Railroads Struggle to Deliver Coal to Utilities

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Mookie

Dave - I am never coy. I am sweet at times, but never coy. But I admit in print - I am completely out of my league on 99% of the postings on this forum. And this is no exception. It is just that when you want to attack someone, you do it immediately. When I ask a question, it gets kicked to the curb for awhile.

I can't take long, convoluted explanations. I need short and simple answers. Little bits and bytes at a time.

Can you do that? I have no agenda - frankly as long as the trains run in my area, I don't care if they haul cow poop. But I do question items from time to time and a short two sentence answer would suffice.

I will treat you like a gentleman as long as you treat me like a lady. If you don't, then the reflection will be on you, not me.

Mookie

Fine with me. In return, I would ask that you don't "pull a Murphy" and chime in with the usual suspects when the next insult barrage begins.

[TomDiehl]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl
It still sounds like we're saying the same thing.

Well, maybe we are, I can't tell.

But I'm sure Dave got a good laugh out of it. [:D]

[n012944]

QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal

QUOTE: Originally posted by Mookie

I think my coal car got dumped!

Don't be so coy. Just come right out and say what you mean.

You took a generalization whence this thread got sidetracked, aka capacity reductions/asset liquidation, took us down a more specific aspect of capacity reduction aka abandoned lines, then tried to tie the one to the topic title.

Now, has anyone alleged that railroads abandoned lines to functioning coal mines or coal deposits? No, but you seem to think so.

The capacity issue is more than abandoned lines. It is also reduction of double track and sidings. When it all gets put together, what you end up with is the loss of the secondary mains, and that's where the asset reduction tact by the railroads has cost them the capacity to get that coal from the mines to the power plants.

And wouldn't you think that since the quantity of coal being transported is under contract, the railroads assumed beforehand that they could get the coal to the plants without delay? Did they not expect the traffic growth in intermodal. Don't the boys in the coal hauling division ever talk to the guys in the intermodal division? After all, they all use the same trackage.

Or perhaps they knew they didn't have the necessary capacity to haul the quantity contracted, but hey, if they can't make their deliveries, what are those captive customers going to do? They ain't goin anywhere, so they can take it or leave it. We have the monopoly, we don't have to perform.

So we are back to the armchair quarterbacking 30 years later. Its amazing how easy that is, isn't it.

Bert

[n012944]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Mookie

Dave - I will treat you like a gentleman

Mookie

Why?

[Mookie]

Dave - I am never coy. I am sweet at times, but never coy. But I admit in print - I am completely out of my league on 99% of the postings on this forum. And this is no exception. It is just that when you want to attack someone, you do it immediately. When I ask a question, it gets kicked to the curb for awhile.

I can't take long, convoluted explanations. I need short and simple answers. Little bits and bytes at a time.

Can you do that? I have no agenda - frankly as long as the trains run in my area, I don't care if they haul cow poop. But I do question items from time to time and a short two sentence answer would suffice.

I will treat you like a gentleman as long as you treat me like a lady. If you don't, then the reflection will be on you, not me.

Mookie

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by idhull

I think we are assuming that all the decisions to abandon/dispose rail lines have been made in the distant past. This process to abandon certain rail lines that one would think are part of the basic network has continued even in recent years. Railroads can make certain routes look uneconomic simply by shifting bridge traffic to a different route. IJust because a route does not originate or terminate loads does not mean that it has no utility or makes an economic contribution to the railway in particular or the transportation system in general.
I am just waiting for the day when a factory closes by an Interstate and someone says we must abandon a segement of the Interstate because it is now uneconomic. This is the reason why countries such as the UK and Sweden have separated the rail infrastructure from the operating company. Unfortunately the cost of doing this in North America is prohibitively expensive. We also use different measures of cost, utility, efficiency and profitability for different, not only for different modes but also for different segments within the mode ( ie. frieght vs passenger) which makes rational comparison difficult.

Very good point. Much of abandonment wasn't driven by losses, but rather the "idea" that more profits could be extracted by loading up on key routes.

