beaulieu I have received clarification from my source that there is only one section of ACSES south of New York City. That section is in New Jersey where the Acela is allowed 135mph. All the rest of the NEC south of NYC is covered by a somewhat enhanced version of the Cab Signal system developed by Union Switch & Signal for the Pennsylvania Railroad in the 1920s. The system modulates a 100Hz carrier signal that is picked up by the Cab Signal equipment on board the locomotive or EMU. This gives 4 possible aspects, Restricting (20mph via unmodulated carrier signal), Approach (30 mph w/carrier signal pulsing at 75 pulses per minute), Approach Medium (45 mph w/ carrier signal pulsing at 120 ppm), and Clear (125 mph w/ 180 ppm). The enhanced system added a second carrier signal at a base frequency of 250 Hz. The locomotive considers the signal being received on both carriers giving additional aspects, the most important of which is a pulsing of 120 ppm on both carriers giving a signal indication to the Engineer of Cab Speed (80 mph). If this Cab Signal coding had been applied between 30th Street and Shore Interlocking the train would have been going much slower and possibly not derailed, though passengers would have been thrown around some. The locomotive was equipped to work with both the legacy Cab Signal equipment and the newer ACSES.
I have received clarification from my source that there is only one section of ACSES south of New York City. That section is in New Jersey where the Acela is allowed 135mph. All the rest of the NEC south of NYC is covered by a somewhat enhanced version of the Cab Signal system developed by Union Switch & Signal for the Pennsylvania Railroad in the 1920s. The system modulates a 100Hz carrier signal that is picked up by the Cab Signal equipment on board the locomotive or EMU. This gives 4 possible aspects, Restricting (20mph via unmodulated carrier signal), Approach (30 mph w/carrier signal pulsing at 75 pulses per minute), Approach Medium (45 mph w/ carrier signal pulsing at 120 ppm), and Clear (125 mph w/ 180 ppm).
The enhanced system added a second carrier signal at a base frequency of 250 Hz. The locomotive considers the signal being received on both carriers giving additional aspects, the most important of which is a pulsing of 120 ppm on both carriers giving a signal indication to the Engineer of Cab Speed (80 mph). If this Cab Signal coding had been applied between 30th Street and Shore Interlocking the train would have been going much slower and possibly not derailed, though passengers would have been thrown around some.
The locomotive was equipped to work with both the legacy Cab Signal equipment and the newer ACSES.
map of ACSES
http://static01.nyt.com/images/2015/05/13/us/investigating-the-philadelphia-amtrak-train-crash-1431540334803/investigating-the-philadelphia-amtrak-train-crash-1431540334803-master495-v7.png
The 80 mph cab signal indication is used for diverging on high speed Xovers. The cab signal system governs only route and block occupancy based speeds. Permanent curve and other civil speed restrictions are transponder based. Work zone speeds are radio based (Amtrak is installing PTC radios along it's ROW).
NS and Conrail are hoping the PTC radios will allow for I-ETMS interoperability on the NEC rather than have to install full ACSES on a captive fleet of locomotives.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
BaltACD I read in one of the news articles identifying the engineeer that he was from Boston.
I read in one of the news articles identifying the engineeer that he was from Boston.
PDN the 2010 NEC improvement plan lists curve realignment from Trenton to North PHL. See table 19 ($500 M ) and page 31 of the Trenton to delaware section. There is mention of Amtrak's plan to eventually start the Acela super express of 160 MPH also mentioned in the document. Iwould suspect that is a long way out as the maaps show many buildings in way to build inside this curve.
http://www.amtrak.com/ccurl/870/270/Northeast-Corridor-Infrastructure-Master-Plan.pdf
The news tonight was spitting out things like requiring seat belts on trains, antiquated equipment, the train breaking off the track, how hard to believe more people weren't killed. What garbage. May the people involved find peace.
