Steam Locomotives versus Diesels

[MichaelSol]

Murphy, you had asked a question directly about Brown's study a whiile back. I'm not ignoring you. I looked through about five boxes of old electrification and related studies over Christmas and couldn't locate Brown's study. Only 15 more boxes to go. My fear is that I took Brown's study out of the boxes a couple of years ago and put it "someplace where I wouldn't lose it."

Wherever that might be, I am sure it is still there.

However, I will come up with it one way or another and see what it actually says regarding your quaery.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by AnthonyV

Michael:

Interesting points.

I would like to get a copy of Brown's study. What is the full reference?

Thanks
Anthony V

H. F. Brown, "Economic Results of Diesel Electric Motive Power on the Railways of the United States of America," Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, 175:5 (1961).

Best regards, Michael Sol

[AnthonyV]

Michael:

Interesting points.

I would like to get a copy of Brown's study. What is the full reference?

Thanks
Anthony V

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by AnthonyV
Your interpretation of the data is that the lack of savings from the Diesel investment resulted in a reduction of the MOW budget.

Allow me to suggest a different interpretation of the data - Loss of revenue caused the reduction in MOW expenditures. It would seem to me that if locomotive expenditures remained constant in real terms, it should not have affected the MOW budget.

Well, I think that has to be true, but the point is that all areas of railroad operations were benefitting from a variety of technical and operational improvements during the 1950s, including MOW. However, dieselization did not contribute any economic improvements at all. If it had, in the same proportions of all other areas of railroad employment and operations, the ROI would have had to have been distinctly higher than it was.

That underscores the point. ROI is Return on Investment. Investment in dieselization on the Milwaukee increased the Company's "investment" by about $100 million. But, as the operating expenses associated with that investment show, no return was gained for the investment. Where would ROI naturally go?

It is a natural conclusion that in a time of declining traffic, many if not most expenses are going to decrease. The remarkable thing with dieselization is that, even with declining traffic, no benefits could be obtained, but rather the contrary, the burden stayed the same while all other operating costs declined. The ROI had no choice but to decline with one set of costs stubbornly refusing to go down, either that or other costs had to be cut artificially in order to maintain the ROI. A true Hobson's choice.

Indeed, if you look at it without regard to dieselization. We have extensive figures on the cost of steam maintenance and operation. We also know that as of 1945, carloadings began to drop off and this declne was pretty steady all through the 1950s. The average age of the steam fleet was about 27 years -- I would have to go and look at that for sure, but that's what I recall. That's an average. The good part of downsizing, in any company, is that this permits a rational disposition of assets. The good performers are kept on and the old, inefficient stuff retired. In the case of most American railroads, this would have been a substantial amount of 30, 40 and even 50 year old steam locomotives.

The average age of the fleet could have been reduced significantly, while maintaining the necessary power to still operate the railroad, because of the loss of traffic.

Now, the key question is this. Dieselization shows no improvement in overall associated direct costs over steam. But, had the steam fleet been rationalized, is that a reasonable conclusion that the same costs would have continued to exist at the same level? A brand new anything almost always performs better than 25-50 year old equipment, so much of the "benefit" of dieselization came not from any technological benefit as much as it was simply new. But, overall, no cost benefits were found. Yet, with steam, the fleet might have been rationalized, costs per hp reduced by a logical and natural process resulting from retirement of old stuff, and no financing charges incurred.

The compromise of those two positions is even more intriguing. And this is Brown's conclusion. Diesel-electric technology was the hands down winner for yard work. The old saying "diesels can start what they can't pull, and steam can pull what it can't start," has no better application than for yard work. More importantly, the lower overall "stress" on the machine gave those yard diesels life spans as long as steam. They were a net economic benefit. Milwaukee's yard switcher fleet of Baldwins, FMs, etc. seemed like they were going to last forever. Worth Smith's decision to replace them with an all new fleet of MP15AC's in 1975 raised the old questions, at 16% interest.

Big steam was different, and so were "big" diesels. Out on the road, diesels wore out quickly, and as we saw earlier in the thread, still do. Steam didn't. It could run and run.