There is somewhat of both a manufacturing analogy and an engineering analogy to that approach. A well designed machine tends to operate well within certain operating parameters. Engines would be good examples, but any manufacturing process machine would be as well. A manager can consolidate the work of two machines working at 45% capacity, thinking he will save money. Yet, it is conceivable that a single machine always worked at 90% or more will simply fail and not do the job at all.

I recall a conversation with a truck engine engineer, not specifically, but to the effect that, "at 3000-4500 rpm this engine can run just about contnuously and go 500,000 miles. At 6,000 rpm, it will last about a day or two."

A rough analogy, but nevertheless, the study that would, to me, be interesting would look at the increased maintenance cost of loading a line to near "capacity," coupled with the efficiency losses/costs in terms of equipment expense, labor, fuel resulting from increased congestion and slower overall movement of trains.

Would a track at 90% of capacity really be more economical than two tracks at 45% capacity?

What I have seen in bits and pieces is "suggestive" that maintenance costs go up faster than the increase in tonnage, and cycle time studies seem to suggest that the operating cost increases far outstrip maintenance savings of the second line. On the other hand, studies that propose such consolidation almost always show, in convincing detail, the opposite. Not sure where the truth is there, and I haven't seen the conclusive study that looks at the whole picture.

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Mookie

I think my coal car got dumped!

Don't be so coy. Just come right out and say what you mean.

You took a generalization whence this thread got sidetracked, aka capacity reductions/asset liquidation, took us down a more specific aspect of capacity reduction aka abandoned lines, then tried to tie the one to the topic title.

Now, has anyone alleged that railroads abandoned lines to functioning coal mines or coal deposits? No, but you seem to think so.

The capacity issue is more than abandoned lines. It is also reduction of double track and sidings. When it all gets put together, what you end up with is the loss of the secondary mains, and that's where the asset reduction tact by the railroads has cost them the capacity to get that coal from the mines to the power plants.

And wouldn't you think that since the quantity of coal being transported is under contract, the railroads assumed beforehand that they could get the coal to the plants without delay? Did they not expect the traffic growth in intermodal. Don't the boys in the coal hauling division ever talk to the guys in the intermodal division? After all, they all use the same trackage.

Or perhaps they knew they didn't have the necessary capacity to haul the quantity contracted, but hey, if they can't make their deliveries, what are those captive customers going to do? They ain't goin anywhere, so they can take it or leave it. We have the monopoly, we don't have to perform.

[Anonymous]

I think we are assuming that all the decisions to abandon/dispose rail lines have been made in the distant past. This process to abandon certain rail lines that one would think are part of the basic network has continued even in recent years. Railroads can make certain routes look uneconomic simply by shifting bridge traffic to a different route. IJust because a route does not originate or terminate loads does not mean that it has no utility or makes an economic contribution to the railway in particular or the transportation system in general.
I am just waiting for the day when a factory closes by an Interstate and someone says we must abandon a segement of the Interstate because it is now uneconomic. This is the reason why countries such as the UK and Sweden have separated the rail infrastructure from the operating company. Unfortunately the cost of doing this in North America is prohibitively expensive. We also use different measures of cost, utility, efficiency and profitability for different, not only for different modes but also for different segments within the mode ( ie. frieght vs passenger) which makes rational comparison difficult.

[Mookie]

I think my coal car got dumped!

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl
It still sounds like we're saying the same thing.

Well, maybe we are, I can't tell.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

But if it goes far enough, that skews the investment decision making process regardless because the bottom line is not accountable to the decisions made.

In a publically held company, as all railroads are in this country, the bottom line is always accountable to, if noone else, the stockholders. Decisions made by the company executives can always be questioned by them.

The larger the corporation, the more diluted the stockholder interests, and the less likely this is to occur. This is why managements are generally in favor of mergers. The process of loss of influence of investors on corporate governance was first examined in The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: Commerce Clearing House Publishing Co., 1932), by Adolph Berle, and Gardiner Means. It was first documented in detail in the rail industry in The Investor Pays (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1933) by Max Lowenthal.