schlimm blue streak 1 Part of the NEC corridor improvement plan figure 16 show Morris - Frankford interlocking as being improved to 160 MPH MAS which includes this curve. http://amtraknec.devcloud.acquia-sites.com/sites/default/files/2012%20Amtrak-Vision-for-the-Northeast-Corridor.pdf I read that and I do not believe that 160 MAS means that the curve itself will necessarily be 160 mph.
blue streak 1 Part of the NEC corridor improvement plan figure 16 show Morris - Frankford interlocking as being improved to 160 MPH MAS which includes this curve. http://amtraknec.devcloud.acquia-sites.com/sites/default/files/2012%20Amtrak-Vision-for-the-Northeast-Corridor.pdf
Part of the NEC corridor improvement plan figure 16 show Morris - Frankford interlocking as being improved to 160 MPH MAS which includes this curve.
http://amtraknec.devcloud.acquia-sites.com/sites/default/files/2012%20Amtrak-Vision-for-the-Northeast-Corridor.pdf
I read that and I do not believe that 160 MAS means that the curve itself will necessarily be 160 mph.
I concur with schlimm's interpetation - that Frankford Jct. and MORRIS interlocking are the outer limts of the proposed improvement*, and hence likely are not included in that portion of the plan. However, that detail is not specifically addressed in this document (42 pages, 9.54 MB electronic file size) in either the tabulation ("2025: Gateway Program" on the right side of page 14 = page 21 of 42 of this "PDF" version), or in the very general/ large scale diagram (Fig. 16 - "NEC-UP - Improvements to Support Stair-Steps 3 and 4 by 2025", at the bottom of page 16 = page 23 of 42).
*I'll defer to Don Oltmann's comments about the speed restrictions in the other curves in this segment.
- Paul North.
oltmanndThe first car was twisted longitudinally 180 degrees. Can't imagine what did that. http://l1.yimg.com/bt/api/res/1.2/2pdhHoUcQDLmGV_VKVybVw--/YXBwaWQ9eW5ld3M7Zmk9ZmlsbDtoPTcwMDtpbD1wbGFuZTtweW9mZj0wO3E9NzU7dz0xMDgw
Others have responded correctly. It hit a catenary pole (seen lying across the car on the right) at an odd angle. I'm guessing that it continued across the car (crushing the tubular design that makes these cars so strong) until it hit the other wall, which bent the end around.
Very sad.
I always assumed Amtrak crew runs would be DC to New York and New York to Boston. Are there 'ID' runs, Philadelphia to Boson and return? Does 188 even go to Boston?
I can't get my head around a qualified engineer, 3 miles from his last stop accelerating his train to 106 MPH through an 80 MPH track speed into a 50 MPH curve. Was this Amtrak's version of the Germanwings co-pilot?
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
I understand tomorrow's Diane Reehm show on NPR will cover this topic. No information on what guest commentators will participate.
Tom
schlimm http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/14/us/amtrak-train-derails-crash-philadelphia.html 1. The NTSB confirms the train was going 106 mph, first in the 70/80 mph straight stretch leading to the 50 mph curve. 2. PTC in some form, if in place there, could have prevented the accident or mitigated it greatly. 3. Had the engineer been doing his job correctly, the accident could have been prevented.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/14/us/amtrak-train-derails-crash-philadelphia.html
1. The NTSB confirms the train was going 106 mph, first in the 70/80 mph straight stretch leading to the 50 mph curve.
2. PTC in some form, if in place there, could have prevented the accident or mitigated it greatly.
3. Had the engineer been doing his job correctly, the accident could have been prevented.
Whoops, that third point is a leap, precluding a mechanical failure.
I will say, network news has just reported that the engineer "can't remember" the accident -- but has retained enough sentience to hire a lawyer.
I will also say that humans are allowed to have accidents. They have job failures every day, and occasionally these are going to have tragic results. Their mechanical systems will also have the occasional tragic result. PTC might well have prevented this accident -- and will surely cause others.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
MrLynn Just heard a CNN interview with an NSTB board member, who said that the area of the crash was not protected by PCS/ACSES. He was not as specific as beaulieu is, nor did he say where else on the NEC PCS has not been implemented. He did say that PCS would have prevented this overspeed disaster (and the one at Spuyten Duyvil in NY). Makes me wonder about Amtrak's one-person-in-the-cab policy where PCS has not been installed.
