Milwaukee Road history - Wikipedia version

[MichaelSol]

I guess people keep asking that question, because it never seems to have been answered.  If the PCE was the sure fire deal that you say it was, why didn't someone, anyone, snatch it up?  The purchase of the East End, just to keep it out of someone else's hands makes sense.  The fact that no one wanted to buy the PCE, and give BN a run for their money, doesn't make much sense.  Why was that?

A corporation was formed as a consortium of shippers, employees and government agencies. It was specifically given a preference by Congress over any other applicant that might attempt to purchase the line. They made a formal application to the ICC to purchase. They intervened in the bankruptcy proceeding. They obtained the financing committments from private lenders to undertake the project -- something the Trustee had been unable to do. They had pro forma projections and an operating and rehabilitation plan in place. They had the support of Milwaukee's creditors and bankers.

They "wanted to buy the PCE." I don't know how to make that any clearer.

"The fact that no one wanted to buy the PCE ... doesn't make much sense" only if you ignore the fact that someone did want to buy it. And for some reason, you are. Why?

 

[MichaelSol]

OK, so we agree that the double entering of expenses had no real effect on anything.  It was simply a correctable error on the application to abandon.

Management, the trustee and the court were all getting the correct financial information when the decison to abandon the Pacific Coast Extension was made.

The decision was made in mid-1978. The "correct financial information" was submitted long after, and long after the decision had become, because of the Trustee's actions on the ground, irreversible. To suggest that it must have been a surprise to Trustee Stanley Hillman must have been an understatement. Apparently someone papered it over with him by saying -- as on this thread -- it was "just" following an ICC formula. A slick line that fools some of the people some of the time.

Then the Consulting Study came back -- can't make money without the PCE.

"No real effect," ... except on Stanley Hillman's ulcer.

 

 

[greyhounds]

OK, here we go.

The asertation that the Pacific Coast Extension of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific was profitable is not logical or proveable.  The reason is that you can not, with any certainty, determine the revenues of the line.  And if you can't determine the revenues, you can't determine the profitability.....

But this Milwaukee thing needs further explination.  Why, for years, wouldn't the cash pile up if expenses were being double entered into the books?

Unless, of course, the Milwaukee's own people were stealing it blind.

You misread.

The expenses were double entered on the Application to Abandon, not "the books".

 

OK, so we agree that the double entering of expenses had no real effect on anything.  It was simply a correctable error on the application to abandon.

Management, the trustee and the court were all getting the correct financial information when the decison to abandon the Pacific Coast Extension was made.

Then why does anyone make an issue of the double entering of expenses on the abandonment application?  It didn't effect anything.

[Murphy Siding]

      Which leads me to the question that always seems to come up when discussing the Milwaukee Road and the PCE.  If, the PCE was "profitable", but the east end/branchline network wasn't, why did a buyer(s) show up to purchase the east end, but not the PCE?

Shippers, employees and government entities got together to do just that for the West End. There was a buyer. I'm not sure why people keep asking this question -- that buyer's plan  earned the support of Milwaukee's creditors, bankers, and the ICC.

Nobody, and I mean nobody, supported the Trustee's plan. It wasn't seen as viable. The East End -- Milwaukee II -- came into existence by default; the simple fact that the Trustee was in a position to make certain outcomes inevitable. The East End became a sort of "Prisoner's Dilemma". Nobody wanted anyone else to get it.

 

I guess people keep asking that question, because it never seems to have been answered.  If the PCE was the sure fire deal that you say it was, why didn't someone, anyone, snatch it up?  The purchase of the East End, just to keep it out of someone else's hands makes sense.  The fact that no one wanted to buy the PCE, and give BN a run for their money, doesn't make much sense.  Why was that?

[MichaelSol]

      Which leads me to the question that always seems to come up when discussing the Milwaukee Road and the PCE.  If, the PCE was "profitable", but the east end/branchline network wasn't, why did a buyer(s) show up to purchase the east end, but not the PCE?

Shippers, employees and government entities got together to do just that for the West End. There was a buyer. I'm not sure why people keep asking this question -- that buyer's plan  earned the support of Milwaukee's creditors, bankers, and the ICC.

Nobody, and I mean nobody, supported the Trustee's plan. It wasn't seen as viable. The East End -- Milwaukee II -- came into existence by default; the simple fact that the Trustee was in a position to make certain outcomes inevitable. The East End became a sort of "Prisoner's Dilemma". Nobody wanted anyone else to get it.

 

[Murphy Siding]

      Which leads me to the question that always seems to come up when discussing the Milwaukee Road and the PCE.  If, the PCE was "profitable", but the east end/branchline network wasn't, why did a buyer(s) show up to purchase the east end, but not the PCE?

