Is that a question, or an opinion? If it's an opinion, then I can not help you.
RWM
petitnjWhat is their problem? NTSB just nailed them to the wall for having multiple signalling systems. It that not enough of a warning? Or is the multimillions of law suits that follow cause them to make things consistent. This is not a hard problem. Upgrade all the signal systems so that yellow over red means the same in every system.
One answer: cost. It would take billions to standardize everything. Billions that an be better spent (IMO) elsewhere. On all my territory yellow over red means approach (unless its a dwarf, then its a slow approach). If I ran somewhere where it meant different, then I guess I'd have to learn it. That's the definition of being qualified.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.
This is about the NTSB findings on the wreck of the Pere Marquette on the south side of Chicago a couple of years ago (see the April 1 "Newswire"). The recommendations were for positive train control and uniform signal rules.
We debated signal uniformity back when the accident happened--Positive Train Control requirements have since come about, and PTC probably would make the confusion meaningless, if nothing else. Or perhaps, since PTC has to be a standardized system, it may require remaining signals (and their rules) to become more standardized.
BTW, I'm kind of smug about being the first person in that earlier thread to come up with what turned out to be the actual cause of this wreck. Guess I'm in the wrong side of business!
But I agree with Zug--in the here and now, you have to know all of your signal systems to be truly qualified on a territory,
Carl
Railroader Emeritus (practiced railroading for 46 years--and in 2010 I finally got it right!)
CAACSCOCOM--I don't want to behave improperly, so I just won't behave at all. (SM)
Even traffic signals aren't really standardized - I can think of several ways that left turns are handled, and that can vary even within one municipality. Ever sit an an unfamiliar intersection, wondering if/when the light was going to change in your favor?
The basics of railroad signalling are there, and are actually fairly consistent across the country, from what I've seen. Yes, there are differences. Many are location specific, so making them consistent with every place else will require an extensive survey of the entire rail system to see if there is anywhere else like them so the aspects can be made the same. That might not be worth the cost.
It does come down to money - new electronics, etc. It also comes down to whose system becomes the standard. In simplest terms (and we all know it won't be simple), with seven class ones, six will be learning some new signal aspects.
In the meantime, as others have said, you have to know your territory.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
The NTSB's charge is to describe what it would take for perfect safety. How it is paid for, or whether there are more effective means of spending the same amount of money to obtain even more safety, is not their charge. Just because the NTSB recommends something doesn't mean it is cost-effective, except for fanatics who live in alternative realities where money costs nothing.
PTC renders it all moot anyway. Alas, for the small minority of railfans who believe that signal aspects should be according to their ideas of what is perfect, the signal aspects will not change, at first roll-out of PTC. Eventually all the signals will go away, and with it the aspects, as PTC renders them superfluous, but I expect that 50 years from now there will still be fanatics arguing over which signal aspect system was the "correct" signal aspect system, just as they still argue over which steam engine was the "best" 50 years after the last of them was melted into rebar.
I am under the impression that American railroads are private enterprise. They, not the US Government,control their respective right of ways including signaling. I thought that all crews had to understand the rulebook.I thought that dispachers were company and not federal employees
In Britain,even after nationalization,there was no standardized signaling. The Great Western used lower quadrant semaphores and seachlight signals,not usually seen on the other three companies that became British Railways.GWR engines also had right hand drive,unique to the GWR.The LMS LNER and Southern all used upper quadrant semaphores and had left hand drive. In 1956 there was a serious accident with fatalities when the crew missed a restrictive signal.The engine assigned to the train was a Britannia class 4-6-2 with left hand drive. The track was ex-GWR and so was the crew.The train's driver(engineer) told investigators that the accident would not have happened if they would have been assigned a Castle class 4-6-0, a GWR engine.It was considered a pretty lame excuse. There were many times that crews had to operate a locomotive where seeing signals would be a problem. Even before World War II,the GWR had trackage rights over other lines in which they used their own locomotives.Doesn't it get back to trainning and the rulebook !
