Most short-line locomotives don't catch on fire. After your engine shut down for low water, how long was it for help to arrive? Were you on a grade? Did you set handbrakes or give a service or emergency application to keep the air-brake cylinders charged on the train? How exactly did you handle the situation, which I know was handled intelligently.
EuclidAnd besides, there is NO WAY to verify that the handbrake securement is adequate. It is IMPOSSIBLE to verify it.
Guess we should remove handbrakes and just use air, then?
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.
daveklepper Most short-line locomotives don't catch on fire. After your engine shut down for low water, how long was it for help to arrive? Were you on a grade? Did you set handbrakes or give a service or emergency application to keep the air-brake cylinders charged on the train? How exactly did you handle the situation, which I know was handled intelligently.
The help arrived the next day when I brought the tools and pipe to fix it. The train was right where I left it. I shut all the engines down but the leader and the leader died with low water after I left. I got a call the next day from the yard crew telling me the engine died. I wasn't worried.
The Automatic air was left in release as per rule and after applying 15 handbrakes then testing the brakes (on a 1.7% grade) the first time I discovered that I needed more handbrakes so off I went. There was a total of 35 handbrakes on the train plus the four locomotives on a 10,500 ton 72 car train when I went home.
Handled in accordance with the rules - LIKE ANY OTHER PROFESSIONAL RAILROADER THAT VALUES HIS JOB.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Even went just a little bit beyond. But obviously that specific procedure would have prevented the disaster. Note the number of handbrakes in themselves.
not only valuing your job, but also your life, health, and that of others as well.
zugmann EuclidAnd besides, there is NO WAY to verify that the handbrake securement is adequate. It is IMPOSSIBLE to verify it. Guess we should remove handbrakes and just use air, then?
I am just saying that it is IMPOSSIBLE to verify securement. That does not mean that it will fail every time. I am just restating what the TSB of Canada said. They wrote the rule. They ought to know. They said this:
"Furthermore, because it is impossible to verify hand-brake effectiveness by pulling or pushing cars on high grades, locomotive engineers cannot accurately know that management’s expectations have been met every time cars are secured in accordance with CROR Rule 112."
Euclid zugmann EuclidAnd besides, there is NO WAY to verify that the handbrake securement is adequate. It is IMPOSSIBLE to verify it. Guess we should remove handbrakes and just use air, then? I am just saying that it is IMPOSSIBLE to verify securement. That does not mean that it will fail every time. I am just restating what the TSB of Canada said. They wrote the rule. They ought to know. They said this: "Furthermore, because it is impossible to verify hand-brake effectiveness by pulling or pushing cars on high grades, locomotive engineers cannot accurately know that management’s expectations have been met every time cars are secured in accordance with CROR Rule 112."
. Sounds like someone that never got away from behind a computer desk is writing these rules.
zugmann Euclid zugmann EuclidAnd besides, there is NO WAY to verify that the handbrake securement is adequate. It is IMPOSSIBLE to verify it. Guess we should remove handbrakes and just use air, then? I am just saying that it is IMPOSSIBLE to verify securement. That does not mean that it will fail every time. I am just restating what the TSB of Canada said. They wrote the rule. They ought to know. They said this: "Furthermore, because it is impossible to verify hand-brake effectiveness by pulling or pushing cars on high grades, locomotive engineers cannot accurately know that management’s expectations have been met every time cars are secured in accordance with CROR Rule 112." . Sounds like someone that never got away from behind a computer desk is writing these rules.
Just like it is Impossible to overbeat a dead horse!
