Do not discount the ability of T&E crews to mistake communications as 'authority to pass a stop signal'.
A couple if nights ago we had a crew come on duty, board their train which was stopped facing a correctly displayed Stop Signal and operate by that Stop signal when they were told that 'when they could be moved' they had authority by a restriction that existed a couple of miles beyond the Absolute Signal. Crew mistook that verbal authority as authority to pass the Absolute Stop Signal - when the procedures to pass a Absolute Stop Signal are very involved and specific when issued by the Train Dispatcher. Review of the full radio communications between the crew and the Train Dispatcher revealed that at NO TIME did the Train Dispatcher give the crew authority to pass the Stop Signal
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Ultimately, this investigation blames the death of the engineer and fireman on the bridge operator. The investigators state as unequivocal fact that, “the radio conversation caused the engineer to disregard the visual wayside indications.” And, yet their only evidence of this is that it could have occurred.
So, what the investigators have concluded is that because the verbal message from the operator came first, it was the act that set the events of the accident into motion. The investigation nearly forgives the engineer because he merely acted on false information from the operator.
And yet, the investigation found the engineer to have a blood alcohol level that is very near the point where it is illegal to drive a car. And this was a B.A.C. level was tested after the engineer’s body was removed from the wreckage of the cab, which probably took significant time. That time may have diminished the B.A.C. measurement from where it was at the time the engineer failed to respond to wayside signals. Moreover, the report asserts that both the engineer and fireman consumed alcohol while on duty the day of the accident.
It should be noted that the operator’s behavior in this matter, while a rules violation, did not arise from carelessness, lack of attention, indifference, impairment, dishonesty, recklessness, ill will, laziness, or malice, as is often the case with a rules violation. The company gave the employees radios and told them to use them to improve transportation. In his own mind, the operator was going beyond the call of duty to help the engineer of the train get it over the road. He was using the radio to “improve transportation.”
But the operator did make a mistake by breaking a rule that forbade the use of the radio to control train movements. And he seemed to have committed a greater error by not informing the crew that he had changed his mind, and was not going to have the route lined up for them.
That is perhaps the hardest action to understand. But was it really an error? He knew that the signals were the overriding authority, so logically; there would be no need to tell the crew that the signals would not be clear. He used the radio to improve transportation. Using the radio to tell the crew that the route would not be clear would do nothing to improve transportation. It is fairly easy to see that reasoning in the mind of a logical man.
Maybe he failed to inform the crew that he had rescinded his advice about the route being clear simply because he forgot. But that could not have been a rules violation since the creation of the subject of the retraction was against the rules in the first place.
In any case, whatever the reasons for the operator’s actions were, the actions per se do not explain the cause of this wreck, and they may not have been even connected to the cause. It may be true, as some have suggested, that the NTSB is free to speculate and use the experience of their best judgment in accident investigations. But to state as fact that the actions of one man directly caused the death of two other men without any proof strikes me as a supreme injustice.
I've had a few control points drop right in front of me. (Unintentional glitches) We too are told in those circumstances to just bring them to a stop, "consistant with good train handling techniques."
Just tonight they were having signal problems at a control point. The dispatcher warned approaching trains that they may lose a signal, and if they did to just bring it to an easy stop and give him a call.
Jeff
Instructions on my carrier are, when getting a 'unexpected' Stop Signal, DO NOT put the train in Emergency. Make a maximum service reduction to stop the train. Uncontrolled slack action is a big derailment cause.
zardoz That very scenario happened back in 1969 at Waxdale (Racine) WI. A college-educated idiot of a Trainmaster decided to do an efficiency test at the automatic interlocking on a southbound CNW train. The train had a clear on the distant signal to the interlocking, but after the train passed the signal, the Trainmaster pulled a fuse to drop the home signal to red. What that idiot didn't understand was that the southbound train was running at track speed (50 at that time), and that there was a curve not too far from the interlocking which prevented the engineer from seeing the signal. So when the engineer came around the curve and saw the red, he immediately plugged the train. Unfortunately, the slack ran in while the train was going around the curve; the buff forces caused the train to derail, spilling about 25 cars onto the right-of-way.