Even with the lack of a single standard system, I would have to say that the accidents caused by mis-interpretation do to a lack of knowing the meaning of the signal are extremely rare. I'd venture a guess that simply misreading a signal happens more frequently. That is, for example, the engineer faces a yellow aspect and in his mind decides it is a less restrictive flashing yellow. The single standard system doesn't solve that problem.
"We have met the enemy and he is us." Pogo Possum "We have met the anemone... and he is Russ." Bucky Katt "Prediction is very difficult, especially if it's about the future." Niels Bohr, Nobel laureate in physics
Interesting that you mention flashing signals. Everywhere I know of, with one exception, flashing is "better" than not flashing. The theory is that if the flashing circuit quits, then you either get the more restrictive steady indication or you get a dark signal - which is the same as the most restrictive signal that could be displayed.
The one exception is one of the newest aspects in NA RRing. Amtrak has a "flashing green" which is used for diverging moves on their high speed Xovers. I suspect it was cheaper to come up with a "vital" flashing circuit for a few locations, than any other possible solution.
Some roads use signals to indicate diverging or normal routes thru switches (clear vs. diverging clear) and some use signals to also indicate the permissible speed (clear vs medium clear (30 mph) for a #15 or limited clear (40 or 45 mph) for a #20) and some use signalling to control civil speeds (curves, etc.) It would seem to me that creating a national standard around these would be difficult. You either have to just do the lowest common denominator, leaving everything else wide open (e.g. red over green would be approach diverging with no speed implications. RR #1 would use timetable to specify speed. RR#2 could use red over green to mean 30 mph and red over flashing green to mean 40 mph.) or you tie down everything meaning red over green means 30 mph regadles of turnout geometry. If RR#2 wants 40 mph, they have to upgrade to display red over flashing green. It also would mean that every engr. and conductor would have to be qualified on every signal indication everywhere. A BNSF crew out of Alliance NE would have to know that flashing green means 80 mph through the crossover - even if the only place it's displayed is 1500 miles away on the NEC.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
I asked about this some time ago on this forum and I'm surpised that this thread didn't meet with the same end that mine did. I got a scathing post that instructed me to shut up because signal systems have to be different for reasons that he said were so complex that I could not possibly understand.
PTC is basically everyone starting from scratch, so there is not a variety of systems needing to be standardized. As has been pointed out, signals vary from railroad to railroad (and within railroads). Which one do you pick as best? Who gets the economic advantage in already having that system so they don't need to change while all the others do? Which signal company wins the lottery and puts all the others out of business because they make the winning system?
petitnjAnd the traffic lights and signs in the U.S. are standardized according to the U. S. Dept of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices.
The signals are standardized - the applications not so much. This is best illustrated in the variety of left turn set-ups you can find, often in the same city. This is roughly analagous to the specialized signal aspects found at interlockings.
How many years did it take for "right turn on red" to make it across the country?
But you are right - on the highway Red means stop, Green means go. Amber does take on some interesting interpretations, though, ranging from "proceed with caution" to "hurry up before the light turns."
And the signals on the railroads mean the same thing in a large percentage of the cases. The devil is in the details.
For those of us who like to look at the actual NTSB documents ("source" data), below are the links to the available documents and my few comments. The NTSB's final report (many pages) hasn't been finalized yet, so that's why it's not included.
The most interesting aspect of this to me is that one of he FRA regulations actually requires essentially that for railroad signals, Red = Stop, Green = Proceed, and Yellow (or Lunar) = Stop May Be Required. Aside from providing some sense of rationality to the system (and furnishing hope that someday I'll understand it better), since the Amtrak engineer was looking at a Red over Yellow I have to wonder what he was expecting to happen - what part of "might have to stop" did he not understand ? More importantly, as some of the comments above state, this is already is a standard or uniform system for signals !
The actual text of the regulation is also below, from:
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2008/octqtr/pdf/49cfr236.23.pdf
None of this is very difficult reading - I recommend it.
- Paul North.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
§ 236.23 Aspects and indications.