Overmod Paul of CovingtonDoes this mean that the brakes on all cars would be left fully applied, or that the air would be bled slowly enough that all cylinders would be empty? The text of the rule is: (n) Securement of unattended equipment. Unattended equipment shall be secured in accordance with the following requirements: ... (2) Except for equipment connected to a source of compressed air (e.g., locomotive or ground air source), prior to leaving equipment unattended, the brake pipe shall be reduced to zero at a rate that is no less than a service rate reduction, and the brake pipe vented to atmosphere by leaving the angle cock in the open position on the first unit of the equipment left unattended. A train's air brake shall not be depended upon to hold equipment standing unattended (including a locomotive, a car, or a train whether or not locomotive is attached). In other words, the brakes will be fully applied via a service-to-emergency application (in other words, assured to be a fast enough release to set up all the brakes that can be signalled from the trainline), and the brakepipe then left open to assure no release signal (or other control air signal) can be sent to the valves. I get the impression this is to prevent a situation like the one at Lac Megantic, where the line pressure (and independent pressure) fell off too slowly to trigger a brake application. The plot thickens, however, because in the discussion to (n)(8)(ii) in the NPRM, the FRA says this: "A locomotive would be left running either to avoid cold weather starting or to avoid a brake test when the next crew takes charge of the train. If the locomotive would have been left running to maintain brake pressure, the train crew can leave one of the trailing locomotives running to maintain brake pressure, and lock its door." So it can be assumed that the practice of leaving an unattended train with brake-air compressor running, and the air brakes released, continues to be permissible -- the rule indicating that any time the air ceases to be supplied, the air brakes will have to be fully -- and probably manually; note the 'angle cock' reference -- applied (the presumption being that the 'securement' called for in (n)(1) with the handbrakes or 'alternate means' was fully and properly made. That will be good news for operations that want to avoid the time and trouble of full brake tests conducted by single-man crews. But I would still want to see some fallback method that applies the brakes if the air compression 'stops' while the train is unattended: a possible alternative would be a valve that sets the air if the trainline pressure falls below a set value (which would be an indication that the trainline is developing an increasing leak or the compressor(s) are not supplying adequate volume or pressure), another being some system that identifies when the compressors aren't running and (either with or without a time delay and warning) sets the air brake. This is separate from the systems that would apply the brake only if the train physically starts to roll -- the breakaway hose, the GPS/RF feature in a FOT or EOT (or midtrain) device, or all the other semi-crackpot inventions that will go on and on my friends. Those are not described here, but as I noted they will be of zero use if the air brakes are set and then 'enough' of them leak off subsequently. The quandary, I think, is mostly political: Do you set the brakes on a dead train, reinforcing the securement via handbrakes, or do you provide independent ways to set the brakes as a positive response to unintended motion? Lawyers could argue the thing either way, and probably have.
Paul of CovingtonDoes this mean that the brakes on all cars would be left fully applied, or that the air would be bled slowly enough that all cylinders would be empty?
The text of the rule is:
(n) Securement of unattended equipment. Unattended equipment shall be secured in accordance with the following requirements: ...
(2) Except for equipment connected to a source of compressed air (e.g., locomotive or ground air source), prior to leaving equipment unattended, the brake pipe shall be reduced to zero at a rate that is no less than a service rate reduction, and the brake pipe vented to atmosphere by leaving the angle cock in the open position on the first unit of the equipment left unattended. A train's air brake shall not be depended upon to hold equipment standing unattended (including a locomotive, a car, or a train whether or not locomotive is attached).
In other words, the brakes will be fully applied via a service-to-emergency application (in other words, assured to be a fast enough release to set up all the brakes that can be signalled from the trainline), and the brakepipe then left open to assure no release signal (or other control air signal) can be sent to the valves.
I get the impression this is to prevent a situation like the one at Lac Megantic, where the line pressure (and independent pressure) fell off too slowly to trigger a brake application.
The plot thickens, however, because in the discussion to (n)(8)(ii) in the NPRM, the FRA says this:
"A locomotive would be left running either to avoid cold weather starting or to avoid a brake test when the next crew takes charge of the train. If the locomotive would have been left running to maintain brake pressure, the train crew can leave one of the trailing locomotives running to maintain brake pressure, and lock its door."
So it can be assumed that the practice of leaving an unattended train with brake-air compressor running, and the air brakes released, continues to be permissible -- the rule indicating that any time the air ceases to be supplied, the air brakes will have to be fully -- and probably manually; note the 'angle cock' reference -- applied (the presumption being that the 'securement' called for in (n)(1) with the handbrakes or 'alternate means' was fully and properly made. That will be good news for operations that want to avoid the time and trouble of full brake tests conducted by single-man crews. But I would still want to see some fallback method that applies the brakes if the air compression 'stops' while the train is unattended: a possible alternative would be a valve that sets the air if the trainline pressure falls below a set value (which would be an indication that the trainline is developing an increasing leak or the compressor(s) are not supplying adequate volume or pressure), another being some system that identifies when the compressors aren't running and (either with or without a time delay and warning) sets the air brake.
This is separate from the systems that would apply the brake only if the train physically starts to roll -- the breakaway hose, the GPS/RF feature in a FOT or EOT (or midtrain) device, or all the other semi-crackpot inventions that will go on and on my friends. Those are not described here, but as I noted they will be of zero use if the air brakes are set and then 'enough' of them leak off subsequently.
