QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol QUOTE: Originally posted by edblysard You crack me up... "from 1986 to 1991" As if that has a single thing to do with what happens this year, or the next. You need to up date your flash cards some. And what is wrong with railroads, as a business taking advantage of the growth in the American economy? So import and container traffic grew, and railroads jumped on it, one of them encourages it by opening office at the origin country of most of it...that’s wrong? PRB coal is in demand; railroads built joint lines and drag as much of the stuff out of there as possible, and you slam them for that? "From 1986 to 1991"...and so? QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol QUOTE: Originally posted by Character The question is, how many of the railroad's projectionos managed to keep what was a struggling industry at the time going forward. The answer is that railroads did fine once they were able to shrug off the wet blanket of ICC pricing regulation. The average rate of return of American railroads 1981-1986 after deregulation was below the average rate of return, 1979-1980, just prior to deregulation. The average rate of return in the years 1986 and 1991 was worse than in 1965, or worse even than the average rate of return earned during the Great Depression. Of course, you would know that already, being all heavily involved and all. The state of the American economy, energy demand, and import/export has had far, far more to do with railroads "coming out of it" than anything that regulatory policy has done. Since I cannot locate in my remarks anywhere that I "slammed" railroads for hauling coal out of the PRB, nor anything else in the response that even makes sense regarding what I said, I will just have to leave the "response" in its natural state of incomprehensibility.
QUOTE: Originally posted by edblysard You crack me up... "from 1986 to 1991" As if that has a single thing to do with what happens this year, or the next. You need to up date your flash cards some. And what is wrong with railroads, as a business taking advantage of the growth in the American economy? So import and container traffic grew, and railroads jumped on it, one of them encourages it by opening office at the origin country of most of it...that’s wrong? PRB coal is in demand; railroads built joint lines and drag as much of the stuff out of there as possible, and you slam them for that? "From 1986 to 1991"...and so? QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol QUOTE: Originally posted by Character The question is, how many of the railroad's projectionos managed to keep what was a struggling industry at the time going forward. The answer is that railroads did fine once they were able to shrug off the wet blanket of ICC pricing regulation. The average rate of return of American railroads 1981-1986 after deregulation was below the average rate of return, 1979-1980, just prior to deregulation. The average rate of return in the years 1986 and 1991 was worse than in 1965, or worse even than the average rate of return earned during the Great Depression. Of course, you would know that already, being all heavily involved and all. The state of the American economy, energy demand, and import/export has had far, far more to do with railroads "coming out of it" than anything that regulatory policy has done.
QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol QUOTE: Originally posted by Character The question is, how many of the railroad's projectionos managed to keep what was a struggling industry at the time going forward. The answer is that railroads did fine once they were able to shrug off the wet blanket of ICC pricing regulation. The average rate of return of American railroads 1981-1986 after deregulation was below the average rate of return, 1979-1980, just prior to deregulation. The average rate of return in the years 1986 and 1991 was worse than in 1965, or worse even than the average rate of return earned during the Great Depression. Of course, you would know that already, being all heavily involved and all. The state of the American economy, energy demand, and import/export has had far, far more to do with railroads "coming out of it" than anything that regulatory policy has done.
QUOTE: Originally posted by Character The question is, how many of the railroad's projectionos managed to keep what was a struggling industry at the time going forward. The answer is that railroads did fine once they were able to shrug off the wet blanket of ICC pricing regulation.
An "expensive model collector"
QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl Did they buy enough stock to have a significant say in the direction the railroad was going with expansion in the PRB?
