I see Amtrak #29 is on time at Martinsburg this evening.
Balt:Interesting observation regarding trucking the UPS loads at NS's expense. Wasnt aware of that contractual agreement, but it makes sense.
In today's trucking market, there should not have any issue finding available truckers.
Ed
Amtrak 29 rolled thru Chesterton at 835...about an hour late. Not bad.
UPS trailers/containers returning.
Progress!
ed
MP173Balt: Interesting observation regarding trucking the UPS loads at NS's expense. Wasnt aware of that contractual agreement, but it makes sense. In today's trucking market, there should not have any issue finding available truckers. Ed
Interesting observation regarding trucking the UPS loads at NS's expense. Wasnt aware of that contractual agreement, but it makes sense.
That has been part of UPS contracts for decades. UPS grades the railroads on 'sort failures'. Each trailer/continer given to the railroads for transport have a specific day and time to be at the destination UPS facility, if a box is late that constitutes a 'sort failure' and is a strike against the railroad in contract performance.
Railroads are responsible for draying boxes from the railroads destination terminal to the UPS terminal at the destination - UPS doesn't really care how the box is actually handled from the time they give it to the railroad until the railroad gives the box back to UPS at destination.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Balt:Didnt realize that the rails are responsible for final mile delivery to the sort station. That is actually very smart on their behalf. No dispute over late delivery.
BTW, 26x just rolled thru with 52 UPS containers/trailers. Normally it has similar number of FedX...none today.
Fred Cain wrote: "Could they possibly have minimized this disaster with a shorter train? The engineer tried to stop the train but it piled up anyway. Would the same thing have resulted with a much shorter train?"
Could we see FRA regs mandating this in time...?
At least for trains that will be carrying hazardous materials and chemicals.
Perhaps a move to segregate hazmat cars into special trains that receive "a higher degree of oversight enroute" than what "regular" trains are subjected to.
Perhaps a 50-80 car limit, depending on what's in the consist.
With mandatory "on the ground inspections" after a certain number of miles.
Or, in lieu of "on-ground" inspections, perhaps a manned car at the rear of the train for additional continuous observation and monitoring. Hey, didn't they have those once before...?
Yesterday, I came across an online news article that had originated by or through CBS, which claimed that a security camera had caught images of sparks shooting out from under one of the cars nearly 20 miles before the train piled up. Is that true? Did anyone else see that? I was not able to actually view the video myself.
If that were true, that would cast a pretty bad light on both the crew and the railroad.
You know, there was a terrible wreck on CSX a number of years ago, also in some part of Ohio, I think, where the lead truck on the second unit had derailed and dragged on the ground for a number of miles until the train ran over a turnout. That's when the whole thing piled up. I don't think hazmat was involved that time but it sure was one helluva mess.
Could this be what might've happened in Palestine? Was there a switch or a turnout near where the train piled up?
Here was the video of the CSX wreck, also caught on a security camera. I read elsewhere where the train'd had dragging equipment for six miles, I think it was. YIKES ~ !
CSX Train Derailment - Wellington, Ohio - Video - YouTube
Fred M CainYesterday, I came across an online news article that had originated by or through CBS, which claimed that a security camera had caught images of sparks shooting out from under one of the cars nearly 20 miles before the train piled up. Is that true? Did anyone else see that? I was not able to actually view the video myself. If that were true, that would cast a pretty bad light on both the crew and the railroad.
Euclid,
Thanks for sharing that.
It could have been inattentiveness on the part of the crew which caused them to miss the transmission at Salem. Or, it could have just as easily been a malfunction of the detector at that location.
I have a sinking feeling that this is gonna turn out to be a rather messy investigation. The tragedy of it all was that it was entirely preventable.
Fred M CainIt could have been inattentiveness on the part of the crew which caused them to miss the transmission at Salem. Or, it could have just as easily been a malfunction of the detector at that location.
Or, it could have been other radio traffic covering the HBD/DED transmission.
Seems like I read that they did get a warmer-than-normal advisory at some point, but that did not require that they stop.