(d) The fundamental indications of signal aspects shall conform to the following: (1) A red light, a series of horizontal lights or a semaphore blade in a horizontal position shall be used to indicate stop.
(d) The fundamental indications of signal aspects shall conform to the following:
(1) A red light, a series of horizontal lights or a semaphore blade in a horizontal position shall be used to indicate stop.
(2) A yellow light, a lunar light, or a series of lights or a semaphore blade in the upper or lower quadrant at an angle of approximately 45 degrees to the vertical, shall be used to indicate that speed is to be restricted and stop may be required.
(3) A green light, a series of vertical lights, or a semaphore blade in a vertical position in the upper quadrant or 60
NTSB Board Meetings & Press Conferences:
http://www.ntsb.gov/Events/Boardmeeting.htm - for/ on March 31, 2009
NTSB Press Release (2 pages): http://www.ntsb.gov/Pressrel/2009/090331.html
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: March 31, 2009 SB-09-12
NTSB DETERMINED ENGINEER'S INACCURATE INTERPRETATION OF SIGNAL LED TO CAUSE OF AN AMTRAK ACCIDENT IN CHICAGO
NTSB Abstract / Synopsis (3 pages):
http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2009/RAR0901.html
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARDPublic Meeting of March 31, 2009(Information subject to editing)
Railroad Accident ReportCollision of Amtrak Pssenger Train 371 and Norfolk Southern Railway Freight Train 23M near Chicago, IllinoisNovember 30, 2007NTSB/RAR-09/01
NTSB Board Meeting Presentations:
http://www.ntsb.gov/Events/2009/Chicago-IL/presentations.htm
Although these are the PDF versions, PPT ("PowerPoinT") is also available:
1.) Investigator In Chief (IIC) Presentation (877 KB in size, 25 pages):
http://www.ntsb.gov/Events/2009/Chicago-IL/Chicago_3-31-09_IIC.pdf
The side view photo of the loco mounted up on the container car below on Page 2 of 25 is very dramatic.
Page 12 of 25: Engineer Called the Signal
•
Page 23 of 25: Different Signal Indications
[ Red 0 over Yellow 0 displayed in both graphics]
• Amtrak Terminal - Slow Approach [not exceeding 30 MPH - PDN]
• Stop at the next signal
• Expect a clear track
Conclusions:
(Page 18 of 25)
The engineer misinterpreted and miscalled the signal at Englewood which resulted in the operation of the Amtrak train at a speed greater than authorized ,and when challenged by the relief engineer, the engineer failed to slow or stop the train while he and the relief engineer discussed their differences in understanding the signal displayed at Englewood.
(Page 19 of 25)
The relief engineer failed to communicate effectively and in a timely manner to the engineer that he had miscalled the restricting signal at Englewood interlocking and failed to then take action herself to stop the train after the engineer did not slow or stop the train when challenged.
(Page 20 of 25)
Multiple Signal Systems
(Page 21 of 25)
- Red light must indicate Stop - Green light must indicate Proceed - Yellow light or lunar light must indicate Restricted and Stop May Be Required
- Red light must indicate Stop
- Green light must indicate Proceed
- Yellow light or lunar light must indicate Restricted and Stop May Be Required
(Page 22 of 25)
Adjoining Railroads
(Page 24 of 25)
The lack of uniform meanings of signal aspects can lead to misinterpetation, as demonstrated by this accident.
2.) Human Performance and Emergency Response Presentation (284 KB in size, 6 pages):
http://www.ntsb.gov/Events/2009/Chicago-IL/Chicago_3-31_09_Performance.pdf
Note that the "Accident Engineer's Exam Results" (Page 3 of 6) states and indicates that he initially failed two signals tests (Amtrak and NORAC*) on his 1st attempt, passed NORAC but failed Amtrak on his 2nd attempt, and then passed Amtrak on his 3rd attempt.
* Misidentified Restricting as a Slow Approach
Note that this is the same mistake as was made in the collision !
