QUOTE: Originally posted by edblysard QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal QUOTE: Originally posted by jeaton There is so very little in the article, it could hardly be called the "whole" story. Granted many years ago, but having been involved in setting up specialized, just for one customer, train services, I can say that it takes much more than "OK, we can do that", even if there very good bucks in the deal. Looking at this story on the surface, it very much appears that the shippers have the attitude the the freight railroads must do anything they are asked to do, without regard to revenue adequacy. To me that is like telling GM they must sell Cadillacs at Chevrolet prices. No, it's about THE basic principle of business - Give the customer what they want, and you'll have their business. But what you fail to grasp, or are being obviously obtuse about, is the fact that BNSF doesn’t WANT that business. It isn’t worth it to them. ... Is it that hard an idea to grasp?
QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal QUOTE: Originally posted by jeaton There is so very little in the article, it could hardly be called the "whole" story. Granted many years ago, but having been involved in setting up specialized, just for one customer, train services, I can say that it takes much more than "OK, we can do that", even if there very good bucks in the deal. Looking at this story on the surface, it very much appears that the shippers have the attitude the the freight railroads must do anything they are asked to do, without regard to revenue adequacy. To me that is like telling GM they must sell Cadillacs at Chevrolet prices. No, it's about THE basic principle of business - Give the customer what they want, and you'll have their business.
QUOTE: Originally posted by jeaton There is so very little in the article, it could hardly be called the "whole" story. Granted many years ago, but having been involved in setting up specialized, just for one customer, train services, I can say that it takes much more than "OK, we can do that", even if there very good bucks in the deal. Looking at this story on the surface, it very much appears that the shippers have the attitude the the freight railroads must do anything they are asked to do, without regard to revenue adequacy. To me that is like telling GM they must sell Cadillacs at Chevrolet prices.
QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol QUOTE: Originally posted by edblysard QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal QUOTE: Originally posted by jeaton There is so very little in the article, it could hardly be called the "whole" story. Granted many years ago, but having been involved in setting up specialized, just for one customer, train services, I can say that it takes much more than "OK, we can do that", even if there very good bucks in the deal. Looking at this story on the surface, it very much appears that the shippers have the attitude the the freight railroads must do anything they are asked to do, without regard to revenue adequacy. To me that is like telling GM they must sell Cadillacs at Chevrolet prices. No, it's about THE basic principle of business - Give the customer what they want, and you'll have their business. But what you fail to grasp, or are being obviously obtuse about, is the fact that BNSF doesn’t WANT that business. It isn’t worth it to them. ... Is it that hard an idea to grasp? "USC 49, IV, A, Chap 111, Sub 1, Sec. 11101. Common carrier transportation, service, and rates (a) A rail carrier providing transportation or service subject to the jurisdiction of the Board under this part shall provide the transportation or service on reasonable request. " Best regards, Michael Sol
QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol North Dakota Inverse Rail Rates: An Illustrative Example The influence that Class I railroad strategies can have on the grain delivery system is illustrated in North Dakota. The practice of so-called “inverse rate” pricing by the Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) Railroad drew a lot of attention in the state and was the subject of a congressional field hearing. At the hearing, a grain farmer located near Gladstone in the southwestern part of the state described how he trucked his grain to a subterminal elevator in Jamestown located 160 miles to the east, even though his local elevator was located only 20 miles from his farm. The reason he trucked his grain to the more distant elevator was because he received a better price for his grain at that elevator than from his local elevator. The subterminal elevator gave him a better price because grain farmers are paid the price of grain minus the cost of transportation, which in this case was the cost of rail transportation to a seaport in the Pacific Northwest (PNW). The BNSF Railroad charged less to ship grain from eastern North Dakota than western North Dakota to PNW ports even though the distance is farther (hence the term “inverse rates”). From the subterminal elevator in Jamestown, the BNSF would then haul the grain back west, passing through the grain farmer’s yard located near Gladstone on its way to a PNW port. Source: Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Field Hearing entitled Rail Freight Transportation in North Dakota, March 27, 2002, Bismarck, ND. S. Hrg. 107-1057. The extent of North Dakota’s captivity is exemplified by the rates that we pay. North Dakota’s rail