I asked Steve Sweeney what happened to thread on train securement, which has been deleted. He replied that it was the fairest thing to do considering their other obligations, but didn't explain what the reason was. He didn't tell me that I had done anything wrong, although I don't remember if I had posted anything in that thread. If any of you did get explanations that said there was something wrong with what you posted, I'd appreciate it if you wouldn't do it again, since that will probably cause the moderators to decide to punish those of us who want legitimately to discuss this.
There were several posts, some of which gave me headaches, which seemed to try to explain a lot of the advantages and disadvantages of various ways to keep a stopped train from rolling. I thank the fellows who took the time to explain it, and hope you'll try to recreate your well thought out explanations.
I don't remember anybody mentioning chocks. The 500 ton gorilla in the room of course is the Lac Megantic disaster. In one of those threads I think I remember asking what would a couple of chocks have done, somebody replied that the chocks would have been turned to splinters. Could somebody explain why, or what would a sufficient number of chocks be to secure a given number of railroad cars, and why other methods might be better than using chocks?
In my layman's opinion I think it'd be a lot easier to tell if somebody's set chocks, and one could tether them to the carbody, so one would not need to carry them, but rather secure them to the carbody when they're not using them. That sounds to me like an easier thing to do than set and release handbrakes.
Patrick Boylan
Free yacht rides, 27' sailboat, zip code 19114 Delaware River, get great Delair bridge photos from the river. Send me a private message
Note that there are rail chocks, but they are used for singular cars at industries.
I saw a picture of the airbrake hose that clamps to the rail a while ago, but can't find it. Can anyone help? It looked rather improvised.
"WAG": Might have been on the Quebec North Shore & Labrador ?
The TSB report of the MM&A runaway mentions chocks as a defense against runaways, although I think Overmod is correct in his assessment of the practical problems chocks pose. Actually, I am surprised that the TSB report mentions them, although they do so only as a generic comment about various means to secure trains, and not as something that would have been practical for securing long trains on mainline grades.
I think it is more important to make a distinction between degrees of risk. Many trains are secured where a runaway would have a good possibility of doing little damage. And many trains are carrying loads that will cause little collateral damage if they should derail. But the complete opposite of these innocuous conditions was the MM&A oil train parked atop the grade leading into Lac Megantic.
Here the stakes were way too high to rely on a system affected by the variables of the number of handbrakes generally assessed to be sufficient by a variety of reinforcing means and human judgment. For such a risky proposition, a modern, 21st Century securement method is called for.
Paul, I think so! Is it in the article about QNS&L from a couple years ago?
The best way is for the crew to apply an adequate number of hand brakes and
the train will not run away. That's the way it's always been done. Chocks are assinine.
gardendance I asked Steve Sweeney what happened to thread on train securement, which has been deleted. He replied that it was the fairest thing to do considering their other obligations, but didn't explain what the reason was. He didn't tell me that I had done anything wrong, although I don't remember if I had posted anything in that thread. If any of you did get explanations that said there was something wrong with what you posted, I'd appreciate it if you wouldn't do it again, since that will probably cause the moderators to decide to punish those of us who want legitimately to discuss this. There were several posts, some of which gave me headaches, which seemed to try to explain a lot of the advantages and disadvantages of various ways to keep a stopped train from rolling. I thank the fellows who took the time to explain it, and hope you'll try to recreate your well thought out explanations. I don't remember anybody mentioning chocks. The 500 ton gorilla in the room of course is the Lac Megantic disaster. In one of those threads I think I remember asking what would a couple of chocks have done, somebody replied that the chocks would have been turned to splinters. Could somebody explain why, or what would a sufficient number of chocks be to secure a given number of railroad cars, and why other methods might be better than using chocks? In my layman's opinion I think it'd be a lot easier to tell if somebody's set chocks, and one could tether them to the carbody, so one would not need to carry them, but rather secure them to the carbody when they're not using them. That sounds to me like an easier thing to do than set and release handbrakes.
Patrick,
Do you chock your automobile every time you park somewhere?
Not picking a fight….
Besides the issues Overmod brought up….if the train settled even the least little bit, how in the world do you get a chock, especially one made from steel, out from under a 200 ton rail car?
A crowbar and a stick of dynamite still wouldn’t work, and imagine say, the head ten or fifteen cars of a train with chocks jammed under the wheels?
Yes, you could bunch up the slack some, but you would have to do that on each car, very time consuming and labor intensive.
If the existing rules for securement are followed, there really is no need for anything else; it has worked for years and years.