3.) Survival Factors Presentation (1.63 MB in size, 10 pages)
http://www.ntsb.gov/Events/2009/Chicago-IL/Chicago_3-31_09_survival.pdf
The Crew Extrication photos on Pages 4 (crew seats), 5 (loco from below), and 7 (loco access points, from above) of 10 are pretty dramatic.
Do we have TORT LAWYERS or their SURROGATES using this site, and if so what are they seeking???
If not then those who continue to press on with this question (which has been responded to in detail) should clearly identify their motivations.
Signal systems...even when implemented on the now Fallen Flag carriers were installed over time...the time required to come up with both the traffic to require signaling an the funds to be able to install it. No Class I Carrier ever went from being non-signaled to totally signaled in one fell swoop at one time with a single technology. As time and technology march on from innovation to innovation signaling technology also moves on from innovation to innovation. As each new segment of signaling was installed, the latest 'proven' technology was installed in the new segment. Even if original segment 1 and newly installed segment 99 display the same physical signal aspects....the technology underlying those aspect is totally different. The foregoing presumes that the management of the signal system remains constant.
Consistent management is something that never occurs in large organizations. People retire, people die, people get promoted, people get fired, people leave for other companies and the hallmark of management is, like dogs, they have to leave their marks on their territory. Even if Management A had achieved PERFECTION, Management B has to change it. Now if you view the Fallen Flag carriers from the approximate time electrical signalling was begun to being installed in the approximation of 1900, and factor in that senior Signalling Management changed approximately every 7 to 10 years or so on each of the Fallen Flag carriers, factor in the changing of technology with multiple signal equipment manufacturers over these times, multiplied by the number of Fallen Flag carriers that now make up the current Class I carriers you will begin to see the the complexity of the installed signal infrastructure that currently exists in the industry.
Even if unlimited funds were available to finance total standardization of all signal systems in the industry...the manufacturing capacity and installation manpower to implement and TEST the implementation would require at least a decade to accomplish...during which time technological improvement will occur and will be implemented, thus either breaking the standardization or not be implemented thus leaving efficiency and economy behind.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
petitnj This is how our system works: 1) Free enterprise resists change 2) Government steps in to standardize things 3) Free enterprise resists further until they are sued or go out of business.
I'm not sure I can agree with your line of thinking here. Can you provide a couple examples where this has happened in the past?
You seem to be jumping to the conclusion that non-standardized signals are the root of the problem. The industry may believe the root of the problem is operators not following the signals. In your scenario, after the government forces the *free enterprise* railroads to fix what the govenment sees as the problem, the problems will still occur. After that, who do you sue, and what will the government standardize then?
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
petitnj This is how our system works: 1) Free enterprise resists change 2) Government steps in to standardize things 3) Free enterprise resists further until they are sued or go out of business. And the traffic lights and signs in the U.S. are standardized according to the U. S. Dept of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. (http://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/)
This is how our system works: 1) Free enterprise resists change 2) Government steps in to standardize things 3) Free enterprise resists further until they are sued or go out of business. And the traffic lights and signs in the U.S. are standardized according to the U. S. Dept of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. (http://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/)
It's obvious that the historical record, facts, reason and logic mean nothing to this poster.
Does he even know about "In the Matter of Container Service", the "Big John" struggle, the fight with the government to allow unit trains, or the countless other attempts by government regulators to prevent change for the better in railroading? If he knew, would he even care? I really doubt that he would.
Since about 1903, the government has consistantly blocked, prevented and stymied progress in US railroading. But that fact doesn't fit the poster's political ideology. So we get this rant from him.
No way does this guy understand the signal system, but he is giving his opinion just the same. I hope he can understand this. I am a engineer who is qualified over 350 miles of trackage and 7 differant railroads, and the signal system they use. It is standardized in that red means stop green means go and yellow means you may stop, not hard to understand, I have seen a few slow appraoch signals in my time And to tell you the truth i have never been diverted or ran thru a yard with a slow aproach signal. If the man did not understand the signal he should have called the dispatcher and asked.