Bucyrus Regarding the issue of having no warning if a clear home signal is taken away: When a train approaches an interlocking with the route lined for it, it is possible to drop a red board in the engineer’s face. If that happens, the engineer may not be able to stop for the signal or even for the conflicting route, but he must make every effort to do so. Whether that would require stopping as quickly as possible, I am not sure. Perhaps it does because I suppose one way a route could be taken away from an approaching train would be for a conflicting train to run its red home signal and enter a conflicting route. So dynamiting the train that lost the route might prevent a collision if a conflicting train has run its stop signal.
What made this incident memorable for me was that I watched the entire derailment happen. I was driving west on Hwy 20, and saw the locomotives go under the bridge just as I was approaching the turn for the frontage road, so naturally I turned off to watch the train go by. As I approached the crossing on the frontage road, I saw the show begin. It looked like a slow-motion ballet of wreckage as it happened. If I had been just a few seconds quicker, I would have been right at the crossing, which would have been not so good for me, as the crossing was buried in wrecked freight cars, and I would have been at the bottom of the pile.
To this day, you can still see traces of damage on the northernmost bridge support on the west side of the tracks, where a boxcar had wrapped itself partially around the pillar.
Paul,
Yes, as Jeff has mentioned, and as BaltACD has confirmed, having the signal being taken away is a moot point in that it did not actually happen in the wreck of OV-8. I did not mean to derail this thread by implying that a signal being taken away played any roll in this accident.
I only mentioned the possibility of signals being taken away in order to make a finer point about the fundamental reason why signals have to be watched continuously if they are clear. I am only trying to distinguish the degree of distraction from the lapse of attention because it is common to associate a distraction with a momentary lapse of attention. In the case of this wreck, the distraction was quite prolonged, as opposed to being momentary.
In this case, the home signal was not clear, but the crew must have assumed it was clear if they were conscious and under the influence of the operator’s message. So even if a remark from the operator caused the crew to have a lapse of attention, that lapse needed to be at least two minutes long. That was the time required for the crew to watch the home signal if they believed it was clear.
Regarding the issue of having no warning if a clear home signal is taken away: When a train approaches an interlocking with the route lined for it, it is possible to drop a red board in the engineer’s face. If that happens, the engineer may not be able to stop for the signal or even for the conflicting route, but he must make every effort to do so. Whether that would require stopping as quickly as possible, I am not sure. Perhaps it does because I suppose one way a route could be taken away from an approaching train would be for a conflicting train to run its red home signal and enter a conflicting route. So dynamiting the train that lost the route might prevent a collision if a conflicting train has run its stop signal.
Not only might the operator accidentally drop a red board against an approaching train after having lined up the route, but also some extenuating circumstance may compel the operator to do it intentionally. And then there is always the possibility of a broken rail or other type of signal fault that can take the route away from a train on approach.
Properly, when a signal is taken down it should immediately indicate STOP. The time out clock should then be running for whatever timeout period it is set to....on most main track signals I have ever worked with, that timeout period is between 8 & 12 minutes....for the period the timer is running NO OTHER CONFLICTING ROUTE can be lined. In the operation of a Drawbridge, that would properly mean....once the signal was taken down the bridge could not be opened and no switches in the route changed until the timer has run.
Descriptions in the report, would make it seem that the Operator had never lined the signal in the first place after having told the crew that the route was lined; he then opened the bridge. Had the signal actually have been lined, he would have had to wait for the timeout to be able to line the bridge. If the signal had actually been lined and the timeout period run, the train - even not paying attention to the wayside signal would have crossed the bridge as the operator would not have been able to raise it during the timeout period.
I might add, during my career I have worked with the operator positions at this location while working with B&O interchange jobs that delivered cars to the Whisky Island interchange which locates about 15 car lengths West of the bridge.
Paul_D_North_Jr Perhaps I'm misunderstanding something, but I'm still troubled by the assertion that even after a train has 'accepted' a signal authorizing a move at some speed and is proceeding on that basis, that the signal could be changed to a more restrictive aspect without any advance warning or opportunity to brake the train in a controlled manner (other than emergency). I do agree, though, that didn't happen in this instance, so the point is moot or not applicable. - Paul North.
