Bob-Fryml wrote: And here's a somewhat related question. Given that in 1971 both the Burlington Northern and The Milwaukee Road had active passenger lines connecting Chicago with Saint Paul/Minneapolis, when did the National Railroad Passenger Corporation decide to favor the latter's route? Or did the existence of Milwaukee being the largest intermediate station on either route make that question a no-brainer?
And here's a somewhat related question. Given that in 1971 both the Burlington Northern and The Milwaukee Road had active passenger lines connecting Chicago with Saint Paul/Minneapolis, when did the National Railroad Passenger Corporation decide to favor the latter's route? Or did the existence of Milwaukee being the largest intermediate station on either route make that question a no-brainer?
The City of Milwaukee was no doubt the compelling factor. However, in 1982, the Milwaukee did a thorough modeling of the double-track between Chicago and Twin Cities with the idea of consolidation into a single track CTC line. Conventional studies had shown that the line would not benefit from the double track for another thirty years, at the then-rate of traffic increase.
Milwaukee President W.L. Smith, a former BN Vice President, really liked that double track as he knew from the standpoint of having been on the "other side" the competitive advantage that Milwaukee had on that route because of the double track. He took Trustee Ogilvie and Federal Judge McMillen over the line in a business car behind a Sprint, showing the Trustee and the Judge the very good scheduling that the double main and rolling crew changes permitted. "We offered service better than the truckers, and virtually all of our traffic on the Sprints was taken off the highways."
However, conventional wisdom at the time called for consolidation of such lines at the traffic levels that the Milwaukee was operating. But, as Smith told me, in terms of service "nobody could beat the Milwaukee on that route" and he felt that obtaining and preserving that distinctive advantage -- contrary to the policy of the FRA and DOT at the time -- was what railroading was all about.
Booz-Allen-Hamilton did a study of the proposed consolidation, and Jim Schwinkendorf, Asst VP Planning, did an internal study. The results showed that operating costs were lower with the double-track because of the scheduling advantages that reduced equipment needs. Further, only the double track allowed the Sprint schedules, and a consolidation would substantially reduce Milwaukee's on-time bonuses received from Amtrak: one of the best on-time performance records on the Amtrak system.
Modern Railroads did an article on the interesting results, and the double-track mainline was, at that time, saved purely as a result of a pretty thorough cost/benefit analysis. But, those studies produced results all very contrary to the existing conventional wisdom -- a conventional wisdom that was otherwise driving line consolidation in the United States.
Whether that understanding -- of the double main's efficiency -- played a role in Amtrak's decision much earlier to use the line was probably "a" consideration, but most likely because Milwaukee's AM and PM Hiawatha's were the most successful of the passenger services on the corridor at the time of Amtrak's creation, likely because of the City of Milwaukee's presence, but perhaps because the train service had always been so reliable.
MichaelSol wrote: Modern Railroads did an article on the interesting results, and the double-track mainline was, at that time, saved, purely as a result of a pretty thorough cost/benefit analysis. Whether that understanding played a role in Amtrak's decision much earlier to use the line was probably "a" consideration, but most likely because Milwaukee's AM and PM Hiawatha's were the most successful of the passenger services on the corridor at the time of Amtrak's creation, likely because of the City of Milwaukee's presence, but perhaps because the train service had always been so reliable.
Modern Railroads did an article on the interesting results, and the double-track mainline was, at that time, saved, purely as a result of a pretty thorough cost/benefit analysis. Whether that understanding played a role in Amtrak's decision much earlier to use the line was probably "a" consideration, but most likely because Milwaukee's AM and PM Hiawatha's were the most successful of the passenger services on the corridor at the time of Amtrak's creation, likely because of the City of Milwaukee's presence, but perhaps because the train service had always been so reliable.
There is still a fair amount of 39' stik rail on track #1 of the Chicago-Milwaukee CP route. About 15 years ago I asked a track gang foreman about it (they were resurfacing the line at the time). He said the stik rail was kept because the (back then) plan WAS to single-track even the C&M (Chicago-Milwaukee) subdivision, with the stik rail track to be used as sidings.
There was even much talk regarding combining the C&M subdivision of the (then) SOO and the New Line of the (then) C&NW between Bryn Mawr and Milwaukee, and possibly beyond. They even talked about doing directional running utilizing both the C&M and the New Line. However, I never did find out exactly where in Milwaukee the lines were going to part.