The quandary, I think, is mostly political: Do you set the brakes on a dead train, reinforcing the securement via handbrakes, or do you provide independent ways to set the brakes as a positive response to unintended motion? Lawyers could argue the thing either way, and probably have.
associated with this.
What is under discussion is a cut of cars(equipment), leaving the anglecock open on a standing cut is the rule, and has been, except when “running around” the cut to get a locomotive on the other end, than you can leave it open for ten seconds, exhaust all the air, close it and do your thing.
Leaving the anglecock closed is considered “bottling the air” and has been forbidden by rule for ages.
Removing reversers has been the norm for quite some time also; the major change is in the reporting of securement to a qualified individual and locking the cab.
Note the term qualified individual, the FRA states that person can and most often will be a second crewmember.
You can report to a dispatcher or control operator also, and the FRA made quite a fuss about the time/cost of doing so, to the point they made a lot of assumptions as to how long that would take and the cost of record keeping associated with this.
You secure the train with hand brakes on the cars first, test the securement, then do a brake pipe reduction, setting all the brakes on the train.
23 17 46 11
Makes sense. Make sure the handbrakes will hold the cars, then apply air brakes. Thanks.
_____________
"A stranger's just a friend you ain't met yet." --- Dave Gardner
Paul of Covington Makes sense. Make sure the handbrakes will hold the cars, then apply air brakes. Thanks. Correct, but you do not consider the air brakes on the cars or the handbrakes and independent brakes on the locomotive(s) as part of the securement process, only the handbrakes on the cars….applying the airbrakes after testing is simply an additional safety precaution. And securing the locomotive with the handbrakes and independent is a separate procedure, required whenever the locomotive is to be left unmanned, it simply adds to the train securement procedure as a bonus. By current rule, unattended locomotives outside of a yard must each be isolated and have their handbrakes set on every locomotive in the consist, be they attached to a train or free standing. All the FRA is doing is codifying the current rules, getting a little press out of the deal, (note the term “press release” )and requiring the carriers to implement some form of accountability and verification as to how and who secures a train, there is no real “new” rules being proposed beyond requiring the verification, and the locked cab requirement, which up until now has been up to each carrier as to if they do or do not lock the doors. Note they make several exceptions to this proposed rule also, involving Class 3 roads using hardware store hasps and master locks. Note too that the FRA is not requiring or creating any more procedures that are already in place, they are just suggesting some form of verification and record keeping as to what and who, and making minor sematic adjustments to the current rules to clarify and make it easier to follow them. In our APB, (accident prevention briefing) yesterday, our superintendent went through the release paragraph by paragraph with us, and we came away with the above conclusion. As for the push pull test, I personally prefer the push test…if you have enough handbrakes applied to the train, and push it with the locomotive, the engineer simply returns the throttle to idle, and you can observe the slack running out of the cars that have no handbrakes applied…if the slack runs out and then stops somewhere within the area you applied brakes to the cars without reaching the locomotive, and brings the locomotive(s) to a stop as well, you can be sure the train is secured. The pull test does the opposite, the slack runs in and you can never be sure if the handbrakes are stopping the train or the weight of the locomotives are contributing, although the inertia of the locomotive can at times give you a indication…if the handbrakes stop that in a short time, you can be pretty sure the handbrakes are doing their job. Again, this is just a personal preference, both fulfill the rule requirement.
Correct, but you do not consider the air brakes on the cars or the handbrakes and independent brakes on the locomotive(s) as part of the securement process, only the handbrakes on the cars….applying the airbrakes after testing is simply an additional safety precaution.
And securing the locomotive with the handbrakes and independent is a separate procedure, required whenever the locomotive is to be left unmanned, it simply adds to the train securement procedure as a bonus.
By current rule, unattended locomotives outside of a yard must each be isolated and have their handbrakes set on every locomotive in the consist, be they attached to a train or free standing.
All the FRA is doing is codifying the current rules, getting a little press out of the deal, (note the term “press release” )and requiring the carriers to implement some form of accountability and verification as to how and who secures a train, there is no real “new” rules being proposed beyond requiring the verification, and the locked cab requirement, which up until now has been up to each carrier as to if they do or do not lock the doors.
Note they make several exceptions to this proposed rule also, involving Class 3 roads using hardware store hasps and master locks.
Note too that the FRA is not requiring or creating any more procedures that are already in place, they are just suggesting some form of verification and record keeping as to what and who, and making minor sematic adjustments to the current rules to clarify and make it easier to follow them.