The diesel-electric figures shown above for Milwaukee Road have two components and that must be kept in mind. The yard locomotive component utlimately showed much better economic advantages, while the road locomotives must necessarily show a worse economic return than what is shown above, since the numbers are fleet numbers and average the road and yard units. So, while the average shows no discernible benefit to the railroad over the period in question, a breakdown between yard and road might well show some disconcerting disadvantages for the road equipment alone. I suspect that, based on Brown's study, that is the case.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[MichaelSol]

Well, let me take issue with OldTimer's unjustified attack on H.F. Brown.

QUOTE: Originally posted by Old Timer
There are lots of studies - the Brown is one example - that arise from someone waking up in the morning with a conclusion in mind and thinking "Wow -- maybe if I can get me some statistics and massage them right, I can support my conclusion and get me some publicity and money thereby!" The Brown obviously is one. First, it amounts to a rationalization after the fact. It formed no conclusion useful to anyone except those interested in establishing a revisionist view of history, a parallel universe, if you will.

I can understand simply disagreeing with a conclusion on something as complex as dieselization, involving as it did one set of costs at the outset and 1.5% interest rates, and another set of costs as the second generation evolved -- interest rates 3-5 times higher.

However to impute to H. F. Brown a greed motive, a publicity motive, and of "rationalizing" his conclusions is not just an unfair and malicious attack on the man, in this context it represents OldTimer's substitution of a personal attack in the place of any statistical support for his own contentions. Of course, OldTimer does so knowing Brown is not here to defend himself.

I worked with Harry Brown briefly. He was a true gentleman, and one of the best informed motive power engineers I have ever known. I was put in touch with him by Milwaukee Road's L.W. Wylie. I gathered they were old friends, and I know Wylie had a terrific respect for Brown, hence the referral on some dieselization questions for an electrification study.

Insofar as his motives. He was hired by British Rail to look at American motive power practice. There was absolutely nothing to be gained by skewing the study. Indeed, unlike GM-sponsored studies, and self-justifying industry studies -- Brown's study represented the only truly independent study I had been able to find. Indeed, OldTimer's accusations notwithstanding, I cannot imagine what Brown's motive might have been other than to report honestly to British Rail what he found.

There is no doubt that Brown's study ruffled some feathers. Contrary to OldTimer's assessment, it looks to me like the big money was on the full-dieselization side. Especially by 1960. To me, it's counterintuitive to suggest Brown was out for some kind of monetary gratification at the sacrifice of his engineering and professional principles. I think the "spokesmen" for GM were far more susceptible to the charge.

The strength of Browm's study is in the expertise of its author and the breadth and detail of his analysis. It was a landmark study. An additional strength of the final report is that it was "peer-reviewed" in the way that industry studies and GM studies never were. That is, publication in a learned society's journal and under its auspices subjects such a study to independent scrutiny by fellow engineers.

The process is an important one. One of my odd duties, compared to what I usually do for a living, is as a peer reviewer for two scholarly journals, Perceptual and Motor Skills, and Psychological Reports. Twice a year they publish an acknowledgment to their peer review staff, and if you check, you will see that I have been there for a little over 15 years now. My resume for that particular endeavor is about 28 pages long, and includes approximately 20 publications of my own in both American and European publications.

The purpose of peer review of scientific or engineering work is, of course, to get a fre***ake on an experimental design, the usefulness of the statistical analysis, and an interpretation of the study or test and how that compares with the conclusions of the authors. Once the peer reviews are completed, these go back to the authors for revisions. In most cases, the peer review process results in at least some revisions, often substantial revisions.

The final product as read by the reading public has already been subjected to critiques by professionals and so the final product is a much more reliable and useful contribution to the scientific literature than would otherwise be the case. Often in the engineering and scientific world, the final publication itself is open to published comment by respected peers who have observations, comment, and even further critiques.

The process is an important one, and H.F. Brown's study was subjected to exactly that kind of review process. If, as OldTimer states, it was "rationalization after the fact," it simply would not have been published. If indeed OldTimer is as experienced as he suggests, he would know for a fact that those kinds of engineering studies are far more meticulously done and far more meticulously scrutinized than the usual government study or, particularly, industry-sponsored studies.

So, while OldTimer wishes Brown's study away by attacking Brown personally, Brown's reputation fortunately insulates him as compared wiith OldTimer's reputation, and the dieselization study itself of far more significance and credibility than the admittedly "quick and dirty" studies OldTimer participated in.