[n012944]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

When Boeing built its giant Everett plant in the mid-60s to build the 747 -- didn't look like R&D.It still took about 9 years to begin making a profit. R&D is peanuts compared to the production costs -- and those all come ahead, years ahead, of actually making a profit.

Building a plant isn't R&D, I never said it was. Plus, although the Everett plant was built to build the 747 models, it was also designed to build other aircraft after the 747's completed production. Boeing knew they weren't going to make this model forever.

What I said was this:

QUOTE: Even with a manufacturing model, Boeing is designing planes that they hope will begin to pay off eight, ten, twelve years from now. Everything up till then is sunk investment. Yet, they do it because 1) they believe in the enterprise, and 2) they have the courage to take the risk.

"Everything up 'till then" in the statement -- up until the point the begin making a profit -- includes the entire cost of the production facility, long, long before a profit can be declared, if ever, on the investment.

It's all or nothing.

Railroads have the advantage of incremental investment not available to an aircraft manufacturer, yet Boeing has been held out as an example of "Built to Last" as a business philosophy ["Successful Habits of Visionary Companies" by Jim Collins and Jerry Porras] notwithstanding Boeing's risk is much higher, and its payout much farther down the road, on investment in facilities. Railbanking is pocket change by comparison.

Boeing can live off its military contracts alone, which allows it to take more risks in the commercial jet market. When the railroads were abandoning track at a breakneck pace in the 70's/early80's, many were either on the verge of, or already in bankruptcy. When you are at that point you can not afford to wait, and pay for, something that MIGHT appear 20 years down the road.


Bert

[TomDiehl]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

When Boeing built its giant Everett plant in the mid-60s to build the 747 -- didn't look like R&D.It still took about 9 years to begin making a profit. R&D is peanuts compared to the production costs -- and those all come ahead, years ahead, of actually making a profit.

Building a plant isn't R&D, I never said it was. Plus, although the Everett plant was built to build the 747 models, it was also designed to build other aircraft after the 747's completed production. Boeing knew they weren't going to make this model forever.

What I said was this:

QUOTE: Even with a manufacturing model, Boeing is designing planes that they hope will begin to pay off eight, ten, twelve years from now. Everything up till then is sunk investment. Yet, they do it because 1) they believe in the enterprise, and 2) they have the courage to take the risk.

"Everything up 'till then" in the statement -- up until the point the begin making a profit -- includes the entire cost of the production facility, long, long before a profit can be declared, if ever, on the investment.

It's all or nothing.

Railroads have the advantage of incremental investment not available to an aircraft manufacturer, yet Boeing has been held out as an example of "Built to Last" as a business philosophy ["Successful Habits of Visionary Companies" by Jim Collins and Jerry Porras] notwithstanding Boeing's risk is much higher, and its payout much farther down the road, on investment in facilities. Railbanking is pocket change by comparison.

It still sounds like we're saying the same thing.

And arguing about it.

As I said WAAAYY back, Dave tossed out this bait and some people took it.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

When Boeing built its giant Everett plant in the mid-60s to build the 747 -- didn't look like R&D.It still took about 9 years to begin making a profit. R&D is peanuts compared to the production costs -- and those all come ahead, years ahead, of actually making a profit.

Building a plant isn't R&D, I never said it was. Plus, although the Everett plant was built to build the 747 models, it was also designed to build other aircraft after the 747's completed production. Boeing knew they weren't going to make this model forever.

What I said was this:

QUOTE: Even with a manufacturing model, Boeing is designing planes that they hope will begin to pay off eight, ten, twelve years from now. Everything up till then is sunk investment. Yet, they do it because 1) they believe in the enterprise, and 2) they have the courage to take the risk.

"Everything up 'till then" in the statement -- up until the point the begin making a profit -- includes the entire cost of the production facility, long, long before a profit can be declared, if ever, on the investment.

It's all or nothing.

Railroads have the advantage of incremental investment not available to an aircraft manufacturer, yet Boeing has been held out as an example of "Built to Last" as a business philosophy ["Successful Habits of Visionary Companies" by Jim Collins and Jerry Porras] notwithstanding Boeing's risk is much higher, and its payout much farther down the road, on investment in facilities. Railbanking is pocket change by comparison.

