1960 to 1970: what the heck happened?

[Datafever]

So, I think we've established that the economy of the 1970's had nothing to do with the Penn Central collapse or the other Northeast railroad bankruptices that brought on the much needed and benificial deregulation. 

As a side note, you bring up an interesting point.  I don't know for sure, but it appears that it was the eastern railroads that had the majority of the problems in the 70's (60's) as far as bankruptcies were concerned.  If that is so, why were the eastern railroads more heavily impacted than the western railroads?

[greyhounds]

So, I think we've established that the economy of the 1970's had nothing to do with the Penn Central collapse or the other Northeast railroad bankruptices that brought on the much needed and benificial deregulation. 

 

 

 

[billbtrain]

GN, NP and CBQ were taking on water during the 1960s as well. Their merger saved their bacon. 

Along those lines -

I know that you have mentioned many times the "diseconomies of scale" that have resulted from railroad mergers.  In what way was the BN merger a boon for the railroads involved? 

GN,NP,and CB&Q were doing ok during the late 1960's.They struggled thru the early and mid 60's due to a recession.The BN merger allowed all three to eliminate duplicate facilities in the Twin Cities area and eliminate the interchange hassle there and in the Billings-Laurel area as well.Another advantage for the merged system was that the coal companies were knocking on BN's door the day after the merger was consumated.CB&Q would have in no way been able to handle that boom on it's own.Yes BN struggled thru the 1970's with the coal boom and need to replace locomotives and freight cars and rebuild track structure(especially along the CB&Q).Great Northern was in good shape at the time of the merger,having no Federally funded land grants to pay back(remember that what land grants GN had were from the state of Minnesota included in the original charter of the Minnesota & Pacific in 1852).Northern Pacific was doing well in spite of it's land grants and poor,meandering route.Chicago,Burlington & Quincy would have been in trouble along with the other granger roads had the merger not intervened.Coal was the CB&Q's only savior.The big problem that all three had to deal with was the same problem all the railroads had at that time:Passenger Service and the inability to be rid of it.Now I will say that GN's management failed to follow thru on Jim Hill's practice of growing the territory served by the railroad as did all railroads in spite of the claims about the ICC.I believe GN would have been in better shape had Hill's philosiphies(sp?) been followed no matter the time period.

Penn Central was in trouble from the start with opposing management teams and then being saddled with the New Haven(in trouble itself long before PC due to passenger service).The PC failure came at a bad time,just 4 months after the BN merger which made investors take a step back from railroad stocks at that time.Then you had the CRI&P failure due to bad management and ICC's failure to make a timely decision about the UP and SP breaking it up between them.

So that's what I see as the railroad's problems in the 70's.Passenger service,Bad management,and too much regulation by an inefficient government entity(ICC).

Have a good one.

Bill B

[erikem]

We are not used to the idea in our current lifetimes, but the American economy, post-Civil War was a deflationary economy. Rates declined all during that period. Historian Gabriel Kolko documented how the origins of the ICC Act lay with the railroads themselves asking the government to regulate "destructive competition" and plummeting rates. The Panic of 1893 brought down more railway mileage than any time before or since -- an occurence related more to general economic conditions than regulation or deregulation but due in part to the corrosive effects of deflation on organizations that required substantial capitalization.

 

If you're talking about a geneal deflationary period, then  you're right in that the American economy hasn't experienced anything like it in the ast 100 years. On the other hand the electronics industry has been in a prolonged deflationary period for several decades. The reasons for this are very similar to what was behind the post Civil war deflationary period, a prolonged period of dramatically improving labor productivity. Railroad labor producitvity was increasing from larger locomotives, standard guage, air brakes and automatic couplers. In addition, the rapid axpansion of the economy was increasing utilization of the lines that had been built.

I remember George Hilton asserting in the late 1960's that the ICC was originally set up as a cartelizing agency to prevent destructive competition. It wasn't till later (e.g the Hepburn Act) that the ICC's mission was amended to include
regulating rates. The adverse effect of state and federal regulation wasn't really felt until WW1, where fares and rates were often kept at pre-war levels despite labor costs being twice pre-war levels - and this pretty much killed off the traction industry in the US.

 The major construction projects after the finish of the WP and the CM&StP's PCE were for areas with developed traffic and were dramatic cost reductions could be obtianed (e.g. GN's Cascade tunnel). It would have been interesting to have seen what other projects would have been built if money wasn't so tight ca 1910 (e.g the Cadotte Pass line).

