n012944 wrote: You are right. The study was done in 1979, not 1977. Former Southern Railway and future Amtrak boss W.Graham Claytor, who was Acting Secretary of Transportation, had the DOT do the study in the summer of 1979.
You are right. The study was done in 1979, not 1977. Former Southern Railway and future Amtrak boss W.Graham Claytor, who was Acting Secretary of Transportation, had the DOT do the study in the summer of 1979.
What is the name of the study and the date of publication? Who are the authors?
n012944 wrote: MichaelSol wrote: greyhounds wrote:A question is: Why did the PCE have such a small portion of the business when it was operating? According to a tonnage map in March 2005 Trains the ratio was 3:2:1 for BN:UP:MILW. And that's putting the Milwaukee in the best possible light. Toyota historically (say the past 20 years) has had a smaller share of business than GM.But almost always made much more money during that time period at the business than GM.The volume production always favored GM.And that's putting GM in the best possible light.And what does that have to do with the railroads. I don't think that you could say that the MILW was making more money than either the UP or BN, so the comparision has little or no meaning here.Bert
MichaelSol wrote: greyhounds wrote:A question is: Why did the PCE have such a small portion of the business when it was operating? According to a tonnage map in March 2005 Trains the ratio was 3:2:1 for BN:UP:MILW. And that's putting the Milwaukee in the best possible light. Toyota historically (say the past 20 years) has had a smaller share of business than GM.But almost always made much more money during that time period at the business than GM.The volume production always favored GM.And that's putting GM in the best possible light.
greyhounds wrote:A question is: Why did the PCE have such a small portion of the business when it was operating? According to a tonnage map in March 2005 Trains the ratio was 3:2:1 for BN:UP:MILW. And that's putting the Milwaukee in the best possible light.
Toyota historically (say the past 20 years) has had a smaller share of business than GM.
But almost always made much more money during that time period at the business than GM.
The volume production always favored GM.
And that's putting GM in the best possible light.
And what does that have to do with the railroads. I don't think that you could say that the MILW was making more money than either the UP or BN, so the comparision has little or no meaning here.
Bert
Just as volume is irrelevant to financial condition, so are Lines on a map meaningless from a financial perspective.
"3:2:1 for BN:UP:MILW" ... and of course BN was more profitable than UP, right?
Because that's what the little line on the maps says, right? And of course you know that to be true. Right?
And if the Operating Ratios on the ground for the lines involved were 65%, 67% and 82%, you would know exactly which roads those represented?
Right?
And that is because those little lines are a financial tool, right?
Suppose that the little lines on the map in 1967 showed NP 2, GN 2, UP 2. and MILW 1. Why does it only show BN 3, UP 2 and MILW 1 in 1973? Shouldn't it show BN 4? Why did BN lose market share? BN's cost elasticity in that era was about 60%. That meant that for every $1 lost in revenue, it only reduced costs 60 cents. So, compared to BN 4, is BN 3 good ... or bad? Higher OR, or Lower OR? Did BN lose 25%, or did MILW grow 30% according to those little lines on the map?
As with GM and Toyota, production volume, in a vacuum, tells you this about the financial health of a company: zero.
MP173 wrote: If one were contemplating vacationing in Montana...and wanted to mix in fishing, mountains, trains, and scenery, what would be a good starting point? Time of the year best for this?ed
If one were contemplating vacationing in Montana...and wanted to mix in fishing, mountains, trains, and scenery, what would be a good starting point?
Time of the year best for this?
ed
June is good. July is better. I like it hot, and so August is great but problematic if the forest fires have kicked in. Some folks like the extended Fall weather, September and October -- warm days and cool nights. A person could stay at the Yogo Inn in Lewistown (former MILW depot). Lewistown was the former headquarters of the MILW Northern Montana Line, and the center of a web of now-abandoned branch lines, to Winnett, Grass Range, Heath. Travel south to Harlowton and the last MILW Boxcab electric downtown, and the roundhouse is still pretty much intact. Further south to Livingston and visit the NP depot museum and former NP mainline shops.
Go west along the old NP mainline on which MRL still uses helpers over Bozeman Pass and spend the night at Bozeman's Gallatin Gateway Inn (former MILW) -- a magnficently restored railroad hotel. That hotel has elegance all over the place. That one is worth the trip.
The Bozeman MILW freight depot has been preserved by a private business in Bozeman which has carefully kept the Milwaukee colors and logos preserved. Looks like you could walk in the door and order up a freight car. Across the street, the NP freight house has been turned into a neat eatery/bar -- the NP Ale House -- with lots of historical railroad photos.