Perhaps I'm misunderstanding something, but I'm still troubled by the assertion that even after a train has 'accepted' a signal authorizing a move at some speed and is proceeding on that basis, that the signal could be changed to a more restrictive aspect without any advance warning or opportunity to brake the train in a controlled manner (other than emergency). I do agree, though, that didn't happen in this instance, so the point is moot or not applicable.
- Paul North.
Bucyrus [snipped] I did read that article in Trains about the wreck that couldn’t happen. In that case, a technical fault with the interlocking plant allowed it to grant two conflicting routes, which should normally be impossible with a properly operating plant. Wasn’t there some redesign of the track routes underway there that required a revision of the interlocking plant? I seem to recall that the technical fault accidentally introduced in that plant remodeling.
Bucyrus Therefore, this is the only explanation that I can imagine that would be directly related to the operator’s message playing a role in the wreck: When the train was four minutes from the bridge, the operator told the engineer that the route was lined for the train, and the engineer acknowledged. Because of that assurance of a lined route, before the home signal came into visual range, the engineer lost conscious free will, and remained in that condition until striking the counterweight. He either suffered a medical emergency, fell asleep, or was hypnotized by the operator’s message. At the same time, the fireman was also lacking conscious free will for some unknown reason. The only possible connection I can see between the operator’s verbal highball and the crew’s lack of conscious free will would be that the operator’s verbal highball put the engineer and fireman into a hypnotic trance. How likely is that? So overall, the investigation was willing to include the minor rules violation of the operator’s verbal highball as part of the cause without any actual proof. And yet, oddly enough, they were unwilling include, as partial cause, the fact that both the engineer and fireman had consumed alcohol while on duty prior to the accident. And yet, that too was a rules violation; arguably a far more serious rules violation than the operator’s verbal highball.
I think the operator telling them they were going to be lined up could very well have led the engine crew to let their guard down. They may have saw the approach before the home signal and figured the home signal would clear up before they reached it. Being under the influence I would think also played a part in either a full or partial loss of attention. Possibly, we'll never know, had they not been told they were going to be lined thru, they would have made more effort to remain attentive.
Reading the report, the discussions of signals being taken away is really moot. The operator never lined up the signals for them. It says the operator only verbally, over the radio, told them they would be lined. He never cleared the home signal, an eyewitness to a proceed indication on the signal not withstanding.
I've read criticisms by some people of some things that come from the NTSB. They seem to focus on some parts, while practically ignoring others. (I've read some reports where some important issues were down played.) To wit, the part the operator played, but not the part the alcohol played. They said someone under the influence indicated would have sufficient ability to avoid a collision. That's assuming they were awake and somewhat attentive. They seem not to think that impairment may lead to a dozing or hypnotic state.
Even though the operator violated the rules, the majority of the blame has to fall on the head end crew for not operating on signal indication. And they paid the ultimate price for their inattention.
Thank you for your comments Paul. That is an interesting point about the interlocking being capable of taking a route away once given. I don’t know if there are exceptions to this, but my understanding of interlocking plants correlates to what Jeff has mentioned above. That is, that a route can be taken away from an approaching train, but it cannot be taken away and replaced by a conflicting route. Specifically, once a train enters a plant that is lined for it, if the route is taken away, the plant locks up. This prevents a conflicting route from being lined up, which might lead to a collision course.
I did read that article in Trains about the wreck that couldn’t happen. In that case, a technical fault with the interlocking plant allowed it to grant two conflicting routes, which should normally be impossible with a properly operating plant. Wasn’t there some redesign of the track routes underway there that required a revision of the interlocking plant? I seem to recall that the technical fault accidentally introduced in that plant remodeling.
Regarding the OV-8, my point in mentioning the possible loss of a signal on approach is to address a possible argument that the engineer was momentarily distracted by the operator’s verbal highball, and that that was sufficient to miss the signal. In fact, the engineer and the fireman were both required by the rules to watch that signal from the time it came until view until the time they passed it. In this case that was a span of two minutes.