[TomDiehl]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

But if it goes far enough, that skews the investment decision making process regardless because the bottom line is not accountable to the decisions made.

In a publically held company, as all railroads are in this country, the bottom line is always accountable to, if noone else, the stockholders. Decisions made by the company executives can always be questioned by them.

[TomDiehl]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

When Boeing built its giant Everett plant in the mid-60s to build the 747 -- didn't look like R&D.It still took about 9 years to begin making a profit. R&D is peanuts compared to the production costs -- and those all come ahead, years ahead, of actually making a profit.

Building a plant isn't R&D, I never said it was. Plus, although the Everett plant was built to build the 747 models, it was also designed to build other aircraft after the 747's completed production. Boeing knew they weren't going to make this model forever.

[MichaelSol]

But if it goes far enough, that skews the investment decision making process regardless because the bottom line is not accountable to the decisions made.

[TomDiehl]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol
Railroads, of course, are insulated to some degree from failure by captive shipper income, and so success and failure in the industry to make appropriate investment decisions for the long term are more difficult to ascertain. So, the industry plods along its same old path -- mistakes don't need to be fixed because its all "hindsight" and the captive shippers will pay for any mistakes anyway.

The financial accountabilty is lost. The capacity issue is a good example of that.

Income from ANY class of shippers can only go so far to cover the bad decisions. As I tried to point out to Dave, looking back at these decisions is a good exercise in "lessons learned" but to try to use this to show evil intent or conspiricy theories is more than just a bit out in left field.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol
The idea that you can't assume "anything" about the future pretty much puts planning departments out of business. In fact, businesses survive or fail based on their long range planning. Executive are hired and fired based on successful strategic planning.

"Assume" is exactly what planning departments do, just as I said in the post quoted here: "Looking at growth and assuming ANYTHING about it is just that, "assuming." Even as far as assuming that the "growth" won't turn to "shrinkage" or "disappear" in the future." I never said they couldn't do it. My quote says the same thing as your second sentence. With those executives you mention, at least the company doing the hiring has a track record to go by, and they have to hope the record isn't just dumb luck.

If you have done a planning function, you will know that the first thing you do is identify "assumptions". This is the mystery in the current capacity issue, because two reasonable assumptions existed: 1) that the rate of traffic growth 1960-1980 was steady, but low; 2) That Staggers would "unleash" railroads to grow at a more robust rate. The minimun assumption, then would have to be that the 1960-1980 growth rate would represent a minimum assumption of growth. Yet, the rate of growth 1980-2005, was slightly less than the rate of growth 1960-1980. Capacity needs, in a rational planning process, "should" have been no surprise. Yet, they seem to be.

[MichaelSol]

When Boeing built its giant Everett plant in the mid-60s to build the 747 -- didn't look like R&D.It still took about 9 years to begin making a profit. R&D is peanuts compared to the production costs -- and those all come ahead, years ahead, of actually making a profit.

[TomDiehl]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol
The idea that you can't assume "anything" about the future pretty much puts planning departments out of business. In fact, businesses survive or fail based on their long range planning. Executive are hired and fired based on successful strategic planning.

"Assume" is exactly what planning departments do, just as I said in the post quoted here: "Looking at growth and assuming ANYTHING about it is just that, "assuming." Even as far as assuming that the "growth" won't turn to "shrinkage" or "disappear" in the future." I never said they couldn't do it. My quote says the same thing as your second sentence. With those executives you mention, at least the company doing the hiring has a track record to go by, and they have to hope the record isn't just dumb luck.

[TomDiehl]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

The Boeing example is not an R&D cost. Aircraft such as the A-380 require 250 sales to break even, before the company begins to make money (Airbus). The plane was designed in 2003 and 2004. That will probably be in 2013-2014, if at all. The planning is extraordinarily long term. Production capacity is planned out 10, 15, 20 years in advance with the idea that profit might occur in the 12, 14th year, maybe later.