[MichaelSol]

Your thesis is on the verge of saying that deregulation was completely irrelevant to how railroads fared financially.  It's an extreme thesis you're arguing, and you know it.

Sol: "... to this idea that regulation explains every failure, and deregulation explains every success: baloney. It's more complicated in both directions."

You mischaracterize my comments.

And I don't see Toyota mentioned on this thread at all.

 

[Anonymous]

Railroads respond as other industries do to general economic conditions -- and regulation is blamed in one instance, and deregulation cheered in the other -- even though the results track almost identically the performance of capital-intensive deregulated industries under both circumstances.

To suggest that the reason that regulated railroads suffered the same fate as other capital intensive but deregulated industries under identical economic conditions was because railroads were regulated is simply a non-sequitur. It does not, cannot, follow from the premise.

This to me represents a "Belief System," not a genuine analysis of either regulation or deregulation.

 

A "belief system?"  A lack of "genuine analysis?"  Come now, Sol.  You know there is data, and you know there are "genuine" history books that empirically demonstrate that during the economically prosperous 1950's and 1960's, railroads were in decline while their deregulated competitors were experiencing growth.  Who is being irrational? Your thesis is on the verge of saying that deregulation was completely irrelevant to how railroads fared financially.  It's an extreme thesis you're arguing, and you know it. 

One problem with your thesis is its premise that railroad performance tracks the performance of the nationwide economy.  I think railroads are so large and have so much inertia that an economic shock like a nation-wide recession won't really be noticable on the railroad until maybe ten years down the road when the deferred maintenance that took place during the recession finally catches up to them.  Thus, there is a response lag.

Another problem with your thesis is its premise that one business is like any other.  How can you compare the Burlington Northern with Toyota and come to any meaningful conclusion?  A railroad mainline is not an auto assembly line.

I think you're arguing extreme views to test them out, to mine the knowlege available here on the forum to proof them.  I don't think you really believe most of what you argue.

 

[MichaelSol]

I can think of at least three Fortune 500 Companies--not counting asbestos-related companies and airlines--that filed for bankruptcy during this time, and I am a long way from being knowledgeable about such things. 

Yes, outside of the heavy industries we have been discussing, there was a "bubble" and it burst -- especially upon the telecom and energy companies  -- ironically, newly deregulated.  

[Datafever]

GN, NP and CBQ were taking on water during the 1960s as well. Their merger saved their bacon. 

Along those lines -

I know that you have mentioned many times the "diseconomies of scale" that have resulted from railroad mergers.  In what way was the BN merger a boon for the railroads involved? 

[MichaelSol]

Nope,  Penn Central (aka, "The Big One") went under in the 60's ...

June 21, 1970

Well, greyhounds does have a point there.  If PC hadn't been taking in water during the 60's, it wouldn't have gone under when it did. 

Neither regulation nor deregulation is insurance against poor management, changing industrial patterns, nor a dumb idea writ large. 

GN, NP and CBQ were taking on water during the 1960s as well. Their merger saved their bacon. 

The moral of their stories: probably didn't have much to do with regulation, since that common element cannot explain diametrically opposed outcomes.

 

[MichaelSol]

You seem to be off topic here.  The subject is not the 70's.  (read the thread title) It's the decade preceeding that lead to the financial collapse of much of the US railroad network.

Ouch.  Kind of a backwards point there, greyhounds.  Gabe makes it very clear in his initial post that he is saying that the 60's were a time that the railroads "made it", while they failed in the 70's.  While the groundwork for failure may have been set up in the 60's (or not), it was the 70's that the failures occurred.

Nope,  Penn Central (aka, "The Big One") went under in the 60's and its predicessors had been going downhill for a long time before that.   As others have said, it took a long time to destroy the New York Central and Pennsylvania.  They were financially sick in economically good times. 

Most industries and companies go through lean times - but then they get good times.  The regulators never let the railroads prosper. 

And the title of the thread is "1960 to 1970".

And Gabe clearly stated:

But, most importantly, you have yet to answer the initial question of this thread.  Why did the rail industry collapse in the 70s when it did not during other recessions, panics, or economic slow downs?

 

[Datafever]

Nope,  Penn Central (aka, "The Big One") went under in the 60's ...

June 21, 1970

Well, greyhounds does have a point there.  If PC hadn't been taking in water during the 60's, it wouldn't have gone under when it did. 

