And now for Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor! The story is better than Amtrak Texas. In any case, it highlights the importance of looking at the numbers over time to detect trends. These trends, by the way, can be used to predict the probability of continuance.
Between 2009 and 2013 ridership on the Acela, which is the NEC’s primary operating profit offering, increased by 12.4 per cent, but the revenues went up by 30.2 per cent. Looks like the riders were willing to pony up more scratch for a patrician class ride. Costs dropped by $28.1 million or 11.4 per cent. Some might claim that the drop was because Amtrak dumped some of the NEC costs on the long distance train, but there is no evidence to support this notion. Other Post Employment Benefit costs (OPEBS) dropped 60.8 per cent, and the core contribution increased by 297.5 per cent.
But the NEC financial performance was not just a function of the Acela trains. From 2011 on the NEC regional trains turned in positive numbers. During the period (2009 through 2013) ridership on the regional trains increased 16.2 per cent whilst revenues increased 32.1 per cent. Total costs excluding OPEBS dropped 2.6 per cent, but OPEBS increased 56.1 per cent. The NEC regional trains went from an operating loss of $34.8 million in 2009 to an operating profit of $133 million in 2013.
The NEC Special Trains, which accounted for less than 1/10 of one per cent of NEC operations during the survey years, turned a loss of $1.6 million in 2009 into an operating profit of $2.9 million in 2013.
In 2009 30.4 per cent of the NEC riders chose the Acela and 69.6 per cent opted for a NEC regional train. By 2013 29.3 per cent of the NEC riders chose the Acela, whilst 70.6 per cent hopped aboard a regional train.
Acela riders accounted for 48.4 per cent of revenues in 2009 and 47.9 per cent in 2013. The corresponding revenue numbers for the regional trains were 51.5 and 51.7 per cent. The numbers don’t add to 100 per cent because the results for the special trains are not included. They are less than 1/10 of one per cent for all variables.
The NEC has been covering its operating costs since 2009. But what about the capital charges, which are an important element in the financial results? I don’t know! But I have submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to Amtrak’s IG for the information. Hopefully, I will get a response. I am prepared to pay for it.
The NEC had a net operating profit of $934.9 million during the period surveyed. In FY13 it had an operating profit of $372.9 million compared to an operating loss of $180.8 million for the state supported and other short distance trains and a corresponding loss of $627.1 million for the long distance trains. This is what we know from Amtrak’s published numbers.
Don Phillips, Fred Frailey, etc. have claimed directly or indirectly that Amtrak distorts its financial results because of inappropriate cost allocation formulas. When challenged, however, none of them offered any solid evidence that Amtrak is materially misstating its financial results. If it did, the external, independent auditors would issue a qualified opinion, based on deficient internal controls, which no one at Amtrak would want to see.
If the NEC wears 80 per cent of Amtrak’s depreciation, which is just a guess, in FY13 it could have covered the NEC costs by increasing the NEC fares by an average of $18.10 per passenger.
RIDEWITHMEHENRY is the name for our almost monthly day of riding trains and transit in either the NYCity or Philadelphia areas including all commuter lines, Amtrak, subways, light rail and trolleys, bus and ferries when warranted. No fees, just let us know you want to join the ride and pay your fares. Ask to be on our email list or find us on FB as RIDEWITHMEHENRY (all caps) to get descriptions of each outing.
I have ridden the Acela from NYC to Washington three times. In all three cases the train originated in NYC, so there were no through passengers. At least half of the passengers in the car that I was in got off in Philadelphia, and they were replaced by a smaller number of passengers traveling from Philadelphia to Wilmington, Baltimore, BWI, or Washington. All three trips were 8:00 a.m. or thereabouts weekday departures from Penn Station.
In FY13 ridership on the NEC was approximately 11.4 million, which was down roughly 2/10s of one per cent from FY12. Acela ridership was down 1.5 per cent.
Ridership does not translate into number of customers. In FY13 I was one Amtrak customer who took 14 trips on Amtrak. Most of them were on the Texas Eagle, but one on the Pennsylvanian from Pittsburgh to NYC; another on the Coast Starlight from LAX to San Francisco; NEC regional trains from NYC to Washington (2); and the Pacific Surfliner from San Diego to LAX (2). I don't believe the Acela is worth the premium fare. I prefer business class on a regional train.
