Why is Amtrak using the Buckingham Branch line instead of CSX's main line between Richmond and Clifton Forge? I assume that the CSX line is better maintained than BB.
blue streak 1 Other posts and other sites bring up the consideration of signal suspension experience. Signal crews and installers probably are well versed on how the rules are for signal suspensions are supposed to be applied. Now what if the CSX crew and maybe Amtrak crew have had little or no experience operating under such conditions ?. If your whole career was operating under CTC rules with only maybe just a few weather outages how easy is it to forget the rules you do not use ?
Other posts and other sites bring up the consideration of signal suspension experience. Signal crews and installers probably are well versed on how the rules are for signal suspensions are supposed to be applied. Now what if the CSX crew and maybe Amtrak crew have had little or no experience operating under such conditions ?. If your whole career was operating under CTC rules with only maybe just a few weather outages how easy is it to forget the rules you do not use ?
And toss in CSX mgt upheaval and the elimination of RFE positions and a shift of attitude from safety to production and what do you get?
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
It was interesting to notice how Sumwalt reacted to questions related to the act of leaving the switch lined wrong. Sumwalt's narrative suddenly seemed to point to a person on the CSX freight crew failing to reline the switch for the main line, and then he mentions having interviewed that crew. Reporters instantly wanted to know what that person responsible for not relining the switch had to say for themself.
But the answer to that pregnant question will have to wait a bit longer because all interviews must be conducted before saying what information they reveal.
While the signal suspension and the potential lack of experience with dark territory operations (ie, SPAFs) are certainly factors, those are both simply safeguards.
The bottom line here remains that the switch was not restored to normal as called out in the timetable (at least in ours, where all mainline switches and their "normal" position is listed) when the crew was done with their move. And it was locked in the reverse position - it's not like an employee (or a trespasser) came by and randomly threw the switch.
The double whammy here could well be if the dispatcher quizzed the crew on the switch and was informed that it was returned to normal, and perhaps that the SPAF was signed. Especially if the crew hadn't normalled the switch.
As Balt notes, all dispatcher traffic is recorded.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
EuclidBut in a head-on collsion when the locomotive strikes an opposing locomotive, a lof of the energy is dissipated in the jacknifing and telescoping of the trailing rolling stock. This is perfectly illustrated in the videos showing staged head-on collisions using steam locomotives pulling trains. The locomotives stop dead in their tracks, ofter having their tenders tossed up in the air as they jacknife vertically from the impact.
w.r.t. energy dissipation after collision, I think about the impact attenuation equipment the put on the back of highway maintenance trucks. They absorb impact from cars that would strike them from behind. Would something like that work for Amtrack? Imagine a 45' low profile car designed to crumple and dissipate impact energy. I would be coupled to the front of the engine, protecting against head-on collisions. It wouldn't prevent all damage in the event of a collision, but it might be the difference between crew fatality and crew on permanent disability.
oltmannd rrboomer Since this is CTC territory, reporting hand throw switch position and or required FRA form(s) are quite likely not second nature to the crew members. What may well come out is CSX has gone through a gigantic shakeup from the late EEH, including brand new non railroad background managers, etc. Events like this are most often the result of several missteps coming together at the wrong time. The results are tragic. Lets hope lessons are quickly learned and no more of this occurs during the rest of the nationwide PTC construction and rollout. It will be interesting to see what, if any, the CSX mgt turmoil in the past year played in this situation. Does anyone know CSX's rules regarding hand-throws in dark territory in the "post Graniteville" world? What does the paper trail look like?
rrboomer Since this is CTC territory, reporting hand throw switch position and or required FRA form(s) are quite likely not second nature to the crew members. What may well come out is CSX has gone through a gigantic shakeup from the late EEH, including brand new non railroad background managers, etc. Events like this are most often the result of several missteps coming together at the wrong time. The results are tragic. Lets hope lessons are quickly learned and no more of this occurs during the rest of the nationwide PTC construction and rollout.
Since this is CTC territory, reporting hand throw switch position and or required FRA form(s) are quite likely not second nature to the crew members. What may well come out is CSX has gone through a gigantic shakeup from the late EEH, including brand new non railroad background managers, etc. Events like this are most often the result of several missteps coming together at the wrong time. The results are tragic. Lets hope lessons are quickly learned and no more of this occurs during the rest of the nationwide PTC construction and rollout.