In any case, I was somewhat surprised to find that Milwaukee Road's own data provided such a clear-cut example of Brown's findings. Milwaukee was not one of Brown's study subjects.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[AnthonyV]

Michael:

Thanks for the response:

We agree that fuel and maintenance costs declined when expressed in constant dollars. These gains were negated by increase in the finance charge.

We agree that investment in the Diesel was a wash when expressed in constant dollars - i.e., locomotive expenditures after Dieselization were the same as before Dieselization.

The question I have is as follows: If this is the case, how could this have affected the MOW budget?

Your interpretation of the data is that the lack of savings from the Diesel investment resulted in a reduction of the MOW budget.

Allow me to suggest a different interpretation of the data - Loss of revenue caused the reduction in MOW expenditures. It would seem to me that if locomotive expenditures remained constant in real terms, it should not have affected the MOW budget.

Also, railroads were in decline long before Dieselization, so using data from the early 1940's as a reference point should be done with caution. It seems that WWII represents an exception to this trend, temporarily raising railroad revenues and ROI. Examination of financial performance in terms of revenues, operating costs, capital investments, and ROI for the entire century may be more instructive than starting in the early 1940's. It would illustrate whether the 1950's was the start of a huge downward spiral or a continuation of what was already happening prior to WWII.

Finally, is it possible that any other type of known locomotive technology is more expensive, less reliable, less efficient, and less versatile than the Diesel-electric? Is it possible that the Diesel-electric is the worst type of locomotive there is except for all the rest?


Anthony V.

[Murphy Siding]

QUOTE: Originally posted by nanaimo73

Old Timer, feltonhill-
Thank you for your posts on this thread about the N&W and the PRR. I really enjoyed reading them.


Futuremodal-
Old Timer is far more knowledgeable on this topic than you or I, and has had over 30 articles published in Trains magazine.

I agree 100% with nanaimo73. Unfortunately, sometimes, the good stuff gets lost in the mix. How about one of you starting a thread seperate of this discussion? Thanks

[nanaimo73]

Old Timer, feltonhill-
Thank you for your posts on this thread about the N&W and the PRR. I really enjoyed reading them.


Futuremodal-
Old Timer is far more knowledgeable on this topic than you or I, and has had over 30 articles published in Trains magazine.

[Anonymous]

I too would still like to see some data from the 30s. The war years represesnt a peak in traffic and revenues. Due to the demand for power, maintenance was kept to the minimum needed to get the loco back out on the road. Some roads like UP went through an extensive rebuilding process in anticipation of the war, in effect front loading those expenses. In the post war period railroads had more power than they needed so when steam locos needed major repairs they were parked. As diesels came online, older classes were retired and what was kept received even less maintenance.

I also think it would be useful to look at roads other than the Milw or Hill lines. Putting the who had the best route argument aside, there were too many northern transcons. Even today the former NP route is underutilized. Perhaps it was the PCE that was the big mistake for those roads.

[daveklepper]

The dieselization of the Boston and Maine is pretty well covered in the CLASSIC TRAINS DIESEL VICTORY. I knew Ernie Bloss, and was a B&M emloyee in the winter of 1952-1953. Park time while in Senior Year at MIT. The savings in maintenance and fuel that each new diesel locomtive provided the B&M more than paid for the interest and the depreciation on the cost of each new locomotive. On average, each new diesel did the work of two steam locomotives it replaced, and at about half the fuel costs and a quarter of the maintenance costs.

Obviously if oil had not be as cheap because of the availability of a tanker port in Boston and if the B&M had on-line coal mines, the figures would have been different.

And also, despite some modern power, maybe about 20% of the fleet, 2-8-4's 4-8-2's and some modern Pacifics, most of the B&M power was pretty old and obsolete, with lots and lots of 2-6-0's, and much double heading with high fuel and crew costs resulted.

Now why didn't the B&M remain profitable? Why was McGinnes able to become President and why didn't he improve matters?

1. Beacuse of the auto and rising crew costs, the long distance passenger trains moved from profitability to money loosers.

2. Inability to raise fares on commuter services that were money loosers to begin with.

3. Loss of freight business because of the great decline in both agriculture and manufacturing in New England, with movement to an education, research, and service economy.

4. Trucks took the potato and some other farm product business away, much as they did lettuce in California, becuase of the possbility of direct farm to supermaket transportation.

So all credit to Guilford for being able to keep the current tracks in service. And all credit to the MBTA to rebuild much of the commuter network and do a good job at that.