rates are among the highest and most profitable anywhere. While the Stagger’s Rail Act sets 180 as a reasonable and profitable revenue-to-variable-cost ratio, many of North Dakota’s rates generate ratios of 300 or more. If there was effective competition in the local transportation marketplace, the railroads would not be able to achieve ratios of this magnitude. We estimate that these excessively high rates cost North Dakota farmers and shippers between $50 and $100 million annually. BNSF’s inverse rates were implemented aboutin 2000. During 2001, a 110-car shuttle train rate from southwestern North Dakota to the PNW was about 28 cents per bushel higher than the rate paid by shippers in eastern North Dakota, even though the shippers in western North Dakota were over 250 miles closer to the market. United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Presented by: Commissioner Tony Clark North Dakota Public Service Commission. Date: March 27, 2002 To the ridiculous proposition that BNSF doesn't think grain traffic is profitable: A 2000 waybill analysis of revenue-to-variable cost ratios and the analysis of current revenue-to-variable cost ratios for BNSF wheat movements to Portland and Minneapolis paint a similar picture. ... For all service levels in either analysis, the average revenue-to-variable cost ratio to either market is at or above 1.85. Moreover, for all service levels of 26 cars or more to either market, the average revenue-to-variable cost ratios exceed 2.43. For all service levels of 52 cars or more to either market, the average revenue-to-variable cost ratios exceed 2.7. Besides ignoring traffic that is substantially more profitable than its central corridor traffic, BNSF is ignoring the needs of the specific market. North Dakota Wheat Commission Administrator Neal Fisher states, “BNSF is pushing shuttle trains at a time when wheat buyers are demanding more quality specificity and segregation of different wheat qualities, not less. To compete with alternative wheat supplies from Canada and other sources, we must tailor wheat shipments to meet the individual needs of flour mills.” The situation is ditto for barley, according to John Mittleider, executive administrator of the North Dakota Barley Council. “There are differentiations in quality to different buyers and for different purposes,” he says. As in spring wheat and durum, Mittleider notes that most buyers don’t want the 110-car shuttle trains. Partly, as with WATCO, the railroad is changing the rules in the middle of the game: In a letter sent to the Burlington Northern Santa Fe on Aug. 30, 2005 North Dakota state officials and ag industry leaders complained that the state's farmers are getting less service from the railroad while paying more money in freight rates. "Fewer cars are available, and the costs of shipping grain are up significantly in many areas. Just a few short years after BNSF strongly encouraged shippers to build facilities capable of loading 52-car trains, the railroad is now penalizing those same shippers." Programs allegedly designed to improve shipping inevitably seems to have the opposite effect: "The most controversial aspect of the Scoots program is that only elevators handling 100- to 110-railcar shuttle trains will be allowed to participate, excluding unit-train loading stations from participation.22 In addition, as currently proposed, elevators will not be allowed to upgrade their facilities to meet all of BNSF’s requirements concerning 58-railcar shipment sizes, loading times, and other terms. Grain elevators that had upgraded their facilities to 52- and 54-railcar loading stations at BNSF’s behest believe this to be unfair. Although 52- to 54-railcar loading stations may be allowed to participate in some instances, as the program is currently designed, this will occur only if that elevator is not within the draw territory of a shuttle-train loader. Many of those elevator operators excluded from the Scoots program believe that it allows the railroad to force grain to a given location, thereby giving the railroad the ability to decide which firms survive in the grain business. Thus, in its present form, adversely affected shippers believe Scoots to be anticompetitive." Marvin Prater, Keith Klindworth " Long-Term Trends in Railroad Service and Capacity for U.S. Agriculture" USDA, 2000. As a result, railroads are slowly losing one of their most profitable businesses in the quest for short term profit. That cow will be milked for only so long. In 1980, railroads handled fully 50% of all grain transport, trucks carried 30%. Now, that is reversed. Railroads carry only 30% of grain, while trucks carry 50%. Railroads have shown themselves repeatedly unable to effeciently and effectively manage the nation's railroad transportation needs, and this invokes the question of the manner and extent of federal re-intervention into the rail industry. "Grain Transport: Modal Trends and Infrastructure Implications," January 5, 2005, John F. Frittelli, Specialist in Transportation Resources, Science, and Industry Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Best regards, Michael Sol
QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol No. See: Karl Sigmund, Ernst Fehr, and Martin Nowak, "The Economics of Fair Play," Scientific American, January 2002., pp. 83--87. Best regards, Michael Sol
QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl None of this freight has moved by rail for many years.