Paul_D_North_Jr Bucyrus: [snipped] Every engineer knows that even when he has a route lined up through an interlocking plant, he has to watch for, and expect that route to be taken away by a change in signal indication. . . . Taking away a route from an approaching train - also known in some places as "dropping or throwing a red in his face" - is supposed to be not allowed or prevented by the interlocking mechanism. Once an oncoming train has 'accepted' a signal indication that would permit a movement - such as by entering into an approaching block or passing a 'point of no return' - the interlocking system is supposed to prevent the signal from changing to a more restrictive aspect until either the train has left the block, or a clock/ timer has run some minutes (obviously, not a problem if the signal changes to a less restrictive aspect while the train is approaching). Unlike a highway traffic signal, the train signal can't suddenly go from yellow to red while you're still entering the intersection. Several articles have appeared in Trains over the years that are related to this, but the best explanation is in this one: "The accident that couldn't happen - collision between CB&Q and RI trains 9/25/64, Montgomery, Illinois" by Shaw, Robert B., Trains, October 1965, p. 23 (accident CB&Q Montgomery RI) Otherwise, your analysis and opinion of the facts and the NTSB's report seems to thoroughly explore all of the possibilities, and is well-reasoned and irrefutable to me. Thank you for the thought that was manifestly put into it, and the time to write it up and post it here. - Paul North.
Bucyrus: [snipped] Every engineer knows that even when he has a route lined up through an interlocking plant, he has to watch for, and expect that route to be taken away by a change in signal indication. . . .
Otherwise, your analysis and opinion of the facts and the NTSB's report seems to thoroughly explore all of the possibilities, and is well-reasoned and irrefutable to me. Thank you for the thought that was manifestly put into it, and the time to write it up and post it here.
I don't think the interlocking would prevent "dropping" a signal in front of a train. What it would prevent is changing the route (moving switch points) in front of a train until time has run down. I think the actual act of changing the signal would lock up the plant until it has "run time."
Currently, our dispatchers/control operators must ask a train if the engineer can comply with a signal being taken away. It's a bit comical when you're still 5 miles from the control point, but you're still in the block. If the engineer can comply they may drop the signal, but can't bend any switches until they know the train has stopped.
Bucyrus [snipped] Every engineer knows that even when he has a route lined up through an interlocking plant, he has to watch for, and expect that route to be taken away by a change in signal indication. . . .
The issue in the case of this wreck is not about employees coming to work with alcohol in their system. It is about consuming alcohol while on duty the day of the wreck. And that could not possibly have had anything to do with a collision resulting from lack of attention.
BaltACD My understanding is that at present, during a drug test, railroad employees are allowed up ot 0.02 and are judged as fit for duty. I believe this standard also applies to airline pilots. To my knowledge, no one has a 0.00 standard.
My understanding is that at present, during a drug test, railroad employees are allowed up ot 0.02 and are judged as fit for duty. I believe this standard also applies to airline pilots. To my knowledge, no one has a 0.00 standard.
0.02 is the current legal limit for motorists under 21, as some medicines (cough syrup has been mentioned) and mouthwash either contain small amounts of alcohol or give a false positive indication of 0.01 or 0.02 BAC. A 0.00 standard isn't possible.
OTR is .04 by the FEDS however most if not all COmpanys have a POLICY you get caught with ANY booze in your system YOUR FIRED and if you had an accident YOUR ON YOUR OWN COME LAWSUIT TIME. Even Cough Syrup is enough to get your but Fired in OTR at times. That tell you something.
At the time this incident occurred, the DWI limit was 0.10, not the 0.08 that has become commonplace across the country at present.
What is Ironic is that 13 Years Prior to one of the Worst Passenger train accidents in the Nations History the NTSB had evidence that Drugs and Alchohal caused Fatal accidents and still refused to act on it. Only after the Colonial Accident on the NE Corridor they acted. Remember that during this time it was nothing for OTR drivers to have a few Beers at night heck from this one lookslike RR workers even drank on the job. Yet they did not act. Only when people DIED that were not Transportation workers did they act. You all know the saying it takes Blood to get action in Washington.