I would be keen to know how many customers Amtrak had in FY13. I have asked that question in my FOIA request.
The use of reserved seating may be tied to labor contracts regarding crew size since reserved seating allows a more accurate passenger count in advance.
Sam,
Thank you for your statistical research on Amtrak's Northeast Corridor Service.
Recently I traveled from New York to Providence on a Northeast Regional train. The fare was $47 which is so low that I could not add my senior citizen discount to it and a regular fare with my discount would have been higher. However, had I taken one of the discount buses that now run I could have traveled for half of the fare in about the same time. I do think that while Amtrak does not have to go as low as competing bus service it cannot ignore that bus service either. And your own research shows that Amtrak has to be doing something right here.
Henry,
I think your post about cost of Amtrak's Northeast Regional Service relative to Acela service is correct. On my trips, between New York and Providence, the time saved on Acela is about 20 minutes, 30 minutes at most and the fare is much much higher. But many people will pay the extra fare to ride Acela.
I don't know how many times seats turn over. On my last trip more people got off the train than got on throughout the journey. However, people got off and to on at every single station including Old Saybrook, CT and Westerly, RI which are small places.
As I said above I could have taken a discount bus for a lower fare. But there is no way anyone is going to get a discount bus from New Rochelle, NY to Mystic, CT. Either you drive or you ride Amtrak.
Finally, I am always surprised to see the number of people who ride Amtrak from New York to stations up to and including New Haven. You know better than I how much lower the fare is on Metro North. But a fair number still ride Amtrak.
Are you certain most of the people you saw leaving at stations up to New Haven boarded at New York and were not riding through from Newark and points south? But,a t the same time, Amtrak is more comfortable than MN mu cars.
This trend is good but when ( not if ) a bridge on the NEC fails and stops all traffic then it is going to be a whole different ball game. MNRR had a swing bridge failure this morning that plugged the route for hours.
http://www.therepublic.com/view/story/654b29733d254c68b5dbbd7c5f8424c3/CT--Metro-North-Bridge-Delay
That is why a second, modern, dedicated HSR route is needed.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
"Don Phillips, Fred Frailey, etc. have claimed directly or indirectly that Amtrak distorts its financial results because of inappropriate cost allocation formulas. When challenged, however, none of them offered any solid evidence that Amtrak is materially misstating its financial results."
The people that made this argument have also been inside Amtrak such as Claytor and a early NRPC board member Joseph V. McDonald. There have also been multiple cost allocation schemes, both RPS with its errors, the new APT with its estimation and others such as the Penn Central allocation formulas from the early 1970's. Nothing in the links is authoritative, but it isn't nothing at all.
V.Payne "Don Phillips, Fred Frailey, etc. have claimed directly or indirectly that Amtrak distorts its financial results because of inappropriate cost allocation formulas. When challenged, however, none of them offered any solid evidence that Amtrak is materially misstating its financial results." The people that made this argument have also been inside Amtrak such as Claytor and a early NRPC board member Joseph V. McDonald. There have also been multiple cost allocation schemes, both RPS with its errors, the new APT with its estimation and others such as the Penn Central allocation formulas from the early 1970's. Nothing in the links is authoritative, but it isn't nothing at all.
When was Claytor associated with Amtrak? When was McDonald associated with Amtrak? What are the current accounting period errors? Please point them out! Numbers please!
Had I presented the executives and senior managers of the Fortune 250 corporation that I worked for with the unsupported, aforementioned historical data statements, I would have been fired.
I wrote to Phillips and Frailey, via snail mail to emphasize the seriousness of my request, asking them to support their implications that Amtrak's cost allocation system is deeply flawed. The system for the current period; not the system that was in place at some time in the past!
Phillips had implied that he had a contact in Minnesota who could verify that Amtrak's cost allocations were flawed. I am still waiting for a reply. And I will be waiting for a very long time, I suspect, because he and his ghost contact in Minnesota don't have access to Amtrak's books.
Frailey claimed that Amtrak's Guest Rewards Program paid dividends for the company. When I asked him for hard numbers, he at least had the decency to admit that he did not have any numbers or any special access to the Guest Rewards Program.