From there, you can go south to Yellowstone Park and the old Union Pacific station at West Yellowstone, or a short hop west to Butte which contains more history than it can possibly contain, and the junction of the Union Pacific and MRL lines, including the still-in-place but abandoned NP line into Butte, the old GN roundhouse, the NP/BN depot, the Milwaukee depot (a TV station carefully restored) where the upstairs offices still have the MILW official's logos on the doors, such as the division superintendent's office.
The Rarus Railroad operates a little tourist train, sometimes, between Anaconda and Butte, and into the old Butte, Anaconda & Pacific facilities in Anaconda. The annual MILW Retired Employee's Picnic last summer had a ride on it and everyone thought it was just great.
West to Deer Lodge where the only surviving MILW Little Joe electric is on display; the old MILW depot in Missoula as is MRL's headquarters, dispatch center, maintenance facility, turntable, and sorting yard. North to Glacier Park and the Essex Inn which is next to the former GN mainline. You can stay in a caboose if the old hotel is not to your liking. The next day, drop over the Continental Divide and to the Many Glacier Inn -- one of GN's hotels when it was promoting passenger travel to the parks -- at Spotted Robe which has an extensive history and display of GN-related stuff; a premier passenger stop on the old GN.
South to Great Falls parallels the BNSF Central Montana cutoff into Great Falls, where both the GN and MILW depots have undergone restoration. Just for something totally strange, nothing to do with railroading, stay at the O'Hair Motor Inn. There, they have a lounge -- a Tiki Lounge, no less -- called the Sip-N-Dip on the second story of this otherwise pretty basic little hotel and watch through the large plexiglass window behind the bar -- which is a window onto the hotel pool -- as Mermaids and Mermen frolic underwater. These are usually college students who are paid to crawl into big plastic fish tails -- some of them get pretty good swimming with them -- and ogle the bar patrons, doing fish tricks for tips. A Piano player named "Peg" has been playing there for 50 or 60 years -- she's about 80, and will play whatever you want to hear, as long as she feels like playing it.
Cut across to Geraldine, and you could follow the old Milwaukee Northern Montana Line through Arrow Creek and Denton into Lewistown. The current railroad hosts the Charlie Russell Chew Choo, a dinner train. http://www.charlierussellchewchoo.com/schedule.html.
Or from Great Falls you could follow the old GN Central Montana Line through Belt and either end up back at Lewistown, or on to Billings/Laurel where the former CBQ and NP lines met, and where MRL interchanges today with the BNSF.
An "expensive model collector"
MichaelSol wrote: n012944 wrote: billbtrain wrote:Plus the facts that the ICC,FRA,Democrats,Republicans,and the Supreme Court were willing to dump all kinds of money into the midwest,Conrail,and Amtrak,but not save the Milwaukee Road as a transcon system. The US DOT did a study on giving funding to the MILW for the PCE in 1977. It was decided after that study that not another dime of the goverments money should be spent on the PCE. It seems to me that the US DOT might have seen something that made them decide this, regardless of what some in the railfan community might think.BertPlease identify the study.Note that the Milwaukee did not enter receivership until December, 1977, and had not applied for any government funds for the PCE as a separate entity in 1977. If you have a copy, please compare and contrast it with the Booz Allen Hamilton study of May, 1979 which has been described in detail on these forums.
n012944 wrote: billbtrain wrote:Plus the facts that the ICC,FRA,Democrats,Republicans,and the Supreme Court were willing to dump all kinds of money into the midwest,Conrail,and Amtrak,but not save the Milwaukee Road as a transcon system. The US DOT did a study on giving funding to the MILW for the PCE in 1977. It was decided after that study that not another dime of the goverments money should be spent on the PCE. It seems to me that the US DOT might have seen something that made them decide this, regardless of what some in the railfan community might think.Bert
billbtrain wrote:Plus the facts that the ICC,FRA,Democrats,Republicans,and the Supreme Court were willing to dump all kinds of money into the midwest,Conrail,and Amtrak,but not save the Milwaukee Road as a transcon system.
The US DOT did a study on giving funding to the MILW for the PCE in 1977. It was decided after that study that not another dime of the goverments money should be spent on the PCE. It seems to me that the US DOT might have seen something that made them decide this, regardless of what some in the railfan community might think.
Please identify the study.
Note that the Milwaukee did not enter receivership until December, 1977, and had not applied for any government funds for the PCE as a separate entity in 1977.
If you have a copy, please compare and contrast it with the Booz Allen Hamilton study of May, 1979 which has been described in detail on these forums.
Business "analysis" by map.
