stating that In yard limits when running on anything other than a clear is to be considered a restricting signal.
Wabash....well said. In any job there are responsibilities that are attached to that job. You are supposed to know the rules. This person didnt. Nor did this person take the advice of a qualified engineer in the cab. Even if there was a disagreement over the signals, why didnt the engineer at least take the "safe course"?
I have a little reading on this to do this weekend to get up to speed, but several frightening questions are beginning to develop including why was this engineer allowed to operate on a railroad in which he did not understand the rules? In a area as congested as Chicago, it was only a matter of time before the "restricting" aspect would have been faced.
Nor do I care that the relief engineer "was a girl" in a man's environment. She had a responsibility to the passengers. When in question, whip out the CORA and put it in his face. "THIS IS A RESTRICTING SIGNAL. SHUT THIS TRAIN DOWN NOW."
Regarding the PTC system...are there no efficiency studies indicating the ROI?
ed
They already have that -- it's the signal aspects and indications page in their employee timetables. No battery required.
MP173Regarding the PTC system...are there no efficiency studies indicating the ROI? ed
Sort of ... there's been some efforts to look at it. But since the details of the implementation are very complex and affect just about everything that happens on the railway (for example, hundreds of people are at present trying designing the communications systems protocols and architecture) it's not possible yet to project with accuracy the effects or the costs. The industry consensus, however, remains that PTC may generate a net positive cash flow when it's all said and done. But the intrinsic manner in which the positive benefit will be distributed across the railway industry will not raise all boats equally.
greyhounds Great. Just freaking great. We've now got another government imposed very expensive solution in search of a problem. It isn't like the wealth needed to install this PTC boondogle is just laying there. It has to be created. Wasting the wealth (which you create through your work and investments) on projects such as PTC, which may or may not produce efficiencies to pay for itself, is not good economic sense. It will make us less well off. Let's see, in this particular case a government employed locomotive engineer didn't understand a signal indication. A second government employed locomotive engineer was present and flat out told him he was wrong. He disregarded her, and in doing so blatently violated railroading's first commandment: "When in doubt, take the safe course of action." (If any part of his "reason" for disregarding her was based on the fact that she was "just a girl", it's sickening. Any man who thinks that way doesn't belong in any position of responsibility.) The proposed solution to the government putting a less than adequate person in control of a loaded passenger train is, of course, a government mandated, very expensive, very wasteful, system that will reduce to an extent, but not totally eliminate, train collisions. $15 billion is a lot of wealth to risk on an untried system that may or may not produce significant efficiencies. I think the goal may well be, as noted above, to bankrupt the railroads through this mandate. Then they will need government (as in our) money. This means governmet control. Not our control, although it will be our money (wealth). We won't have a thing to say about things. The connected power brokers will be in charge. The neo-fascists will cheer.
I don't think it's entirely fair to call it untried -- I've been around it long enough to have confidence it will work. This is not saying that someone can just run over to Best Buy, plug it in, and turn it on. There's a lot of work to do, but I don't think anyone in the rail industry involved in PTC is dubious that we can't resolve all the details.
Railway Man I don't think it's entirely fair to call it untried -- I've been around it long enough to have confidence it will work. This is not saying that someone can just run over to Best Buy, plug it in, and turn it on. There's a lot of work to do, but I don't think anyone in the rail industry involved in PTC is dubious that we can't resolve all the details. RWM
spokyoneBut just when everyone thinks all the details have been resolved, a string of events will occur in a certain way that no one thought of, then a crash will occur because we do not have an experienced human in charge
PTC hasn't been touted as a replacement for a live crew yet.
But never underestimate the ingenuity of the human mind. If a crew member can figure out a way to circumvent the system and make their job "easier," they will, until something happens (usually bad) to expose it.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Railway Man MP173 Regarding the PTC system...are there no efficiency studies indicating the ROI? ed Sort of ... there's been some efforts to look at it. But since the details of the implementation are very complex and affect just about everything that happens on the railway (for example, hundreds of people are at present trying designing the communications systems protocols and architecture) it's not possible yet to project with accuracy the effects or the costs. The industry consensus, however, remains that PTC may generate a net positive cash flow when it's all said and done. But the intrinsic manner in which the positive benefit will be distributed across the railway industry will not raise all boats equally. RWM
MP173 Regarding the PTC system...are there no efficiency studies indicating the ROI? ed
This, of course, also means that it may not generate a net positive cash flow.
$15 Billion is an awfully big bet on something that no one has good confidence in.