Actually, that is an R&D cost. Boeing, in this example, has to develop a new type aircraft for what they think the airlines will want to buy when they're ready to put it into production. They have to research whether new materials will work for the new design, for example, or if changes in the aerodynamics will pay off in better fuel economy (not as major a factor in the 60's as it is today). That's the simple definition of research and development.

[MichaelSol]

In the world of finance, all investments are carried at book for accounting purposes, and valued at market for economic analysis purposes.

At sale or exchange, the appreciation is declared for accounting purposes irregardless.

[MP173]

Railbanked lines, of course would be considered an investment. The lines would be an "asset" on the balance sheet.

The problem would be it would be a non income producing asset. That is a tough sell to investors and bankers. Really tough. Plus to the local governments which would require taxation on the "investment".

Railroads already have a problem with asset turnover.

Now, if something could be done to shield those from taxation and take the investment off of the books...then it might work.

One other minor point. The "investment" would not appreciate in value. Once entered on the balance sheet, it stays at that amount, less accumulated depreciation.

So...as an investment, it would not work in the world of finance.

ed

[rrandb]

In NY state the taxes alone will skew your numbers far away from a no brainer to decide to hold non-revenue producing assets of a real estate nature. They do not care if its making money or not.

[MichaelSol]

The Boeing example is not an R&D cost. Aircraft such as the A-380 require 250 sales to break even, before the company begins to make money (Airbus). The plane was designed in 2003 and 2004. That will probably be in 2013-2014, if at all. The planning is extraordinarily long term. Production capacity is planned out 10, 15, 20 years in advance with the idea that profit might occur in the 12, 14th year, maybe later.

The idea that you can't assume "anything" about the future pretty much puts planning departments out of business. In fact, businesses survive or fail based on their long range planning. Executive are hired and fired based on successful strategic planning.

Railroads, of course, are insulated to some degree from failure by captive shipper income, and so success and failure in the industry to make appropriate investment decisions for the long term are more difficult to ascertain. So, the industry plods along its same old path -- mistakes don't need to be fixed because its all "hindsight" and the captive shippers will pay for any mistakes anyway.

The financial accountabilty is lost. The capacity issue is a good example of that.

[TomDiehl]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by jeaton

Your example works for 20 years, but $100,000 at 9% for 27 years goes over a $million. But let us not forget the risk. It does cut both ways, but if at the time of decision to bank or scrap the estimate is that the track will never have a productive purpose, then the decision to scrap would seem to be appropriate.

To be fair, I only suggested the existance the ongoing cost to keep the property which might be just the property tax and while it would likely be well below the $1 million per mile to rebuild, after a couple of decades sitting idle, there is going to be an expense to put the track back in shape. You might also remember that under the betterment accounting system, the track was not depreciated. Tearing it up converts the book value to a current expense, which can become a nice non-cash deduction from taxable income. All of the above goes into the decision making process to dispose of unneeded or unused assets. As I have said before, I don't know of very many business that will keep unused production assets that will have no use in the foreseeable future.

Railroads attacked their own capacity to carry freight. Had they simply looked at growth, 1960-1980, and assumed that was a minimum, then they knew -- they had to know -- they were going to have a capacity crisis on mainlines. Most "production assets" don't appreciate over time. Again, this confuses a manufacturing model with a real estate model, where such assumptions are just about the opposite. Even with a manufacturing model, Boeing is designing planes that they hope will begin to pay off eight, ten, twelve years from now. Everything up till then is sunk investment. Yet, they do it because 1) they believe in the enterprise, and 2) they have the courage to take the risk. Railroads have an even longer event horizon than aircraft builders. Railbanking is low risk compared to building new facilities -- because of appreciation, it can even be seen as an investment.

This goes back to the point of using todays facts to judge decisions made 20 to 45 years ago. How many times, in all facets of life, have we heard the statements that start with "If I knew then what I know now?" Your second sentence even says this. Looking at growth and assuming ANYTHING about it is just that, "assuming." Even as far as assuming that the "growth" won't turn to "shrinkage" or "disappear" in the future.