[MichaelSol]

OK, here we go.

The asertation that the Pacific Coast Extension of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific was profitable is not logical or proveable.  The reason is that you can not, with any certainty, determine the revenues of the line.  And if you can't determine the revenues, you can't determine the profitability.

The Application to Abandon did, in fact, use "Branchline" abandonment rules. Apparently the ICC hadn't gotten around to formulating rules for transcontinental mainline abandonment. In this instance, the rules understated revenue.

However, 30%, if I am recalling correctly, of Milwaukee's PCE traffic moved within zones 8, 7 and 6 -- west of Miles City. They weren't making any mistakes "allocating" that.

Further, detailed traffic studies by Reebie & Associates and Booz Allen Hamilton were done on revenue losses. The Application to Abandon, for instance, in its final form, showed $186 million in revenue using the branchline rules. And showed a profit. 

The traffic studies were comprehensive. Milwaukee knew just about exactly what traffic they were going to lose, and what little they were going to keep, on a carload by carload basis.

BAH estimated actual revenue attributable to the PCE would be closer to $240 million, again, if I am recalling correctly, representing about $60 million in net profit over operating expenses. A pretty good estimate because when it was shut down, Milwaukee's net loss shot up by just about $55 million. I doubt that it was just a coincidence.

These numbers were pretty close, as well, to Milwaukee's Planning Department projections rejected by Trustee Hillman in 1978.

To say that a railroad "couldn't figure out" how it earned its money is, I think, patently ridiculous.

 

[MichaelSol]

OK, here we go.

The asertation that the Pacific Coast Extension of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific was profitable is not logical or proveable.  The reason is that you can not, with any certainty, determine the revenues of the line.  And if you can't determine the revenues, you can't determine the profitability.....

But this Milwaukee thing needs further explination.  Why, for years, wouldn't the cash pile up if expenses were being double entered into the books?

Unless, of course, the Milwaukee's own people were stealing it blind.

You misread.

The expenses were double entered on the Application to Abandon, not "the books".

 

[nanaimo73]

  That's what I always understood it to be. Management and stockholders milked the cow dry and want to liquidate the whole thing, but a few were able to save a little bit.

There were 5 senior management members that were charged during the late 1970s with taking money from the Milwaukee Land Company and transferring it to the Railroad.

[greyhounds]

That's what I always understood it to be. Management and stockholders milked the cow dry and want to liquidate the whole thing, but a few were able to save a little bit.

Well, there's a difference between milking and stealing.

The stockholders certainly had a right to milk their own cow. (In this case, the Milwaukee Road "cow")  Whatever they could get out of her was rightfully theirs.  They owned "her", it was their "milk".

But if somebody in "Lines West" management was "cookin the books", and stealing from the stockholders, that'd be a different story.  He would have ben taking somebody elses "Milk".  And that's stealing. 

The question is: "Where did the cash generated by the double entering of the expenses go?"

(For the Record:  I am opposed to any actual abuse of  real cows, or bovines of any other type, or any other animal that God Has Set Upon This Earth and I do volunteer for animal welfare.   And now I will be slammed for referencing God.)

[snagletooth]

ut this Milwaukee thing needs further explination.  Why, for years, wouldn't the cash pile up if expenses were being double entered into the books?

Unless, of course, the Milwaukee's own people were stealing it blind.

That's what I always understood it to be. Management and stockholders milked the cow dry and want to liquidate the whole thing, but a few were able to save a little bit.

[greyhounds]

OK, here we go.

The asertation that the Pacific Coast Extension of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific was profitable is not logical or proveable.  The reason is that you can not, with any certainty, determine the revenues of the line.  And if you can't determine the revenues, you can't determine the profitability.

Now, if a shipment only moved on the PCE, say from Great Falls to Seattle, then we do know that 100% of the revenue can be assigned to the PCE.   But if a shipment moved to or from the PCE to or from other parts of the Milwaukee network there is a very real question as to how much of the revenue do you allocate to the PCE.

Look at the often mentioned traffic between the Pacific Northwest and Kansas City.  How much of the revenue from this traffic belongs to the PCE route and how much belongs to the route past the Twin Cities to Kansas City?  There's no way to know.  So saying the PCE was profitable is simply a function of arbitrarily allocating enough revenue to the PCE.  If you do that, then you'll show the PCE to be "profitable".  But what you "show" means nothing. 