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QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl So Odyssey Partners guided the Milwaukee Road into a highly profitable, major artery for coal traffic out of the Powder River Basin by investing heavily in track upgrades? Or did they go belly up? Well, as one Partner put it, paraphrasing, "our view, and Milwaukee management's view, were two completely different world views." As I am sure -- absolutely sure -- you understand, the bankruptcy petition took control of the company out of the hands of its investors and essentially placed it entirely in the hands of management and the Federal District Court. So Odyssey Partners were the "kiss of death" for the Milwaukee Road? Or didn't they buy into it deep enough to make a difference? Which is what put them into bankruptcy proceedings in the first place. ? Not sure what you are saying here. Maybe you don't either. Stock is usually purchased from other stockholders. You don't buy stock directly from a company unless there is a new stock issue. Odyssey didn't put anything directly into Milwaukee, they bought other people's stock on the open market.
QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl So Odyssey Partners guided the Milwaukee Road into a highly profitable, major artery for coal traffic out of the Powder River Basin by investing heavily in track upgrades? Or did they go belly up? Well, as one Partner put it, paraphrasing, "our view, and Milwaukee management's view, were two completely different world views." As I am sure -- absolutely sure -- you understand, the bankruptcy petition took control of the company out of the hands of its investors and essentially placed it entirely in the hands of management and the Federal District Court. So Odyssey Partners were the "kiss of death" for the Milwaukee Road? Or didn't they buy into it deep enough to make a difference? Which is what put them into bankruptcy proceedings in the first place.
QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl So Odyssey Partners guided the Milwaukee Road into a highly profitable, major artery for coal traffic out of the Powder River Basin by investing heavily in track upgrades? Or did they go belly up? Well, as one Partner put it, paraphrasing, "our view, and Milwaukee management's view, were two completely different world views." As I am sure -- absolutely sure -- you understand, the bankruptcy petition took control of the company out of the hands of its investors and essentially placed it entirely in the hands of management and the Federal District Court.
QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl So Odyssey Partners guided the Milwaukee Road into a highly profitable, major artery for coal traffic out of the Powder River Basin by investing heavily in track upgrades? Or did they go belly up?
QUOTE: Originally posted by Charactr I have simply brought the light of reality into your little railfan dreamworld. Indeed, if anyone is misrepresenting himself it is you, who repeatedly imply that they worked for a railroad that is conveniently dissolved and gone and that you have all sorts of high level connections that you won't specify. Who is lying now Mikey???
QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol QUOTE: Originally posted by Character Oh, and since I've actually worked for railroads and know how decisions are made, I'd say my testimony can trump your voodoo economics any day... Hiding behind a fake name, alleging you are an attorney in violation of the Rules of Professional Responsibility, you attempt to throw your "claimed" weight around far too much -- and substitute it far too readily for informed discussion -- to convince me you know anything at all. This one is a good example. "We were wrong, but therefore we were right. They were right, but therefore they were wrong. Their foresight was better than our foresight, so we will call their foresight hindsight, and our hindsight foresight." Wait a minute, I do know attorneys like that ....
QUOTE: Originally posted by Character Oh, and since I've actually worked for railroads and know how decisions are made, I'd say my testimony can trump your voodoo economics any day...
QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol QUOTE: Originally posted by Character QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol QUOTE: Originally posted by jeaton Interesting that the lines on the "I would have saved them" list might have provided some relief for handling the huge shift in the movement of consumer goods from domestic manufacturing origins to west coast ports. I would like to see the 1980 prediction of that shift. Maybe coal is different? As late as 1989, no one anywhere in the coal business was forecasting the growth of Powder River Basin coal production to any where near to today's levels. I have here the Port of Seattle studies from 1975-1980 that predicted just about exactly the growth of intermodal import export that actually occured over the 30 year projections involved. When Odyssey Partners bought into Milwaukee Road, they relied on US Department of Energy projections that showed that Powder River coal use was going to explode, and was in fact already exploding between 1974 and 1980. The problem with your arguments here is that you would have to argue that the people and agencies that did, in fact, accurately predict the growth, were somehow wrong, even though their projections were right on the mark. Wonderful to use 20/20 hindsight to justify your arguments of today. Unfortunately, the time frames you are speaking of were prior to the EPA regs favoring low sulphur coal and although government projections may have been out there, such research is notoriously inaccurate. Even today customer projections themselves, which should be much more accurate than abstract government generalizations are often 50% or more off the mark. No responsible management deploys assets based upon such vague information. That would result in lengthy class action litigation by shareholders. The projections, by definition, were foresight, not hindsight. What you are saying is that even though the projections were accurate, they should be discounted, and railroad projections which were obviously inaccurate, should be granted great weight. That would be interesting testimony in the class action suit.