QUOTE: In all "fairness" the produce shippers approached the railroad and demanded a level of service that wasn't possible to add to the existing rail network.
QUOTE: Sorry, I'm just able to read things with an open mind.
QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal QUOTE: Originally posted by NS2317 I think the most interesting part of the article states how shippers where caught putting their eggs in one basket by using the trucking industry. After November when a rockslide closed Snoqualmie Pass traffic, they suddenly realized the importance of rail as an "alternative" solution. Now they want to suddenly hype BNSF's response as unreasonable. Sounds to me as if BNSF felt like they were being treated as some kind of transportation "safety valve" when shippers are caught with their pants down. Anyway, they said they needed 4 day service. That is 96 hours. BNSF came back with a quote of 100hrs or 4.16 days. That's a 4 hour difference. Granted, produce is a time sensitive commodity, but come on. Especially when the stuff is probably taking the slow boat to China, anyway? There has to be more than meets the eyes here. NS2317, I admit it is sometimes hard to discern what these reporters are trying to say, and I do wish such articles would be put out by professional transportation writers rather than these cub reporters, but that being said.... I believe the "4 day service" in the article refers to rail service being made available every four days e.g. that would be a four day cycle for a dedicated train, two days over and two days back. I think 48 hours is about the minimum time produce shippers can accept before their stuff is subject to rejection dockside. That being said, is there any reason a dedicated train can't run on a 30 hour cycle time on such a short corridor? It's close to being a single crew district between Quincy and Seattle, why can't these trains run 10 hours over, 10 hours to unload the outbound containers and reload the empties, and 10 hours back? 10 hours between Quincy and Seattle is only 20 miles per hour in transit time, less than the standard 25 mph *required*[}:)] by the Class I's. The article seems quite clear to everybody else reading it. Sorry it doesn't fit the agenda of your "non-vendetta." Twice a week would be an average of 3-1/2 days between trains. One train every four days would be even less often. Not following the math here.
QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal QUOTE: Originally posted by NS2317 I think the most interesting part of the article states how shippers where caught putting their eggs in one basket by using the trucking industry. After November when a rockslide closed Snoqualmie Pass traffic, they suddenly realized the importance of rail as an "alternative" solution. Now they want to suddenly hype BNSF's response as unreasonable. Sounds to me as if BNSF felt like they were being treated as some kind of transportation "safety valve" when shippers are caught with their pants down. Anyway, they said they needed 4 day service. That is 96 hours. BNSF came back with a quote of 100hrs or 4.16 days. That's a 4 hour difference. Granted, produce is a time sensitive commodity, but come on. Especially when the stuff is probably taking the slow boat to China, anyway? There has to be more than meets the eyes here. NS2317, I admit it is sometimes hard to discern what these reporters are trying to say, and I do wish such articles would be put out by professional transportation writers rather than these cub reporters, but that being said.... I believe the "4 day service" in the article refers to rail service being made available every four days e.g. that would be a four day cycle for a dedicated train, two days over and two days back. I think 48 hours is about the minimum time produce shippers can accept before their stuff is subject to rejection dockside. That being said, is there any reason a dedicated train can't run on a 30 hour cycle time on such a short corridor? It's close to being a single crew district between Quincy and Seattle, why can't these trains run 10 hours over, 10 hours to unload the outbound containers and reload the empties, and 10 hours back? 10 hours between Quincy and Seattle is only 20 miles per hour in transit time, less than the standard 25 mph *required*[}:)] by the Class I's.