I looked at that tonnage map.It is dated 1971-73.Then the Milwaukee had an increase in 1976-78 before the decline in 1978-79.I'd like to see a map depicting that.BN and UP had better connections and more resources,MILW had the majority of container traffic coming out of Tacoma/Seattle.Tacoma declined in container traffic after the MILW was gone because of limited capacity,losing business to Long Beach and Portland.
More later,I have to go to work.
Have a good one.
Bill B
billbtrain wrote: I have to agree with Michael Sol that the Milwaukee could again have been a viable railroad.Container traffic out of Tacoma,coal from the Roundup,Montana mines,forest products from Washington,the SP connection at Portland,the connection at the Canadian border,grain from the Dakota's and Montana,etc prove to me that it could have worked.Better than the midwest lines in an area overrun with failing economies and lack of rail customers to keep at least 7 systems going.Plus the facts that the ICC,FRA,Democrats,Republicans,and the Supreme Court were willing to dump all kinds of money into the midwest,Conrail,and Amtrak,but not save the Milwaukee Road as a transcon system.Then you have the Milwaukee Executives deferring maintenance on physical plant and equipment and driving away business,just to prove their statements that the railroad would not/could not/should not make money on its own.Looks to me like a lot of the wrong people in the wrong places.I think they should be put out to pasture and bring back the Milwaukee Road as a transcon.Have a good one.Bill B
I have to agree with Michael Sol that the Milwaukee could again have been a viable railroad.Container traffic out of Tacoma,coal from the Roundup,Montana mines,forest products from Washington,the SP connection at Portland,the connection at the Canadian border,grain from the Dakota's and Montana,etc prove to me that it could have worked.Better than the midwest lines in an area overrun with failing economies and lack of rail customers to keep at least 7 systems going.Plus the facts that the ICC,FRA,Democrats,Republicans,and the Supreme Court were willing to dump all kinds of money into the midwest,Conrail,and Amtrak,but not save the Milwaukee Road as a transcon system.Then you have the Milwaukee Executives deferring maintenance on physical plant and equipment and driving away business,just to prove their statements that the railroad would not/could not/should not make money on its own.Looks to me like a lot of the wrong people in the wrong places.I think they should be put out to pasture and bring back the Milwaukee Road as a transcon.
Well, we disagree. And I think we can have fun disagreeing. Kind of like discussing wether Kolfax or Drysdale had the best curve ball.
A question is: Why did the PCE have such a small portion of the business when it was operating? According to a tonnage map in March 2005 Trains the ratio was 3:2:1 for BN:UP:MILW. And that's putting the Milwaukee in the best possible light.
greyhounds wrote: nanaimo73 wrote: greyhounds wrote: The Milwaukee Road's deceased Pacific Coast Extension is basically the Anna Nicole Smith of this forum. People are fighting over the deceased's remains. Put it in the ground. It's essence is gone from This Earth. Texas or Bahamas. It doesn't matter. Your constant attacks on the Milwaukee Road are the problem. Judging by the Milwaukee's Yahoo group, the CMSP&P must be one of America's most interesting and popular fallen flags. Why do you hate the CMSP&P, is it jealousy or just Michael ?Most of us on the forum have learned a lot from his postings, and I can overlook his attitude. I wish there were NYC, EL and MP versions of Michael on the forum. I'd even like to see a "IC/ICG Michael". Oh, I don't hate the Milwaukee Road. As I pointed out, it would be like hating a corpse.I disagree, based on evidence, that it was a viable or even potentially viable, enterprise. I should be able to say so in a discussion without being personally attacked. I'm not the only one who has been attacked personally by Michael. It seems to be his way of dealing with almost anyone who disagrees with him.I try to ignore it now.I don't think I attack the Milwaukee. Pointing out that it could rarely turn a buck or that its PCE was in 4th place in terms of tonnage to/from the Pacific NW behind the GN line, the NP line and the UP line is not an attack.
nanaimo73 wrote: greyhounds wrote: The Milwaukee Road's deceased Pacific Coast Extension is basically the Anna Nicole Smith of this forum. People are fighting over the deceased's remains. Put it in the ground. It's essence is gone from This Earth. Texas or Bahamas. It doesn't matter. Your constant attacks on the Milwaukee Road are the problem. Judging by the Milwaukee's Yahoo group, the CMSP&P must be one of America's most interesting and popular fallen flags. Why do you hate the CMSP&P, is it jealousy or just Michael ?Most of us on the forum have learned a lot from his postings, and I can overlook his attitude. I wish there were NYC, EL and MP versions of Michael on the forum. I'd even like to see a "IC/ICG Michael".
greyhounds wrote: The Milwaukee Road's deceased Pacific Coast Extension is basically the Anna Nicole Smith of this forum. People are fighting over the deceased's remains. Put it in the ground. It's essence is gone from This Earth. Texas or Bahamas. It doesn't matter.