[MichaelSol]

You seem to be off topic here.  The subject is not the 70's.  (read the thread title) It's the decade preceeding that lead to the financial collapse of much of the US railroad network.

Ouch.  Kind of a backwards point there, greyhounds.  Gabe makes it very clear in his initial post that he is saying that the 60's were a time that the railroads "made it", while they failed in the 70's.  While the groundwork for failure may have been set up in the 60's (or not), it was the 70's that the failures occurred.

Nope,  Penn Central (aka, "The Big One") went under in the 60's ...

June 21, 1970

[Datafever]

You seem to be off topic here.  The subject is not the 70's.  (read the thread title) It's the decade preceeding that lead to the financial collapse of much of the US railroad network.

Ouch.  Kind of a backwards point there, greyhounds.  Gabe makes it very clear in his initial post that he is saying that the 60's were a time that the railroads "made it", while they failed in the 70's.  While the groundwork for failure may have been set up in the 60's (or not), it was the 70's that the failures occurred.

Nope,  Penn Central (aka, "The Big One") went under in the 60's and its predicessors had been going downhill for a long time before that. 

I'm not disagreeing with you on that.  I was taking objection to your statement that Mr. Sol's response was off-topic.

Granted my pool of knowledge is small, but my knowledge of the Illinois Central, Nickle Platte, Southern Pacific, and a few other railroads indicate that--although I would not describe the 1960s as a boom of rail traffic--rail lines seemed healthy and sustainable.  But, by the 1970s, it looked like every rail line was heading for a two mile run off a one mile pier.

 

[MichaelSol]

A point made in a vacuum. And that's the only way that point can be made.

Look around. Is nearly all American business healthier than in the 1970s? Do you really, really think that when businesses failed in all directions -- and it included railroads -- and that when businesses enjoyed record success in all directions -- and it also included railroads -- that regulation/deregulation is a better explanation than documented general economic conditions?

 

You seem to be off topic here.  The subject is not the 70's.  (read the thread title) It's the decade preceeding that lead to the financial collapse of much of the US railroad network.

Had the 70s not occured, and instead prosperity had ensued, most likely the dire results for railroading would not have occured.  That is my contribution -- the premise is insupportable that anything that happened during the 1960s to railroading led to unique and independent results during the 1970s that were different than the economy as a whole -- because it wasn't.

The problem with the "regulation" argument is that it absolves the industry of responsibility for its own mistakes. Something GM, Ford, Chrysler, Lockheed, IH and others did not have the luxury of doing when they suffered the identical results financially during the 1970s.

Identical results -- completely different premises. Doesn't fly. The "reality" is that the railroads' "collapse" in the 1970s was because the railroads collapsed in the 1970s.

The point of the "70s" shows, clearly, that both regulated and deregulated industries respond to economic conditions, and that regulation had little to do with the "collapse" because the identical circumstances enveloped non-regulated industries which were free to innovate, invest, buy trucking companies, and do whatever they **** well pleased. And they collapsed just the same as railroads. Therefore, regulation was not the cause of collapse. QED.

Railroads made some mistakes. Big ones. Regulation has always been the foil. Why not? It's the standard refuge of the irresponsible to blame something else.  

[greyhounds]

You seem to be off topic here.  The subject is not the 70's.  (read the thread title) It's the decade preceeding that lead to the financial collapse of much of the US railroad network.

Ouch.  Kind of a backwards point there, greyhounds.  Gabe makes it very clear in his initial post that he is saying that the 60's were a time that the railroads "made it", while they failed in the 70's.  While the groundwork for failure may have been set up in the 60's (or not), it was the 70's that the failures occurred.

Nope,  Penn Central (aka, "The Big One") went under in the 60's and its predicessors had been going downhill for a long time before that.   As others have said, it took a long time to destroy the New York Central and Pennsylvania.  They were financially sick in economically good times.  Edit:  Missed it by six months - PC filed bankruptcy in June 1970.

Most industries and companies go through lean times - but then they get good times.  The regulators never let the railroads prosper. 

And the title of the thread is "1960 to 1970".

[Datafever]

The absense of economic regulation does not gurantee success, but its presence sure prevented the railroads from adapting to rapidly changing market condiditons.    Since they were not allowed to adapt, they died.