A windfall for Guilford is the the lack of capacity on the B&A from the Al Pearlman single-tracking, which forces Conrail to allow Guilford to carry lots of connecting freight over the Hoosack Tunnel route.

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Old Timer

Sayeth futuremodal:

"For someone who claims to disdain this whole topic, you sure are putting in a lot of commentary."

Well, not as much as Mr. Sol; but you're right. It is a waste of time, so I'll quit.

Thanks for the motivation to do so.

Old Timer

Good call Old timer, even when your in the right, sometimes you just have to conceed defeat to c lose minded people.

[Anonymous]

Sayeth futuremodal:

"For someone who claims to disdain this whole topic, you sure are putting in a lot of commentary."

Well, not as much as Mr. Sol; but you're right. It is a waste of time, so I'll quit.

Thanks for the motivation to do so.

Old Timer

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by AnthonyV

To Michael Sol:

I find your analysis of railroad dieselization facinating, especially the data per revenue ton shown earlier. However, I do not understand your definition of inflation index.

Inflation indexes are problematic. Without them numbers can lack context. With adjustments, other aspects are taken out of context.

My comment that inflation was negligible is based on a conventional view of inflation. Thirty six percent of the inflation that occured during that period occured 1944-1949, before dieselization on the Milwaukee was substantially far along. From 1950 onward, however, annual inflation ranged from -1% to as high as 8% but averaging through 1962 only 1.8% annually. That is negligble inflation by conventional or historical standards. Does inflation add up? Well, certainly.

QUOTE: Based on data from several sources (Inflationdata.com is one), inflation from 1944 to 1962 resulted in a 75 percent increase in prices. Applying this to your locomotive cost data of $0.42 per ton in 1944 results in a cost of $0.74 per ton in 1962, which is exactly the cost you show for 1962. Stated another way, overall locomotive costs were the the same in 1962 as in 1944 expressed in constant dollars. Obviously, this is only true if the data that I used is applicable to a railroad.

Well, that of course is the point: any practical gains from dieselization were swallowed up by financing charges to support dieselization. There was no net gain from dieselization. As you point out, despite the expenditure of over 100 million dollars, the retirement of $40 million in good assets, and additional expenditures for new facilities which are not examined here, the costs of supporting motive power -- fuel, maintenance and financingt -- were the same, adjusted for inflation, in 1962 as in 1944. Entirely because of the financing charges.

However, in reality, railroads desperately needed net gains in all areas of their operations. As you note, Dieselization is an area where they did not get them. As it happens, compared to all other areas of railroad operation, Dieselization is the only area where railroads enjoyed no improvement whatsoever, despite the investment of hundreds of millions of dollars of desperately needed capital.

The problem is more profound however. The 1950s was a period of substantial productivity increases. Railroading in particular had to seek improvements: the status quo was not enough for any industry. Simply keeping pace with inflation was not enough. Revenues were falling. Efficiencies in all areas of operation were staying well ahead of both inflation and declining revenues. The single point of failure was in the dieselization effort.

Inflation indexes, out of context, don't show a clear picture. However, creating self-identifying indexes can be useful. In this instance, each classification is given an initial index value of 100. Intrinsic changes relative to the index then can be easily viewed and understood.

In the folowing graph, "Indexes" are shown.

Here, direct costs associated with dieselization are indexed at 100 for 1944. Pretty much still an all steam fleet. These include fuel, maintenance and repair costs, and financing costs. Fuel and maintenance improvments were not enough to keep pace with financing charges.

The Index value for Revenue is obviously the key to measuring effective productivity. If the index of other categories is less than the Revenue and Operating Expenses Index, the company is obtaining useful efficiencies. If the Index value exceeds the Revenue or Expense index value, the company is suffering a net loss to its earnings. However, as in Maintenance of Way, the Index value is so "efficient" you might wonder ....

You can see, comparing the overall Operatng Expense index, that it represents a virtual compromise between MOW and Motive Power direct charges. In order to offset the Dieselization charges, MOW had to yield to the Dieselization Index.

Two straight lines are included. One passes through the Motive power Index. It trends resolutely upward. The other passes through the Maintenance of Way Index. It trends resolutely downward. These are "trend lines" resulting from linear regression analysis which shows the probability of future trends based on the existing data.