Here again is the NTSB report of their investigation of this accident:
Here's the report
I believe that this investigation was simply unable to explain the fundamental cause of this accident, and therefore, they did their best to cobble together an explanation anyway. They offered the obvious and undisputable conclusion that the engineer failed to respond to wayside signals. In many past collisions, that has been the fundamental cause without any way to explain why the engineer failed to heed signals. But, in this accident, the investigators went further and speculated as to why the engineer failed to respond to the signals.
It seems as though the investigation has simply added the operator’s verbal highball to the cause because the it was a rules violation, and it seemed to be a piece that fit the puzzle. But does it really fit?
While it appears to fit as far as it goes, it still leaves a major element unexplained. That is the fact that the engineer did not apply the brakes once he was within visual range of the home signal. At the speed of around 33 mph, the engineer had about two minutes to react between the point where he could first see the home signal and the point where he hit the counterweight. That would have probably been enough time to stop. And if he could not stop, he and the fireman could have easily gotten off the moving train before impact.
The investigation blames the operator for giving the engineer verbal assurance that the route would be lined up for him. That was indeed a rules violation. But the investigation seems to place more emphasis on blaming the operator for taking the route away after telling the engineer he had given him the route, and taking the route away without telling the engineer he had done so. That, however, was not a rules violation. No matter what the operator told the engineer about having the route, there is no excuse for the engineer relying on that verbal assurance and thus ignoring the wayside signals.
Every engineer knows that even when he has a route lined up through an interlocking plant, he has to watch for, and expect that route to be taken away by a change in signal indication. And every engineer knows that he is not permitted to ignore a signal once it is perceived to be giving a clear indication.
In order for the operator’s verbal highball message to have even played a role in the cause of this wreck, the following would have had to happen:
Upon hearing from the operator that the route was lined up, the engineer completely suspended his forward attention at minimum for the time it took from the home signal coming within visual range until the time of hitting the counterweight.
No engineer is going to do that just because they are told that the route has been lined for them.
Therefore, this is the only explanation that I can imagine that would be directly related to the operator’s message playing a role in the wreck:
When the train was four minutes from the bridge, the operator told the engineer that the route was lined for the train, and the engineer acknowledged. Because of that assurance of a lined route, before the home signal came into visual range, the engineer lost conscious free will, and remained in that condition until striking the counterweight. He either suffered a medical emergency, fell asleep, or was hypnotized by the operator’s message. At the same time, the fireman was also lacking conscious free will for some unknown reason.
The only possible connection I can see between the operator’s verbal highball and the crew’s lack of conscious free will would be that the operator’s verbal highball put the engineer and fireman into a hypnotic trance. How likely is that?
So overall, the investigation was willing to include the minor rules violation of the operator’s verbal highball as part of the cause without any actual proof. And yet, oddly enough, they were unwilling include, as partial cause, the fact that both the engineer and fireman had consumed alcohol while on duty prior to the accident. And yet, that too was a rules violation; arguably a far more serious rules violation than the operator’s verbal highball.
A similar situation was the Newark Bay Bridge disaster of 1958. A CNJ suburban train came off the NY&LB and plunged over the opening of a raised vertical lift bridge. The ICC accident investigation concluded that the accident was caused by failure to operate in accordance with signal indications. Radio transmissions were not involved but the engine crew worked this route as their regular assignment so they may have expected clear indications with the wayside signals as part of their normal routine.
Yes, I have no way of proving what happened. I won’t even speculate. But I had assumed that the investigation purported to show facts that could be concluded from the evidence. I did not realize that the investigation draws conclusions as speculation, and then declares them to be fact because they can’t be proven otherwise. In any case, it is as plain as day that the investigation has drawn a conclusion for which there is no evidence.
Bucyrus The report concludes that part of the cause was that the interlocking operator for the drawbridge issued a verbal instruction that undermined the engineer’s reliance on wayside signals. While they apparently did establish as fact that the operator issued the verbal instruction, I see no proof that this undermined the engineer’s reliance on the wayside signals. All that the evidence shows is that the engineer failed to heed the wayside signals. There is no way to prove that this failure to heed the signals resulted from the operator’s verbal highball.