I will agree that the lack of ability to adapt (regardless of regulatory restrictions) was a large contributor to the industry meltdown.  The same would also apply to many of the other mega-corporations that failed.  Large corporations are just not able to adapt as quickly as the smaller ones are.  And sometimes it just happens to be entire industries (regardless of size of individual companies) that get caught up in the inability to adapt. 

[Datafever]

You seem to be off topic here.  The subject is not the 70's.  (read the thread title) It's the decade preceeding that lead to the financial collapse of much of the US railroad network.

Ouch.  Kind of a backwards point there, greyhounds.  Gabe makes it very clear in his initial post that he is saying that the 60's were a time that the railroads "made it", while they failed in the 70's.  While the groundwork for failure may have been set up in the 60's (or not), it was the 70's that the failures occurred.

[greyhounds]

A point made in a vacuum. And that's the only way that point can be made.

Look around. Is nearly all American business healthier than in the 1970s? Do you really, really think that when businesses failed in all directions -- and it included railroads -- and that when businesses enjoyed record success in all directions -- and it also included railroads -- that regulation/deregulation is a better explanation than documented general economic conditions?

 

You seem to be off topic here.  The subject is not the 70's.  (read the thread title) It's the decade preceeding that lead to the financial collapse of much of the US railroad network.

When Ford, GM, etc. were doing just fine in the 60's, a large part of the railroad industry was being strangled by economic regulation. 

The absense of economic regulation does not gurantee success, but its presence sure prevented the railroads from adapting to rapidly changing market condiditons.    Since they were not allowed to adapt, they died.

[MichaelSol]

By the way are you suggesting that the less regulated trucking industry suffered during the last recession!?! 

 I didn't say anything about trucking. Make your own conclusions, but please don't put words in my mouth.

But, most importantly, you have yet to answer the initial question of this thread.  Why did the rail industry collapse in the 70s when it did not during other recessions, panics, or economic slow downs?

Well, you have stated your own premise -- that similar "collapses" have never occured.

When you posit a controlled condition that presupposes your desired conclusion, I guess that conclusion is inevitable and you are unlikely to recognize the alternative that more miles of railroad were in receivership in 1895 than in 1975. More miles of railroad were in receivership in 1935 than in 1975. Oh wait, that's not an alternative -- that's actually true! But, since you have already determined that similar collapses have never happened, relevant history is simply irrelevant to what you wish to conclude.

Your ahistorical approach also begs the question -- why did the auto industry collapse in the 1970s when it did not during other recessions, panics, or economic slowdowns?  Why did key players in aircraft manufacturing collapse in the 1970s when they did not during other recessions, panics, or economic slowdowns? What happened to the steel industry that literally muscled its way through earlier recessions? 

I haven't answered your question? Please read the earlier comment: "High capital industries got clobbered -- legacy physical plants? Change in business climate? Inflation? Unions? Wage and price controls? Soaring taxes? "Japan, Inc."? Skyrocketing fuel costs? Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, and yes."

But, you propose that regulation was, instead, the culprit.

I think that represents an incurable optimism about the impact of general economic conditions. 

I propose that the economy was the problem. Regulation may or may not have been a burden -- but your question was not the general proposition but rather, what happened to railroads in the 1970s.

Admittedly, you imposed a premise on your question -- a pre-arranged and I think erroneous set of facts -- proposing that such a collapse never happened before. Dramatic, but the assumption is insupportable. However, if that particular assumption is necessary to support some observation or conclusion about regulation and deregulation, I can only assume you will make the conclusion your assumptions have made inevitable.

<> If you look to the 1970s and see the traumatic effects of the general economic environment on business throughout the economy, then attempt to ascribe the identical trauma suffered by railroads to a completely different cause, it simply does not pass the Occam's Razor test.

Rates, if you wish to be confused on the matter, were at historic highs by 1979; substantially higher we are enthusiastically reminded, than post-Staggers.

Railroad revenue, if you wish a context, was the greatest in industry history in 1979, substantially higher, we are not so loudly told, than post-Staggers.

 

 

 

<>

[Kevin C. Smith]

My understanding of the Hepburn Act is the "tip of the iceberg". There were enough other things that went wrong, too, no doubt. The Hepburn Act slowed (pratically froze) rates in the middle of a time of huge capital investments.

....

Vastly oversimplified, I know.

Not just oversimplified. This is dead wrong.

Where do you read that railroad rates were rising during that era? The answer is fundamental to your entire proposition.