The chart ends at 1962. You might guess as to the predictive power of these trend lines for direct Motive power expenses and for M-O-W expenses during the rest of the 1960s. Not good in either case. And, as the dieselization process grew into the second generation, the interest charges changed from the 1.5-1.8% of 1945-1950, and the 3-3.5% of the mid-1950s, to the 5,7, and 10% of the 1960s, then 12, 14 and 16% of the early 1970s. At each ratchet of the interest charges, the Diesel fleet grew more expensive, and MOW suffered further.



This is more useful, no doubt, than inflation based data.

However, the fact that the dieselization process generated an Index continually in excess of the Revenue and Expense Indexes, clearly at the sacrifice of the MOW Index, tells you succinctly exactly what happened, and how this was the precursor for the declining maintenance budgets of the 1960s, and the Rail Crisis of the 1970s, notwithstanding unattributed studies that allegedly say something else, but which apparently remain unpublished and Inaccessible.

Well, here are real numbers from the real statistical record.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Anonymous]

Old Timer

For the umteenth time - No one is claiming that dieselization caused ROI's to drop in half.

The hypothesis put forth is that the drop in ROI's over this period is directly correlated to the railroads' accumulation of unnecessary debt in order to be fully dieselized ASAP.

You seem to be stuck on this precept of yours that some are claiming diesels caused ROI's to drop. You need to read carefully, no one is saying that.

For someone who claims to disdain this whole topic, you sure are putting in a lot of commentary.

[AnthonyV]

To Michael Sol:

I find your analysis of railroad dieselization facinating, especially the data per revenue ton shown earlier. However, I do not understand your definition of inflation index.

Based on data from several sources (Inflationdata.com is one), inflation from 1944 to 1962 resulted in a 75 percent increase in prices. Applying this to your locomotive cost data of $0.42 per ton in 1944 results in a cost of $0.74 per ton in 1962, which is exactly the cost you show for 1962.

Stated another way, overall locomotive costs were the the same in 1962 as in 1944 expressed in constant dollars. Obviously, this is only true if the data that I used is applicable to a railroad.

Other infomation I would find interesting includes industry-wide ROI data from 1900 to 1940 (I can only find post 1940 data) and industry-wide cost per revenue ton mile in constant dollars over time.

Can you shed any light on this?

Thanks
Anthony V.

[nanaimo73]

QUOTE: Originally posted by CSSHEGEWISCH

Factors to be considered include the added cost of maintaining two sets of maintenance facilities at any location where steam would be operated unless steam and diesel operation would be strictly segregated.

Canadian Pacific's stategy of dieselizing by territory was a smart move. I don't know if many railroads did this. CP had to buy Baldwins because Alco's wait list was to long. Perhaps if the railroads had dieselized slower they would have stayed with one or two manufacturers. The Milwaukee Road bought Alcos, Baldwins, EMDs, GEs and Whitcombs during 1940, and then FMs starting in 1944. They must have wasted a lot of money on their parts inventory.

[CSSHEGEWISCH]

Keeping the newer steam power is service until it was fully depreciated makes sense if that fact is taken in isolation. Other factors to be considered include the added cost of maintaining two sets of maintenance facilities at any location where steam would be operated unless steam and diesel operation would be strictly segregated, and the increasing cost of obtaining replacement parts for steam as those parts become a smaller, virtually custom trade. N&W ran into the latter issue as it became virtually the only major operator of steam power.

[Anonymous]

Quoth APG45:
"Until then I will go with what makes the most sense. That is to accept that railroad professionals around the world know what they are talking about when they say the diesel locomotive was the best way to go."

There are lots of studies - the Brown is one example - that arise from someone waking up in the morning with a conclusion in mind and thinking "Wow -- maybe if I can get me some statistics and massage them right, I can support my conclusion and get me some publicity and money thereby!" The Brown obviously is one. First, it amounts to a rationalization after the fact. It formed no conclusion useful to anyone except those interested in establishing a revisionist view of history, a parallel universe, if you will.

While the bulk of my experience was in rail operations, I did work as a transportation consultant, both on my own and for a Washington DC firm; I also worked for the government agency charged with the creation of Conrail, which relied considerably on the work of consultants. While we had plenty of knocking to perform on plenty of rail managements, we found nothing to support the claim that their troubles were due to dieselization. As an adjunct, we did quick and dirty analyses of both the Rock Island and Milwaukee Road (both in dire straits) and, again, found nothing to support the present claim.