CShaveRR This is about the NTSB findings on the wreck of the Pere Marquette on the south side of Chicago a couple of years ago (see the April 1 "Newswire"). The recommendations were for positive train control and uniform signal rules. We debated signal uniformity back when the accident happened--Positive Train Control requirements have since come about, and PTC probably would make the confusion meaningless, if nothing else. Or perhaps, since PTC has to be a standardized system, it may require remaining signals (and their rules) to become more standardized. BTW, I'm kind of smug about being the first person in that earlier thread to come up with what turned out to be the actual cause of this wreck. Guess I'm in the wrong side of business! But I agree with Zug--in the here and now, you have to know all of your signal systems to be truly qualified on a territory,
Just curious about some of the background facts here. I apologize in advance for displaying my ignorance of this territory - and no, I'm not a tort lawyer, just trying to understand this situation better and assess for myself whether the supposed "non-standardization" of signals really exists and is what needs to fixed, or more attention paid to locomotive engineer training, qualifications, testing, or something else, etc.:
It's Amtrak's line from Detroit to Chicago, correct ? Which was the predecessor RR ?
What kind of signals did it have back in the day ?
What percentage of the Pere Marquette's run is on Amtrak ? On NS ? Any other RR ?
Where's the junction from Amtrak to NS ? Is that also where the signal systems/ aspect "conventions" change ?
Is it obvious that the train is changing from Amtrak and its signals to NS and its signals, wherever that occurs ?
Thanks in advance for any answers and insights, or any other information that I didn't think to ask.
No, Paul, this is NS' line, not Amtrak's. Amtrak owns its own line only between Kalamazoo and Porter, Indiana, and the Pere Marquette route merely intersects with it at Porter. Porter is also where it changes from CSX to NS rails on the way to Chicago.
Back in the day, there would have been PRR position-light signals at this spot, if the track layout was the same (can't state that one positively). There are still some PRR-style signals east of there under which this train would have traveled.
The Pere Marquette runs over CSX from Grand Rapids to Porter, former NYC from Porter to somewhere in Whiting, former PRR from that point the rest of the way in to Union Station. Perhaps the stretch between the 21st Street lift bridge and the station is owned by Amtrak. Signals may not change there, but the rulebook does. The train in question had been operating under NS (NORAC?) rules for 30 miles or more when the collision happened.
I'm not that "up" on the rules of various eastern railroads at this point, so I'm not sure how similar or different CSX's Restricting signals may be from NS'. There would be a change in signal definitions when the train crossed the bridge going into Union Station, since Amtrak operates with GCOR here. Signal styles would change at Porter, and again where the train leaves NYC for ex-PRR trackage. Obviously, some of the old PRR position-light signals have been replaced; CSX is in the process of replacing the old searchlight signals with color-light (don't think it affects aspects, though).
Hope this helps, Paul--I have some more specific information available, but have to go to work soon.
Paul (and others):I am not a railroader and not a lawyer, but observe portions of the line from Porter into Chicago somewhat during my daily travels. Carl has it pretty well pegged as far as ownership and operations.
There are PRR type signals still in operation on a portion of the line, primarly from Whiting into Chicago. I cannot say what type of signal it was, having not seen it. The engineer should have had a copy of the CORA Operating Guide. It does show in both PRR type signals and other types that red/yellow is "restricting".
I have not read the STB ruling, but the summary that concerns me is another engineer was in the locomotive and apparently did not assume control of the situation.
ed
tree68 Amber does take on some interesting interpretations, though, ranging from "proceed with caution" to "hurry up before the light turns." And the signals on the railroads mean the same thing in a large percentage of the cases.
Amber does take on some interesting interpretations, though, ranging from "proceed with caution" to "hurry up before the light turns."
And the signals on the railroads mean the same thing in a large percentage of the cases.
On a train, how does one "hurry up before the light turns"?
zardoz On a train, how does one "hurry up before the light turns"?
Hmmm. Although it does appear that in the incident in question.....