About 5 years later, I was talking to a signal maintainer (on the same C&M sub) that was redoing the wiring at a crossing. He said that all of the crossings were being rewired in anticipation of high-speed (110mph) Hiawatha trains.
Quite a turn-around.
zardoz wrote: There is still a fair amount of 39' stik rail on track #1 of the Chicago-Milwaukee CP route. About 15 years ago I asked a track gang foreman about it (they were resurfacing the line at the time).
There is still a fair amount of 39' stik rail on track #1 of the Chicago-Milwaukee CP route. About 15 years ago I asked a track gang foreman about it (they were resurfacing the line at the time).
I was over that line during that resurfacing work, between LaCrosse and Columbus, and was surprised to see the former Milwaukee crews still wearing their Milwaukee Road hardhats, and even some equipment with the canted red logo. Surprised, because the Soo Line had initially tried to obliterate everything "Milwaukee Road". The Milwaukee "presence" on those work crews was so conspicuous as to appear to me to be a point of pride. As I went through, I thought "how on earth are they getting away with that?"
Bob-Fryml wrote:And here's a somewhat related question. Given that in 1971 both the Burlington Northern and The Milwaukee Road had active passenger lines connecting Chicago with Saint Paul/Minneapolis, when did the National Railroad Passenger Corporation decide to favor the latter's route? Or did the existence of Milwaukee being the largest intermediate station on either route make that question a no-brainer?Just curious./s/ Bob
Just curious.
/s/ Bob
We at the Northwestern helped out with a presentation to Railpax, in the week after we joined, saying the Milwaukee was the superior route via Chicago-Milwaukee-St. Paul.
MichaelSol wrote: zardoz wrote: There is still a fair amount of 39' stik rail on track #1 of the Chicago-Milwaukee CP route. About 15 years ago I asked a track gang foreman about it (they were resurfacing the line at the time). I was over that line during that resurfacing work, between LaCrosse and Columbus, and was surprised to see the former Milwaukee crews still wearing their Milwaukee Road hardhats, and even some equipment with the canted red logo. Surprised, because the Soo Line had initially tried to obliterate everything "Milwaukee Road". The Milwaukee "presence" on those work crews was so conspicuous as to appear to me to be a point of pride. As I went through, I thought "how on earth are they getting away with that?"
Actually, the provincialism doesn't surprise me that much. When I first started working for the CPRS in 1995 as an Agent/Operator in Enderlin, North Dakota, some of the former Soo Line guys up there kidded me about wearing my Milwaukee Road jacket to work one day saying "that's a 4-letter word up here".
Los Angeles Rams Guy wrote: Actually, the provincialism doesn't surprise me that much. When I first started working for the CPRS in 1995 as an Agent/Operator in Enderlin, North Dakota, some of the former Soo Line guys up there kidded me about wearing my Milwaukee Road jacket to work one day saying "that's a 4-letter word up here".
W.L. Smith retired rather than have anything to do with Dennis Cavanaugh. Another Milwaukee employee recalls:
"My personal experience with this subject came with the involvement of disposing of all Milw assets remaining in the Chicago Union Station headquarters after the Milw sale. I was retained under contract to "sell off" all items housed in that building with specific instructions to especially eliminate all items that referred to the Milw name.
"These instructions came direct from Dennis Cavanaugh, Chairman SooLine Railroad. I never met Cavanaugh in person, but with my personal telephone conversations with him, it was obvious he hated the Milw with a passion and would do what ever possible to marr its good name. One specific quote I recall him making was "what kind of chicken s_ _ _ outfit did I buy" which was directed to Milw management in the handling of "excess" personnel, which at the time was also my responsibility to eliminate along with "railroad memorabilia and furniture".
"In the disposition of these items, the Soo was not concerned with selling everything at fair market value, ... . Having negotiated rates and contracts with the SooLine for years prior to the "take over" it was obvious they were nothing more than a dollar saving railroad and that is all they were concerned with."
As much as I loved the Milwaukee Road (and always will), to say that I was somewhat "ticked off" when the Trustee and Senior Management threw their support behind the Evil Empire (a.k.a. the CNW) in late '84 would be the understatement of the year. In that regard, I can't really say I'm surprised at the dissension and animosity that likely existed.