So cite whom you please, Michael and futuremodal. You have convinced yourselves. You're not having much luck convincing the rest of us.

Old Timer

[MJ4562]

A lot of statistics and a few studies have been thrown around but no one has really proven anything in this thread. The best way to make headway in this discussion is to review the Brown study to pick it apart and decide for ourselves how good their work is.

Until then I will go with what makes the most sense. That is to accept that railroad professionals around the world know what they are talking about when they say the diesel locomotive was the best way to go.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Old Timer
I'm sorry that you think I don't grasp the situation. In reality, I grasp it very nicely, thank you.

As usual, a strong opinion without a shred of proof.

I am reminded, as usual, of Albro Martin's obsequious remark to D.J. Russell, marvelling at how the railroad industry could manage to always have such first class executives despite the crippling regulation then besetting railroads, and how he was taken aback at Russell's observation: "Why, Mr. Martin, I'm not sure that we did."

I remain impressed at how observers, inside and outside of the industry, continue to speak of the industry's careful analysis of needs and attention to "the bottom line" without ever explaining how this is so for an industry that has not been able to earn its cost of capital for nearly 80 years.

My earlier charts did not show well the effects "on the bottom line" since they did not directly take into account the drops in tonnage during the time.Taking "the bottom line" into account where it counts the most, the Milwaukee Road performance during its era of dieselization is perhaps best directly shown by reducing the data to dollars of expenditure per revenue ton of freight carried. Naturally, since the next remark would be "well, what about inflation," an inflation index is also shown. There was virtually non-existent inflation during the period.

Here's the graph.

Click on the graph and it will show a larger image in your browser.

Now, Milwaukee was for all practical purposes all diesel by 1956. Everything after that represents purely diesels and electrics. Prior to 1948, it was 10% diesel-electric. By 1953, it was about 50/50. Milwaukee Road dieselized as or more rapidly than any comparable Class I railroad.

Yet, where are the positive results?

Maintenance costs of motive power per revenue ton were, if anything, overall slightly higher after dieselization than before. Where's the benefit?

Fuel costs are slightly higher after dieselization than in 1944 when Milwaukee operated 1094 steam engines and only 79 diesels. Where's the benefit?

Financing costs by 1962 now exceeded the costs of both fuel and maintenance per revenue ton. Since neither maintenance nor fuel costs appreciably improved, how did the substantial increase in financing charges make the "bottom line" better? What did it actually buy?

Finally, as the graph shows, the combined charges of fuel, maintenance, and financing charges by 1962 were nearly twice the operating costs, per revenue ton, as in 1944 when Steam was by far the primary motive power on the Milwaukee Road.

So what caused the significant increase in costs directly associated with dieselization, and how did this help the railroad's "bottom line"?

Assuming this was true for all railroads, does a doubling of the operating costs account reasonably for a 50% drop in ROI?

Well ......?

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Anonymous]

Futuremodal sayeth:

"I find it fancinating that you seem to take the whole idea of premature dieselization as a personal affront, rather than accepting the study and the concept for what it is."

What idea of premature dieselization? Who dieselized prematurely? The last big railroad to dieselize was N&W, and they waited until the costs per GTM/TH favored the diesels, and then steam was gone.

I don't know of any railroad that dieselized prematurely. I know several railroads, the Southern being most prominent, that would like to have dieselized a lot earlier than they did.

You cite this Brown study as some kind of gospel which you think proves that everybody screwed up. As long as you think that way, trying to explain anything else to you is like trying to explain reality to a Democrat.

But the Brown study (which I admit I haven't studied, simple-minded me) is subject to the same prejudices as any other. You choose to accept it for what it is, whatever it may be. It doesn't seem to have changed history in the least.

I don't accept the premise, but then again, I'm just simple-minded.

Old Timer

[Anonymous]

so Old Timer,

The Brown study is, in your opinion, faulty because it ascribes the most likely variables for the ROI drop instead of using your presumed variables, the latter of which have become the status quo due to it's ease of acceptance for the simple minded. Is that about it?

I find it fancinating that you seem to take the whole idea of premature dieselization as a personal affront, rather than accepting the study and the concept for what it is.