Would the ICC support such an arbitrary allocation of revenue and possibly "show" the PCE to be profitable.  Of course they would.  In a branch line abandonment application a railroad had to "allocate" 50% of the revenue to the branch.  You could haul it 800 miles on a main line, and 20 miles on a branch, but the branch got 50% of the revenue according to the ICC.  Heck Fire, they had to come up with something.  And they did.

As to this double counting of expenses, it needs more explination.

It's not like Enron or MCI.  In those cases profits were overstated.  MCI, for example, capitalized money going out that should have been expensed.  This is the equivalent of you paying someone to mow your lawn and adding it to the value of your house in a loan application because a well kept lawn improves your home's worth.  It's a little hard to catch because nobody really knows what your home is worth until somebody makes an offer.  (The MCI auditors should have done better.)

The alledged Milwaukee "mistake" or "fraud" or "whatever" is very different.  It's alledged to be an understating of profit.  That's a little harder to do.  You see, you've got all this cash on hand that you're not supposed to have.  You supposidly spent it to run the railroad, but it's still there.  You've got something very real to explain.  The books don't balance.

Now it is quite possible that the managers of Milwaukee Lines West were stealing.  I've seen similar. Our manager of Sales Administration double submited bills for country club membership fees.  He pocketed the money until he was caught by the auditors.  We had a TOFC ramp manager in Louisville receive invoices from a trucking company for services they never performed.  He authorized payment and split the money with them.  He went to Federal Prison.

But this Milwaukee thing needs further explination.  Why, for years, wouldn't the cash pile up if expenses were being double entered into the books?

Unless, of course, the Milwaukee's own people were stealing it blind.

[MichaelSol]

One of the big reasons for going through Butte was that a few of the directors of the CM&StP during the time that the PCE was planned and built were also directors of the Anaconda Copper Company - which also had a bearing on why the CM&StP electrified (good market for copper).

     Did CM&StP get rewarded for this effort, by getting traffic from Anaconda?

Don't know how much, if any, traffic Anaconda sent to the MILW. Michael Sol would probably be able to give a much more informaed answer than I would. Also keep in mind that at the time the PCE was built, Butte was by far the largest city in Montana.

During those days, the mighty Anaconda Copper Mining Co. ran the biggest industry facility between the Twin Cities and the Puget Sound, it controlled the majority of the forest products industries between the Dakotas and Washington State, it owned the biggest newspapers in Montana, and it controlled many wholesale and retail operations. Recall, J. Hill's first western terminus was Butte, Montana. The NP built through it, the GN built to it, the UP built to it, and the Milwaukee built through it as Milwaukee's owner, William Rockefeller, wanted his own railroad to serve the Anaconda's interests, as he was one of the primary owners of that company as well, and didn't like the idea of contributing profits to his competitors -- a Rockefeller family trait.

From the limited shipment records of the Anaconda company that I have reviewed, Milwaukee received about as much traffic as the Great Northern and Northern Pacific combined. It was the preferred railroad for the mineral divsion, the smelting division, the Big Blackfoot Milling (Forest Products) division, as well as general wholesale and retail of Hennessey & Co. as well as the Missoula Mercantile -- not subsidiaries, but related wholesalers and retailers throughout the territory.

What I question is not that Butte wasn't worth reaching by Milwaukee rails, but that the profile and alignment of the mainline had to be somewhat skewed in order to go through Butte (and Butte proper still had to be reached by a short branchline!)  It seems that, if indeed the PCE charter called for "the shortest route to the PNW of the northern transcons" (paraphrased), that it would have been a little more judicious to stick to that "shortest line" caveat by routing the mainline through Great Falls and Cadette Pass, and instead reaching Butte by a branchline down from the Blackfoot River valley.

Also on that note, why didn't the Milwaukee just purchase the BA&P line to incorporate it into it's system, rather than building parallel to it through Silver Bow canyon?

Well, the first two surveys, after the Northern Securities decision was handed down in 1901, went only to Butte. That was the entire focus.

By 1905, I think they understood that electrification was so advantageous that route was almost secondary -- that comparisons with other roads from a traditional route -- as opposed to technological -- perspective were bound to underestimate the technological advantage that Milwaukee had until June 16, 1974.

The Milwaukee did purchase a one-half interest in the BA&P (from James J. Hill) and did, in fact, use the BA&P rails from Butte to Finlen. They built their own line through Silver Bow canyon in 1914 when the impending 3,000 vDC electrification made continued operation under the BA&P 2,400 vDC catenary infeasible.

 

 

 

[MichaelSol]

If the expenses were double entered, where were the auditors? 

Michael, what would a carload of general freight fetch in the mid 70's that was from the PNW to Chicago?  $1000? $1500? 

ed

From Montana, probably about $1400, from Seattle, about $1800-$2,100.