Los Angeles Rams Guy wrote: As much as I loved the Milwaukee Road (and always will), to say that I was somewhat "ticked off" when the Trustee and Senior Management threw their support behind the Evil Empire (a.k.a. the CNW) in late '84 would be the understatement of the year. In that regard, I can't really say I'm surprised at the dissension and animosity that likely existed.
I've heard the CNW called many things over the years, but "Evil Empire" is new. Does that make Heineman equivalent to Chancellor Palpatine?
I'm not saying it's wrong or misleading, just that I never heard that one.
zardoz wrote: Los Angeles Rams Guy wrote: As much as I loved the Milwaukee Road (and always will), to say that I was somewhat "ticked off" when the Trustee and Senior Management threw their support behind the Evil Empire (a.k.a. the CNW) in late '84 would be the understatement of the year. In that regard, I can't really say I'm surprised at the dissension and animosity that likely existed.I've heard the CNW called many things over the years, but "Evil Empire" is new. Does that make Heineman equivalent to Chancellor Palpatine?I'm not saying it's wrong or misleading, just that I never heard that one.
I thought only CGW fans dislike the CNW.
Jeff
I love to work on the old MILW Rd. lines. I Have been working for CPR for 4 years now, and love to talk to the old MILW guys about the "good o' days". I remember one guy telling me that if and when they would get a new bucket of track bolts or spikes that some of the guys on the section would bring them home so the gangs wouldn't come and take them. otherwise a common pratice was the go though the scrap pile and look for any useable bolts and spikes, and then go though it again just to make sure. Also, there is a common term we use on the section and it is to "Red Wing plug it." Thats when you either don't plug the spike hole at all or use dirt! Very common on the Red Wing, MN MOW section. It just goes to show you that they really didn't have anything. Has anyone checked out this link? I know its just one man's opinion. but I liked it. http://www.trainweb.org/milwaukee/article.html
One of the things I heard is that when the SOO bought the MILW they only bought somethings and one thing that they didn't buy was the MILW name. Thats why there was such a mad scramble to cover everything that bared the Milwaukee Road name. I still do find some things that have the MILW name like a note pad at my desk, a wheel barrow that was used around the yard to pick up the dropped grain that still has the lettering C.M.stP.P on it, and switch plates, etc, etc.
Thanks
There was another thread...whatever happened to the Milwaukee Road? I guess it generated a lot of heat.
But the answer to what happened really is the Milwaukee Road could not run trains on time. 261 and 262 had to run on time to get the auto business and each division was run as if it were a separate railroad.
I heard tales of how the Coast Division (out of Tacoma, WA) would get their trains over the road on time by getting them all into the Avery yard which if my feeble memory serves only had four tracks, completely clogging it. Coast Division did its job alright..then the Mountain Division had to somehow manage the mess.
For some reason, trains getting to Avery always had to be switched, shorts ahead, longs back in order to keep from pulling the long cars off the many curves to the top of the pass at East Portal. Why this was not done elsewhere, don't ask me.
Then the decision was made to abandon electrification just as the point when oil prices skyrocketed... but copper was high at the point, just as it is today, so they were all for scapping.
But continuing electrification never did quite pencil out because there was just not quite enough traffic, especially when there was a non electrified space from Othello, WA to Avery Idaho. So any decision on updating electrification included building many miles of new catenary and substations.
By the time the decsion had to be made, the substations on both Mountain and Coast Divisions were museum piece and nothing was stock. Electricity (3000 volts DC) to power the trails was generated by motor generator sets...a great idea when started, but mightly behind the times in the 70s.
Milwauke Road, especially as a transcontinental railroad was always an iffy proposition. But excellent management could have made it go. But it did not have it.
mrmikel wrote: But continuing electrification never did quite pencil out because there was just not quite enough traffic, especially when there was a non electrified space from Othello, WA to Avery Idaho. So any decision on updating electrification included building many miles of new catenary and substations.By the time the decsion had to be made, the substations on both Mountain and Coast Divisions were museum piece and nothing was stock. Electricity (3000 volts DC) to power the trails was generated by motor generator sets...a great idea when started, but mightly behind the times in the 70s.
It penciled out just fine.