Too, the qualifier after the highlighted portion does take that into account...
I don't see how spending a pile of money in one fell swoop, is necessarily going solve the problem where maybe the problem is that someone is not familiar enough of the territory and also perhaps of a case of not reading the small booklet/mission guide for the conductor as I call it that comes with the waybill. Don't know what it is called but I am looking at a CN one; TGBO maybe? Also, if you have doubts on how to proceed to or through a signal, doesn't it make sense to coordinate further movements through the dispatcher or yard master depending on where you are?
Spending a whole bunch of money doesn't always mean or often mean safer conditions. Better research and communication is often just as good as a few billion dollars.
Carl & ed -
OK, thanks for the replies & additional info. You've pretty well answered my biggest question - from the NTSB diagram, the Amtrak train was crossed-over from Track 1 to Track 2 just before the Englewood interlocking (METRA crossing at grade). There are places here in the Northeast Corridor where a seemingly simple move like that will change the train from Amtrak to ConRail or SEPTA (or NJT or MN, or further North to maybe ConnDOT or MBTA - don't know that end real well, though). That would be a trap for the unwary - though the engineer should have been "wary" anyway - and I was wondering if the setup there was like that at all. Apparently, it isn't - not by a good 30 miles !
I need to think about and digest it all a little more - there may be a few other good points waiting in the wings, but I too have that G-T-W thing to "work around" now. Thanks again, fellas.
A quick point on PTC:
99% of the U.S. will be one of two systems. The "Class 1" universe will all be on a Wabtec platform, which is locomotive-based, peer-to-peer with wayside interface units. UP is proceeding on a "vital" pathway where the PTC will be its own Method of Operation whereas BNSF is proceeding on a "non-vital" pathway with the PTC being an overlay on existing Methods of Operation such as CTC and TWC. NS appears so far to be leaning toward the vital path, CSX hasn't announced, and CN, CPR and KCS are not yet to that level of analysis. The Northeast Corridor universe will all be on the ACSES platform, which is a development of existing cab-signal systems. A few railroads which do not touch either of those universes can do something else, for example, the Alaska Railroad is well along on a US&S wayside-based platform. Some of the commuter railways are stating they would prefer an evolved intermittant cab-signal system such as what GETS has provided for TriMet on the new Beaverton-Wilsonville, Oregon, commuter line. But if they touch a Class 1, that probably won't fly unless they want to dual-equip.
Estimated costs for PTC have doubled in the last year, and then some; I would not be surprised to see the eventual cost in excess of $15 billion.
Many people do not grasp that train-control systems are supposed to deliver efficiency as well as safety. It doesn't do much good to make the system so safe that the efficiency results in bankruptcy of the railways, unless, that happens to be your goal. The Class Is are determined to extract efficiency value from their multibillion dollar investment in PTC. That is going to be an interesting challenge. I haven't decided yet whether I'm having fun yet, though.
A good point - the role of the relief engineer, who hasn't been mentioned much here - has been brought up by Andy. Here are some of my thoughts on that:
1.) The situation is that the regular engineer had been on duty a good while, so he may well have been fatigued - the train had been delayed en route, and that's why Amtrak prudently called a relief crew. The relief engineer offered to take over for him, but he refused. We now know that it had taken him 3 attempts to successfully pass both the NORAC and Amtrak signals exams. Then he's got some girl trying to tell him he's not reading the signals right ?!? So, is anybody else wondering if his ego / machismo was maybe playing an unspoken role here ?
2.) "Dumping the air" on him would have been an emotionally tough thing to do, in any event, with the "brotherhood" railroad culture - she'd likely be marked as the railroad equivalent of a "snitch" or "rat" for the rest of her career. So that's probably why they were arguing about it - "discussing" it per the NTSB report - for the 70 seconds until the impact. Meanwhile - as Andy notes above - the engineer had let the train get up to 40 MPH, when even the signal indication he mistakenly thought he had limited him to 30, so she'd have been justified in pulling the air on him from that alone.