It will be interesting to see what, if any, the CSX mgt turmoil in the past year played in this situation.
Does anyone know CSX's rules regarding hand-throws in dark territory in the "post Graniteville" world? What does the paper trail look like?
Post Graniteville, the FRA requires a Switch Position Awareness Form in dark territory when using a hand operated switch.
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2005/11/25/05-23303/fra-emergency-order-no-24-notice-no-2-emergency-order-no-24-hand-operated-main-track-switches
The form can be a specific document or, has we use, a Conductor's Log book. It requires the times the switch is reversed and restored normal. Once restored normal, the intials of the person restoring the switch (if not the conductor) must be entered and the conductor and engineer must initial the document. When reporting clear of a warrant (in our case) in the dispatcher must be advised of switches used, if any, and that both condr and engr agree that they are restored normal.
In a signal suspension, they would need the SPAF. I could see someone in normally signalled territory forgetting something like this. Although, even in CTC we advise the dispatcher when we have restored a switch.
Jeff
It is a concern as to what was the CSX crew past 72 hours of their activities were ? When did they go on duty and off just before the incident ? What time was their next scheduleded on duty if one ? What were their previous times as well ? Were any HOS factors involved ? Where were they picked up after " securing " the CSX train ?
BigJimIn the wake of all of this, the sensitive folks at TRAINS come out with this!
They have had the '13 biggest blunders in railroading' in heavy rotation on the mobile site since before the Cayce accident, and they have another ad in black and white (I think it is Classic Trains related) touting some other wreck-porn sort of book. You'd think they would have the decency, or at least the respect, to take these out of rotation for a reasonable time when this, or the earlier wreck in Washington, occurred. I wasn't going to comment on this disconnect, but I'm glad Big Jim broached the issue.
BigJimIn the wake of all of this, the sensative folks at TRAINS comes out with this!
That showed up in my mailbox (with my magazine) several days before the wreck. If they are clairvoyant enough to have predicted this incident, I want to talk to them about a lottery ticket.
tree68It's highly unlikely that there was any northbound traffic during that period, as that would have messed up the switch mechanically. And even then, that would assume that a northbound did not see that the switch was reversed.
From ASMTRANSITDOCS
Amtrak Train 92 departing Miami 1/3/2018 came through the previous morning over five hours late at 9:39 AM. Whether there were other trains besides the AutoCarrier train remains to be learned.
In the wake of all of this, the sensative folks at TRAINS comes out with this!https://kalmbachhobbystore.com/product/special-issue/vt-tr04180601-c?utm_source=SilverpopMailing&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=SA000_HBS_180206_P32296_TR04_TRN-CTR-HBS_Final&utm_content=&spMailingID=32901143&spUserID=MTE2ODA0NDM0NDA0S0&spJobID=1220257150&spReportId=MTIyMDI1NzE1MAS2
.
MP173I am unfamiliar with CSX ops in that region. Is this the normal Florida route for freight? How many trains daily on this line? ed
ed
The incident happened on the former Seaboard line from Hamlet to Savannah. It does have through freight traffic, however, I am not sure just how much. The former Atlantic Coast Line route from Richmond to Savannah is the preferred route.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
VOLKER LANDWEHRI hope the timeline NTSB is establishing will answer some of our questions.
Indeed. While there clearly was no southbound traffic on the line between the time the train was parked in the siding and when 91 came through, we don't know how long that was - at least I haven't heard that yet.
I would opine that if the crew of the freight knew they were getting out of the way of 91 they would have realized the switch needed to be restored. If we're talking hours between them parking the train and the arrival of 91...
It's highly unlikely that there was any northbound traffic during that period, as that would have messed up the switch mechanically. And even then, that would assume that a northbound did not see that the switch was reversed.
I am unfamiliar with CSX ops in that region. Is this the normal Florida route for freight? How many trains daily on this line?
Overmod, Miningman, both of you are absolutely correct, especially Miningman's contention of "The more we become reliant on technology..." et al.