I have submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to Amtrak's IG regarding a number of Amtrak's accounting practices, including how it accounts for and allocates depreciation. Instead of speculating about what might be, especially based on ancient history, I suggest that you do the same thing.
blue streak 1 This trend is good but when ( not if ) a bridge on the NEC fails and stops all traffic then it is going to be a whole different ball game. MNRR had a swing bridge failure this morning that plugged the route for hours. http://www.therepublic.com/view/story/654b29733d254c68b5dbbd7c5f8424c3/CT--Metro-North-Bridge-Delay
What is the rate of bridge failure on the NEC? How many loss minutes reported by Amtrak in FY13 were due to bridge failures and/or other infrastructure failures?
I understand the need to maintain and repair the infrastructure. But the problem should be presented in a robust format.
Periodically we hear that the nation's bridges are falling apart and/or they are obsolete. The American Society of Civil Engineers, hardly a disinterested group, claims that we need a massive bridge rebuild program. Here are some numbers from the DOT re: highway bridges. Admittedly, they are not railroad bridges, but they show, if nothing else, that the condition of the nations bridges are not getting worse but are getting better.
As per National Transportation Statistics, Table 1-28: Condition of U.S. Highway Bridges, 1990 to 2012, in 1990 the U.S. had 572,205 highway brides, of which 137,865 were classified as structurally deficient, and 100,355 were classified as functionally obsolete. Obsolete, in many instances, means that they are serviceable, but if the engineers were to rebuild them, they would use a different design and perhaps materials. Translated into percentages, in 1990 24.1 per cent of the bridges were structurally deficient and 17.5 per cent were functionally obsolete.
In 2012 the number of bridges had increased to 607,378. The number of bridges classified as structurally deficient had shrunk to 66,749 (11 per cent of the total) and the number of functionally obsolete bridges was 84,748 (14 per cent).
Clearly, America needs to maintain and enhance its infrastructure. But as the aforementioned numbers, when put in context, show, the situation is getting better. Not worse!
Thank you for remembering my father. Joseph V. MacDonald was on the Amtrak board from July 19, 1974 until his death, June 17, 1978. I think Dad’s belief was that Amtrak should just run the trains, and not own tracks, especially not Penn-Central tracks, lest that burden cause long-distance trains (like the Montrealer!) to be diminished or sacrificed.
http://www.unitedrail.org/1994/07/02/amtrak-the-long-path-to-profitability/
Mike MacDonald
Mike, sorry for misspelling the last name. I was in government, at a state DOT, until this month and have always really appreciated the people who actually work to make the system function for what is often poor pay.
As a engineer I refer to textbooks whose first printing may have been 80 years ago. Sometimes, those books are a lot better at providing context to a problem as they trace the development of thought on a question. The links provide a good synopsis of the development of problems during the history of NRPC cost accounting.
IIRC there have been three route level accounting methods used in the last ten years, and the current APT method that produces only Total Costs, assigning all overhead to routes, has the least application to whether a route should be continued or not. Consider this summary from NPRC's annual report right after the Claytor years, note the amounts in the Corporate column that are looking for a revenue center to be assigned toward.
In particular note the cash loss in the Intercity column. I think this was the beginning of the new equipment orders, hence the jump.
As to authoritativeness of references, this is a Discussion Board. I don't think I can get fired for under-performing here:)
V.Payne Mike, sorry for misspelling the last name. I was in government, at a state DOT, until this month and have always really appreciated the people who actually work to make the system function for what is often poor pay. As a engineer I refer to textbooks whose first printing may have been 80 years ago. Sometimes, those books are a lot better at providing context to a problem as they trace the development of thought on a question. The links provide a good synopsis of the development of problems during the history of NRPC cost accounting. IIRC there have been three route level accounting methods used in the last ten years, and the current APT method that produces only Total Costs, assigning all overhead to routes, has the least application to whether a route should be continued or not. Consider this summary from NPRC's annual report right after the Claytor years, note the amounts in the Corporate column that are looking for a revenue center to be assigned toward. In particular note the cash loss in the Intercity column. I think this was the beginning of the new equipment orders, hence the jump. As to authoritativeness of references, this is a Discussion Board. I don't think I can get fired for under-performing here:)
You are correct. You cannot get fired from this discussion board. But relying on very old data, which may not be relevant, destroys any credibility, although I get the impression that you don;t care.