The Milwaukee Road's deceased Pacific Coast Extension is basically the Anna Nicole Smith of this forum. People are fighting over the deceased's remains.
Put it in the ground. It's essence is gone from This Earth. Texas or Bahamas. It doesn't matter.
Your constant attacks on the Milwaukee Road are the problem. Judging by the Milwaukee's Yahoo group, the CMSP&P must be one of America's most interesting and popular fallen flags. Why do you hate the CMSP&P, is it jealousy or just Michael ?
Most of us on the forum have learned a lot from his postings, and I can overlook his attitude. I wish there were NYC, EL and MP versions of Michael on the forum. I'd even like to see a "IC/ICG Michael".
Oh, I don't hate the Milwaukee Road. As I pointed out, it would be like hating a corpse.
I disagree, based on evidence, that it was a viable or even potentially viable, enterprise. I should be able to say so in a discussion without being personally attacked. I'm not the only one who has been attacked personally by Michael. It seems to be his way of dealing with almost anyone who disagrees with him.
I try to ignore it now.
I don't think I attack the Milwaukee. Pointing out that it could rarely turn a buck or that its PCE was in 4th place in terms of tonnage to/from the Pacific NW behind the GN line, the NP line and the UP line is not an attack.
I like that attitude. Enjoy your vacation.
Say a believing and thoughtful prayer. Remember with love. Continue your own life with joy and not bitterness. For that too, will end soon enough.
billbtrain wrote: What were there for industry shipping on the Milwaukee Road's PCE? For instance,what amount did U.S.Gypsum ship out of Heath,Montana? Thanks.
What were there for industry shipping on the Milwaukee Road's PCE? For instance,what amount did U.S.Gypsum ship out of Heath,Montana? Thanks.
Historically, MILW PCE was forest products, mining, import/export, ag.
US Gypsum shipped between 1950 and 1977 between $1 million and $300,000 of wallboard transportation revenue. Something around a 1,000 carloads annually, typically. Not bad for a little 9 mile spur line in the middle of nowhere.
Just happened to notice, while looking that up on my "Revenue Study" that in 1977, Lines West generated the same amount of revenue per mile of line as Lines East -- $91,257 vs. $91,883. A typical Lines West employee, however, generated $82,980 in revenue, while Lines East generated $59,844 per employee. LW, 139% of the productivity of LE. I doubt that said anything about the employees, but rather about the system efficiency involved.
Let's keep this thread going.
I believe in the time line of Durnat Canyon between Butte and Finlen it was mostly MILW steam beneath BA&P 2400v DC trolley. By the time the MILW 3000v DC locos were in use the MILW had constructed it's own line through the canyon.
I think Noel Holley's Milwaukee Electrics book does mention the heavier MILW electrics using the BA&P voltages through the canyon for a time, though. The MILW would not want to stick with that for any length of time since there is a rising grade eastbound through the canyon and limiting the voltage and electrical capacity would limit the tonnage through the canyon.
UPDATE: From Charlie Mutschler's book "Wired for Success" covering the BA&P we have the following time line.
The Milw leased trackage rights on the BA&P between Colorado Jct. (Butte) to Cliff Jct. (Finlen) from 1908 to Dec 1914. The BA&P was electrified by 10/13 and the first regular electrics west of Butte on the MILW in regualr service were in December 1915.
That would seemingly make MILW electrics under BA&P catenary possible though not a regular occurance.
BUTTE routing: Though Butte was served by the BA&P, NP, GN and UP by the time the MILW moved westward none of these lines were mainlines. The NP was the closest to having thru service and indeed their passenger trains were through trains like the MILW's. Freight was a different story. All other railroads needed to make a connection with freight traffic but the MILW was a straight pick up in either direction. The NP only had an 11 mile connection for westbound freight but eastbound loads had to go over the Pass to Logan. GN loads east were not too bad but westbound loads had to go north east to Great Falls before being routed to the west. The UP had to take loads in either direction a long way south over a helper grade before they could be sent in the proper direction. If nothing else the MILW could claim bragging rights for the only mainline in Butte and people in Butte have always been protective of their primary position in Montana economics and politics. You really have to know some Buttians and understand Butte politics to understand how the MILW would appeal to travelers and shippers from Silver Bow county.
futuremodal wrote: Were the two systems totally incompatable then, or could the 2.4k BA&P locos also utilize the Milwaukee 3k wires on that portion from Butte to Finlen?
Were the two systems totally incompatable then, or could the 2.4k BA&P locos also utilize the Milwaukee 3k wires on that portion from Butte to Finlen?