Railway Man greyhounds Great. Just freaking great. We've now got another government imposed very expensive solution in search of a problem. It isn't like the wealth needed to install this PTC boondogle is just laying there. It has to be created. Wasting the wealth (which you create through your work and investments) on projects such as PTC, which may or may not produce efficiencies to pay for itself, is not good economic sense. It will make us less well off. Yadda, Yadda, Yadda. (I edited out some stuff here) $15 billion is a lot of wealth to risk on an untried system that may or may not produce significant efficiencies. I think the goal may well be, as noted above, to bankrupt the railroads through this mandate. Then they will need government (as in our) money. This means governmet control. Not our control, although it will be our money (wealth). We won't have a thing to say about things. The connected power brokers will be in charge. The neo-fascists will cheer. I don't think it's entirely fair to call it untried -- I've been around it long enough to have confidence it will work. This is not saying that someone can just run over to Best Buy, plug it in, and turn it on. There's a lot of work to do, but I don't think anyone in the rail industry involved in PTC is dubious that we can't resolve all the details. RWM
greyhounds Great. Just freaking great. We've now got another government imposed very expensive solution in search of a problem. It isn't like the wealth needed to install this PTC boondogle is just laying there. It has to be created. Wasting the wealth (which you create through your work and investments) on projects such as PTC, which may or may not produce efficiencies to pay for itself, is not good economic sense. It will make us less well off. Yadda, Yadda, Yadda. (I edited out some stuff here) $15 billion is a lot of wealth to risk on an untried system that may or may not produce significant efficiencies. I think the goal may well be, as noted above, to bankrupt the railroads through this mandate. Then they will need government (as in our) money. This means governmet control. Not our control, although it will be our money (wealth). We won't have a thing to say about things. The connected power brokers will be in charge. The neo-fascists will cheer.
Yadda, Yadda, Yadda. (I edited out some stuff here)
You are most correct. I should have worded that better. I should have used the word "unproven" instead of the word "untried".
What I was trying to say was that PTC has not been shown to produce the sufficient efficiencies required to justify its huge cost when adopted on a universal basis as mandated by the government. It was a failure on my part to properly express my thoughts. I apologize.
I too have been around long enough to have great confidence that the PTC system can be made to work. All it will take will be a lot of money, time and effort. What I have no confidence in is a command economy under which the universal adoption of PTC is mandated by the government instead of being adopted on a case by case basis after a careful cost/benifit analysis done by the entity that will bear the cost and enjoy the benifits. Will the benifits outweigh the costs of the money, time and effort spent on this thing? Who the Hell knows? And $15 Billion is one Hell of a bet on something that has never been proven to produce significant savings on a universal basis.
If I had to bet my own money, and I do bet my own money from time to time, I'd bet that PTC has a high probability of paying off on busy routes such as the Northern Transcon west of Casselton, ND where the double track ends. I'd also bet that it has almost no probability of paying off on low density lines such as CN's Iowa line. So why the mandate for universal adoption?
I'll refrain from going political here.
tree68But never underestimate the ingenuity of the human mind. If a crew member can figure out a way to circumvent the system and make their job "easier," they will, until something happens (usually bad) to expose it.
When you build an idiot-proof system, the universe responds by creating more ingenious idiots.
Greyhounds and Andy:
Actually the safety value of PTC can be calcuated with a good level of precision. The structure-and-logic goes like this:
Effects of PTC and whether they are net cash flow positive are:
Net-net: positive enough that the Class 1s did not flinch to much when the RSIA passed, did they?
Two observations:
Lawsuits costs have reached the point where awards are well beyond reasonable damages (yes I hear you - what is reasonable). Lawsuits are filed for frivolous claims and some tort lawyers encourage them because a settlement is too frequently made just to avoid the costs even though the defendent would likely win. If we adopt the UK system where the loser in a civil suit has to pay the winners costs much of this would go away. Therefore litigation costs are too inflated and should be judged accordingly in any cost/benefit analysis.
We should recognize the cost of bureaucracy in enforcing these mandates knowing up-front that bureaucracies almost never go away. How long before the ICC went away and was then replaced by another bureaucracy? The administrative costs, and the always present bureaucratic inefficiency, are huge. And even these costs do not take into account the cost of these employees after they retire with a very short span of actual working time. Just talk to the retired government employees who have worked twenty years and retired to see what a deal they have. And some double-dip by taking another government job.
So perhaps positive train control should be slowly initiated where passenger service operates, but on commuter lines first where the passenger density is greatest.
Diningcar:
I have to project costs given likely outcomes -- and a massive re-ordering of the U.S. method of assessing and costing liability is not a likely outcome. There's no will by the public for it, in fact, the public seems to be more interested in making even more certainty that if anything goes wrong, someone will pay.
Ironically it's the lack of an FRA bureaucracy to administer PTC that worries us. There's no assurance that the FRA will be able to turn around in a timely manner the flood of documentation it requires. But once the systems are implemented, the FRA oversight and required bureaucracy is pretty minimal. I don't see a long-term monster here.