You're correct in the point of "Again, this confuses a manufacturing model with a real estate model," but then go on to compare R&D costs of an aircraft manufacturer to a railroad's decision to hold on to, or dispose of, miles of track that aren't performing well in the time period when the decision is made. You would have to know the financial condition of the railroad(s) (not good, at least here in the northeast), did they HAVE money to railbank those miles or did they need the quick "fix" of immediate cash from the scrapping just to survive, were they in bankruptcy and the decision was being made by a court appointed trustee, just to name the most obvious questions still in the air.

[Murphy Siding]

OK kudos to Dave for finally making a list ! I'll have to mull this over for a bit.....[:P]

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by jeaton

Your example works for 20 years, but $100,000 at 9% for 27 years goes over a $million. But let us not forget the risk. It does cut both ways, but if at the time of decision to bank or scrap the estimate is that the track will never have a productive purpose, then the decision to scrap would seem to be appropriate.

To be fair, I only suggested the existance the ongoing cost to keep the property which might be just the property tax and while it would likely be well below the $1 million per mile to rebuild, after a couple of decades sitting idle, there is going to be an expense to put the track back in shape. You might also remember that under the betterment accounting system, the track was not depreciated. Tearing it up converts the book value to a current expense, which can become a nice non-cash deduction from taxable income. All of the above goes into the decision making process to dispose of unneeded or unused assets. As I have said before, I don't know of very many business that will keep unused production assets that will have no use in the foreseeable future.

Railroads attacked their own capacity to carry freight. Had they simply looked at growth, 1960-1980, and assumed that was a minimum, then they knew -- they had to know -- they were going to have a capacity crisis on mainlines. Most "production assets" don't appreciate over time. Again, this confuses a manufacturing model with a real estate model, where such assumptions are just about the opposite. Even with a manufacturing model, Boeing is designing planes that they hope will begin to pay off eight, ten, twelve years from now. Everything up till then is sunk investment. Yet, they do it because 1) they believe in the enterprise, and 2) they have the courage to take the risk. Railroads have an even longer event horizon than aircraft builders. Railbanking is low risk compared to building new facilities -- because of appreciation, it can even be seen as an investment.

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding

QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal

Murphy,

I think you will understand this:

The decommissioned power plants were replaced by newer power plants.

The abandoned rail lines were not replaced by newer rail lines.

Comprende muchacho?

Similar to how the traffic from unprofitable rail lines was replaced by traffic on other lines, and gasp! highways? I see the similarities, even if you don't.

So you're sure that traffic from so-called unprofitable rail lines (a debatable point in and of itself) went to other lines? Sure, some went to highways, but isn't that what we're trying to prevent? Not to mention manufacturing that has moved overseas, not to mention production facilities that just shut down, period?

What you are missing from the power plant analogy is that the power plants that were shut down tended to be smaller, e.g. lower economies of scale, and were replaced by larger power plants, most of the time by the same utility. The utilities didn't just "cash out" the asset to sex up the balance sheet like the railroads did ("Wow, look at our present cash flow! We railroad CEO's deserve a big fat bonus, isn't that right all you stockholders?").

Subsequently, if the railroads had acted like the utilities, they would have replaced the abandoned lines with newer more modern trackage. They didn't, ergo the comparison is not apt.

QUOTE:

QUOTE:
And I never said all abandoned rail lines should have been saved. We talked about that before, not to long ago. You have either a very poor memory, or a very disingenuous tact for trying to denegrate folks such as I. Which is it?

[(-D][(-D][(-D] It must be poor memory, or trying to hit a moving target. As far as the disingenuous tract,well, I don't think so. I did have chilie for dinner last night, though, so maybe that's part of the problem?[;)] I did go back and look. Sure enough, you did provide info on two current rail lines.
As you keep refering back to past abandonments that you think railroads made in error, I keep thinking that they did what made sense at the time. So what abandonded lines, (other than the Milwaukee Road, I'll give you that one, as we all know the feelings of everybody on that one)are you talking about?