There was an interlock where the two wires crossed at Butte. Once in a while something would stick and the BA&P locomotives would suddenly be raring up and jumping all over the place. "Hi Ho Silver and away" ... with a 6,000 ton ore train in tow. Dangerous situation to be placing a 3000 volt DC feed into a 2400 volt system. Not a lot of room in those little BA&P locos for 3000 volts to be hunting for a way out.
MILW could run just fine off the 2400 vDC, but capacity was a problem. Two Joes, or their earlier counterparts, would swallow the whole BA&P system and probably take it down. Plus, the MILW needed a continuous 3000 vDC trolley between Morel and Janney Substations as Morel was part of the power block that fed the bottom half of the Butte Hill.
futuremodal wrote: MichaelSol wrote: Once electrification proved it's worth, was any thought given to "short cutting" parts of the line e.g. eliminating some of the reverse curves/loop tracks on Pipestone Pass and/or St. Paul Pass with shorter but steeper grades? Would there have been that much difference (on how it affected the tracks and rolling stock) between a 1.7/2.0% grade and say a 3% or 4% grade with the 3k electrification? I take it that the longer St. Paul Pass tunnel proposal lost some of it's urgency once electrification established it's superiority over traditional steam, but did that necessarily negate the desire to reduce overall mileage of the PCE (which the longer, lower St. Paul Pass tunnel and realignment projected would have accomplised)?
MichaelSol wrote:
Once electrification proved it's worth, was any thought given to "short cutting" parts of the line e.g. eliminating some of the reverse curves/loop tracks on Pipestone Pass and/or St. Paul Pass with shorter but steeper grades? Would there have been that much difference (on how it affected the tracks and rolling stock) between a 1.7/2.0% grade and say a 3% or 4% grade with the 3k electrification?
I take it that the longer St. Paul Pass tunnel proposal lost some of it's urgency once electrification established it's superiority over traditional steam, but did that necessarily negate the desire to reduce overall mileage of the PCE (which the longer, lower St. Paul Pass tunnel and realignment projected would have accomplised)?
Well, the amount of energy required was still the same to move the tonnage -- the electrification was just more powerful and efficient. Doubling up the grade would have removed many of the benefits of the electrification.
The St. Paul Tunnel bypass at Bryson was probably just an internal rate of return question -- at what point could it be justified? According to BN engineering, the Cascade Tunnel generated a negative rate of return from day one, and will for all time; a bad idea, just Ralph Budd's effort to be just as much an Empire Bulder as the old man. The Bryson bypass may have just never generated the return necessary -- especially with the electrification in place.
In essence, the efficiency of the electrification increased the economic hurdle necessary to justify alignment changes.
futuremodal wrote: MichaelSol wrote: Well, the first two surveys, after the Northern Securities decision was handed down in 1901, went only to Butte. That was the entire focus.So Butte was sort of a point of reference between the plains division and the Pacific Coast division?By the way, when was the Cadotte Pass line first proposed for the Milwaukee? Was it after the PCE was completed?
MichaelSol wrote: Well, the first two surveys, after the Northern Securities decision was handed down in 1901, went only to Butte. That was the entire focus.
Well, the first two surveys, after the Northern Securities decision was handed down in 1901, went only to Butte. That was the entire focus.
So Butte was sort of a point of reference between the plains division and the Pacific Coast division?
By the way, when was the Cadotte Pass line first proposed for the Milwaukee? Was it after the PCE was completed?
I think Butte represented what the Standard Oil Company thought was the most important destination between the Twin Cities and Seattle.
My notes on Cadotte Pass are as follows:
"As early as 1906, Milwaukee surveyors had purportedly run surveys that took the Milwaukee mainline from Melstone and not towards the south, to Butte, but northwest to Lewistown, Great Falls, and Missoula.1 By 1909, Company surveyors in the Blackfoot River country seemed to confirm a Great Falls line that would provide a shorter route through Montana than the southern line through Butte.2"
I also note that prior to the Cadotte survey, "Milwaukee's idea of a second, northerly mainline through Kalispell to Spokane ran into difficulties. Surveys up the Teton River were proving unsatisfactory. Survey parties spent "all summer" 1912 in the mountains east and west of Kalispell, searching for a line from the Sun River through Kalispell to Libby.1 They were unable to find a line that gave them easier grades than Pipestone Pass."
By the way, when was the Cadette Pass line first proposed for the Milwaukee? Was it after the PCE was completed?
By 1905, I think they understood that electrification was so advantageous that route was almost secondary -- that comparisons with other roads from a traditional route -- as opposed to technological -- perspective were bound to underestimate the technological advantage that Milwaukee had until June 16, 1974.