I think the possibility that PTC will be concentrated on commuter lines will "come to the front" when the resources are allocated -- because there won't be enough people to make this happen everywhere on the timetable requested in the Rail Safety Improvement Act.
Railway Man Greyhounds and Andy: Actually the safety value of PTC can be calcuated with a good level of precision. The structure-and-logic goes like this: Assess historic rates and rates-of-change of occurrence for authority excursions including work-zone violations, open-switch derailments, and overspeed derailments. Project the percentage at which these result in property damage or human casualty using historic factors. Assess using historic factors and current-day multipliers the cost of these events. Determine which types of these events are likely to be prevented by PTC. Compare that to the overall rate. Determine a multiplier (less than 1.0). Factor in the cost of money. Factor in the trend rate of tort claim values (multiplier may or may not be greater than 1.0) Build a formula, plug in the variables. Use statistics to determine confidence intervals. [emphasis added - PDN; snip of list of PTC effects on net cash flow]
[emphasis added - PDN; snip of list of PTC effects on net cash flow]
For what it's worth, I understand that insurance carriers - in evaluating the proabable costs of future claims - take the following approach, such as for worker's compensation, automobile, and general liability:
A. Evaluate and determine the frequency or probablility of accidents or events (1. above);
B. Assign a likely typical cost to each event, based on historical experience (3. above, plus maybe 6. above, too).
C. Multiply A times B = likely claims.
Note that this excludes the effects of 2. = percentage of events that cause property damage or casualty (injury or death). The basis for this - as I understand it - is that any accident has the potential for being costly; whether it actually turns out to be or not (i.e., "no harm - no foul - no cost") is a matter of fortunate happenstance. As such, any accidents or events with minimal damage payouts are not something to be relied upon for the insured's benefit (and to the insurance company's possible future detriment) - essentially, the insured's past good luck. From the insurance company's perspective, most of the risk is in the happening of the accident or event in the first place, not the magnitude of the resulting damages.
Personally, I disagree with this approach, at least when the statistical sample is large enough - I think the methodology outlined by RWM above is more defensible. Interestingly, that methodology also generally parallels the theory and procedure of the legal system and the classic 4-stage trial process for determining the amount of damages in tort/ negligence-type claims: First, determine fault (1 - duty & 2 - breach of same ) = happening of the accident; next 3 - causation/ responsibility (the PTC analysis might not need to take that into account, though - just assumes that the RR will be 100 % responsible); then 4 - damages ($ amount); and lastly, any "special damages" (punitive damages additive or multiplier, attorney's fees, etc.). As such it will seem pretty familiar to that community of reviewers and "stakeholders".
As to diningcar's comment regarding the "beyond reasonable" magnitude of present-day tort awards: Certainly that's true, but any analysis of alternatives should use those higher figures anyway, at least until it's clear that they've gotten back under control. Otherwise, for example, the administrative risk is that the reserve for claims will be drastically underfunded - say, they were calculated at an avergae of $500,000, but have turned out to be $1 million each. Here, the decision risk is that the wrong or a less-than-optimum decision will be made because the wrong values were used for data inputs. That would result in skewing the selected alternate towards less PTC and more risk of claims. However, the claims will then be higher than anticipated, so the system will appear to be not performing as well as expected or promised.
Of course, using the current inflated levels of tort claims in the analysis will have a skewed effect, too - more safety equipment (PTC) than would be objectively justified from a realistic view of the probable damage payouts. Nevertheless, that is more defensible position and result - if you think differently, read a history of the mid-1970's Ford Pinto gas tank fires, and the punitive damage awards for the resulting injuries. That happened when it was discovered and presented to the juries that - horrors* ! - those cold*, calculating Ford engineers and risk managers had actually assigned a dollar value to human lives, and then calculated the risk of injury and death claims from using thin-shelled gas tanks vulnerably mounted near the rear axle - all in the name of light weight and better fuel mileage, of course. We wouldn't want to risk that happening to the RR industry now, would we ?