In our APB, (accident prevention briefing) yesterday, our superintendent went through the release paragraph by paragraph with us, and we came away with the above conclusion.
As for the push pull test, I personally prefer the push test…if you have enough handbrakes applied to the train, and push it with the locomotive, the engineer simply returns the throttle to idle, and you can observe the slack running out of the cars that have no handbrakes applied…if the slack runs out and then stops somewhere within the area you applied brakes to the cars without reaching the locomotive, and brings the locomotive(s) to a stop as well, you can be sure the train is secured.
The pull test does the opposite, the slack runs in and you can never be sure if the handbrakes are stopping the train or the weight of the locomotives are contributing, although the inertia of the locomotive can at times give you a indication…if the handbrakes stop that in a short time, you can be pretty sure the handbrakes are doing their job.
Again, this is just a personal preference, both fulfill the rule requirement.
Overmod schlimm For those who do not care to wade through the entire document, here is the FRA summary [my emphases]: ... "Verify securement by qualified persons ... Had t[this] emphasized point been the rule and actual practice in Canada, Lac Magantic would not have occurred. I am not sure the proposed rulemaking would have assured this. Note that it is verbal and of presumed short duration (according to the NPRM itself, about 15 seconds for a single-man-crew report of securement status). What would have been reported for the train involved in the Lac Megantic incident? That seven brakes had been applied, and the train was secure? Implicitly taking the employee's word that securement has been accomplished? It was also my understanding that Tom Harding had communicated his securement with MM&A RTC and the two were in 'agreement' regarding train securement, the handling of incidents regarding the locomotive fire and shutdown, etc. Unless the verbal securement procedure contains more specific forms of assurance, and perhaps some independent means of verifying actual implementation (telemetered sensors for brake application, as a hypothetical example) it won't be an improvement on what already existed on the night the train ran away -- and unless specifically worded, it wouldn't have 'caught' the fact that the train was substantially hanging on the applied independent brake. This is not to argue at all with the point that a proper tie-down verification 'conversation' would have been instrumental in preventing the Lac Megantic wreck -- only that the existing rules are not sufficiently amended by the NPRM. A secondary point of interest that is raised here is: if the cab of a locomotive on fire is locked, what is the procedure for 'first responders' to follow? The one 'good' thing this might have produced would be that someone with a key -- under the circumstances, probably Tom Harding himself; in any case, someone knowledgeable about locomotives -- would have been directed to get to the locomotive in question ASAP. On the other hand, my somewhat cynical opinion is that the door would have been pried open, or a window hacked out, just as with any other locked premise a fire department encounters, and the effective result would have been the same. The emphasis needs to be on that last point, Perform additional inspections by qualified persons when emergency responders have been on equipment --perhaps with the added understanding that those inspections take place QUICKLY under certain circumstances, for example when all locomotives in a consist have been shut down. I did not miss the additional note about locking the door of a trailing unit that is fired up to substitute for a lead locomotive. At least they're consistent.
schlimm For those who do not care to wade through the entire document, here is the FRA summary [my emphases]: ... "Verify securement by qualified persons ... Had t[this] emphasized point been the rule and actual practice in Canada, Lac Magantic would not have occurred.
For those who do not care to wade through the entire document, here is the FRA summary [my emphases]:
... "Verify securement by qualified persons ...
Had t[this] emphasized point been the rule and actual practice in Canada, Lac Magantic would not have occurred.
I am not sure the proposed rulemaking would have assured this.
Note that it is verbal and of presumed short duration (according to the NPRM itself, about 15 seconds for a single-man-crew report of securement status). What would have been reported for the train involved in the Lac Megantic incident? That seven brakes had been applied, and the train was secure? Implicitly taking the employee's word that securement has been accomplished?
It was also my understanding that Tom Harding had communicated his securement with MM&A RTC and the two were in 'agreement' regarding train securement, the handling of incidents regarding the locomotive fire and shutdown, etc. Unless the verbal securement procedure contains more specific forms of assurance, and perhaps some independent means of verifying actual implementation (telemetered sensors for brake application, as a hypothetical example) it won't be an improvement on what already existed on the night the train ran away -- and unless specifically worded, it wouldn't have 'caught' the fact that the train was substantially hanging on the applied independent brake.
This is not to argue at all with the point that a proper tie-down verification 'conversation' would have been instrumental in preventing the Lac Megantic wreck -- only that the existing rules are not sufficiently amended by the NPRM.