The Lac- Megantic accident is the result of a flawed interpretation of the securement rules, as Balt and myself, plus many others have pointed out, counting the locomotive handbrakes as part of the securement is against almost every carriers own rules, and if a cut of cars can remained secured with the weight of a locomotive or two pushing or pulling on it, then the cars are secured.
23 17 46 11
As I understand it, the flawed interpretation of securement at Nantes was including the independent brakes as part of the securement and test, and failing to do both steps of the test. Whereas, including the locomotive handbrakes in the securement was permitted under MM&A rules.
I think that the most reliable securement would be a full-train, power parking brake with a single point control than can be locked. There would be no issues with limited manpower, limited time, or people being tired or lazy. There would be no issues with how many brakes to set, how tight to set them, how well they work, how steep the grade is, or what the weather is like. There would be no false impressions. There would just be one simple control that says “ON” or “OFF.”
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
NorthWest Paul, I think so! Is it in the article about QNS&L from a couple years ago?
This is also a very interesting TSB Canada Railway Investigation Report on the whole handbrake question - not sure if it was referenced here before:
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2011/r11q0056/r11q0056.pdf (16 pages, 507 KB electronic file size in this 'PDF" format)
"Runaway Train
Quebec North Shore and Labrador Railway
Freight Train LIM-55
Mile 67.20, Wacouna Subdivision Dorée, Quebec
11 December 2011
Report Number R11Q0056
Summary
On 11 December 2011, as freight train LIM-55 was descending a long steep grade, the locomotive engineer, unable to control the train speed using the dynamic and automatic brakes, applied the emergency brakes at Mile 68.00 of the Wacouna Subdivision to stop his movement. One hour later [just after the engineer finishing applying what he thought was a sufficient number of handbrakes to hold the train - PDN], the train ran away, descending the grade for a distance of almost 15 miles and reaching a maximum speed of 63 mph. The train finally came to a stop at Mile 52.80. No one was injured and there was no derailment."
The lessons learned: 1) Inspect, fix, and apply (use more torque) the handbrakes more aggressively (the report is rife with embarrassing results of post-accident tests on all of these aspects - no wonder they didn't hold !); and 2) Apply more handbrakes on steeper grades - see Appendix B for a revised table (page 15/ 16).
On the broader question: In addition to whatever handbrake rules that are in effect, park the train in/ on a roughly level siding that's got a substantial sag or 'bowl' effect to it, like maybe 5 to 10 ft. vertical ascent* from the siding to the main line - in both directions - with an interlocked double-point split-switch derail at the end of the siding, or a similarly equipped cross-over to the main which however is normally aligned to straight ahead for a few hundred feet into a dirt embankment (like the PRR used to do at the ends of its yard leads) - it takes an affirmative action to change the X-over to the diverging route out onto the main.
*That's enough to keep gravity or most normal winds** from blowing the train out, but not so much as to require a lot of power. At 0.5% grade, the 10 ft. ascent would require only 2,000 ft. (33 carlengths of 60 ft.) from PVI to PVI at each end, so it would not create a 'ruling grade' in any practical sense.
**In the event of a high-wind severe thunderstorm, tornado, hurricane, or earthquake to overcome that vertical rise - or sabotage or joy-riding, etc., that's what the split-point derail or dead-end runaway track is for. They also ought to be equipped with anti-tampering devices and alarms that lead to an immediate police-type emergency response, similar to breaking into a bank or jewelry store.
Almost any human-dependent or mechanical device is subject to forgetfulness or failure, and becomes increasingly complex as attempts to prevent, counter, or respond to those failures are added. Gravity is automatic, simple, and perpetual.
- Paul North.
BaltACD: Thank you for your visual interpretation of this topic. Really made my day!
Found it! Page 45, Feb 2012 Trains. Called an MED, or Mechanical Emergency Device, it is a clamp that is connected by a short chain to a stub-ended air brake hose. Simple, cheap, effective, reliable, and quick. Seems to me to be the best way to add redundancy.
Otherwise, I think the securement "problem" doesn't really exist.
FRA issues proposed rule to prevent unintended train movements
(Source: Federal Railroad Administration press release, September 9, 2014)
http://www.ble-t.org/pr/news/headline.asp?id=40143
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
Here is the actual text of the NPRM. (Why there was no link to this anywhere in either the BLET piece or the FRA press release that it references is a mystery to me.)
Overmod Here is the actual text of the NPRM. (Why there was no link to this anywhere in either the BLET piece or the FRA press release that it references is a mystery to me.)
It has often been said here that if the securement rules are followed, there is no danger. However, it appears that the regulating authorities are a long ways from accepting that premise.
The new rules call for the railroads to develop a process for verifying that the hand brakes applied are sufficient to hold the train. I thought we already had a process.