Just heard a CNN interview with an NSTB board member, who said that the area of the crash was not protected by PCS/ACSES. He was not as specific as beaulieu is, nor did he say where else on the NEC PCS has not been implemented. He did say that PCS would have prevented this overspeed disaster (and the one at Spuyten Duyvil in NY).
Makes me wonder about Amtrak's one-person-in-the-cab policy where PCS has not been installed.
PCS is what? The NEC south of NYC is protected by a legacy PRR Cab Signal system, usually refered to as CSS(Cab Signal System). The Cab Signals have a limited number of aspects and only require the acknowledgement by the Engineer, rather than enforcing the speed restriction. Therefore they do not meet the requirements of the PTC mandate. With speeds north of NYC on the newly electrified trackage being as high as 150 mph, Amtrak choose Alstom Signaling's ACSES II system for that trackage. Alstom's ACSES system meets the requirement for PTC(Positive Train Control) and it was offered to the freight railroads. The freight railroads rejected the system as too expensive and with features that they did not need. The freight railroad's choice was Wabtec's V-ETMS system, which offered a lower price, and Wabtec agreed to license production of the various pieces of hardware to all of the other signalling system companies, which Alstom was reluctant to do.
Alstom ACSES II
Incidentally, beaulieu, the Regionals routinely hit 115 or so in Maryland, and probably elsewhere south of NYC. /Mr Lynn
Incidentally, beaulieu, the Regionals routinely hit 115 or so in Maryland, and probably elsewhere south of NYC.
/Mr Lynn
I am aware of that. Between 30th Street Station in Philly and the beginning of the 50 mph speed restriction for the curve at Frankford Jct. the maximum speed allowed for a Regional is 80 mph. The signalling systems in use on the NEC are driven by the needs of Acela.
.
Track speed between 30th Street and a point just .3 miles to the south (actual direction west) of the curve is 80 mph on the inner tracks (which this train would have been on) and 70 on the outer pair of tracks. It is 45-60mph through the curve, and then north of the junction it is 110/90 mph.
That point .3 miles west of the junction is where the cab signals that would be found in the cab governing speed stop; there is nothing governing the speed through the curve northbound, and the signal system picks up again just north of junction. .3 miles is equal to about 13 seconds at track speed, more than enough time for someone to accelerate from 80mph to 110 mph.
beaulieuWord elsewhere is that a SEPTA commuter train passed the site where Amtrak #188 three minutes before the derailment. The commuter train had its windshield shattered by gunfire. The curved at Frankford Jc. has its speed limit of 50mph enforced by ACSES for Westbound trains only due to higher speed limits in that direction. ACSES does not provide enforcement for Eastbound trains(like ATK#188). According to what I have heard is that ACSES does not protect most locations between NYC and Washington DC. due to not being required at the lower speeds found south of NYC. . .
Also: The Septa train windshield was hit by something, but reports I've heard say only "something," not "gunfire." The NTSB guy said it was totally unrelated to Train 188 wreck.
Is the speed restriction for the curve the same for Acela's and the NE Regionals hauled by a locomotive?
Is the operating compartment of the ACS-64 similar to that of the Acela?
Was the Engineer on a regular assignment or working in 'Pool Service' or off the Extra List?
I am certain we will find out in about a year when the NTSB publishes their report.
Looks from the images that the train exceeded the overturning speed for the curve. Low center of gravity may have prevented the motor from rolling over (as opposed to steam locomotives with high centers of gravity) but evidently created a scenario where the following cars derailed (rail possibly rolled over or the flanges climbed the outside rail).
As for the damage to the first car, there's no way that any coach can survive a high speed impact with a catanery tower. The Pennsy had one heavyweight coach that was split open like a sardine can in the previous Frankford Junction wreck.
We now know that the new locomotives can accelerate 7 cars from stop to 106 MPH in 3.4 miles. What we don't know is why it happened in this instance.