A secondary point of interest that is raised here is: if the cab of a locomotive on fire is locked, what is the procedure for 'first responders' to follow? The one 'good' thing this might have produced would be that someone with a key -- under the circumstances, probably Tom Harding himself; in any case, someone knowledgeable about locomotives -- would have been directed to get to the locomotive in question ASAP. On the other hand, my somewhat cynical opinion is that the door would have been pried open, or a window hacked out, just as with any other locked premise a fire department encounters, and the effective result would have been the same. The emphasis needs to be on that last point, Perform additional inspections by qualified persons when emergency responders have been on equipment --perhaps with the added understanding that those inspections take place QUICKLY under certain circumstances, for example when all locomotives in a consist have been shut down.
I did not miss the additional note about locking the door of a trailing unit that is fired up to substitute for a lead locomotive. At least they're consistent.
My third point in the emphasized quotes was "Perform additional inspections by qualified persons when emergency responders have been on equipment." Has the MMR been required to send a qualified person to the scene, one would hope he would have discovered the train was not secured. But if employees are careless, in a hurry to leave, beyond HOS, etc., then the rules won't help. Perhaps employees need to be more carefully screened to see if they are likely to follow rule procedures carefully.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
schlimmMy third point in the emphasized quotes was "Perform additional inspections by qualified persons when emergency responders have been on equipment." Has the MMR been required to send a qualified person to the scene, one would hope he would have discovered the train was not secured.
I didn't comment because that point is so correct it needs no comment from the likes of me. The FRA appears to be valuing this lesson more than the Canadians, and in my opinion they are very right to do so.
schlimm My third point in the emphasized quotes was "Perform additional inspections by qualified persons when emergency responders have been on equipment." Has the MMR been required to send a qualified person to the scene, one would hope he would have discovered the train was not secured. But if employees are careless, in a hurry to leave, beyond HOS, etc., then the rules won't help. Perhaps employees need to be more carefully screened to see if they are likely to follow rule procedures carefully.
Just like posters need to be screened and tested.
Operating personnel are tested on the rules annually to maintain their Federal License to be either a Conductor or Engineer. Additionally those dreaded 'weed weasels' are charged with the responsibility of performing 'Efficiency Tests' and reporting the results of them on all aspects of rules compliance at all hours of the day, any day of the week - including Holidays. Hours of Service is never an excuse for not securing the train if it is going to left unattended - it is a matter of public safety and public safety trumps HOS. In the MMA case, the HOS was not a consideration, the engineer was on duty at 1330, reached his tie up point at 2230, 'secured' the train and departed to the hotel at 2330.
Then we need to screen the screeners and screen the screener screener's. Ad nauseum!
.
Old hogger's advice to me:
Brakes on engines hold the engines.
Brakes on the train hold the train.
zugmann Old hogger's advice to me: Brakes on engines hold the engines. Brakes on the train hold the train.
And when in doubt give the train a good jerk and keep jerking until your satisfied.
Tip it over! Solves that problem!
She who has no signature! cinscocom-tmw
From the FRA report:
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2014/09/09/2014-21253/securement-of-unattended-equipment
Quote from the report:
"Proposed paragraph (n)(8)(i) requires that an employee responsible for securing equipment defined by paragraph (n)(6) verify securement with another qualified person. This is similar to Emergency Order 28 which currently requires employees to verify proper securement with a qualified railroad employee. This may be done by relaying pertinent securement information (i.e., the number of hand brakes applied, the tonnage and length of the train or vehicle, the grade and terrain features of the track, any relevant weather conditions, and the type of equipment being secured) to the qualified railroad employee. The qualified railroad employee must then verify and confirm with the train crew that the securement meets the railroad's requirements. However, proposed paragraph (n)(8)(i) does not contain a requirement that the railroad maintain a record of the verification of proper securement. Show citation box
FRA believes that the type of verification requirement in proposed paragraph (n)(8)(i) will serve to ensure that any employee who is responsible for securing equipment containing hazardous materials will follow appropriate procedures because the employee will need to fully consider the securement procedures to relay what was done to the qualified employee. Further, the qualified railroad employee (e.g. a trainmaster, road foreman of engines, or another train crew employee) will be in a position to ensure that a sufficient number of hand brakes have been applied. Under this proposed rule, the qualified railroad employee must have adequate knowledge of the railroad's securement requirements for the specific location or for the specific circumstance for which the equipment will be left unattended. Without limiting the type of employee who may be qualified, FRA envisions that a dispatcher, roadmaster, yardmaster, road foreman of engines, or another crew member would be able to serve in the verification capacity."