QUOTE: Originally posted by Character QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol QUOTE: Originally posted by jeaton Interesting that the lines on the "I would have saved them" list might have provided some relief for handling the huge shift in the movement of consumer goods from domestic manufacturing origins to west coast ports. I would like to see the 1980 prediction of that shift. Maybe coal is different? As late as 1989, no one anywhere in the coal business was forecasting the growth of Powder River Basin coal production to any where near to today's levels. I have here the Port of Seattle studies from 1975-1980 that predicted just about exactly the growth of intermodal import export that actually occured over the 30 year projections involved. When Odyssey Partners bought into Milwaukee Road, they relied on US Department of Energy projections that showed that Powder River coal use was going to explode, and was in fact already exploding between 1974 and 1980. The problem with your arguments here is that you would have to argue that the people and agencies that did, in fact, accurately predict the growth, were somehow wrong, even though their projections were right on the mark. Wonderful to use 20/20 hindsight to justify your arguments of today. Unfortunately, the time frames you are speaking of were prior to the EPA regs favoring low sulphur coal and although government projections may have been out there, such research is notoriously inaccurate. Even today customer projections themselves, which should be much more accurate than abstract government generalizations are often 50% or more off the mark. No responsible management deploys assets based upon such vague information. That would result in lengthy class action litigation by shareholders.
QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol QUOTE: Originally posted by jeaton Interesting that the lines on the "I would have saved them" list might have provided some relief for handling the huge shift in the movement of consumer goods from domestic manufacturing origins to west coast ports. I would like to see the 1980 prediction of that shift. Maybe coal is different? As late as 1989, no one anywhere in the coal business was forecasting the growth of Powder River Basin coal production to any where near to today's levels. I have here the Port of Seattle studies from 1975-1980 that predicted just about exactly the growth of intermodal import export that actually occured over the 30 year projections involved. When Odyssey Partners bought into Milwaukee Road, they relied on US Department of Energy projections that showed that Powder River coal use was going to explode, and was in fact already exploding between 1974 and 1980. The problem with your arguments here is that you would have to argue that the people and agencies that did, in fact, accurately predict the growth, were somehow wrong, even though their projections were right on the mark.
QUOTE: Originally posted by jeaton Interesting that the lines on the "I would have saved them" list might have provided some relief for handling the huge shift in the movement of consumer goods from domestic manufacturing origins to west coast ports. I would like to see the 1980 prediction of that shift. Maybe coal is different? As late as 1989, no one anywhere in the coal business was forecasting the growth of Powder River Basin coal production to any where near to today's levels.
QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal The cost of keeping rails in place is a fraction of what it costs to rebuild an abandoned line or build a whole new line. Keeping a line mothballed for 20 or 30 years is much less costly than having to rebuild that line after abandonment. But again, you're talking about a cost to a railroad that doesn't have enough money to pay the bills for the part that is operating. And the idea that you'll need a given line in 20 or 30 years is pure speculation. When your company is teetering on bankruptcy, you can't afford to speculate. So were all the railroads teetering on bankruptcy when they engaged in whole hearted retrenchment? No, but they were all lacking that crystal ball that told them which lines to keep, and which one to pitch. So, they did the only thing that anyone (you included) would have done. They analized current traffic, and predictable future business. They did what they felt was correct at the time, based on what they knew at the time-the same as you, or any other person would have had to do. To suggest otherwise, isn't quite realistic. Back to a question Dave avoided in the past: Which lines, slated for abandonment today will be the heavy mainlines 20 or 30 years from now? "Will be" or "could be"? The latter is the salient way to present the question, since the former is a pure guessing game. Here's the proper way to ask that question: Which lines either abandoned or possibly slated for abandonment could concievably become heavy duty mainlines in the future if preserved/rebuilt? And I have answered this before, but here we go again (with the terse version) UP's Modoc line BNSF's Havre-Great Falls line BNSF's Great Falls-Helena line BNSF's ex-SP&S line The entire PCE The ex-Cowboy line The ex-GN Sandpoint to Spokane The ex CSP Jaype line The ex-GN Helena-Butte line The ex-UP Weiser-New Meadows line The ex-UP Burns (OR) line The ex-UP Twin Falls - Wells line The Tennesee Pass line The ex-SF Prescott line Thanks Dave! I agree with you 100%. You just proved my point![:D] Of course. it's a pure guessing game. It was when the railroads had to make those decisions too. It is unrealistic to believe that the railroads could have *guessed* any better then, than you would be able to *guess* now. Neither had/has a crystal ball.[V]
QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal The cost of keeping rails in place is a fraction of what it costs to rebuild an abandoned line or build a whole new line. Keeping a line mothballed for 20 or 30 years is much less costly than having to rebuild that line after abandonment. But again, you're talking about a cost to a railroad that doesn't have enough money to pay the bills for the part that is operating. And the idea that you'll need a given line in 20 or 30 years is pure speculation. When your company is teetering on bankruptcy, you can't afford to speculate. So were all the railroads teetering on bankruptcy when they engaged in whole hearted retrenchment? No, but they were all lacking that crystal ball that told them which lines to keep, and which one to pitch. So, they did the only thing that anyone (you included) would have done. They analized current traffic, and predictable future business. They did what they felt was correct at the time, based on what they knew at the time-the same as you, or any other person would have had to do. To suggest otherwise, isn't quite realistic. Back to a question Dave avoided in the past: Which lines, slated for abandonment today will be the heavy mainlines 20 or 30 years from now? "Will be" or "could be"? The latter is the salient way to present the question, since the former is a pure guessing game. Here's the proper way to ask that question: Which lines either abandoned or possibly slated for abandonment could concievably become heavy duty mainlines in the future if preserved/rebuilt? And I have answered this before, but here we go again (with the terse version) UP's Modoc line BNSF's Havre-Great Falls line BNSF's Great Falls-Helena line BNSF's ex-SP&S line The entire PCE The ex-Cowboy line The ex-GN Sandpoint to Spokane The ex CSP Jaype line The ex-GN Helena-Butte line The ex-UP Weiser-New Meadows line The ex-UP Burns (OR) line The ex-UP Twin Falls - Wells line The Tennesee Pass line The ex-SF Prescott line
QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal The cost of keeping rails in place is a fraction of what it costs to rebuild an abandoned line or build a whole new line. Keeping a line mothballed for 20 or 30 years is much less costly than having to rebuild that line after abandonment. But again, you're talking about a cost to a railroad that doesn't have enough money to pay the bills for the part that is operating. And the idea that you'll need a given line in 20 or 30 years is pure speculation. When your company is teetering on bankruptcy, you can't afford to speculate. So were all the railroads teetering on bankruptcy when they engaged in whole hearted retrenchment? No, but they were all lacking that crystal ball that told them which lines to keep, and which one to pitch. So, they did the only thing that anyone (you included) would have done. They analized current traffic, and predictable future business. They did what they felt was correct at the time, based on what they knew at the time-the same as you, or any other person would have had to do. To suggest otherwise, isn't quite realistic. Back to a question Dave avoided in the past: Which lines, slated for abandonment today will be the heavy mainlines 20 or 30 years from now?
QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal The cost of keeping rails in place is a fraction of what it costs to rebuild an abandoned line or build a whole new line. Keeping a line mothballed for 20 or 30 years is much less costly than having to rebuild that line after abandonment. But again, you're talking about a cost to a railroad that doesn't have enough money to pay the bills for the part that is operating. And the idea that you'll need a given line in 20 or 30 years is pure speculation. When your company is teetering on bankruptcy, you can't afford to speculate. So were all the railroads teetering on bankruptcy when they engaged in whole hearted retrenchment? No, but they were all lacking that crystal ball that told them which lines to keep, and which one to pitch. So, they did the only thing that anyone (you included) would have done. They analized current traffic, and predictable future business. They did what they felt was correct at the time, based on what they knew at the time-the same as you, or any other person would have had to do. To suggest otherwise, isn't quite realistic.
QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal The cost of keeping rails in place is a fraction of what it costs to rebuild an abandoned line or build a whole new line. Keeping a line mothballed for 20 or 30 years is much less costly than having to rebuild that line after abandonment. But again, you're talking about a cost to a railroad that doesn't have enough money to pay the bills for the part that is operating. And the idea that you'll need a given line in 20 or 30 years is pure speculation. When your company is teetering on bankruptcy, you can't afford to speculate. So were all the railroads teetering on bankruptcy when they engaged in whole hearted retrenchment?
QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal The cost of keeping rails in place is a fraction of what it costs to rebuild an abandoned line or build a whole new line. Keeping a line mothballed for 20 or 30 years is much less costly than having to rebuild that line after abandonment. But again, you're talking about a cost to a railroad that doesn't have enough money to pay the bills for the part that is operating. And the idea that you'll need a given line in 20 or 30 years is pure speculation. When your company is teetering on bankruptcy, you can't afford to speculate.
QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal The cost of keeping rails in place is a fraction of what it costs to rebuild an abandoned line or build a whole new line. Keeping a line mothballed for 20 or 30 years is much less costly than having to rebuild that line after abandonment.
QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal The cost of keeping rails in place is a fraction of what it costs to rebuild an abandoned line or build a whole new line. Keeping a line mothballed for 20 or 30 years is much less costly than having to rebuild that line after abandonment. But again, you're talking about a cost to a railroad that doesn't have enough money to pay the bills for the part that is operating. And the idea that you'll need a given line in 20 or 30 years is pure speculation. When your company is teetering on bankruptcy, you can't afford to speculate. So were all the railroads teetering on bankruptcy when they engaged in whole hearted retrenchment? No, but they were all lacking that crystal ball that told them which lines to keep, and which one to pitch. So, they did the only thing that anyone (you included) would have done. They analized current traffic, and predictable future business. They did what they felt was correct at the time, based on what they knew at the time-the same as you, or any other person would have had to do. To suggest otherwise, isn't quite realistic. So how is it the railroads all got it so wrong, while every other freight transportation mode got it right and continued to expand and accumulate assets?
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
"We have met the enemy and he is us." Pogo Possum "We have met the anemone... and he is Russ." Bucky Katt "Prediction is very difficult, especially if it's about the future." Niels Bohr, Nobel laureate in physics
QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal The cost of keeping rails in place is a fraction of what it costs to rebuild an abandoned line or build a whole new line. Keeping a line mothballed for 20 or 30 years is much less costly than having to rebuild that line after abandonment. But again, you're talking about a cost to a railroad that doesn't have enough money to pay the bills for the part that is operating. And the idea that you'll need a given line in 20 or 30 years is pure speculation. When your company is teetering on bankruptcy, you can't afford to speculate. So were all the railroads teetering on bankruptcy when they engaged in whole hearted retrenchment? No, but they were all lacking that crystal ball that told them which lines to keep, and which one to pitch. So, they did the only thing that anyone (you included) would have done. They analized current traffic, and predictable future business. They did what they felt was correct at the time, based on what they knew at the time-the same as you, or any other person would have had to do. To suggest otherwise, isn't quite realistic. So how is it the railroads all got it so wrong, while every other freight transportation mode got it right and continued to expand and accumulate assets? Because, they had something the other modes didn't have-miles and miles of excess trackage, in the wrong place, costing money; which the ICC would not let them get rid of fast enough.
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