QUOTE: Originally posted by NS2317 I think the most interesting part of the article states how shippers where caught putting their eggs in one basket by using the trucking industry. After November when a rockslide closed Snoqualmie Pass traffic, they suddenly realized the importance of rail as an "alternative" solution. Now they want to suddenly hype BNSF's response as unreasonable. Sounds to me as if BNSF felt like they were being treated as some kind of transportation "safety valve" when shippers are caught with their pants down. Anyway, they said they needed 4 day service. That is 96 hours. BNSF came back with a quote of 100hrs or 4.16 days. That's a 4 hour difference. Granted, produce is a time sensitive commodity, but come on. Especially when the stuff is probably taking the slow boat to China, anyway? There has to be more than meets the eyes here.
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QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl None of this freight has moved by rail for many years. Source? Because there is another 3PI (Columbia Rail Intermodal) that is running a similar service over BNSF out of Wenatchee to Seattle last I heard.
QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl In all "fairness" the produce shippers approached the railroad and demanded a level of service that wasn't possible to add to the existing rail network. Not possible? What's your source on that claim? Again, we're talking about a service that only has to average 20 mph over a short haul, so it doesn't require every other train going in the hole for it. Only one dedicated train added to the existing rail network. What is your source for the contention that BNSF can't add one more train to the Stevens Pass corridor on a 4 day cycle rather than an 8 day cycle?
QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl In all "fairness" the produce shippers approached the railroad and demanded a level of service that wasn't possible to add to the existing rail network.
QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal QUOTE: Originally posted by NS2317 I think the most interesting part of the article states how shippers where caught putting their eggs in one basket by using the trucking industry. After November when a rockslide closed Snoqualmie Pass traffic, they suddenly realized the importance of rail as an "alternative" solution. Now they want to suddenly hype BNSF's response as unreasonable. Sounds to me as if BNSF felt like they were being treated as some kind of transportation "safety valve" when shippers are caught with their pants down. Anyway, they said they needed 4 day service. That is 96 hours. BNSF came back with a quote of 100hrs or 4.16 days. That's a 4 hour difference. Granted, produce is a time sensitive commodity, but come on. Especially when the stuff is probably taking the slow boat to China, anyway? There has to be more than meets the eyes here. NS2317, I admit it is sometimes hard to discern what these reporters are trying to say, and I do wish such articles would be put out by professional transportation writers rather than these cub reporters, but that being said.... I believe the "4 day service" in the article refers to rail service being made available every four days e.g. that would be a four day cycle for a dedicated train, two days over and two days back. I think 48 hours is about the minimum time produce shippers can accept before their stuff is subject to rejection dockside. That being said, is there any reason a dedicated train can't run on a 30 hour cycle time on such a short corridor? It's close to being a single crew district between Quincy and Seattle, why can't these trains run 10 hours over, 10 hours to unload the outbound containers and reload the empties, and 10 hours back? 10 hours between Quincy and Seattle is only 20 miles per hour in transit time, less than the standard 25 mph *required*[}:)] by the Class I's. The article seems quite clear to everybody else reading it. Sorry it doesn't fit the agenda of your "non-vendetta." Twice a week would be an average of 3-1/2 days between trains. One train every four days would be even less often. Not following the math here. The article mentions BNSF's desire for a "200 hour" window for delivery to Tacoma from Quincy. That means the cycle time is about 8 days. The produce shippers need a 4 day cycle maximum, otherwise the service is useless to them.
QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl Sorry, I'm just able to read things with an open mind. LOLWMCOOMN! You're not presenting the output of an open mind, rather you are just regurgitating the spin from BNSF.
QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl Sorry, I'm just able to read things with an open mind.
QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal Spoke with an associate from the Bennett lumber mill connected to the WATCO Marshall to Pullman line via the ex-Milwaukee/WI&M line, e.g. the line owned by the State of Washington but for which WATCO no longer wants to operate. He stated that the charge per lumber car has gone up from $250 to $750 in the last few years. On top of that, they usually only receive half the cars they order per week. Yep, that's BNSF in a nutshell - higher rates for poorer service.
QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal The article mentions BNSF's desire for a "200 hour" window for delivery to Tacoma from Quincy. That means the cycle time is about 8 days. The produce shippers need a 4 day cycle maximum, otherwise the service is useless to them.