[Anonymous]

One of the big reasons for going through Butte was that a few of the directors of the CM&StP during the time that the PCE was planned and built were also directors of the Anaconda Copper Company - which also had a bearing on why the CM&StP electrified (good market for copper).

     Did CM&StP get rewarded for this effort, by getting traffic from Anaconda?

Don't know how much, if any, traffic Anaconda sent to the MILW. Michael Sol would probably be able to give a much more informaed answer than I would. Also keep in mind that at the time the PCE was built, Butte was by far the largest city in Montana.

During those days, the mighty Anaconda Copper Mining Co. ran the biggest industry facility between the Twin Cities and the Puget Sound, it controlled the majority of the forest products industries between the Dakotas and Washington State, it owned the biggest newspapers in Montana, and it controlled many wholesale and retail operations. Recall, J. Hill's first western terminus was Butte, Montana. The NP built through it, the GN built to it, the UP built to it, and the Milwaukee built through it as Milwaukee's owner, William Rockefeller, wanted his own railroad to serve the Anaconda's interests, as he was one of the primary owners of that company as well, and didn't like the idea of contributing profits to his competitors -- a Rockefeller family trait.

From the limited shipment records of the Anaconda company that I have reviewed, Milwaukee received about as much traffic as the Great Northern and Northern Pacific combined. It was the preferred railroad for the mineral divsion, the smelting division, the Big Blackfoot Milling (Forest Products) division, as well as general wholesale and retail of Hennessey & Co. as well as the Missoula Mercantile -- not subsidiaries, but related wholesalers and retailers throughout the territory.

What I question is not that Butte wasn't worth reaching by Milwaukee rails, but that the profile and alignment of the mainline had to be somewhat skewed in order to go through Butte (and Butte proper still had to be reached by a short branchline!)  It seems that, if indeed the PCE charter called for "the shortest route to the PNW of the northern transcons" (paraphrased), that it would have been a little more judicious to stick to that "shortest line" caveat by routing the mainline through Great Falls and Cadette Pass, and instead reaching Butte by a branchline down from the Blackfoot River valley.

Also on that note, why didn't the Milwaukee just purchase the BA&P line to incorporate it into it's system, rather than building parallel to it through Silver Bow canyon?

[MichaelSol]

I am intrigued by the contention that bookkeeping double entry of losses showed the PCE losing money when it was actually making a profit.  Is this an undisputed fact?  Has the error ever been explained?

The bookkeeping error occured in the Application to Abandon. Appendix K. That is, the operating expenses contained in that exhibit had, in several cases, overstated the actual expenses by double entering some expenses. This was discovered by ICC auditors. The Milwaukee had to make four sets of corrections before they "got it right."

This was odd as Lines West always reported independently, and kept separate books of operations -- out in Seattle it was like a separate railroad general office. So, the process wasn't just something they stumbled around trying to figure out how to do for the first time. Of course, that was the first document that the Trustee was going to be actually asked to look at and sign that showed the western operation as profitable.

The Trustee had just spent the previous several months telling everyone it wasn't profitable, and doing everything he could to discourage traffic and shut it down. He was a numbers guy, and perhaps someone was trying to avoid those particular "numbers" and hope no one noticed.

The ICC's Office of Rail Public Counsel had reviewed the Application to Abandon and made the findings about the double-entered expenses. They announced it in a press release to the general public, including the ICC's own revised figures showing net profit on Lines West for the years, 1976, 1977, and 1978, so it became a matter of public record through the Associated Press.  I believe the full Commission noted it in one of their orders.

So, this wasn't any party with an agenda either way -- the fact is that the initial application showed that Lines West lost money when in fact expenses had to be double entered in order to show that. Another way of looking at it was that someone made up extra expenses to justify the claim. I personally reviewed those findings in some detail with Henri Rush and with David Miller at the ICC at the time.

Was it plausibly an accident? Well, all sorts of things went through my mind as to who might have done it and why.

 

[MichaelSol]

One of the big reasons for going through Butte was that a few of the directors of the CM&StP during the time that the PCE was planned and built were also directors of the Anaconda Copper Company - which also had a bearing on why the CM&StP electrified (good market for copper).

     Did CM&StP get rewarded for this effort, by getting traffic from Anaconda?

Don't know how much, if any, traffic Anaconda sent to the MILW. Michael Sol would probably be able to give a much more informaed answer than I would. Also keep in mind that at the time the PCE was built, Butte was by far the largest city in Montana.