I'm pretty sure the radio traffic is recorded, and I have no doubt that if that's the case, the "tapes" have been pulled.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
It's not hard to miss the radio transmission from detectors. Other radio traffic can override the detector. The crew can be on another channel talking to the dispatcher or someone else. CSX had/has one east of Confluence, Pa. that with a certain length of train, would transmit when the head end was in a tunnel where the transmissiom could not be received.
Separate detectors east of Willard, Oh. would occasionly transmit simultaneously, garbling both messages.
Depending too much on wireless messaging has it's problems. The old fixed signal method of indicating defects would be a good backup for radio.
How deep in the train was the defective car? I think I saw somewhere that it was around twelve cars. If that is true, I wonder how the crew would not have seen that much fire coming from the car for twenty miles, especially at night.
tree68 Fred M Cain It could have been inattentiveness on the part of the crew which caused them to miss the transmission at Salem. Or, it could have just as easily been a malfunction of the detector at that location. Or, it could have been other radio traffic covering the HBD/DED transmission. Seems like I read that they did get a warmer-than-normal advisory at some point, but that did not require that they stop. I'm pretty sure the radio traffic is recorded, and I have no doubt that if that's the case, the "tapes" have been pulled.
Fred M Cain It could have been inattentiveness on the part of the crew which caused them to miss the transmission at Salem. Or, it could have just as easily been a malfunction of the detector at that location.
In hearing many CSX Defect Detectors - there are NO 'conditional' reports to the crews. It is either NO DEFECTS or a statement of where to inspect for specific defects or if there are too many specific defects the instruction is INSPECT ENTIRE TRAIN.
When I was working, Defect Detectors would broadcast a identifying message to the train when it entered the DD. Upon the train completely passing the DD it then broadcasts the results message. If a train stops or goes too slow across the DD it will broadcast a DD Malfunction message and the crew is to inspect the entire train.
DD's retain on site a record of EVERYTHING that they have broadcast for a extended period of time. A period of time long enough to cover any accident that may have happened after a train passed the detector. Signal Maintainers can secure this data.
The hotbox and dragging equipment detectors on my local ex-Wabash/N&W Norfolk Southern line have a re-transmit feature. Key in the correct DTMF tones and the detector will repeat the last transmitted message. I've heard crews use it a handful of times when the detector got "walked on" by other nearby radio transmissions.
That said, I'm starting to think that there was something wrong with the detector's temperature sensor. It saw something trending hot, which is NS "code" for not hot enough to trigger an alarm but something the crew should be aware of. Given the video evidence that's come out, there's no doubt in my mind that it should have triggered a critical alarm. Usually on my local NS line the detector center will have the train stop and check the problem car out or make a stop with a full service brake application and then release the brakes. I can't recall them seeing a potential problem and telling a crew to go on their merry way. I have been impressed by how knowledgable the detector center staff have been. They have a pretty high hit rate when it comes to analyzing the detector data and then telling the train crew what the most likely issue causing the problem is (handbrake, sticking brakes, bearing starting to go bad, etc.). Usually, they are right on.
Fred M Cain Yesterday, I came across an online news article that had originated by or through CBS, which claimed that a security camera had caught images of sparks shooting out from under one of the cars nearly 20 miles before the train piled up. Is that true? Did anyone else see that? I was not able to actually view the video myself. If that were true, that would cast a pretty bad light on both the crew and the railroad. You know, there was a terrible wreck on CSX a number of years ago, also in some part of Ohio, I think, where the lead truck on the second unit had derailed and dragged on the ground for a number of miles until the train ran over a turnout. That's when the whole thing piled up. I don't think hazmat was involved that time but it sure was one helluva mess. Could this be what might've happened in Palestine? Was there a switch or a turnout near where the train piled up? Here was the video of the CSX wreck, also caught on a security camera. I read elsewhere where the train'd had dragging equipment for six miles, I think it was. YIKES ~ ! CSX Train Derailment - Wellington, Ohio - Video - YouTube
Explanations and excuses aside, it means safety equipment and factors are being neglected or are simply inadequate for such heavy axle loadings
Man, the sharks have found their prey now. Derailments just part of doing business?