Here is a quote mentioning the application of handbrakes being applied to locomotives as part of the securement. I have not read the entire report, so somebody might want to check me on the context:
The regulations also require railroads to develop a process or procedure for verifying that the hand brakes applied are sufficient to hold the equipment with the air brakes released. When dealing with locomotives and locomotive consists, § 232.103(n)(3) establishes specific additional requirements: Show citation box
For those who do not care to wade through the entire document, here is the FRA summary [my emphases]:
"Prevent trains or vehicles transporting specified hazardous materials from being left unattended on a mainline track or side track outside a yard, unless specific securement requirements are followed.Develop a plan identifying such locations or circumstances.Verify securement by qualified persons; and ensure that locks on locomotive cab are secure. Include securement requirements in job briefings.Perform additional inspections by qualified persons when emergency responders have been on equipment.Install locking mechanisms on locomotive doors and repair them in a timely manner."
Had the first and/or third emphasized point been the rule and actual practice in Canada, Lac Magantic would not have occurred.
EuclidAll hand brakes must be fully applied on all locomotives in the lead consist of an unattended train.
I've been proceeding on the assumption that a 'safe' procedure for securement involves:
1) Apply the 'sufficient number' of handbrakes to the cars to pass a proper shove test
2) Perform proper shove test to assure train (locomotives and all) will not move. Apply more handbrakes if the test fails. Do not keep the independent brake applied when doing this test!
3) Apply handbrakes on locomotives (both as additional 'insurance' and in case the locomotives become separated from the train under some circumstance).
I don't see anything substantial changing this. The language of the NPRM appears to require 'verification' of brake application with another 'qualified individual', but the language also states "FRA believes the communication will take 15 seconds of two qualified individuals' time, or 30 labor seconds." so with respect to single-man crews this isn't particularly more than verbal confirmation that securement is 'assured'. Somewhat fascinatingly, any procedure to actually document that the verification was done (as is presently required under Order 28) is not going to be required.
Note that any unattended train MUST have its brakepipe pressure reduced to zero and the trainline left open - 232.103(n)(2), So all the fancy systems that would apply the air brake if the train starts to roll away -- breakaway hoses, RFID/GPS devices, valves that dump the air if all the locomotives in a consist go down -- become essentially meaningless for unattended trains. Am I the only one who finds this somewhat disturbingly like the Government rules for denaturing alcohol?
I don't know if everyone will notice, but this memorandum was included in the discussion of the NPRM. As of March 24, 2010, the FRA considered the 'sufficient number of handbrakes' language woefully inadequate. and noted in part:
"To simply have instructions that state 'a sufficient number of hand brakes have to be applied' does not satisfy the intent of the regulation, unless there is the provision that the pneumatic brake has to be released to determine the equipment is secure."
(To save time and repetition, and to avoid having to hear the Song That Never Ends again, here also is a link to the FRA Action Plan for Hazardous Materials Safety.)
It would appear that most of this NPRM involves that now-dismissed-here chestnut about locking the lead locomotive cab, providing a lockbox for the reverser, etc. (I note that the BLE-T is quoted as making this a major point...) Much of the language in this is... interesting, considering the discussions we have had on this subject. I particularly enjoyed some of the application of 'statistics', particularly the mixing of assumptions and generation of specific-looking numbers. Fascinating that they cite the Adirondack Railroad vandalism as a case supporting adoption of lockable cabs by small railroads... do they really think a locked cab door would have affected that situation?
It might be easy to miss the other 'important' change being made in the NPRM -- it's 232.103(n)(10):
"Each railroad shall adopt and comply with procedures to ensure that, as soon as safely practicable, a qualified employee verifies the proper securement of any unattended equipment when the railroad has knowledge that a non-railroad emergency responder has been on, under, or between the equipment."
This continues a policy required by Order 28 -- what's interesting is that this has been explicitly preserved after TC essentially attempted to pooh-pooh the significance of this aspect in contributing to the Lac Megantic accident. As noted in the NPRM:
"FRA also believes that after the Lac Mégantic accident that railroads would have adopted this practice even in the absence of Emergency Order 28, as a standard business practice, so FRA is confident that this section creates no new benefits or costs."
Paul_D_North_JrThis is also a very interesting TSB Canada Railway Investigation Report on the whole handbrake question - not sure if it was referenced here before: http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2011/r11q0056/r11q0056.pdf (16 pages, 507 KB electronic file size in this 'PDF" format)
Paul,
Yes, that runaway report for the QNS&L is very interesting. It is a truly amazing revelation. While we sit here and debate the adequacy of train securement practice, the premier authority in Canada says it is a flawed concept that cannot be relied on.