The Milwaukee did purchase a one-half interest in the BA&P (from James J. Hill) and did, in fact, use the BA&P rails from Butte to Finlen. They built their own line through Silver Bow canyon in 1914 when the impending 3,000 vDC electrification made continued operation under the BA&P 2,400 vDC catenary infeasible.
n012944 wrote: A couple of things to add. For the ICC to grant permission for the "NewMil" to buy the PCE, the "NewMil" would have had to meet five validity tests: 1. can the "NewMil" be funded2. is it fair to the creditors of the MILW3. can it be put into effect by 4/1/804. does it incorporate management-labor agreements to boost productivity5. will it be selfsustaining.The US DOT told the ICC that the only "test" that the "NewMil" could pass was number 3, it could be up and ready to run by 4/1/80. The DOT thought that the "NewMil" faced a cash shortfall of over 600 Million dollars over the next five years. On 12/31/1979 the ICC voted in a 7-0 decision that the "NewMil" would work.
1. can the "NewMil" be funded
2. is it fair to the creditors of the MILW
3. can it be put into effect by 4/1/80
4. does it incorporate management-labor agreements to boost productivity
5. will it be selfsustaining.
The US DOT told the ICC that the only "test" that the "NewMil" could pass was number 3, it could be up and ready to run by 4/1/80. The DOT thought that the "NewMil" faced a cash shortfall of over 600 Million dollars over the next five years. On 12/31/1979 the ICC voted in a 7-0 decision that the "NewMil" would work.
My notes state as follows:
"On December 16, the ICC held hearings, and on December 31, found that the plan was not feasible because of a lack of financing, over-optimistic traffic assessments, under-estimation of the costs and time factors involved in rehabilitating the Milwaukee Road's western lines, and underestimation of the costs involved in acquiring the necessary equipment to operate the system. In addition, the ICC found that the NewMil plan would leave the old Milwaukee with most of the debt of the Company, and take $533 million worth of assets out of the old Company's estate, which would be an impermissible taking from the shareholders and creditors. 1 "The Commission has determined that NewMil's plan lacks adequate financing, is not fair and equitable to the Milwaukee estate, and does not propose a railroad that can be operated on a self-sustaining basis," the ICC said. The decision was 7-0.2"
The decision ranged from the ridiculous to the ludicrous. It was the typical case of looking for a variety of rationalizations to prop up their decision. Particularly in the context that this was one of two plans being submitted at the same time to the ICC, the other being the Trustee's. No one supported the Trustee's plan. The ICC had determined that NewMil could not obtain financing. NewMil already had the financing committed from SeaFirst Bank and Lazard Freres. The ICC thought the plan would not be fair to creditors -- yet the major creditors supported the plan. The rehabilitation plan had been worked out in conjunction with two of the best railway engineers in the country. "Most" of the debt would remain with the "old" company as would "most" of the assets. The Commission criticized the lack of a management-labor agreement before there was a management to negotiate an agreement! The ICC made up the $533 million figure out of thin air. Indeed, in most instances, contrary to accepted practice, the ICC did not rely on expert testimony for its conclusions.
Ultimately, the weight of the opinion was the finding of the lack of ability to operate on a self-sustaining basis -- the revenue adequacy standard by which, thirty years later, most railroads have not met -- 30 years apparently not representing "self-sustaining."
Railroads continue to just barely hang on by the standards that the ICC turned down the NewMil proposal.
MichaelSol wrote: Murphy Siding wrote: Fair enough answer. Let me rephrase the question then. Why were they not able to buy the PCE?The ICC, led by Chairman Darius Gaskins, determined that the proposal offered a rate of return of 10.6% whereas the ICC's annual determination of "revenue adequacy" would have required an 11% rate of return -- which only two railroads in the country were earning at the time -- the first time that the standard had been applied to a railroad in receivership, and which has rarely been met by the most highly successful railroads -- "roaring successes" you might hear -- since that time.The ICC also noted that the Trustee had actively been driving away business on the west end, and that his actions had compromised the ability of any new system to operate. At the same time, the ICC flatly rejected the Trustee's plan for reorgnization as unrealistic and unworkable. It was an interesting spectacle -- the ICC noted that the Trustee had actively interferred with providing rail service, and had offered a non-starter of a reorganization plan, but at the end of the day, had to leave him in charge because it had no authority over him.Later, as President of the Burlington Northern, Gaskins pondered that it had been "a difficult decision."Indeed, if anyone wants an example of ICC incompetence, in the name of revenue adequacy, the ICC rejected a proposed highly profitable road, and defaulted to an ultimate railroad reorganization that promised no rate of return at all. This thread stands for the proposition that there is a strong sentiment of conventional wisdom that argues that the outcome made perfect sense.So, yes, it was a government decision that throttled a private initiative.