So they have a new rule that calls for someone to verify the securement. And yet Rule 112, as it has always been, calls for verification of securement. That is what the “handbrake effectiveness verification” test is intended to verify. So, it does indeed seem to be attempting to solve the problem by calling for the verification of the verifiers. I see it as similar to calling signals.
But specifically to the points that I have highlighted in purple, how can any other person verify the securement without doing their own pull test? It says that the verifier must have adequate knowledge of the railroad’s securement requirements. One of those requirements is conducting and passing the pull test. It does no good to simply have knowledge of it.
I think that basically, there is only so much that verification can accomplish, so another road needs to be taken. That road is to reduce and simplify what needs to be verified.
The Federal law quoted is from the FRA and is American, rule 112 is Canadian. Different countries, different laws, different rules, different requirements.
The "pull test" you keep talking about is Canadian and is NOT necessarily part of US law or rules. For example the "pull" test is not part of the UP securement rules.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
dehusmanThe Federal law quoted is from the FRA and is American, rule 112 is Canadian. Different countries, different laws, different rules, different requirements. The "pull test" you keep talking about is Canadian and is NOT necessarily part of US law or rules. For example the "pull" test is not part of the UP securement rules.
Yes you are right. I should not have referred to Rule 112 in linkage to the FRA paper. To the U.P. method, what test to they use? I assume that it is just a test in which the air brakes are released to see if it rolls. To some extent, that would still apply to the points I made about the verifiers. They would have to witness that test, wouldn't they?
In the U.S., what types of tests are used on various railroads? I assume they all test, but some just release air brakes while others push/pull.
Euclid To some extent, that would still apply to the points I made about the verifiers. They would have to witness that test, wouldn't they?
To some extent, that would still apply to the points I made about the verifiers. They would have to witness that test, wouldn't they?
Nope. The employee securing just has to tell the "qualified employee" the required info. The ONLY people who knows whether the equipment is secure is the crew securing it. Everybody else may be hundreds of miles away.
The Feds have all sorts of requirements for persons performing an activity to tell somebody else that they have performed the activity, under the assumption that if you have to tell somebody you did something that you will be more likely to have actually done it.
So how do you call that verification that somebody has done something? All it verifies is that somebody has told somebody they have done something. I can see how it might add a degree of assurance. But to me verify means to go all the way and know; not just be told it is so.
Euclid So how do you call that verification that somebody has done something? All it verifies is that somebody has told somebody they have done something. I can see how it might add a degree of assurance. But to me verify means to go all the way and know; not just be told it is so.
So how do you propose it be verified?
Bottom line, nobody can ever just screw up anymore. If something happens it MUST BE because there's a flaw in the system. It just has to be! So the feds and/or company passes 100 laws, rules and regulations, even though current laws, rules, and regulations would have been fine if they were followed. So when someone screws up and doesn't follow the new 100 laws, rules, and regulations, the feds and/or company will pass 100 more NEW laws, rules and regulations. Repeat until you throw up.
It'd be funny if it wasn't so tragic.
zugmann Euclid So how do you call that verification that somebody has done something? All it verifies is that somebody has told somebody they have done something. I can see how it might add a degree of assurance. But to me verify means to go all the way and know; not just be told it is so. So how do you propose it be verified? Bottom line, nobody can ever just screw up anymore. If something happens it MUST BE because there's a flaw in the system. It just has to be! So the feds and/or company passes 100 laws, rules and regulations, even though current laws, rules, and regulations would have been fine if they were followed. So when someone screws up and doesn't follow the new 100 laws, rules, and regulations, the feds and/or company will pass 100 more NEW laws, rules and regulations. Repeat until you throw up.
I think that verification by humans has its limits. As I mentioned before, rather than add more layers of verification, I think it would be a lot more effective to reduce and simplify what needs to be verified.
Euclid, I think it would be a lot more effective to reduce and simplify what needs to be verified.
What are we verifying, and how do you propose to verify what you want?
What I am talking about is more like the certainty of verification that comes from an interlocking plant. It would come from a powered parking brake that can be locked. Maybe the lock signal could be sent somewhere for monitoring or further control. Just one issue to verify; ON or OFF.
I have a solution. Throw the brakes in the big hole and place the locomotive in run eight. Once the wheels on the cars are sufficiently flattened, the train ain't going nowhere.
Norm
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