[Modelcar]

....Yes, most of it. But I better quailfy that....One really doesn't know just how fast the economy would have improved and caused demand....We were still trying to work our way out of the terrible economy from the depths of the great depression. So if for some reason it would have started to recover...{without the advent of the war}, then I believe diesel would have been moving in as replacement power as needed.....

[germanium]

When you consider the costs of the infrastructure needed for steam power, I'm surprised that diesels didn't take over earlier. A plausible explanation is that railroad managements did not feel that the diesel was a proven enough tool in railroad use, but steam was, obviously, a known quantity. If the war had not interrupted, would all steam have been gone by (say) 1945 ?
What are your opinions, gentlemen ?

[rrandb]

The N&W owned coal mines and only had to haul the "free fuel". They too had to eventually throw in the towel. Many railroads would have dieselised sooner but WWII forced them to purchase new steam due too wartime restrictions on productiion of diesels. They were needed for maritime use. Once the "F" unit production started again it never stopped. All major steam builders attempted to offer diesels. They were part of this same conspiricy that led to there demise. Alas it was too little too late. [2c]

[daveklepper]

Swichers (and branchline railcars) were the first diesels on possibliy most railroads.

[nanaimo73]

Michael-
If I understand the theory you have mentioned, the railroads should have replaced their steam switchers first, starting around 1939. The rest of the steam power should have been kept as long as it was economical.
During the period from 1945 to 1952, does the theory say the old, out-of-date steam power should have been replaced with more modern steam, or with a gradual dieselization ?

And regarding the CMSP&P Freight Motors, would you know if they kept their friction bearings to the end ?

[cpbloom]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Old Timer

Michael Sol and you would have this forum believe that after WWII all railroad managements, seduced by the promise of quick savings in operating and maintenance costs with diesels, got rid of steam without thought of the costs of financing the change

I agree, because when I read this topic it seems that this is what they are trying to imply.[2c]

[rrandb]

QUOTE: Originally posted by GP40-2

QUOTE: Originally posted by rrandb

So evidently shipyards were just as successful as the diesel builders in convincing the maritime industry to make a wholesale switch from steam to diesel. This is not just a case of smoke and mirrors by the EMD salesmen. I remember several years ago the american coal industry talked of sponsering a new steam engine. It was to be a steam electric but we are still waiting for a protoype. It never got any further than drawings. If the coal industry can find a way to get what was historically one of there best customers(railroads) back then they will. They are working on it but the technoligy still needs more development. [2c]

Just make synthetic diesel out of the stuff, and you have the railroads back as customers, WITHOUT all the expense of designing a different form of motive power. That, by the way, is where the industry will be heading in spite of the steam dreams some of you railfans have.

Trust me they are working on a direct injection internal combustion Coal based motor and not just for railroads. Its just a matter of time. Those "steamers" will be back. BMW has a prototype but uses gasoline too!!!

[Anonymous]

Sayeth Futuremodal:

"Old Timer,

If I may.....

Mr. Sol did not say, nor did he infer, that dieselization caused any rallroads to go bankrupt. What he said is that debt accumulation from financing massive dieselization caused ROI's to drop in half, a direct correlation. Why you still can't grasp that is anybody's guess.

And when you use the ole' "I notice you haven't provided documentation for my false ascertion" routine, well, you just look silly."

My problem that you think I can't grasp is basically this: Michael Sol and you would have this forum believe that after WWII all railroad managements, seduced by the promise of quick savings in operating and maintenance costs with diesels, got rid of steam without thought of the costs of financing the change (I say all managements, but the N&W was an exception, paying cash for its original dieselization and the facilities to maintain diesels).

I'm sorry that you think I don't grasp the situation. In reality, I grasp it very nicely, thank you. I can assure you first, that the drop in ROI had little or nothing to do with the costs of buying diesels (and I've seen no documentation that my conclusion is wrong), and that there was not a railroad involved that didn't take a hard look at the WHOLE situation, including financing, before they went for the diesels. To say they did is to indict all railroad managements for lacking enough foresight, and in that you're dead wrong.

Railroad managements might have been shortsighted in a lot of areas back then, and I'd be the last to argue that they weren't (having been around, back then), but figuring the cost of capital and the long-term implications of heavy investment is not something they'd skimp on. If you and Mr. Sol are looking for a cause for the drop in ROI, you're going to have to look elsewhere. There are plenty of places to look.

Old Timer