It's not just about abandonments, it's about reduced trackage system wide, including the loss of double track portions, sidings, et al. It's also about lines that were bled dry (e.g. the profits from the line were not returned for the lines upkeep), then when the cost of getting the line back to decent standards became so extreme the railroads tried to hardball steep rate hikes ostensibly for the "true cost" of getting the line back into shape. (As if the revenues from the new steep rate hikes would also go to actually rehabbing the line and not sent back east for padding the CEO's bonus check!)

You mention the Milwaukee PCE. Well, portions of that line are actually under the auspices of a "second chance abandonment." After the Milwaukee pulled out, portions of the PCE were still kept by certain entities for operational usage. BN bought the Snoqualmie Pass portion with it's 0.7% west bound grade and 1.7% eastbound grade, but then decided that the ol' Stampede Pass line was *better* with it's 2.2% grades and reverse curves on both sides of the hill. I also believe BN originally bought the Lind to Ellensburg portion as well, and gave that up to the State for a rail trail.

I mentioned the Modoc line as an alternate for UP's OSL. How about the BNSF's Great Falls to Helena line, still intact except for a few washouts, but hasn't been used in a decade even though it is intregal as a part of the I-15 rail corridor from Edmonton to Los Angeles. Yes, there's lot's of NAFTA traffic between Alberta and SoCal, but it all goes via the I-5 corridor, which is at max capacity (e.g. the UP and BNSF are having to turn down business - where does that business go? Truck, overseas, or shut down.)

While we're in Montana, how about the original GN line between Havre and Great Falls? Now it's just two truncated branchlines, but it was a viable alternate to Marias Pass. Now, the BNSF is choked between Shelby and Sandpoint, while MRL still has capacity, but no High Line trains can make it onto MRL since the line was torn out and the GF to Helena line embargoed.

We've talked about the chokepoint through Spokane. Once there were three separate mainlines through town, now down to one. Yeah, we all know it was due to Expo 74, but the railroads at the time seemed almost happy to give it all away. They could have said no, they had the ROW first, probably could have forced the Expo folks to accomodate the UP line into the park theme (which would have been AWESOME!), maybe consolidate the GN and UP lines since the GN line was in the heart of the Expo park.

I've mention the local lines that were severed in response to the creation of the slack water ports on the Snake River. BN at first spent a good chunk of money upgrading the line from Marshall to Lewiston (once a viable secondary line), then changed their minds and embargoed the line from Moscow to Arrow (near Lewiston). Abracadabra, a viable regional line with new rails and ballast was reduced to a dead end branchline, and it's value subsequently went down to near zero. Predicably, BN sold the line to WATCO, who then conned the State of Washington into buying the remaining portion, then WATCO decides to give up service on the line anyway at BNSF's behest.

BN once had the NP line from Seattle to British Columbia as an alternative to the ex-GN line along the Puget Sound shoreline. Well, the shoreline is enough for that Canadian traffic, we'll tear out chunks of the NP line. Now BNSF is stuck with only the shoreline for Vancouver to Seattle traffic. When will that line be at capacity (if it isn't already?)

How about the Cowboy Line? I am not sure if it is still all there or not, I only know that DM&E runs the portion near Chadron. Yet how much would that line be worth as an alternative coal hauling line to the east?

Okay, so you say how about those "unprofitable" branch lines that hauled grain? Well, I know of a dozen or so such lines within a 100 miles of my abode, wherein folks actually made a bid for such lines, usually at or above the ostensible scrap value stated by the railroad, but the railroad would always turn down the potential buyers. Gee, free money, and keeping a client base to boot! No go, go figure.

Other lines did mangage to obtain "permission" for someone else to buy it, then the buyers would end up not getting car orders in a timely manner, and subsequently would give up on the line altogether.

Or it would be a local government entity that would either unsuccessfully bid for a line, or they'd manage to buy it with all the restrictive caveats, then still wouldn't get even the minimally expected level of service.

Who wants to buy a line if the Class I connection won't even provide rudimentary service?

That's just a partial list from the PNW and the Northern Tier that I know of. It should be enough for you to rescind your view that all such lines were unprofitable and thus deserving of abandonment.