You don't have any access to Amtrak's current accounting methodologies; yet you imply that the numbers that were cobbled together decades ago are relevant to your argument. Good luck with that!
Sam1yet you imply that the numbers that were cobbled together decades ago are relevant to your argument.
I don't have a hard time believing this is true. Inertia and sloth are two of Amtrak's core values! While is is possible that the cost allocation schemes may have been skewed to drive home some political point long ago, I find it believable that nothing has changed because there was no push to change and nobody would take on risk without any possiblitly of reward. So, the status quo prevails for no particular reason!
I think that trying to read between the lines and say that Amtrak does "this" or "that" because of a particular internal bias toward one service or another is giving Amtrak too much credit!
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
Sam1 What is the rate of bridge failure on the NEC? How many loss minutes reported by Amtrak in FY13 were due to bridge failures and/or other infrastructure failures? I understand the need to maintain and repair the infrastructure. But the problem should be presented in a robust format. Periodically we hear that the nation's bridges are falling apart and/or they are obsolete. The American Society of Civil Engineers, hardly a disinterested group, claims that we need a massive bridge rebuild program. Here are some numbers from the DOT re: highway bridges. Admittedly, they are not railroad bridges,
Periodically we hear that the nation's bridges are falling apart and/or they are obsolete. The American Society of Civil Engineers, hardly a disinterested group, claims that we need a massive bridge rebuild program. Here are some numbers from the DOT re: highway bridges. Admittedly, they are not railroad bridges,
SAM1:
There are 10 movable bridges on the NEC according to the PRIIA of 2010. One draw bridge not listed in PRIIA is Newark's Penn station's dock bridge that is now subject to long term planning for replacement. Each one can have one of several failures short, medium, long term. each failure will have a certain probably of failure. Unfortunately probably of a failure on the NEC would require a spread sheet to cover various scenarios. All will be additive for a failure to close down a portion of the NEC and not the highest single bridge failure number.
Note the WALK bridge failures at Norwalk are adding up to a very high percentage. It failed 16 times out of 271 openings in 2013.
The new lift bridge and new bascule bridge now operating will have a very low failure possibility.
Bridge pivots are the most failure prone and swing bridge pivots are the worse. Other failures can be due to power failure, boat strikes, freight train strikes as well. All which need to be added in.
Granted highway bridge deficiencies are decreasing but what about RR bridges ? What are the percentage of RR draw bridge replacements to highway bridges ? Then what are the failures of RR bridges to highway bridges ? What is the number of truss bridge replacements ? What are the percentages of basic bridge replacements ?
How much older are the RR bridges and have many of them had their cooper rating reduced ?
Information regarding the condition of the nation’s railroad bridges is difficult to come by. I found a GAO Report to Congress dated August 2007 that contains some insights. The data for the report was collected, it appears, in 2006, which makes it more than eight years old or older. Whether it is still relevant is not known.
The GAO found that there is little public information regarding the condition of the nation’s railroad bridges and tunnels and their impact on rail congestion. The railroads consider their bridge and tunnel information proprietary and only share it with the federal government selectively. The Class I railroads maintained detailed inspection and maintenance information regarding their bridges and tunnels. The Class II and Class III railroads do so to a lesser extent.
The Federal Railroad Administration has a limited role in overseeing the safety of railroad bridges and tunnels. It believes that the railroads have a vested interest in seeing that its bridges and tunnels are maintained properly to ensure safety of operations and to reduce congestion. The FRA has issued bridge management guidelines, makes structural observations, and may take action to address any structural issues.
According to the FRA, from 1998 through 2006, there were 22 train accidents that could be attributed to bridge failure. No one was killed and one person was injured. No one has been killed in a train accident attributable to a bridge failure since 1957. Considering that the Class I railroads owned and maintained over 61,000 bridges in 2006, whilst the Class II and III railroads owned and maintained more than 15,000 bridges, the accident rate attributable to bridge problems does not suggest that the nation’s railroad bridges are in disrepair.
The report does not mention Amtrak's bridges, other than to say that the investigators talked with Amtrak. Moreover, I did not read the entire report; it is 71 pages long.