Shortly after, Amtrak funding slashed.
https://www.yahoo.com/politics/amtrak-crash-hits-home-for-lawmakers-who-respond-118880314740.html
Rich
If you ever fall over in public, pick yourself up and say “sorry it’s been a while since I inhabited a body.” And just walk away.
Low CofG seems to have helped the locomotive remain upright(transformer located between the locomotive's trucks). The first passenger coach struck a cantenary tower side-on, causing the severe damage before the tower brokeaway from its mounting.
Word elsewhere is that a SEPTA commuter train passed the site where Amtrak #188 three minutes before the derailment. The commuter train had its windshield shattered by gunfire. The curved at Frankford Jc. has its speed limit of 50mph enforced by ACSES for Westbound trains only due to higher speed limits in that direction. ACSES does not provide enforcement for Eastbound trains(like ATK#188). According to what I have heard is that ACSES does not protect most locations between NYC and Washington DC. due to not being required at the lower speeds found south of NYC.
The Amtrak ACS-64 is equipped with ACSES which meets PTC requirements. It does not have a compatibility problem due to not being able to operate on Freight railroad networks. It can only run on Amtrak, Metro-North, and ConnDOT trackage. Also ACSES does not require wayside radio towers to transmit data and authorities. Rather it uses balizes(transmitter beacons) located in the track. On a per mile basis it is more expensive. Amtrak had commited to this system for trackage for the route from NYC to Boston before the PTC mandate so it made sense for them to use it over both the NEC and Keystone corridors, thus avoiding the need to equip the Acela and new electric locomotives with both systems.
bjturon It dosn't look these Amfleet coaches telescoped... and the new coaches in the recent Metrolink grade crossing accident did very well with the new collision tech. The fatalities I recken will all be from that one virtually demolished Amfleet. Its sickening to see... looks like it was kicked and stepped on by Godzilla.
It dosn't look these Amfleet coaches telescoped... and the new coaches in the recent Metrolink grade crossing accident did very well with the new collision tech. The fatalities I recken will all be from that one virtually demolished Amfleet. Its sickening to see... looks like it was kicked and stepped on by Godzilla.
Also looking at the paint transfers on the south side of the locomotive the skid marks look to me as if the locomotive turned end for end. And the pantograph is not on the roof. Also one of the cab air conditioners appears to have been torn off the roof.
Rgds IGN
As is often the case with railroad accidents, the cause of this one may not be as simple as it first appears. Right now, it appears to be a simple case of the train grossly exceeding the speed limit on the curve. So far so good. But how did this happen? Amtrak has a PTC style signal overlay system called the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES) on much of the Northeast Corridor, which enforces speed limits at places like restrictive curves. I don't know whether this system is yet in place at the accident site. What is in place is Automatic Train Control (ATC), an older system that enforces signal indications. From the limited information that's come out so far, Amtrak may have done something through its ATC system to enforce lower speeds on this particular curve. If this is true (I'm sure we'll find out before too long), the system should have slowed the train if the engineer failed to do so. Why didn't it? Lots of questions and not many answers at this point.
I have an idea for different shape for passenger cars that I'm hoping would prevent cars from telescoping into each other in a crash. Make both ends of each passenger car "body" 45 a degree angle to the drivers side of the car. And have that angle go all the way to the other side of the car. The ends of the cars would still need to be strong enough to avoid collapsing. The doors going from one car to another could still be in the center. Accordion sides can still be used. I will make a simple mockup of the car bodies and put up a video on my YouTube channel within a week.
Modeling the "Fargo Area Rapid Transit" in O scale 3 rail.
A lot of people in the press and politics are already beating the drum of "our transport system is underfunded including rail" and "congress needs to spend more money".
This may be true in the broad picture, and clearly PTC does fit into this (unfunded mandate) except I beleive Amtrak has stated it will make the orginal PTC federal deadline... but I find it hard to beleive that one more rail accident or bridge collapse will change anything with our "do nothing/we hate the goverment/taxcuts more holier than thou" congress.