I posted it in previous discussions last year, but the point was lost in all the bickering here. What stands out is the unreliability of Rule 112 which is essential to public safety in preventing disasters such as Lac Megantic. The most amazing admission of the TSB of Canada regarding the flaw with Rule 112 is this quote from the QNS&L report. My emphasis added in large font:
“Locomotive engineers who apply hand brakes do not receive any definitive feedback to confirm that sufficient brake shoe force was attained. Furthermore, because it is impossible to verify hand-brake effectiveness by pulling or pushing cars on high grades, locomotive engineers cannot accurately know that management’s expectations have been met every time cars are secured in accordance with CROR Rule 112. Other railway companies in Canada have enhanced CROR Rule 112, on high-grade sections of track, by putting into place procedures detailing the application and the number of hand brakes required. Without specific instructions that take into consideration local conditions, there is a risk of underestimating the number of hand brakes required to secure a train on a steep grade such as between Bybee and Tika and consequently other trains could run away.”
Overmod:
"Note that any unattended train MUST have its brakepipe pressure reduced to zero and the trainline left open - 232.103(n)(2), So all the fancy systems that would apply the air brake if the train starts to roll away -- breakaway hoses, RFID/GPS devices, valves that dump the air if all the locomotives in a consist go down -- become essentially meaningless for unattended trains."
Does this mean that the brakes on all cars would be left fully applied, or that the air would be bled slowly enough that all cylinders would be empty? The latter makes no sense. If the brakes are left applied, then it's highly unlikely that there would be a need for the devices you mentioned to dump the air as with enough handbrakes to hold the train plus the application of all automatic brakes it's highly unlikely that train is going to move, and as has been mentioned on one of these threads, the air brakes can hold for a month or more.
_____________
"A stranger's just a friend you ain't met yet." --- Dave Gardner
schlimm For those who do not care to wade through the entire document, here is the FRA summary [my emphases]: ... "Verify securement by qualified persons ... Had t[this] emphasized point been the rule and actual practice in Canada, Lac Magantic would not have occurred.
... "Verify securement by qualified persons ...
Had t[this] emphasized point been the rule and actual practice in Canada, Lac Magantic would not have occurred.
I am not sure the proposed rulemaking would have assured this.
Note that it is verbal and of presumed short duration (according to the NPRM itself, about 15 seconds for a single-man-crew report of securement status). What would have been reported for the train involved in the Lac Megantic incident? That seven brakes had been applied, and the train was secure? Implicitly taking the employee's word that securement has been accomplished?
It was also my understanding that Tom Harding had communicated his securement with MM&A RTC and the two were in 'agreement' regarding train securement, the handling of incidents regarding the locomotive fire and shutdown, etc. Unless the verbal securement procedure contains more specific forms of assurance, and perhaps some independent means of verifying actual implementation (telemetered sensors for brake application, as a hypothetical example) it won't be an improvement on what already existed on the night the train ran away -- and unless specifically worded, it wouldn't have 'caught' the fact that the train was substantially hanging on the applied independent brake.
This is not to argue at all with the point that a proper tie-down verification 'conversation' would have been instrumental in preventing the Lac Megantic wreck -- only that the existing rules are not sufficiently amended by the NPRM.
A secondary point of interest that is raised here is: if the cab of a locomotive on fire is locked, what is the procedure for 'first responders' to follow? The one 'good' thing this might have produced would be that someone with a key -- under the circumstances, probably Tom Harding himself; in any case, someone knowledgeable about locomotives -- would have been directed to get to the locomotive in question ASAP. On the other hand, my somewhat cynical opinion is that the door would have been pried open, or a window hacked out, just as with any other locked premise a fire department encounters, and the effective result would have been the same. The emphasis needs to be on that last point, Perform additional inspections by qualified persons when emergency responders have been on equipment --perhaps with the added understanding that those inspections take place QUICKLY under certain circumstances, for example when all locomotives in a consist have been shut down.
I did not miss the additional note about locking the door of a trailing unit that is fired up to substitute for a lead locomotive. At least they're consistent.
The rule was already in place because the engineer performed the securement and was qualified to verify it. He did verify it, but he made an error. So the new rule requiring that the securement be verified by a qualified person is meaningless.
And besides, there is NO WAY to verify that the handbrake securement is adequate. It is IMPOSSIBLE to verify it.
Paul of CovingtonDoes this mean that the brakes on all cars would be left fully applied, or that the air would be bled slowly enough that all cylinders would be empty?