Amtrak is involved in some New England Bridge repairs, some of which showed up in the News wire.
Their capital expenses for these are high, but since Amtrak doesn't really pay for it, it doesn't show up on their P&L for the NEC. The Government merging DOT has made it harder to track true costs from one "transportation "act" to another. Many end up being partnerships with State or even private railroads.
Other costs. Amtrak has the very old Tunnel in Baltimore its paying Heavy for a study on replacement, replacement costs will be huge....
So why or how does the NEC make money? A historical geography picture will tell all. The whole region was developed and cities built originally on Horse and buggy paths, land "grants", water ways, and railroads.. Its NOt organized, and its heavily congested. Throw a few million autos in there and your have serious problems. Parking in one of the NEC cities can run up to 20-30 bucks an HOUR in some places... SO they PAY... look at this I found, from 2009....
Rail is BIG business on the NEC.......
Sam1 ... According to the FRA, from 1998 through 2006, there were 22 train accidents that could be attributed to bridge failure. No one was killed and one person was injured. No one has been killed in a train accident attributable to a bridge failure since 1957. Considering that the Class I railroads owned and maintained over 61,000 bridges in 2006, whilst the Class II and III railroads owned and maintained more than 15,000 bridges, the accident rate attributable to bridge problems does not suggest that the nation’s railroad bridges are in disrepair. The report does not mention Amtrak's bridges, other than to say that the investigators talked with Amtrak. Moreover, I did not read the entire report; it is 71 pages long.
...
That the report does not mention Amtrak, leaves out the Amtrak bridge disaster near Mobile, Alabama, where several passengers died after a barge hit a bridge.
MidlandMike Sam1 ... According to the FRA, from 1998 through 2006, there were 22 train accidents that could be attributed to bridge failure. No one was killed and one person was injured. No one has been killed in a train accident attributable to a bridge failure since 1957. Considering that the Class I railroads owned and maintained over 61,000 bridges in 2006, whilst the Class II and III railroads owned and maintained more than 15,000 bridges, the accident rate attributable to bridge problems does not suggest that the nation’s railroad bridges are in disrepair. The report does not mention Amtrak's bridges, other than to say that the investigators talked with Amtrak. Moreover, I did not read the entire report; it is 71 pages long. That the report does not mention Amtrak, leaves out the Amtrak bridge disaster near Mobile, Alabama, where several passengers died after a barge hit a bridge.
The GAO report only covered accidents covered by natural structural failure, i.e. wear and tear, design, etc. As you have noted, the bridge failure near Mobile was caused by a barge striking the bridge. I was going to mention it parenthetically in my post, but decided to see if someone would raise the issue.
Sam1 Information regarding the condition of the nation’s railroad bridges is difficult to come by. I found a GAO Report to Congress dated August 2007 that contains some insights. The data for the report was collected, it appears, in 2006, which makes it more than eight years old or older. Whether it is still relevant is not known.
blue streak 1 Sam1 Information regarding the condition of the nation’s railroad bridges is difficult to come by. I found a GAO Report to Congress dated August 2007 that contains some insights. The data for the report was collected, it appears, in 2006, which makes it more than eight years old or older. Whether it is still relevant is not known. 270+ failures to close on just 5 bridges between New Haven and Rochelle is certainly significant. we cam imagine that many failures are for only a few minutes ? But any failure indicates a possible major failure later? http://trn.trains.com/Railroad%20News/News%20Wire/2014/06/Bridge%20failures%20disrupt%20Metro%20North%20service%20175%20times%20in%20Connecticut%20in%20a%20year.aspx
Sam1: if you read the article closely you will see that the WALK bridge over the Norwalk river is not listed. That bridge had what 16 failures ? will edit original post.
apologize for not proof reading the typo. Should have given more thought. The real question is how many of the failures will happen during the summer boating season as compared to winter time ? The summer holiday periods of Memorial day, July 4th, & Labor day mya have a much higher number of openings ? Anyone able to guess or have actual figures ?
Again, WALK cannot be an Amtrak responsibility. It is owned by the State of Connecticut and operated for CDOT by Metro North
Our community is FREE to join. To participate you must either login or register for an account.