During those days, the mighty Anaconda Copper Mining Co. ran the biggest industry facility between the Twin Cities and the Puget Sound, it controlled the majority of the forest products industries between the Dakotas and Washington State, it owned the biggest newspapers in Montana, and it controlled many wholesale and retail operations. Recall, J. Hill's first western terminus was Butte, Montana. The NP built through it, the GN built to it, the UP built to it, and the Milwaukee built through it as Milwaukee's owner, William Rockefeller, wanted his own railroad to serve the Anaconda's interests, as he was one of the primary owners of that company as well, and didn't like the idea of contributing profits to his competitors -- a Rockefeller family trait.

From the limited shipment records of the Anaconda company that I have reviewed, Milwaukee received about as much traffic as the Great Northern and Northern Pacific combined. It was the preferred railroad for the mineral divsion, the smelting division, the Big Blackfoot Milling (Forest Products) division, as well as general wholesale and retail of Hennessey & Co. as well as the Missoula Mercantile -- not subsidiaries, but related wholesalers and retailers throughout the territory.

 

 

[erikem]

One of the big reasons for going through Butte was that a few of the directors of the CM&StP during the time that the PCE was planned and built were also directors of the Anaconda Copper Company - which also had a bearing on why the CM&StP electrified (good market for copper).

     Did CM&StP get rewarded for this effort, by getting traffic from Anaconda?

Don't know how much, if any, traffic Anaconda sent to the MILW. Michael Sol would probably be able to give a much more informaed answer than I would. Also keep in mind that at the time the PCE was built, Butte was by far the largest city in Montana.

[MP173]

If the expenses were double entered, where were the auditors? 

Michael, what would a carload of general freight fetch in the mid 70's that was from the PNW to Chicago?  $1000? $1500? 

ed

[Murphy Siding]

One of the big reasons for going through Butte was that a few of the directors of the CM&StP during the time that the PCE was planned and built were also directors of the Anaconda Copper Company - which also had a bearing on why the CM&StP electrified (good market for copper).

     Did CM&StP get rewarded for this effort, by getting traffic from Anaconda?

[Anonymous]

I am intrigued by the contention that bookkeeping double entry of losses showed the PCE losing money when it was actually making a profit.  Is this an undisputed fact?  Has the error ever been explained?

[erikem]

It just seems on the surface anyway that the Milwaukee didn't take full advantage of "untouched" areas along a logical mainline corridor, areas along the mainline where Milwaukee was either the only game in town or the dominate mainline.  Butte already had NP, UP, and GN; Helena had the NP mainline; and both had to be reached by going through the Belt mountain ranges and the Continental Divide at 5800' to 6500' - meanwhile Great Falls only had a GN branchline at the time, and could have been reached from the east with nary a mountain grade.  Spokane had GN, NP, UP through town, while Lewiston ID had an NP branch from the north and a UP branch from the west, yet Milwaukee chooses to bypass Spokane to the south, thus misses both towns, and just skims the north end of the Palouse grain growing region.  They missed the Tri-Cities, missed Yakima, missed Portland, missed Wenatchee.

One of the big reasons for going through Butte was that a few of the directors of the CM&StP during the time that the PCE was planned and built were also directors of the Anaconda Copper Company - which also had a bearing on why the CM&StP electrified (good market for copper).

 

[Anonymous]

What exactly do you question in their route choice?

I assume you're refering to my concurrence on the Wikipedia entry in which "some historians" questioned the initial route choice......

Since I'm on a roll, I believe in hindsight the best route for Milwaukee, CB&Q, or CNW through Montana to Puget Sound would have been to avoid the Belts and head for Great Falls.  Right there you maintain a Prairie Division profile all the way to Great Falls, and that pesky NP isn't your constant companion.  Then head west/southwest over Cadette or Rogers to Missoula, then over Lolo to the Clearwater River drainage near present day Lowell ID.  That's your primary Mountain Division, Great Falls to Lowell, two passes, roughly 200 miles, and the only time you see another railroad is when you cross over the NP at Missoula.  Then from Lowell you're running water level grade all the way to Benton County in Washington, and if you can't get the Gorge, then head northwest along Umtanum Ridge over the Saddles to Ellensburg (1% grades both ways), and then head over Snoqualmie at 0.7% ruling westbound grade, 1.6% eastbound.  That's your secondary Mountain Division, less grades but more snow to deal with, either way a much better alignment than your competitors NP and GN.

But whatever you do, try to get that North Bank of the Columbia as Priority Number 1.  If you do it'll pay dividends for years to come.