Nor is there any way to prove otherwise.
Bucyrus The fact that the route was not lined for the train would have given the engineer a red home signal. Yet the engineer did not apply the brakes in approach to the home signal even though he had plenty of time to do so. Even by the time the engineer and fireman were able to see the lowered counterweight, they had plenty of time to jump off of the locomotive. Yet they did not jump. These two unexplainable facts suggest that the reason the engineer failed to heed the wayside signals was broader than the fact that the operator had issued a verbal highball. To go further, I would conclude that those two facts suggest that the verbal highball issued by the operator did not play a part in the crash.
I would opine that the verbal highball had everything to do with the crash, as it is entirely possible that the crew wasn't watching where they were going, or was doing so only perfunctorily.
Bucyrus If the operator’s verbal highball were the cause, the scenario would have been that the engineer would have approached too fast to stop for the red home signal. But certainly, he would have made every attempt to stop for it once he saw it. The result would have been that the train slid past the red home signal and hit the counterweight. A head end crew that was familiar with the bridge, when approaching unable to stop, with the bridge lined against them—such a crew would almost certainly have jumped off because they would have been aware of the insurmountable risk of staying on the locomotive.
Such familiarity can cause one to have false confidence. Since they "knew" the bridge was clear, and they were familiar with the route, they may have surmised that for the next X distance, they had nothing to be concerned with. See my previous comment.
Bucyrus One possible cause that would perfectly explain why the engineer did not brake and did not jump would be that he was asleep. There is no way to know if he was or not, but if he was, that would explain the accident details. Page 15, first paragraph of the report, the last sentence says: “In any event, the radio conversation caused the engineer to disregard the visual wayside indications.” I do not see any proof of that statement. While it is true that a verbal highball such as the one issued by the operator would have been capable of causing an engineer to disregard the wayside signals; I see no conclusive evidence that indicates that was the case with the OV-8 wreck. At best, it is circumstantial evidence. And moreover, the fact that additional cause would be needed to explain the circumstances of the accident moves toward the improbability of more than one fatal error occurring coincidentally to cause an accident.
There is no proof that this was, or wasn't, the cause of the collision. The only people who could have cleared that up didn't survive.
Bucyrus So, I believe the conclusion of the report is based on flawed logic.
So, I believe the conclusion of the report is based on flawed logic.
I'd prefer to think that it was based on a "best guess" based on what the investigators saw in their investigation. We can't prove them right or wrong.
[quote user="Bucyrus"]
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
I read the report, but I cannot say I absorbed every word of it, so perhaps I am missing something. But from what I gather, some questions and observations come to mind.
The report concludes that part of the cause was that the interlocking operator for the drawbridge issued a verbal instruction that undermined the engineer’s reliance on wayside signals.
While they apparently did establish as fact that the operator issued the verbal instruction, I see no proof that this undermined the engineer’s reliance on the wayside signals. All that the evidence shows is that the engineer failed to heed the wayside signals. There is no way to prove that this failure to heed the signals resulted from the operator’s verbal highball.
The fact that the route was not lined for the train would have given the engineer a red home signal. Yet the engineer did not apply the brakes in approach to the home signal even though he had plenty of time to do so.
Even by the time the engineer and fireman were able to see the lowered counterweight, they had plenty of time to jump off of the locomotive. Yet they did not jump.
These two unexplainable facts suggest that the reason the engineer failed to heed the wayside signals was broader than the fact that the operator had issued a verbal highball. To go further, I would conclude that those two facts suggest that the verbal highball issued by the operator did not play a part in the crash.
If the operator’s verbal highball were the cause, the scenario would have been that the engineer would have approached too fast to stop for the red home signal. But certainly, he would have made every attempt to stop for it once he saw it. The result would have been that the train slid past the red home signal and hit the counterweight. A head end crew that was familiar with the bridge, when approaching unable to stop, with the bridge lined against them—such a crew would almost certainly have jumped off because they would have been aware of the insurmountable risk of staying on the locomotive.