Some relatively random notes from one Power Company study:
The extension and expansion of the electrified sections of the Milwaukee Road will payout. The first fifteen years of operation will yield a small profit whose present value in 1974 is estimated to be $194,562. In the sixteenth year when the second generation of diesel locomotives would come into service, ... the savings would be very large - exceeding $2,OOO,OOO per year.
New substations in the area of the "gap" are supplied by taps from existing utility transmission lines. Additional capacity is made available on the Coast Division and the Rocky Mountain Division by installing five new rectifier substations -to replace substations with motor generator sets ... These displaced motor generator sets are proposed to be moved to 6 substations where increased power appears to be required.
Losses from the utility delivery point to the locomotive were considered. Presently these losses approximate 30% on the Rocky Mountain Division and 25% on the Coast Division. Losses will be reduced substantially by this project.
The reductions are brought about in three ways:1. Increasing feeder capacity by doubling feeder cross section. 2. Increasing maximum voltage to 3750 volts from 3300 volts. 3. By the use of silicon diode rectifiers with losses of less than 2% as compared with motor-generator set losses of 8%.
AVERY - OTHELLO EXTENSION
New Catenary
Poles, etc. $1,680,000
Trolley and Feeders $3,120,000
Labor $3,000,000
Trolley Total $7,800,000
New Substations
Roxboro, Ralston, Revere, Malden, Tekoa, Plummer, St. Maries: 3750 VDC Rectifier substations at 4400 kw.
AC Substation Facilities [By Power Companies]
DC Substation Facilities $1,778,000
Substation Total $2,800,000
Total Avery - Othello $9,578,000
A Rectifier substation at Black River will replace the MG substation at Tacoma. Puget Sound Power & Light will pay to build the transmission line extension to serve Black River if it can also use the line.
The largest portion of the total outlay for the electrification of the Milwaukee main line from Seattle-Tacoma to Harlowton will be for locomotives. Out of a total estimated investment of $32,000,000 by Milwaukee, $20,250,000 would be for locomotives and $11,750,000 for trolley, feeders and substations.
Fuel cost inflation should be greater for diesel fuel than for electric power because the utilities have large deposits of low cost coal available for development and oil supplies are increasingly more remote and more costly.
Sometimes these engineers really hit the nail on the head.
mrmikel wrote: ... but copper was high at the point, just as it is today, so they were all for scapping.
... but copper was high at the point, just as it is today, so they were all for scapping.
No, either way, the copper was coming out of the system, and had been incrementally for years. All of the upgrade proposals utilized copper salvage revenue as a partial contribution to the upgrade costs.
"Following the pattern established by the Railroad Company's electrical engineers, it is proposed to replace all copper feeders in the Coast and Rocky Mountain Divisions with aluminum feeders of approximately the same weight, thus doubling the equivalent copper cross section of all feeders replaced; This change will introduce a new size of wire to the Railroad; namely, 2250 MCM Al. "Sagebrush". This is equivalent to 1415 MCM copper."
mrmikel wrote: Milwauke Road, especially as a transcontinental railroad was always an iffy proposition. But excellent management could have made it go. But it did not have it.
The West end was where the growth was.
Between, 1960 and 1970, the annual growth rates (MGTM) were as follows:
Coast Division: 4.2%
Gap: 6%
Rocky Mountain: 5.4%
The ten year total showed a 50% total tonnage growth. Then, the BN merger conditions kicked in, and the growth rate grew to an 8% average annual increase, 1971-1976, another 50% increase in total tonnage.
Not many railroads in that era were showing consistent, sustained growth like that, and certainly not on Milwaukee's Lines East, which showed declining tonnages throughout those periods.
This was a problem for the Trustee and his minions, and resulted in one of the most dishonest portrayals, under oath, of a set of facts I have ever seen.
Inevitably, testimony on the subject of Milwaukee traffic and the PCE, offered to the Bankruptcy Court, the ICC, you name it, would start off with a description of the relatively light traffic on the PCE historically, and then jump into the BN Merger Conditions and what they were "supposed" to achieve. The next paragraph, in any statement or testimony, would invariably then remark something to the effect that "unfortunately, traffic on the Milwaukee continued to decline."
Any uninformed reader or listener, since the testimony was offered in the context of abandonment of the PCE, would reasonably conclude that the testimony was saying that "traffic on the Milwaukee PCE continued to decline."