Thank you,Dave.Good overview of Milwaukee's misses.I've been looking over the PCE from Forsyth,Montana to the coast on MSN Live Search (satellite images and such)in 3D.Looks like some changes could have been made with tunnels or even daylighting some areas to reduce or even eliminate curvature and maybe some short sections of grades.Worst choices of all was abandoning the PCE instead of the midwest lines.Looks like Milwaukee Road could have captured a lot of container traffic out of Tacoma and eliminated some capacity issues.

Have a good one.

Bill B

Well, just my opinion.  For what it's worth, I think James Hill made some route choice blunders as well.  He too had the chance to route the GN along the North Bank of the Columbia, or he also could have utilized Snoqualmie Pass if he just had to have a direct line to the Puget Sound, but for some reason he chose to go straight west out of Spokane over Stevens Pass, the worst of all the Cascade passes. 

In retrospect, the Milwaukee was fortunate that Snoqualmie Pass was still available so late in the game, not to mention the fact that Milwaukee was so close to getting the North Bank of the Columbia!  JJ Hill did make up for his poor GN route by incorporating the SP&S along the North Bank before the Milwaukee could act.

As for NP and UP, I tend to be more forgiving of their initial ventures into the Pacific Northwest.  The NP was a pioneer line which seemed to constantly be on shaky ground finance-wise, and constuction techiques were not as sophisticated as they were just a few decades later.  They were wise to utilize the ORN from Wallula to Portland, too bad they couldn't keep that trackage!  As for the choice of Stampede Pass, well.....this was the NP - it's amazing to me that such an abject example of poor routing has become such a stamp of misplaced fatalism for BNSF even today!

UP basically took what someone else had built - ORN, OSL, OWRN, SI - and incorporated them into it's system.  What are you going to do?

[billbtrain]

What exactly do you question in their route choice?

I assume you're refering to my concurrence on the Wikipedia entry in which "some historians" questioned the initial route choice.

Prior to joining this forum, I had several long held views regarding the Milwaukee's route to the Pacific Northwest.  I liked the Snoqualmie Pass section, disdained the Saddle Mountains crossing, and wondered if the north bank of the Columbia Gorge could have been secured if the directors had acted with a little more urgency once the transcon decision was made.  I questioned why the Milwaukee chose to bypass both Spokane and Lewiston, why they chose the St. Paul Pass line over either the Lolo Pass route (used by US Highway 12) to hit Lewiston directly or Lookout Pass and Fourth of July Pass to hit Spokane directly.  Why turn down toward Butte instead of using a shorter route through Helena?  Why didn't they avoid the Belt Mountians altogether by using Rogers Pass via Great Falls?

Well, some of those inquiries were answered by the contributions of forum members, not just Michael but also kenneo and artfbe.  For example, I had no idea that Milwaukee was considering Cadette Pass (just north of Rogers Pass) as a new mainline route to either supplement the Pipestone Pass line or supercede it.  What I still question about this is why go to all the trouble of building via Butte with heavy duty permanent construction?  Why not just build a temp track over Cadette until the longer tunnel could be availed?  A branch line down to Butte to tap the mines would have sufficed, right? 

I also was unaware that Milwaukee had planned a long tunnel underneath St. Paul Pass to reduce the ruling grades from 1.7% both ways to under 1% both ways, as well as eliminate some mileage and curvature.  But again, why the heavy duty permanent construction if the eventual route was intended as a temp line?

Milwaukee built grain branches aplomb in Montana, but seemed to neglect the best grain growing areas of the Palouse in Eastern Washington and North Central Idaho.  Milwaukee also built some branch lines that just seem to defy logic - the line to Port Angeles via car ferry, the branch up the Swan River Valley in Montana, the dead end branch up to Ione Washington, the branch to Hanford WA.  If they had money to build branchlines, why not tap up to Wenatchee and the Big Bend Country of Washington instead of down to Hanford?  Why not build one down into the heart of the Palouse country and down to Lewiston instead of a mostly logging branch to Elk River ID?  Why not build to a connection with one of the Canadian roads instead of dead ending a few miles south of the border?

It just seems on the surface anyway that the Milwaukee didn't take full advantage of "untouched" areas along a logical mainline corridor, areas along the mainline where Milwaukee was either the only game in town or the dominate mainline.  Butte already had NP, UP, and GN; Helena had the NP mainline; and both had to be reached by going through the Belt mountain ranges and the Continental Divide at 5800' to 6500' - meanwhile Great Falls only had a GN branchline at the time, and could have been reached from the east with nary a mountain grade.  Spokane had GN, NP, UP through town, while Lewiston ID had an NP branch from the north and a UP branch from the west, yet Milwaukee chooses to bypass Spokane to the south, thus misses both towns, and just skims the north end of the Palouse grain growing region.  They missed the Tri-Cities, missed Yakima, missed Portland, missed Wenatchee.