[* - some cynicism and heavy sarcasm in here]
Railway Man A quick point on PTC: 99% of the U.S. will be one of two systems. The "Class 1" universe will all be on a Wabtec platform, which is locomotive-based, peer-to-peer with wayside interface units. UP is proceeding on a "vital" pathway where the PTC will be its own Method of Operation whereas BNSF is proceeding on a "non-vital" pathway with the PTC being an overlay on existing Methods of Operation such as CTC and TWC. NS appears so far to be leaning toward the vital path, CSX hasn't announced, and CN, CPR and KCS are not yet to that level of analysis. The Northeast Corridor universe will all be on the ACSES platform, which is a development of existing cab-signal systems. A few railroads which do not touch either of those universes can do something else, for example, the Alaska Railroad is well along on a US&S wayside-based platform. Some of the commuter railways are stating they would prefer an evolved intermittant cab-signal system such as what GETS has provided for TriMet on the new Beaverton-Wilsonville, Oregon, commuter line. But if they touch a Class 1, that probably won't fly unless they want to dual-equip. Estimated costs for PTC have doubled in the last year, and then some; I would not be surprised to see the eventual cost in excess of $15 billion. Many people do not grasp that train-control systems are supposed to deliver efficiency as well as safety. It doesn't do much good to make the system so safe that the efficiency results in bankruptcy of the railways, unless, that happens to be your goal. The Class Is are determined to extract efficiency value from their multibillion dollar investment in PTC. That is going to be an interesting challenge. I haven't decided yet whether I'm having fun yet, though. RWM
A quick point on PTC:
99% of the U.S. will be one of two systems. The "Class 1" universe will all be on a Wabtec platform, which is locomotive-based, peer-to-peer with wayside interface units. UP is proceeding on a "vital" pathway where the PTC will be its own Method of Operation whereas BNSF is proceeding on a "non-vital" pathway with the PTC being an overlay on existing Methods of Operation such as CTC and TWC. NS appears so far to be leaning toward the vital path, CSX hasn't announced, and CN, CPR and KCS are not yet to that level of analysis. The Northeast Corridor universe will all be on the ACSES platform, which is a development of existing cab-signal systems. A few railroads which do not touch either of those universes can do something else, for example, the Alaska Railroad is well along on a US&S wayside-based platform. Some of the commuter railways are stating they would prefer an evolved intermittant cab-signal system such as what GETS has provided for TriMet on the new Beaverton-Wilsonville, Oregon, commuter line. But if they touch a Class 1, that probably won't fly unless they want to dual-equip.
spokyoneWill the systems you mentioned still allow a dispatcher to enable two trains to occupy one block for efficiency? (Pere Marquette)
Will the systems you mentioned still allow a dispatcher to enable two trains to occupy one block for efficiency? (Pere Marquette)
Yes, just like it's done everywhere in the U.S. at present. In some cases both trains will be at restricted speed, in other cases only the following train.
Maybe it's just me on a Monday, but I took spokyone's question as having a dose or irony or cynicism in it - the Pere Marquette reference as being to the Amtrak train that collided with a stopped NS intermodal train ahead of it, after passing a "Restricting" signal (15 MPH max., and able to stop within 1/2 range of vision, etc.) to allow it to close up on the NS train, because the Amtrak engineer mistakenly interpreted the signal as "Approach" (30 MPH max, able to stop at next signal).
So, a few clarifying questions:
Would PTC's enabling the DS to permit 2 trains in the same block defeat the purpose of PTC and still allow this kind of accident to happen ? My understanding is that no, it won't, because:
A) PTC will keep a "tighter leash" on the following train when the DS allows a following train into an occupied block, by enforcing the actual speed limits of the signal - not over 15 MPH, instead of the mistaken 30 MPH (let alone the actual 40 MPH that the Amtrak train got up to); and,
B) PTC will also "know" where the rear of the preceding train is, and so how far the head end of the following train has to go before they would collide, as well as the braking performance ("curve") of the following train. Thus, PTC will continuously monitor the situation (via GPS, track "tags", and axle "distance" counters, etc.) and if the following train gets close to not being able to "stop within 1/2 range of vision" for that speed, the the PTC will enforce that as well by making a brake application.
Are my understandings above correct, or am I missing something here ?
Now for the zinger: How wil the PTC know or deal with the "range of vision calculation" ? Suppose at 15 MPH the stopping distance for the following train is 500 ft. (made-up value for this question). But, account of site (and sight) conditions - such as on a sharper curve and on the inside of the cruve is either a parallel retaining wall, train with high cars on an adjacent track, and/ or close vegetation - the range of vision is less than twice that stopping distance - say, less than 1,000 ft. Or worse yet, say the sight distance is less than the actual 500 ft. stopping distance - I could see (pun !) that happening with the train-on-adjoining-inside-track scenario. Will the PTC be programmed to be able to take such things into account - that the sight distance might be restricted by "permanent" site conditions at certain locations such as the retaining wall, semi-permanent such as the vegetation (kind of like a temporary "slow order"*), or really temporary and transient conditions like the train on the adjoining track ? What a programming and implementation headache/ nightmare that could / will be ? Wow . . .
[* - not going to think about adjusting the vision range calculation for vegetation conditions as the deciduous leaves change each season - unless arborists are going to be hired as well to implement this ? ]
Any thought or responses will be interesting, I'm sure. Thanks.
Our community is FREE to join. To participate you must either login or register for an account.