But that was utterly false. Traffic had been growing all during the 1960s on the PCE and the rate of growth accelerated significantly during the 1970s as a result of the BN Merger Conditions. Milwaukee traffic on Lines East was failing and failing faster than the PCE could grow new traffic.
But, in the context of the presentations, the ICC, Congress, and the Bankruptcy Court heard carefully prepared testimony designed to leave the impression, the utterly false impression without actually saying it and committing perjury, that the PCE was losing traffic.
It was a remarkable exposition of how two truths could be used together to tell a lie. And how the weakness of Lines East was substituted for the strong growth on Lines West.
Now, why? Well, it doesn't make much sense, does it, if the assumption was that, at each turn, everyone was acting sincerely and diligently on behalf of the best interests of the railroad company?
When the big, expensive consulting study came back showing that the only realistic long-term viable railroad had to include the PCE in some configuration or another, the Trustee blew up at the staff that had advocated the shutdown, and quit. He may have been asking the same question at that point.
Mike, when you refer to wire size, what does 2250 MCM or 1415 MCM mean? Is there a difference between Al and Cu wire sizes?
CPRguy, thanks for the link to the Todd James article on the final years of the Milwaukee. I have always been puzzled regarding what happened; and although he obviously has some strongly held opinions, it is the most comprehensive explanation I have seen.
I printed it out and need to study it awhile. However, just who is/was Todd James? I tried Googling him and came up dry. In deciding how much weight should be given to some of his statements, it would be useful to have some background on him.
doghouse wrote: Mike, when you refer to wire size, what does 2250 MCM or 1415 MCM mean? Is there a difference between Al and Cu wire sizes?
"Circular mil" is a standard unit of measure used in electrical engineering to describe the cross-sectional area of a conductor, copper, aluminum, etc. It represents one-thousands of an inch. Milwaukee Road's original feeder cable was 500 MCM -- thousand circular mils -- copper, for instance. This had been supplemented on mountain grades in the 1950's with 750 MCM aluminum.
The "equivalency" referred to by the Power company engineers refers to the size of the aluminum conductor needed to give equivalent power flow compared to a given size copper conductor. Copper is a better conductor of electricity than aluminum and so a larger aluminum conductor is necessary to equal the copper wire.
Dakguy201 wrote:CPRguy, thanks for the link to the Todd James article on the final years of the Milwaukee. I have always been puzzled regarding what happened; and although he obviously has some strongly held opinions, it is the most comprehensive explanation I have seen.I printed it out and need to study it awhile. However, just who is/was Todd James? I tried Googling him and came up dry. In deciding how much weight should be given to some of his statements, it would be useful to have some background on him.
Todd Jones was an engineer on the Canadian Pacific, at Portage I believe. Pretty smart guy and as he talked to old Milwaukee engineers, he developed the perception of "hey, wait a minute" about the Milwaukee's demise. You will note that he credits myself and Dave Sprau at the end of the article, which was printed in two parts in CTC Board magazine. He wrote it during 1999, if I recall. He had a website he put together. http://www.trainweb.org/milwaukee/
I haven't heard from him for a number of years.
Todd spent quite a bit of time going over the recent history of the MILW with both Dave and I -- I from the standpoint of the Milwaukee; Dave from the standpoint of a now retired BN Dispatcher located at a key time at the key joint MILW/BN agency at Maple Valley, Washington. Dave was a lifelong NP/BN employee and a very knowledgeable railroader in the Pacific Northwest.
At Maple Valley, Dave could see daily the uptick in traffic in both directions; the Kent Auto Marshalling facility virtually eliminating the former GN auto traffic; the Chryslers and Fords in one direction, Toyotas in the other; thousands of carloads of wheat, lumber, the Southern Pacific traffic, the upsurge in COFC/TOFC from the Stacey Street intermodal facility, capturing 76% of Port of Seattle import/export traffic, 50% of its container traffic, 50% of Port of Tacoma, and $45 million at Port of Portland/Southern Pacific and the Portland subdivision, the addition of second sections daily of 261 and 262, and daily 265 and 266.
Regarding the BN Merger Gateway conditions, I asked Dave how it looked from BN's perspective on the PCE as a result of the Conditions and the Portland Entry. His response, "Milwaukee Road was having BN for lunch." He could see it out his window every day.