I see it all the time, people spoiled rotten by technology and labor-saving devices so that they're totally lost when having to do without them, too many examples to go into here.
I was up in New Jersey when Hurricane Sandy struck wiping out electric power in much of the area. One of the most pathetic things I saw then were photo spreads in the New York papers showing young people absolutely frantic looking for places to charge their cell phones of various makes and models. They couldn't function without 'em!
What kind of world are we making here? Gives me the willies.
Well, at least at The Basic School for Marine officers up the road in Quantico VA they still teach land navigation the old fashioned way, with map and compass, just as they did when I was there 40+ years ago. As they put it, "Well, what are you gonna do Lieutenant when that fancy GPS unit takes a bullet or a piece of shrapnel and won't work anymore?"
Miningman The question being is the new cohort too far gone down the road of dumber and dumber, walking away from a switch aligned off the main into a parked train, thinking that is someone else's problem?
I hope the timeline NTSB is establishing will answer some of our questions.
Someone wrote on this thread that Amtrak 91 was 20 minutes late. Perhaps the CSX crew thought #91 was already through. But that is speculation and doesn't answer why the CSX crew reported the switch realigned early.Regards, Volker
Overmod--- The more we become reliant on technology the less responsible, uninterested and lazy people become. So PTC will require a major step up, testing and enforcement of what to do and the rules when it inevitably has problems. The question being is the new cohort too far gone down the road of dumber and dumber, walking away from a switch aligned off the main into a parked train, thinking that is someone else's problem?
I've seen answers on tests from adult students that are ridiculous to a six year old, but the explanation is 'that is what the calculator shows'.
I am wondering (idle curiosity): does anyone of us know the number of the turnout (how fast can it be taken safely)?
Johnny
rrboomerSince this is CTC territory, reporting hand throw switch position and or required FRA form(s) are quite likely not second nature to the crew members.
In light of the reported release of authority by the CSX crew without physically relining the switch, I find this perhaps the most unsettling emergent concern I have.
How much more ignorant of correct track-warrant or indeed any manual dispatching procedures will the current cohort of employees become under mandated PTC? And what safety corners will be cut, knowingly or unknowingly, when PTC goes down or, worse, becomes unstable without warning or reasonably assured operability?
23 17 46 11
tree68 oltmannd Does anyone know CSX's rules regarding hand-throws in dark territory in the "post Graniteville" world? What does the paper trail look like? The fact that this isn't normally dark territory throws an unknown into the mix that Balt will have to address. Based on my observations of CSX operations on the dark line near me: It starts when the crew is issued an EC1 (track warrant), which will include a "Line 11" (other comments) giving them permission to operate any switches they will need for their work. When they are ready cancel their EC1, the dispatcher will ask if all switches are lined and locked normal, and if the SPAF (switch position awareness form) has been completed and signed by both crewmembers. I don't hear the EC1's for the Chicago Line when I'm down that way, so I don't know if they work the same way on the signalled lines.
oltmannd Does anyone know CSX's rules regarding hand-throws in dark territory in the "post Graniteville" world? What does the paper trail look like?
The fact that this isn't normally dark territory throws an unknown into the mix that Balt will have to address.
Based on my observations of CSX operations on the dark line near me: It starts when the crew is issued an EC1 (track warrant), which will include a "Line 11" (other comments) giving them permission to operate any switches they will need for their work.
When they are ready cancel their EC1, the dispatcher will ask if all switches are lined and locked normal, and if the SPAF (switch position awareness form) has been completed and signed by both crewmembers.
I don't hear the EC1's for the Chicago Line when I'm down that way, so I don't know if they work the same way on the signalled lines.
EC1 Line 11 is not used in normal signalled territory. In signalled territory prior to work, crew is to announce to the Dispatcher over the Road Radio Channel that they will be operating specific switch(es) - at the conclusion of the the work the crew is to announce over to the Dispatcher over the Road Channel that the switch(es) have been restored for Main Track operation.
oltmanndDoes anyone know CSX's rules regarding hand-throws in dark territory in the "post Graniteville" world? What does the paper trail look like?