You're right. I was thinking along the lines of the difficulties that were encountered in the 1910 (date?) rate hearings. Good point-even though they couldn't increase rate the way that was asked for just removing the volatility and general downward pressure on rates (in real terms) must have been helpful. Thanks for clarifying.

[gabe]

I can think of at least three Fortune 500 Companies--not counting asbestos-related companies and airlines--that filed for bankruptcy during this time, and I am a long way from being knowledgeable about such things.  I can think of several more that were on the ropes and taking serious hits.

By the way are you suggesting that the less regulated trucking industry suffered during the last recession!?! 

But, most importantly, you have yet to answer the initial question of this thread.  Why did the rail industry collapse in the 70s when it did not during other recessions, panics, or economic slow downs?  Yes, lines failed during such times in the past, but the sky was not falling in the past like it was during the 70s?

Gabe

[Anonymous]

Is this book informative ?

"A History of the ICC, From Panacea to Palliative," Ari and Olive Hoogenboom, W.W. Norton & Company, 1976

Yes.

Better yet, but hard to find, is the ICC's own 2-volume history of itself, as it delineates all the key dates of decisions, authorities, etc.

S. Hadid

[MichaelSol]

Well, how many miles are in receivership now? Getting rid of the suffocating, restrictive, counter productive, economic regulation seems to have gotten rid of the problem.

Except for airlines. Apparently deregulation is not a panacea ... oh gosh, Ford's in trouble too ... to this idea that regulation explains every failure, and deregulation explains every success: baloney. It's more complicated in both directions.

Well he confined his comments to railroads ("how many miles are in receivership now").  And he does have a point, which is the health of the railroads today.

A point made in a vacuum. And that's the only way that point can be made.

Look around. Is nearly all American business healthier than in the 1970s? Do you really, really think that when businesses failed in all directions -- and it included railroads -- and that when businesses enjoyed record success in all directions -- and it also included railroads -- that regulation/deregulation is a better explanation than documented general economic conditions?

 

Yes, very much so, and I think that is Greyhounds' point.

When the economy has natural crests and nadirs, the ability of unchackeled management to make decisions in reaction to the natural ebb and flow of the economy--which by no means was limited to the rise of economic activity surrounding the Korean War or the decline of economic activity during the 70s--is essential for an industry to both survive and prosper.   This is especially true when that industry is competing with another industry that does have such freedoms and is being indirectly subsidized out of the general fund.

Gabe

P.S.  How many lines went under in the most recent recession?

Well, how many other Fortune 500s went under?

Interesting how this is viewed -- through a prism of preordained conclusions.

Railroads respond as other industries do to general economic conditions -- and regulation is blamed in one instance, and deregulation cheered in the other -- even though the results track almost identically the performance of capital-intensive deregulated industries under both circumstances.

To suggest that the reason that regulated railroads suffered the same fate as other capital intensive but deregulated industries under identical economic conditions was because railroads were regulated is simply a non-sequitur. It does not, cannot, follow from the premise.

This to me represents a "Belief System," not a genuine analysis of either regulation or deregulation.

<>  

[gabe]

Well, how many miles are in receivership now? Getting rid of the suffocating, restrictive, counter productive, economic regulation seems to have gotten rid of the problem.

Except for airlines. Apparently deregulation is not a panacea ... oh gosh, Ford's in trouble too ... to this idea that regulation explains every failure, and deregulation explains every success: baloney. It's more complicated in both directions.

Well he confined his comments to railroads ("how many miles are in receivership now").  And he does have a point, which is the health of the railroads today.

A point made in a vacuum. And that's the only way that point can be made.

Look around. Is nearly all American business healthier than in the 1970s? Do you really, really think that when businesses failed in all directions -- and it included railroads -- and that when businesses enjoyed record success in all directions -- and it also included railroads -- that regulation/deregulation is a better explanation than documented general economic conditions?

 

Yes, very much so, and I think that is Greyhounds' point.

When the economy has natural crests and nadirs, the ability of unchackeled management to make decisions in reaction to the natural ebb and flow of the economy--which by no means was limited to the rise of economic activity surrounding the Korean War or the decline of economic activity during the 70s--is essential for an industry to both survive and prosper.   This is especially true when that industry is competing with another industry that does have such freedoms and is being indirectly subsidized out of the general fund.

Gabe

P.S.  How many lines went under in the most recent recession?