Railroads better go back to basics. Like safety first. Sensible employment. Protecting the property.
EuclidI cannot image a heat detector finding a car on fire and not be able to communicate that due to the communication system being interrupted by other use. I would think it would be just “hard wired” into immediately stopping the train. It seems like an infallible detector connected to a bureaucracy. Maybe this makes the case for detectors onboard the railcars instead of on the wayside.
Obviously you have never dealt with communication systems beyond Radio Shack walkie talkies.
Here on CSX at LaGrange ga it has defect detectors about one mile outside of town on all four routes that go thru LaGrange. Now the detector north of LGC is about 12 - 13 miles from the north one on the A&WP. Seems like they around here may be closer than NS but cannot say for sure on the other lines ??
blue streak 1Here on CSX at LaGrange ga it has defect detectors about one mile outside of town on all four routes that go thru LaGrange. Now the detector north of LGC is about 12 - 13 miles from the north one on the A&WP. Seems like they around here may be closer than NS but cannot say for sure on the other lines ??
When I was working, CSX was making an effort to have DD's every 15 miles or there abouts.
FRA regulations require a train to pass a working detector every 50 miles or the train must be stopped and get a walking inspection. Needless to say, walking inspections are discouraged for many reasons.
Initially DD's were being spaced about ever 25 Miles which was all well and good, could even stay within the regulations if one of the DD's had issues and had to be taken out of service. Problems happened when consecutive DD's had to be taken out of service; that is when CSX began the program to space them about every 15 miles, thus consecutive DD's could be O/S and a train could still be inspected by a DD within the every 50 miles requirement.
BaltACD FRA regulations require a train to pass a working detector every 50 miles or the train must be stopped and get a walking inspection. Needless to say, walking inspections are discouraged for many reasons.
https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/ohio-train-derailment-east-palestine-chemicals-update-governor-mike-dewine/
The 'chatter' I am hearing on HERE, is to the effect that what the Salem Detector reported was 'trending' and therefore 'conditional' in what the crew response should be.
I DO NOT know NS procedures. On CSX Defect Detectors are a GO/NO GO deal. The detector either reports No Defects or identifies Defect loctions with the direction 'Inspect Train'. The 'routine' Detector on CSX is a combination Hot Box/Dragging Equipment detector. These detectors broadcast the results of their inspection over the Road Radio Channel at the completion of the inspection. Crews KNOW to listen for the DD Inspection Report after passing the Detector.
The CSX WILD (Wheel Impact Load Detectors) do not broadcast reports to trains, instead they send their data to the Mechanical Department in Jacksonville, where the data is evaluated and warnings are then sent to both the Train Dispatcher and the Chief Dispatcher on the territory the train is operating via the CADS system with the instructions for the train to stop and inspect the indicated car(s) for flat wheel type defects. WILD's are not hot box detectors.
BaltACD The 'chatter' I am hearing on HERE, is to the effect that what the Salem Detector reported was 'trending' and therefore 'conditional' in what the crew response should be. I DO NOT know NS procedures. On CSX Defect Detectors are a GO/NO GO deal. The detector either reports No Defects or identifies Defect loctions with the direction 'Inspect Train'. The 'routine' Detector on CSX is a combination Hot Box/Dragging Equipment detector. These detectors broadcast the results of their inspection over the Road Radio Channel at the completion of the inspection. Crews KNOW to listen for the DD Inspection Report after passing the Detector. The CSX WILD (Wheel Impact Load Detectors) do not broadcast reports to trains, instead they send their data to the Mechanical Department in Jacksonville, where the data is evaluated and warnings are then sent to both the Train Dispatcher and the Chief Dispatcher on the territory the train is operating via the CADS system with the instructions for the train to stop and inspect the indicated car(s) for flat wheel type defects. WILD's are not hot box detectors.
NS contacts trains with subcritical problems after they pass a detector. They go above and beyond what you describe at CSX.