Euclid BigJim NTSB Press release: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKe2dJIBmKA&feature=em-uploademail Those are very thought provoking details. Sumwalt uses the end of the video as a time benchmark for the sequential events of horn signal, service application, and emergency application. I assume the end of the video marks the moment of impact. I don't understand the purpose of the horn signal. I would not have expected any brake application other than emergency as soon as the train entered the siding, if not before. Sumwalt explained that it is the engineer's duty to look at the switch points upon approach to see which way they are lined. Is there a target on that switch that gives a reflective indication of how it is lined?
BigJim NTSB Press release: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKe2dJIBmKA&feature=em-uploademail
NTSB Press release: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKe2dJIBmKA&feature=em-uploademail
Those are very thought provoking details. Sumwalt uses the end of the video as a time benchmark for the sequential events of horn signal, service application, and emergency application. I assume the end of the video marks the moment of impact.
I don't understand the purpose of the horn signal. I would not have expected any brake application other than emergency as soon as the train entered the siding, if not before.
Sumwalt explained that it is the engineer's duty to look at the switch points upon approach to see which way they are lined. Is there a target on that switch that gives a reflective indication of how it is lined?
Electric Lock Main Track switches do not have banners or targets.
Where Normal track speeds exceed 20 MPH and tracks may hold Trains (as defined in the Rule Book) Electric Lock Swtiches are required. Normal speed for Passenger trains when the signal system is operating is 79 MPH; with the signal system suspended 59 MPH. Within the defined areas of a Signal Suspension - Signals convey no authority except as may be specified in the Signal Suspension Bulletin. In many cases at the entry and exit of Signal Suspension Limits, the Suspension Bulletin 'MAY' specify that a signal 'MAY' identify the alignment of a switch that is protected by the signal. All other signals within the limits must be disregarded as the actions of signal personnel could have them displaying all kinds of indications including potentially some that aren't authorized by the rule book.
Well, according to the NTSB it's worse than we thought. 659' from 'the switch' to the point of impact. At 7 sec from the termination of the EDR data the train was at full throttle (!) moving 56mph -- note that this appears to be after the locomotive negotiated the switch. At 5 sec the blended brake was applied (which I believe automatically knocks the throttle to idle on the P42) but this only took about 3mph off the train. The emergency brake was actuated only 3 seconds before the collision (using the 'mushroom-shaped button' according to Sumwalt; you can see it explained in the P42 video) and the train turned out to be going exactly how fast I thought, 50mph, at the moment the EDR cut off.
Apparently the CSX crew released track occupancy to the dispatcher 'in advance of' their actually relining the switch (!) and there is now some argument that they placed a derail some distance ahead of the standing train (which might account for a tilt and glancing collision leaving the lead truck where it is now). I will be highly interested in seeing the SPAF here ... if there is one.
A Trains staffer brought up during the Q&A that the Amcafe is in fact broken in half; NTSB indicated they will not have meaningful results on this for at least several days.
Sunwalt repeatedly stated that 91's movement was under 'track warrant' between 'two control points' -- is this correct for operation under signal suspension?
Deggestythis does bring a question up: When was the signal system suspended? And, yet another: How many freight trains run through there each day, and when do they run?
And, yet another: How many freight trains run through there each day, and when do they run?
Can only go by my experiences with Signal Suspensions on the Baltimore Division; that when I retired had PTC installed and in testing Operation on several subdivisions.
Signal Suspensions affecting one or two Control Point would normally be placed in effect at 8 AM on Saturday mornings (Saturday & Sunday being periods of reduced traffic). The Suspensions would remain in effect until the Signal Department had installed and TESTED the equipment that was being installed; the Suspensions would normally last until Sunday afternoon or evening, on occasion, when trouble was encountered they could extend into Monday or Tuesday, however Sunday was the most frequent end of the Suspension.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/ntsb-amtrak-engineer-sounded-horn-applied-emergency-brake-in-sc-crash/2018/02/05/902b8df4-0aaf-11e8-95a5-c396801049ef_story.html?utm_term=.e676efcc57ee
Per this report, the Engineer was able to dump the train, dropping them down to 50 mph at impact. He also sounded the horn for 3 seconds continuiously.
At this point, clearly the Amtrak Crew has been absolved of all responsibility for the wreck. They did their job and were literally lined and locked towards disaster. May they rest in peace.
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