Murphy Siding wrote: Fair enough answer. Let me rephrase the question then. Why were they not able to buy the PCE?
The ICC, led by Chairman Darius Gaskins, determined that the proposal offered a rate of return of 10.6% whereas the ICC's annual determination of "revenue adequacy" would have required an 11% rate of return -- which only two railroads in the country were earning at the time -- the first time that the standard had been applied to a railroad in receivership, and which has rarely been met by the most highly successful railroads -- "roaring successes" you might hear -- since that time.
The ICC also noted that the Trustee had actively been driving away business on the west end, and that his actions had compromised the ability of any new system to operate. At the same time, the ICC flatly rejected the Trustee's plan for reorgnization as unrealistic and unworkable. It was an interesting spectacle -- the ICC noted that the Trustee had actively interferred with providing rail service, and had offered a non-starter of a reorganization plan, but at the end of the day, had to leave him in charge because it had no authority over him.
Later, as President of the Burlington Northern, Gaskins pondered that it had been "a difficult decision."
Indeed, if anyone wants an example of ICC incompetence, in the name of revenue adequacy, the ICC rejected a proposed highly profitable road, and defaulted to an ultimate railroad reorganization that promised no rate of return at all. This thread stands for the proposition that there is a strong sentiment of conventional wisdom that argues that the outcome made perfect sense.
So, yes, it was a government decision that throttled a private initiative.
A couple of things to add. For the ICC to grant permission for the "NewMil" to buy the PCE, the "NewMil" would have had to meet five validity tests:
The US DOT told the ICC that the only "test" that the "NewMil" could pass was number 3, it could be up and ready to run by 4/1/80. The DOT thought that the "NewMil" faced a cash shortfall of over 600 Million dollars over the next five years. On 12/31/1979 the ICC voted in a 7-0 decision that the "NewMil" would not work.
Murphy Siding wrote: Once this proposal was shot down, was there no turning back?
Once this proposal was shot down, was there no turning back?
The States of South Dakota and Montana stepped forward, which would have preserved the entire line to Marengo, Washington, and BN was looking at purchasing the remainder of the line to Black River Junction.
In essence, this was a second round of additional entities interested in buying the PCE, and additional efforts to preserve the entire line.
Montana, in particular, looked to a federal loan to assist in its efforts, and the agency handling the loan -- USDA -- had virtually approved it.
Then, President Jimmy Carter's staff interceded and told Montana Governor Tom Judge that, since Carter wasn't going to win Montana, which was leaning heavily to Ronald Reagan, "the White House" needed to put federal money where it might "do some good" in the upcoming presidential election. Montana's efforts were shot down.
By that time, the big shippers that had been supporting the PCE even in its darkest, slowest hours -- Cargill, Chrysler, Potlatch, Weyerhauser, Toyota, GM, Champion International, Montana Power Co., Continental Grain, etc. -- began to drift away. It's strong connections with the SP and the British Columbia roads were beginning to fail. It's heavy traffic at Ports of Seattle, Tacoma, Longview and Portland was eroding quickly. The Trustee's continuing denial of service was taking its toll.
Never has a financial outcome depended so thoroughly upon a completely unrelated and thoroughly cynical political manipulation of the federal budget to obtain a partisan objective.
MichaelSol wrote: Murphy Siding wrote: Fair enough answer. Let me rephrase the question then. Why were they not able to buy the PCE?The ICC, led by Chairman Darius Gaskins, determined that the proposal offered a rate of return of 10.6% whereas the ICC's annual determination of "revenue adequacy" would have required an 11% rate of return -- which only two railroads in the country were earning at the time -- the first time that the standard had been applied to a railroad in receivership, and which has rarely been met by the most highly successful railroads -- "roaring successes" you might hear -- since that time.Later, as President of the Burlington Northern, Gaskins pondered that it had been "a difficult decision."So, yes, it was a government decision throttled a private initiative.
So, yes, it was a government decision throttled a private initiative.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
MP173 wrote: By all accounts by the end the ROW was a mess and it would have required enormous investment to get it back in order.
By all accounts by the end the ROW was a mess and it would have required enormous investment to get it back in order.
Several studies were done for rehab requirements. The FRA hired the former Chief of Engineering of the B&O, and other agencies hired the retired Chief Engineer of the Southern Pacific. One estimate for rehab of the mainline west of the Twin Cities was $53 million; the other estimate, for mainlines west of Miles City was $51 million.