3.) "The rules are written in someone''s blood" has been noted here by others here many times before, and so it is again. The good thing that hopefully comes out of this is a real-life example for all conductors and engineers in training to hear about and realize that the day may well come when they're in that gut-wrenching position and have about 2 seconds to make the decision and act and what are you going to do ? and what if you're wrong ? but what if you're right and prevent the wreck that seems like its going to happen - but am I really sure I'm right ? and is it safer to dump the air and risk passengers being hurt over nothing, or to let this train keep moving and maybe nothing bad will happen anyway, and so on. I can see a good instructor doing some role-playing with this - "You're the relief engineer now - tell us how you'd handle it", and then discuss it in the class, and so on. Certainly anyone who takes the job seriously will then understand the obligation of the other person in the cab.
4.) The specific rule violation by the relief engineer was "In case of doubt, the safe course must be taken." Well, clearly she was in doubt - she said something, and was still debating it - but she didn't take the safe course of stopping the train.
5.) We might ask if her hesitation in dumping the air was based on fear or uncertainty about what the other engineer's story would then be, and what discipline might be imposed if she turned out to be wrong anyway. I don't know what the prevailing attitude is about that on the railroads, but - sticking my neck out here - if I were in charge I'd pretty much give the person who pulled the air the benefit of the doubt, unless he/she had a pattern of doing such things that demonstrated they didn't understand the rules. [EDIT- add/ insert:] I think'd I rather have to pay the claims (and tort lawyers) for some cuts and bruises and broken bones of passengers from a few too-fast stops, than for the costs of a large scale wreck such as this one - or God forbid, another Chatsworth. [end EDIT] Maybe the one in the wrong gets some time off without pay, but I wouldn't fire anyone for that - at least not the first or second time. But for sure they'd have an all-expense paid trip to the next signals class and exam, and not be allowed out on the road again unaccompanied until they passed that exam.
6.) In the "standardize the signals" debate, someone above - I think it was BaltACD and/or oltmannd, naturally enough - made the point that achieving uniformity in the signal systems is an expensive goal that would take a long time - like 10 years ? - to achieve, at great expense, and even at that it's either a moving target that's always changing and hence out of reach to actually complete, or else you have to freeze the technology at some point in time at the "lowest common denominator" level, and is that really what we want, etc. All of those are excellent points, and have to be respected because they're just reality.
However, I'll suggest breaking that down a little bit between:
A.) Making more uniform just the Aspects that are displayed, their Names, and Indications; as distinguished from -
B.) Standardizing the signal systems and circuits themselves, that are in the "background" so to speak, and not visible to the train crews. This is all the province of the signal engineers only, and that's where the serious money would be spent if this had to happen.
The train crews shouldn't care less whether the signal that is displayed is generated by relays, solid state circuits, computers, dispatchers, or trained monkeys* - "Just do what it indicates". As long as those indications are reasonably uniform, that should eliminate the worst of this problem.
[*- No implication intended with the juxtaposition between those last 2 - seriously !]
Behind the scenes, doing that should not commit or force the signals guys to spending a lot of money to upgrade all the circuits and widgets that produce the signals. If they're working fine, no need to change them wholesale and throw them out - perhaps just remove or change the 1 or 2 indications that are "out of step" with everyone else. Yes, I know that it some cases that may be like "splitting the baby" - it's all 1 integrated system, and you can't do that without breaking it open and wrecking the whole thing, etc. OK, then maybe those few systems need to be replaced entirely, or the troublesome function deleted or negated by wiring it to a bulb that doesn't show, or some "workaround" like that - I don't know. There are members here who are far more expert than I (essentially zero qualifications) in such matters, so I'm prepared to be told that in detail and at length - so be it. But perhaps those same people could also tell us if it might work in some instances, or not, or what else could be done short of replacing the entire system, for the reasons that have been mentioned above.
7.) Then again, as has been mentioned, PTC may make the whole thing moot in 5 years. Or not. Time will tell.
Well, I've got to GBTWN (Get Back To Work Now). Let's see what the responses are.
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