But here is a counter arguement... given all the "very important people" including congressman, lobbiests, and bankers who travel in great numbers on the NEC, could this perhaps great a groundswell of public pressure for the congress to act?
I reading a book right now on the Tokyo Earthquake of 1923 and its focus on the great call for urban, social, and econmic change/reform in Japan post-disaster... and the actual megar results. For example the idea to rebuild the capital as a great modern city was defeated in part by politicans who pushed "austerity" and question why Tokyo sould get all the money instead of the poor farmers in the countryside. Sound familiar?
I'm a little skeptical of calling for investment in Amtrak or commutter rail in the direct aftermath of a great tragedy before we have all the facts... or at least most of them. Yes perhaps we will discover the had PTC been installed here the wreck would have been adverted... but then if its true Amtrak is schedule to meet the PTC deadline (as I beleive is the case) then this is less about funding more about bad luck... that the crash occured months before the new safety system was to be installed.
And what about the existing system... did it protect this curve... was it ATS or a ATC system like on MetroNorth and the LIRR. The Spuyten Duyvil derailment could have been prevented by the existing ATC system... and a week later that system was expanded to protect that curve and other speed restrictions... no PTC required.
BaltACDThe train made it's regular stop at 30th Street Station - how far from 30th Street is the location of the derailment?
I measured it on Google Maps and it looks to be about 3.4 miles.
Also came across this report:
http://www.keyetv.com/news/features/top-stories/stories/ntsb-amtrak-train-going-over-100-mph-before-crash-25827.shtml
The engineer survived, apparently without serious injury (good). The article says he declined to make statement to 'investigators' (not clear from which organization) and had a lawyer with him. Hmmm.
UPDATE: found another article
http://kxan.com/2015/05/12/amtrak-train-derailment-disastrous-mess-kills-5-people/
that mentioned a police precinct. OK, now I understand the lawyer. Hopefully the NTSB will get an interview while events are fresh in his mind; a lot of stress on that guy.
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The AAR defines the interoperability. That is one of the things that has caused some of the delay is making sure the system is compatibly with all the conditions on the various railroads.
Its not a matter of waiting for the perfect rocket, its waiting for the rocket to be built. The idea of taking a rocket to the moon has been around since the 1800's, but it took decades if not a century for the technology to catch up with the idea before it was feasible. The delays to PTC are part of the government's own making (it took them years to issue rulings on what they meant by certain requirements, if the railroads don't know what the requirements are they can't build the system, and the FCC impeded the railroads from installing the radio network required to support PTC). Part of the delay was getting delivery of the equipment and the shop space to install it in the engines. Its not just bolting a box to a bulkhead, it involves a lot of new wiring and plumbing to connect it to the engines systems AND maintain all the existing systems until PTC is in effect and proven.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
BroadwayLion nyc#25 The railroads must get an extention on PTC because the technology had NOT been fully deveolped. That's why it's such a stupid deadline! Rocketry has never been fully developed, but that did not stop us from going to the moon. This is NOT rocket science, and can be implimented at any time. Problem is, each railroad will do it differently, and a carrier like AMTK must be compatible with all of them. NTSB says you have to have PTC, but says nothing about what kind of PTC from what company with what kind of interfaces. ROAR
nyc#25 The railroads must get an extention on PTC because the technology had NOT been fully deveolped. That's why it's such a stupid deadline!
The railroads must get an extention on PTC because the technology
had NOT been fully deveolped. That's why it's such a stupid deadline!
Rocketry has never been fully developed, but that did not stop us from going to the moon.
This is NOT rocket science, and can be implimented at any time. Problem is, each railroad will do it differently, and a carrier like AMTK must be compatible with all of them.
NTSB says you have to have PTC, but says nothing about what kind of PTC from what company with what kind of interfaces.
ROAR
Besides, Native Americans are still attempting to process radio permits.
The Route of the Broadway Lion The Largest Subway Layout in North Dakota.
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The train made it's regular stop at 30th Street Station - how far from 30th Street is the location of the derailment?
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