I also question the choice of crossing the Columbia River at Beverly instead of farther south.  It just looks rough to cross a bridge located by a natural wind tunnel, then have to start 20 miles of 2.2% grade.  By crossing farther south they could then follow the natural contours of the ridges off the Saddle Mountains and keep the grade less harsh.  But of course, they chose to utilize Lind Coulee to get from southern Spokane County to the river, and of course they took that course because they chose to cross the Bitterroots at St. Paul Pass instead of Lolo.  If Milwaukee crosses at Lolo, they avoid any steep grades from there all the way to Puget Sound, since Lolo gives them a more southerly latitude.

That kind of stuff.

Since I'm on a roll, I believe in hindsight the best route for Milwaukee, CB&Q, or CNW through Montana to Puget Sound would have been to avoid the Belts and head for Great Falls.  Right there you maintain a Prairie Division profile all the way to Great Falls, and that pesky NP isn't your constant companion.  Then head west/southwest over Cadette or Rogers to Missoula, then over Lolo to the Clearwater River drainage near present day Lowell ID.  That's your primary Mountain Division, Great Falls to Lowell, two passes, roughly 200 miles, and the only time you see another railroad is when you cross over the NP at Missoula.  Then from Lowell you're running water level grade all the way to Benton County in Washington, and if you can't get the Gorge, then head northwest along Umtanum Ridge over the Saddles to Ellensburg (1% grades both ways), and then head over Snoqualmie at 0.7% ruling westbound grade, 1.6% eastbound.  That's your secondary Mountain Division, less grades but more snow to deal with, either way a much better alignment than your competitors NP and GN.

But whatever you do, try to get that North Bank of the Columbia as Priority Number 1.  If you do it'll pay dividends for years to come.

Thank you,Dave.Good overview of Milwaukee's misses.I've been looking over the PCE from Forsyth,Montana to the coast on MSN Live Search (satellite images and such)in 3D.Looks like some changes could have been made with tunnels or even daylighting some areas to reduce or even eliminate curvature and maybe some short sections of grades.Worst choices of all was abandoning the PCE instead of the midwest lines.Looks like Milwaukee Road could have captured a lot of container traffic out of Tacoma and eliminated some capacity issues.

Have a good one.

Bill B

[Murphy Siding]

One of these years, I need to plan a vacation to Montana and Idaho to get the lay of the land.  Sounds like a great place.

ed

It definately looks different than these flat cornfields that you and I are used to looking at.

[MP173]

One of these years, I need to plan a vacation to Montana and Idaho to get the lay of the land.  Sounds like a great place.

ed

[Anonymous]

What exactly do you question in their route choice?

I assume you're refering to my concurrence on the Wikipedia entry in which "some historians" questioned the initial route choice.

Prior to joining this forum, I had several long held views regarding the Milwaukee's route to the Pacific Northwest.  I liked the Snoqualmie Pass section, disdained the Saddle Mountains crossing, and wondered if the north bank of the Columbia Gorge could have been secured if the directors had acted with a little more urgency once the transcon decision was made.  I questioned why the Milwaukee chose to bypass both Spokane and Lewiston, why they chose the St. Paul Pass line over either the Lolo Pass route (used by US Highway 12) to hit Lewiston directly or Lookout Pass and Fourth of July Pass to hit Spokane directly.  Why turn down toward Butte instead of using a shorter route through Helena?  Why didn't they avoid the Belt Mountians altogether by using Rogers Pass via Great Falls?

Well, some of those inquiries were answered by the contributions of forum members, not just Michael but also kenneo and artfbe.  For example, I had no idea that Milwaukee was considering Cadette Pass (just north of Rogers Pass) as a new mainline route to either supplement the Pipestone Pass line or supercede it.  What I still question about this is why go to all the trouble of building via Butte with heavy duty permanent construction?  Why not just build a temp track over Cadette until the longer tunnel could be availed?  A branch line down to Butte to tap the mines would have sufficed, right? 

I also was unaware that Milwaukee had planned a long tunnel underneath St. Paul Pass to reduce the ruling grades from 1.7% both ways to under 1% both ways, as well as eliminate some mileage and curvature.  But again, why the heavy duty permanent construction if the eventual route was intended as a temp line?

Milwaukee built grain branches aplomb in Montana, but seemed to neglect the best grain growing areas of the Palouse in Eastern Washington and North Central Idaho.  Milwaukee also built some branch lines that just seem to defy logic - the line to Port Angeles via car ferry, the branch up the Swan River Valley in Montana, the dead end branch up to Ione Washington, the branch to Hanford WA.  If they had money to build branchlines, why not tap up to Wenatchee and the Big Bend Country of Washington instead of down to Hanford?  Why not build one down into the heart of the Palouse country and down to Lewiston instead of a mostly logging branch to Elk River ID?  Why not build to a connection with one of the Canadian roads instead of dead ending a few miles south of the border?