QUOTE: Originally posted by edblysard
QUOTE: And where is your source that they can? You own supposition, or a statement frm BNSF that they can handle one more dedicated train. Last I checked, you were not a dispatcher, so how do you "know" if opposing trains will or will not have to go in the hole? Your just presenting guesses and supposition as fact, again. Ed
QUOTE: Originally posted by TomDiehl QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal The article mentions BNSF's desire for a "200 hour" window for delivery to Tacoma from Quincy. That means the cycle time is about 8 days. The produce shippers need a 4 day cycle maximum, otherwise the service is useless to them. And again, you're reading between the lines with your anti-BNSF glasses on. Which paragraph of that article in your original link does it even MENTION a "200 hour" window?
QUOTE: Originally posted by NS2317 QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal The article mentions BNSF's desire for a "200 hour" window for delivery to Tacoma from Quincy. That means the cycle time is about 8 days. The produce shippers need a 4 day cycle maximum, otherwise the service is useless to them. [%-)] I've re-read that article many times and I still don't see any implication of a 4 day cycle. 4 day service yes, but not 2 days there and two days back. Maybe I need glasses?
QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol It s ironic, after reading railroad industry complaints for 30 years that truckers were competing "unfairly" and "stealing" railroad traffic, that railroads no express no interest in an opportunity to "recover" lost traffic. Luther Miller, Railway Age "A coal-shipper lawyer said the railroads' treatment of captive customers "is like selling $3 Cokes in the ballpark because there's no competition." He added that you might not mind paying that much for a ballpark soda if you got a good game to go along with it--but coal shippers, he said, were getting only "high prices, poor service" and the disinterest of "unresponsive rail employees." Congress may be hearing a lot of that kind of talk if coal customers feel they have no choice but to take their case to Capitol Hill. If coal customers do make war on the railroads in Congress, they may find themselves fighting shoulder to shoulder with some real adversaries of the railroads, big trucking interests. That's right: American Trucking Associations threatened last month to join big railroad customers in seeking to roll back some of the railroads' market freedoms. ATA said its board had empowered it to do this if the railroads persisted in resisting the introduction of heavier, longer trucks on the highways. What kind of allies are these? If motor carriers succeed in their effort to put veritable trains-of-trucks on the highways, the railroads will lose another layer of relatively high-rated traffic. What remains on the railroads--low-rated bulk commodity traffic that the truckers don't want, traffic like coal--will have to bear a greater share of costs." Railroads continue to alienate its shippers, shipper by shipper. Coal producers, chemical shippers, auto manufacturers, grain shippers -- all with the same complaints. Those who suggest that railroads need to look more closely to the long term benefits to the industry of fair pricing and good service, I think are far more interested in the health of the industry than those who parrot the current line that today's buck is worth tomorrow's ten. Historical industry expediency led one federal judge to remark that, "there is neither justification for, nor satisfaction in, [actions today] which tomorrow bring only a harvest of barren regrets." "In re the Reorganization of the Chicago, M.St.P.&P.R. Co. (1942) 124 F.2nd, 754, 757. Best regards, Michael Sol
QUOTE: Originally posted by rrandb I sorry I missed the part in the article that said BNSF was in danger of losing a customer. I was under the impression they were unable to prvide a level of service to pick up a new customer. There is no indication that these shippers had any interest in BNSF untill a slide closed the road. Unless an industry is willing and able to work within the constraints of existing rail infrastruture they may not be a good candidate to ship by rail. Rails cannot be everything to everyone. Who is going to pay for these trains when it is not potatoe or apple season. [2c]
QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol It s ironic, after reading railroad industry complaints for 30 years that truckers were competing "unfairly" and "stealing" railroad traffic, that railroads express no interest in an opportunity to "recover" lost traffic.
QUOTE: posted by rrandbI sorry I missed the part in the article that said BNSF was in danger of losing a customer. I was under the impression they were unable to prvide a level of service to pick up a new customer.
QUOTE: Originally posted by rrandb Are you using some sort of information that I can not see in the article. Is there a special math I am not aware of.
QUOTE: Originally posted by rrandb Are you going to share with us or is proprietary????[?] LOL [2c]
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