Michael,
How long would the revamping of the old electrified sections and closing the gap between the two sections have taken and what would have been purchased for new power?
Have a good one.
Bill B
Back in 1969, GE proposed buidling some C-C electrics with essentially the same continuous TE and horsepower as the Little Joes - which would have been great for fast freight. The motors were GE-750's as in the Joe's, but I suspect the introduction of Kapton insulation is what allowed for a higher continuous current rating for the motors.
Michael is right about the definition of cmils and the proposed aluminum feeders would have substantially improved power delivery to the trains.
MichaelSol wrote: But, in the context of the presentations, the ICC, Congress, and the Bankruptcy Court heard carefully prepared testimony designed to leave the impression, the utterly false impression without actually saying it and committing perjury, that the PCE was losing traffic.(portion omitted) Now, why? Well, it doesn't make much sense, does it, if the assumption was that, at each turn, everyone was acting sincerely and diligently on behalf of the best interests of the railroad company?When the big, expensive consulting study came back showing that the only realistic long-term viable railroad had to include the PCE in some configuration or another, the Trustee blew up at the staff that had advocated the shutdown, and quit. He may have been asking the same question at that point.
(portion omitted)
Without saying it outright you are hinting that the Milwaukee's management were doing their best to eliminate the company. Further, the Bankruptcy Trustee became aware that was the case; and rather than terminate those responsible for such actions, he chose to end his involvement.
Are we talking about a railroad with a deliberately destructive management? It sure sounds like it. One has to wonder about motivation to do something like that. When attempting to explain a puzzle, sometimes it helps to ask who benefitted. In this case that is obviously the only competitor in that territory.
There has to be a great story in here somewhere.
Roughly $200,000 total for the first fifteen years profit...for that the railroad is supposed to invest millions? Milwaukee was not the UP with bottomless pockets.
The existing locomotives were falling apart. There were tracks full in the Tacoma yard. It was not a done deal that the system would continue to be 3000 volts. A higher voltage AC system was, as I recall, more prominent in the thinking of the engineers. That is primarily because the substations could be eliminated and the power dropped off as needed by the power company, as well as the locomotive control technology is simpler using an AC system.
Dakguy201 wrote: MichaelSol wrote: But, in the context of the presentations, the ICC, Congress, and the Bankruptcy Court heard carefully prepared testimony designed to leave the impression, the utterly false impression without actually saying it and committing perjury, that the PCE was losing traffic.(portion omitted) Now, why? Well, it doesn't make much sense, does it, if the assumption was that, at each turn, everyone was acting sincerely and diligently on behalf of the best interests of the railroad company?When the big, expensive consulting study came back showing that the only realistic long-term viable railroad had to include the PCE in some configuration or another, the Trustee blew up at the staff that had advocated the shutdown, and quit. He may have been asking the same question at that point.Without saying it outright you are hinting that the Milwaukee's management were doing their best to eliminate the company. Further, the Bankruptcy Trustee became aware that was the case; and rather than terminate those responsible for such actions, he chose to end his involvement. Are we talking about a railroad with a deliberately destructive management? It sure sounds like it. One has to wonder about motivation to do something like that. When attempting to explain a puzzle, sometimes it helps to ask who benefitted. In this case that is obviously the only competitor in that territory.There has to be a great story in here somewhere.
You may want to see the book, The Nation Pays Again: The Demise of the Milwaukee Road 1928-1986, by Thomas H. Ploss (deceased mid-90's), 165 pp., ISBN 0961378816 / 9780961378813, privately published 1986 (?). Ploss was a Milwaukee Road staff attorney who wrote the book just after its demise. I haven't read it (yet) - I prefer to look to the future - but probably will some day. A quick search indicates that copies are for sale from $75 to $110, so I'll probably borrow it through Inter-Library Loan ("ILL") first.
If you really want to know more - about the book, Ploss, and the Milwaukee Road's demise - use the Trains.com forum Search function below. Insert "Nation Pays Again" (use the quotes so it searches for the whole phrase, not just the individual words), and you should get about 44 "hits". Some are repetitive and mere mentions; others - mainly from back in the 2004 - 2006 time frame - are more substantial.
- Paul North.
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