The highest cost estimate was about $36,000 per mile. Tom Dyer thought it might be as low as $32,000 per mile. The estimates, by senior engineers in the profession, independently arrived at, were surprisingly close. Neither one had any incentive to low-ball their estimates, siince neither was initially hired by by parties associated with preservation effects; rather, to the contrary.
Contrast those estimates with the MILW line, Chicago/Twin Cities, which engineering estimates pegged at $252,000 per mile to rehab with 4R money -- and they got the money! You can conclude that the Chicago mainline was in much, much worse shape ... or that the condition of the PCE mainline was highly exagerated, highly. The rehabilitation of the old NP line over Stampede Pass was on the order of several million dollars per mile of line. Indeed, that short BN project cost more than double the entire cost estimate for the entire PCE mainline -- and they didn't even get stack capacity out of the project. That just shows how bad off that PCE mainline must have really been!
You might wonder why that misnomer exists, and is even perpetuated by some to this day.
The record was very well developed on that point.
In railroad terms, the cost was not "enormous" and certainly not compared with the cost of the other end of the system. I have yet to see anyone complain that the Lines East rehab cost was "enormous."
Compared to the nearly $400 million in extra revenue generated by the Gateways condition alone, the Lines West rehab was indeed "pocket change."
MichaelSol wrote: Murphy Siding wrote:I guess people keep asking that question, because it never seems to have been answered. If the PCE was the sure fire deal that you say it was, why didn't someone, anyone, snatch it up? The purchase of the East End, just to keep it out of someone else's hands makes sense. The fact that no one wanted to buy the PCE, and give BN a run for their money, doesn't make much sense. Why was that?A corporation was formed as a consortium of shippers, employees and government agencies. It was specifically given a preference by Congress over any other applicant that might attempt to purchase the line. They made a formal application to the ICC to purchase. They intervened in the bankruptcy proceeding. They obtained the financing committments from private lenders to undertake the project -- something the Trustee had been unable to do. They had pro forma projections and an operating and rehabilitation plan in place. They had the support of Milwaukee's creditors and bankers. They "wanted to buy the PCE." I don't know how to make that any clearer."The fact that no one wanted to buy the PCE ... doesn't make much sense" only if you ignore the fact that someone did want to buy it. And for some reason, you are. Why?
Murphy Siding wrote:I guess people keep asking that question, because it never seems to have been answered. If the PCE was the sure fire deal that you say it was, why didn't someone, anyone, snatch it up? The purchase of the East End, just to keep it out of someone else's hands makes sense. The fact that no one wanted to buy the PCE, and give BN a run for their money, doesn't make much sense. Why was that?
A corporation was formed as a consortium of shippers, employees and government agencies. It was specifically given a preference by Congress over any other applicant that might attempt to purchase the line. They made a formal application to the ICC to purchase. They intervened in the bankruptcy proceeding. They obtained the financing committments from private lenders to undertake the project -- something the Trustee had been unable to do. They had pro forma projections and an operating and rehabilitation plan in place. They had the support of Milwaukee's creditors and bankers.
They "wanted to buy the PCE." I don't know how to make that any clearer.
"The fact that no one wanted to buy the PCE ... doesn't make much sense" only if you ignore the fact that someone did want to buy it. And for some reason, you are. Why?
Ken:I am not an accountant but have a basic understanding of accounting and financial reporting. I believe you can determine whether a division of a railroad, or a factory or just about any entity of a larger company is "profitable".
The challenge is to properly allocate revenue and expenses accordingly and finally the overhead costs. No doubt a railroad would know what it's costs are, not only overall, but by division. Revenue would generally be allocated based on miles, plus pickup/delivery charges and any terminal expenses at intermediate yards.
Perhaps we have accountants here that can address this a bit better than me.
I am not a spokesman for the MILW crowd, but I would think that if their traffic density was at a reasonable level that line should have been profitable. Not by running 1 train each way daily, but if they were running 8-10/day with the majority of the freight being long haul (1000 miles) or so,with the carload rates quoted above ($1400 from Montana, $2k from the coast), that would be an attractive situation.
Now, the problems would have developed when the company allowed the ROW to fall to the levels that occured. Schedules couldnt be met, derailments cost $$$ and costs generally rose.
Why didnt anyone buy at the end? Why would then? By all accounts by the end the ROW was a mess and it would have required enormous investment to get it back in order. BN had two routes to PNW and UP had theirs. They knew their traffic was going to increase due to the 8-10 trains a day that vaporized. In fact by then I am sure the trains were down to a much lower frequency/day. Buying and rehabbing would have been a lot of $$ and considerable risk. Plenty of routes to the PNW existed at the time, just not enough business.
I am sure I will be corrected if any of the assumptions are incorrect.
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