[nanaimo73]

Is this book informative ?

"A History of the ICC, From Panacea to Palliative," Ari and Olive Hoogenboom, W.W. Norton & Company, 1976

[MichaelSol]

Michael-

Did Mr Derleth cover the Hepburn Act in much detail in his 1948 book ? Were his views of its effect on the CM&StP similar to yours ?

August Derleth was a Poet and a writer of Gothic Mysteries. Apparently he felt well prepared to write about the Milwaukee Road.

From his notes, Company notes, and the records of his publisher, Creative Age Press, I see that "his views" were primarily those of F. H. Johnson, Milwaukee Director of Public Relations.

In turn, Johnson's views were no doubt strongly influenced by his background at the Burlington, from whence he came, and by Charlie Buford, a Milwaukee VP who at the time was President of the American Association of Railroads.

Without going back to read Derleth, I can bet we don't agree.

 

[MichaelSol]

My understanding of the Hepburn Act is the "tip of the iceberg". There were enough other things that went wrong, too, no doubt. The Hepburn Act slowed (pratically froze) rates in the middle of a time of huge capital investments.

....

Vastly oversimplified, I know.

Not just oversimplified. This is dead wrong.

Where do you read that railroad rates were rising during that era? The answer is fundamental to your entire proposition.

We are not used to the idea in our current lifetimes, but the American economy, post-Civil War was a deflationary economy. Rates declined all during that period. Historian Gabriel Kolko documented how the origins of the ICC Act lay with the railroads themselves asking the government to regulate "destructive competition" and plummeting rates. The Panic of 1893 brought down more railway mileage than any time before or since -- an occurence related more to general economic conditions than regulation or deregulation but due in part to the corrosive effects of deflation on organizations that required substantial capitalization.

But, what does a "Panic" do to price pressure? It pushes them down. Even for railroads.

Now, what happened after the passage of the Hepburn Act? Well, the Panic of 1907, the most severe in some estimations of any aside from the Great Depression itself.

What happened to railroad rates after the passage of the Hepburn Act?

They continued a decline that had been occuring for a half century. And they also did what prices do when economic depressions occur. There is absolutely nothing remarkable about what happened. To the contrary -- what happened should have happened based on economic principles, not a regulatory event.

You say the Hepburn Act "froze" rates. If actually true, that would have been a huge plus. If true, railroads should have bowed in homage to the Hepburn Act. Railoads would have loved to have the rates "frozen" for the first time in their history.

Indeed, the only thing that should cause anyone to sit up and take notice is if somehow the Hepburn Act had repealed the general rate conditions which had always been one of decline.

What is remarkable is the effort, entirely misleading I think, to attribute prices that were clearly and manifestly the result of general economic conditions to some favorite "evil" regulatory boogeyman. To believe that, however, requires the complete suspension of general economic principles, or to adopt a belief that railroads operate independently of them. 

 

[nanaimo73]

Michael-

Did Mr Derleth cover the Hepburn Act in much detail in his 1948 book ? Were his views of its effect on the CM&StP similar to yours ?

[MichaelSol]

Well, how many miles are in receivership now? Getting rid of the suffocating, restrictive, counter productive, economic regulation seems to have gotten rid of the problem.

Except for airlines. Apparently deregulation is not a panacea ... oh gosh, Ford's in trouble too ... to this idea that regulation explains every failure, and deregulation explains every success: baloney. It's more complicated in both directions.

Well he confined his comments to railroads ("how many miles are in receivership now").  And he does have a point, which is the health of the railroads today.

A point made in a vacuum. And that's the only way that point can be made.

Look around. Is nearly all American business healthier than in the 1970s? Do you really, really think that when businesses failed in all directions -- and it included railroads -- and that when businesses enjoyed record success in all directions -- and it also included railroads -- that regulation/deregulation is a better explanation than documented general economic conditions?

 

[MP173]

Great thread.  Glad to see everyone back.  There sure was a flurry of activity late yesterday.  I guess we all had enough Christmas and was ready to resume the great discussion.

Now, I am going to add this to the "what went wrong list"...the forced inclusion of the New Haven into the Penn Central merger.  Looking back, PC had a very slim chance of success, but that chance was completely whisked away with the addition of the New Haven.

I have read several books on this topic including Saunder's two "Merging" volumes.  Also I read "The Men Who Loved Trains."

What other books would you suggest as the required reading of this topic?

ed