I watched them stop a train on Monday with a block of 5 cars with sticking brakes that were "trending hot". MOW forces trackside confirmed seeing brake smoke coming from some cars behind the mid-train DPU. The train stopped, did a set and release on the brakes and proceeded without incident past the next detector.
ns145 BaltACD The 'chatter' I am hearing on HERE, is to the effect that what the Salem Detector reported was 'trending' and therefore 'conditional' in what the crew response should be. I DO NOT know NS procedures. On CSX Defect Detectors are a GO/NO GO deal. The detector either reports No Defects or identifies Defect loctions with the direction 'Inspect Train'. The 'routine' Detector on CSX is a combination Hot Box/Dragging Equipment detector. These detectors broadcast the results of their inspection over the Road Radio Channel at the completion of the inspection. Crews KNOW to listen for the DD Inspection Report after passing the Detector. The CSX WILD (Wheel Impact Load Detectors) do not broadcast reports to trains, instead they send their data to the Mechanical Department in Jacksonville, where the data is evaluated and warnings are then sent to both the Train Dispatcher and the Chief Dispatcher on the territory the train is operating via the CADS system with the instructions for the train to stop and inspect the indicated car(s) for flat wheel type defects. WILD's are not hot box detectors. NS contacts trains with subcritical problems after they pass a detector. They go above and beyond what you describe at CSX. I watched them stop a train on Monday with a block of 5 cars with sticking brakes that were "trending hot". MOW forces trackside confirmed seeing brake smoke coming from some cars behind the mid-train DPU. The train stopped, did a set and release on the brakes and proceeded without incident past the next detector.
EuclidCould a car in this condition be deemed "subcritical" and not require stopping to investigate?
I would opine that it would depend on the thresholds for which the detector was set, and the relative temperature between a hotbox and actual flame. One would think flame would be hotter, but...
It would be the lube that was burning, and perhaps any non-metallic seals.
And it would depend on whether that particular sensor was operating properly.
I have no idea if there is any sort of test done on the IR/temperature sensors on a regular basis. And even if there is, it's probably at a long enough interval that one could fail in the interim. That's a signal/MOW question.
You know, many years ago, I knew a guy who was an SP brakeman on the road based out of Tucson. This was long before caboose-less trains and most, if not all, road freights still had a combination of roller and friction bearing journals in the consist.
This guy told me that he'd much rather have a "hotbox" in a friction bearing journal than in a roller bearing journal because, as he explained, usually with a hotbox on a friction bearing journal you can either see it or smell it or often times both but that's not always the case with an overheated roller bearing journal. He did mention that on a roller bearing journal, sometimes you could hear it but usually not see or smell any smoke.
His testimony, however, doesn't quite explain what was burning as the train rolled through Salem, OH. What truly amazes and astounds me is that the damn thing made it another 20 miles.
Euclid...but I am only wondering about the policy involved.
NS145 outlined that for NS. Essentially, if it doesn't meet the criteria, they simply get an advisory.
The question would be how long/how far a car can get with a failing bearing. Part of that is dependent on speed - the faster they are moving, the more quickly the bearing will go from initial failure to melting the end of the axle off.
I'm sure this will all be a part of the final FRA report.
tree68 Euclid ...but I am only wondering about the policy involved. NS145 outlined that for NS. Essentially, if it doesn't meet the criteria, they simply get an advisory. The question would be how long/how far a car can get with a failing bearing. Part of that is dependent on speed - the faster they are moving, the more quickly the bearing will go from initial failure to melting the end of the axle off. I'm sure this will all be a part of the final FRA report.
Euclid ...but I am only wondering about the policy involved.
They get an advisory and almost always they are requested to stop and inspect or stop and release the brakes. My big question is why this particular train didn't get stopped. I'm sure NS wish they had stopped 32N now, but hindsight is 20/20.
Part is dependent upon speed and part is dependent upon loading - the heavier the car is loaded the more pressure it is placing on the bearing. With nominal maximum load being 286K upon 4 axles per car and each axle having 2 journals that ends up being 35,750 pounds per journal. A somewhat substantial load per journal.
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