One possible cause that would perfectly explain why the engineer did not brake and did not jump would be that he was asleep. There is no way to know if he was or not, but if he was, that would explain the accident details.
Page 15, first paragraph of the report, the last sentence says: “In any event, the radio conversation caused the engineer to disregard the visual wayside indications.”
I do not see any proof of that statement. While it is true that a verbal highball such as the one issued by the operator would have been capable of causing an engineer to disregard the wayside signals; I see no conclusive evidence that indicates that was the case with the OV-8 wreck. At best, it is circumstantial evidence. And moreover, the fact that additional cause would be needed to explain the circumstances of the accident moves toward the improbability of more than one fatal error occurring coincidentally to cause an accident.
Not a problem, I'm trying to edit this Subject right now, but I'm new to the forum. I originally just wanted to find the issue of "Trains" in question, I already knew about the wreck as a former PC employee,(1974 hired) and I didn't realize my question would spark such interest. Thanks to all who have helped.
I suggest that the moderators or the original poster change the title of this thread to something like:
1974 Wreck of Penn Central Train OV-8
It is interesting that the DB operator imposed his own authority between the engineer and the wayside signals, and because the operator partly controlled those signals, the engineer accepted the operator’s personal authorization, and let it override the authority of the wayside signals.
Then when the operator realized he had made a mistake in giving his personal authorization to the engineer, the operator simply rescinded it without telling the engineer. It makes you wonder why the operator did not tell the engineer that he was taking the route away from the train after telling the engineer that he (the operator) had given the route to the train.
The only explanation I can see, is that the operator simply assumed it was not necessary to tell the engineer because the rules required the engineer to obey the wayside signal indications. Perhaps the operator was a bit embarrassed for making the mistake of forgetting about the boat he had waiting for the bridge to open, and did not want to broadcast it on the radio.
There was a similar situation on the Milwaukee Road coming down the hill into St. Paul. There was a switch tender at the base of the hill. Trains had to approach that location prepared to stop until they got a highball from the switch tender. About a quarter-mile earlier, there was an open station at Chestnut Street where the operators would hold up their arms in an “X” shape as a signal that the switch tender had the route lined for them.
The point was that the “X” signal acted like an approach signal to the switch tender, so that trains did not have to slow way down and crawl up to the switch tender to see if he would give a highball. The operating assumption was that if you got an “X” from Chestnut Street, you could expect a highball from the switch tender.
Of course this was a complete fallacy, because only connection between this improvised approach signal and the “home signal” of the switch tender were the intentions of two human beings communicated by telephone. If an engineer relied on the “X”, expecting a highball from the switch tender, and did not get one, he would not be able to stop in time. The switch tender was free to line up the route or not, no matter what the engineer had been told ahead of time by the Chestnut Street operator.
So, when coming down the hill, the new brakemen would call out the “X” signal to the engineer by saying “The crossing is clear.” And then the engineer would tell them to ignore that signal because it has no meaning.
Poor communication was definitely an issue and this accident goes a long way in explaining why it took so long for the FRA to approve the use of radio to govern train movements, as in the use of track warrants.
No question on the D&A thing - the timing or the acceptance at that time.
Today that .05 or .06 would probably get you a conviction for driving while impaired.
That said, the poor communication was undoubtedly a primary cause.
Thanks for that link, Larry (32 pages, approx. 1.37 MB in size for that 'PDF' format version).
The Blood Alcohol Concentration of the engineer was not a causal factor or the proximate cause of that wreck, as I understand it, although the NTSB was clearly puzzled and troubled by the apparent total failure of the engine crew to brake the train to any degree even though they could see the 'Stop' indication of the 'home' signal at least 2 full minutes before the impact.
Instead, it appears from the NTSB's view of the facts, the engineer likely still would have hit the counterweight when the bridge operator lowered it in front of the approaching train after giving the train radio permission to proceed.
Tree remember this was BEFORE the Chase MD collision and before Dug and Alchohal Testng became such a 800 LB Gorilla. It was nothing back then for OTR drivers to have a few at night then drive the next morning.
Our community is FREE to join. To participate you must either login or register for an account.