The text of the rule is:
(n) Securement of unattended equipment. Unattended equipment shall be secured in accordance with the following requirements: ...
(2) Except for equipment connected to a source of compressed air (e.g., locomotive or ground air source), prior to leaving equipment unattended, the brake pipe shall be reduced to zero at a rate that is no less than a service rate reduction, and the brake pipe vented to atmosphere by leaving the angle cock in the open position on the first unit of the equipment left unattended. A train's air brake shall not be depended upon to hold equipment standing unattended (including a locomotive, a car, or a train whether or not locomotive is attached).
In other words, the brakes will be fully applied via a service-to-emergency application (in other words, assured to be a fast enough release to set up all the brakes that can be signalled from the trainline), and the brakepipe then left open to assure no release signal (or other control air signal) can be sent to the valves.
I get the impression this is to prevent a situation like the one at Lac Megantic, where the line pressure (and independent pressure) fell off too slowly to trigger a brake application.
The plot thickens, however, because in the discussion to (n)(8)(ii) in the NPRM, the FRA says this:
"A locomotive would be left running either to avoid cold weather starting or to avoid a brake test when the next crew takes charge of the train. If the locomotive would have been left running to maintain brake pressure, the train crew can leave one of the trailing locomotives running to maintain brake pressure, and lock its door."
So it can be assumed that the practice of leaving an unattended train with brake-air compressor running, and the air brakes released, continues to be permissible -- the rule indicating that any time the air ceases to be supplied, the air brakes will have to be fully -- and probably manually; note the 'angle cock' reference -- applied (the presumption being that the 'securement' called for in (n)(1) with the handbrakes or 'alternate means' was fully and properly made. That will be good news for operations that want to avoid the time and trouble of full brake tests conducted by single-man crews. But I would still want to see some fallback method that applies the brakes if the air compression 'stops' while the train is unattended: a possible alternative would be a valve that sets the air if the trainline pressure falls below a set value (which would be an indication that the trainline is developing an increasing leak or the compressor(s) are not supplying adequate volume or pressure), another being some system that identifies when the compressors aren't running and (either with or without a time delay and warning) sets the air brake.
This is separate from the systems that would apply the brake only if the train physically starts to roll -- the breakaway hose, the GPS/RF feature in a FOT or EOT (or midtrain) device, or all the other semi-crackpot inventions that will go on and on my friends. Those are not described here, but as I noted they will be of zero use if the air brakes are set and then 'enough' of them leak off subsequently.
The quandary, I think, is mostly political: Do you set the brakes on a dead train, reinforcing the securement via handbrakes, or do you provide independent ways to set the brakes as a positive response to unintended motion? Lawyers could argue the thing either way, and probably have.
Euclid The rule was already in place because the engineer performed the securement and was qualified to verify it. He did verify it, but he made an error. So the new rule requiring that the securement be verified by a qualified person is meaningless. And besides, there is NO WAY to verify that the handbrake securement is adequate. It is IMPOSSIBLE to verify it.
In 27 years of railroading including all along the Moosehead sub I've never had a train move on its own. Luck ??
Some time back, I had asked why there wasn't a simple way to simply block the wheels, the way they do on a firetruck. The answer- from railroaders who would know, was that the weight of a train trying to roll downhill would simply smoosh whatever the block was, and rip out whatever it was attached to. 'Made sense to me, so I didn't need to rehash the Lac Megantic tragedy for the umteenth time.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
Randy Stahl Euclid The rule was already in place because the engineer performed the securement and was qualified to verify it. He did verify it, but he made an error. So the new rule requiring that the securement be verified by a qualified person is meaningless. And besides, there is NO WAY to verify that the handbrake securement is adequate. It is IMPOSSIBLE to verify it. In 27 years of railroading including all along the Moosehead sub I've never had a train move on its own. Luck ??
because you are an intelligent person and set up the brakes intelligently, using the number of handbrakes you think appropriate and then adding a few more just for a safety factor, and your locomotives were reasonably well maintained and you probably never once had a fire department shut down one of your locomotives to put out a fire.
When will this dead horse ever get buried!
daveklepper because you are an intelligent person and set up the brakes intelligently, using the number of handbrakes you think appropriate and then adding a few more just for a safety factor, and your locomotives were reasonably well maintained and you probably never once had a fire department shut down one of your locomotives to put out a fire.
I've my consist shut down for low water a few times and the train didn't move....
The engines were maintained like any other shortline engine..
BaltACD beatinga귞horseby beatinga귞horseby beatinga귞horseby beatinga귞horseby beatinga귞horseby When will this dead horse ever get buried!
beatinga귞horseby
When it REALLY starts stinking
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