It just seems on the surface anyway that the Milwaukee didn't take full advantage of "untouched" areas along a logical mainline corridor, areas along the mainline where Milwaukee was either the only game in town or the dominate mainline.  Butte already had NP, UP, and GN; Helena had the NP mainline; and both had to be reached by going through the Belt mountain ranges and the Continental Divide at 5800' to 6500' - meanwhile Great Falls only had a GN branchline at the time, and could have been reached from the east with nary a mountain grade.  Spokane had GN, NP, UP through town, while Lewiston ID had an NP branch from the north and a UP branch from the west, yet Milwaukee chooses to bypass Spokane to the south, thus misses both towns, and just skims the north end of the Palouse grain growing region.  They missed the Tri-Cities, missed Yakima, missed Portland, missed Wenatchee.

I also question the choice of crossing the Columbia River at Beverly instead of farther south.  It just looks rough to cross a bridge located by a natural wind tunnel, then have to start 20 miles of 2.2% grade.  By crossing farther south they could then follow the natural contours of the ridges off the Saddle Mountains and keep the grade less harsh.  But of course, they chose to utilize Lind Coulee to get from southern Spokane County to the river, and of course they took that course because they chose to cross the Bitterroots at St. Paul Pass instead of Lolo.  If Milwaukee crosses at Lolo, they avoid any steep grades from there all the way to Puget Sound, since Lolo gives them a more southerly latitude.

That kind of stuff.

Since I'm on a roll, I believe in hindsight the best route for Milwaukee, CB&Q, or CNW through Montana to Puget Sound would have been to avoid the Belts and head for Great Falls.  Right there you maintain a Prairie Division profile all the way to Great Falls, and that pesky NP isn't your constant companion.  Then head west/southwest over Cadette or Rogers to Missoula, then over Lolo to the Clearwater River drainage near present day Lowell ID.  That's your primary Mountain Division, Great Falls to Lowell, two passes, roughly 200 miles, and the only time you see another railroad is when you cross over the NP at Missoula.  Then from Lowell you're running water level grade all the way to Benton County in Washington, and if you can't get the Gorge, then head northwest along Umtanum Ridge over the Saddles to Ellensburg (1% grades both ways), and then head over Snoqualmie at 0.7% ruling westbound grade, 1.6% eastbound.  That's your secondary Mountain Division, less grades but more snow to deal with, either way a much better alignment than your competitors NP and GN.

But whatever you do, try to get that North Bank of the Columbia as Priority Number 1.  If you do it'll pay dividends for years to come.

[Murphy Siding]

'Oh No! Not Again'-Rod Stewart

Yeah,Bring back the Milwaukee as a Chicago to Tacoma transcon with some of the western(Dakotas to Washington)branchlines(get rid of the midwest lines instead).And go back in time and make BN GN instead(with some changes of maintenance of physical plant and equipment).Sorry,I couldn't help myself.It is all interesting tho.

And what is your first name,futuremodal.I dislike refering to someone by their handle.Seems impersonal to me(no disrespect).

Have a good one.

Bill B

Sorry, I'll have to update my file when I get a chance. 

Dave Smith

Yea,futuremodal, you need a good first name, like "Murphy"

[Anonymous]

'Oh No! Not Again'-Rod Stewart

Yeah,Bring back the Milwaukee as a Chicago to Tacoma transcon with some of the western(Dakotas to Washington)branchlines(get rid of the midwest lines instead).And go back in time and make BN GN instead(with some changes of maintenance of physical plant and equipment).Sorry,I couldn't help myself.It is all interesting tho.

And what is your first name,futuremodal.I dislike refering to someone by their handle.Seems impersonal to me(no disrespect).

Have a good one.

Bill B

Sorry, I'll have to update my file when I get a chance. 

Dave Smith

[ChuckHawkins]

What exactly do you question in their route choice? I know very
little about the western roads. If we question their route choice,
because they missed  certain geographical localities, on what
basis should we do so? Did their 1900 based foresight prove bad, and if
so, when?

I think we attach a little more importance to the PCE
in these discussions based on what we now know about Far East trade.
I'm not sure it would have been very relevant to analysis even in the
60/70s. That wouldn't have been obvious 100 years ago. People knew the
PRB coal was in its location for years but the Clean Air act changed
the nature of the situation in a hurry.