Main Line Electrifications

[Anonymous]

MichaelSol:

Amount of substations per sections does not matter really - the thing is that you cannot really go above ~2kA continuus without some major engineering in place. To lower currents you need to increase voltage. 6 kV DC - feasible, but anything more then this... I dunno. There might be problems with extinguishing arc with DC voltages so high and possible tight clearances.

On 3kV DC a typical 8000 hp universal loco may go as high as 4 kA. Getting more of them on a single section - bad thing... But not a problem with 25 kV AC (or 15 kV AC - for that matter).

I suspect that the 5 kV loco costs are not an issue now :)

QUOTE: This was something we noted: AC locomotives appeared to have shorter economic service lives than standard DC equipment.

With many AC locos reaching 50 year time frame... Besides - noone builds straight DC locos anymore.

QUOTE: This no doubt remains true for electric locomotives as well. And, as Alan points out, anything placing voltages on the order of 20k, 25k or 50k directly into the confines of a locomotive body shell that is then converting that power to DC and back to AC again, represents a lot of high voltage activity in a very small space.

Oh come on - you know it is not true. In a comparsion to a straight DC loco an interior of a modern AC loco is just a set of boxes. No 3kV relay boxes, switches etc. ANd the HIgh voltage goes as far as the transformer. Usually all connections are made on the roof of the loco. There is no live 25kV in the vehicle.

QUOTE: Russian Railways reports 56 empoyee deaths per year related to electrification -- as opposed to other railway related causes -- apparently most of them occuring on AC sections.

Sources?

Anyhoo - SZD employs about 1,5-2 million people. Stellar safety record...

QUOTE: However, future planning does not seem to account for the fact that 100kv, 200 kv, 350 kv and 500 kv AC supply sources will not be available in the not-so-distant future, as these lines are converted to DC for its inherent long distance transmission efficiency and environmental advantages.

3 phase AC is the cheapest form of moving energy. Period. HVDC is used where it is impossible to string typical high tension line - usually to connect an island to a mainland or to connect two off-phase systems. Cost of a high power converter is astronomical.

QUOTE: Well, 3600 vDC costs about $45,000 per mile to electrify, heavy conductor and all. This $1 mi per mile figure sounds inordinately high.

Omg - check current prices.

Recently, to upgrade an existing catenery to 200 kmh polish railways paid ~$250.000/km. That works out to $400k per mile (2 tracks) - that is sans substations, connection ot the power grid and masts. 1mil/mile is usual cost.

$45k will not buy you the necessary wire, let alone the whole catenary ;)

Townsend:

Except for a few rare circumstances (like arc furnaces) noone uses 100+ kV for anything else then transmission.

In this part of the world 3kV DC stations are fed from 6 to 20 kV 50hz, stepped down to 3,6 kV/50 hz then rectified, and smoothed.

To get from 110 kV the voltage usually goes down 110 -> 40 -> 20 -> 10/6 kV.

[arbfbe]

Moving the electricity and powering the locomotives are two completely different engineering problems. The MILW solved them by using high voltage AC in pretty thin wires to get the power from the dams in Montana to the substations along the line. There the conversion to DC was made to power the locomotives. The locomotives were supplied directly by the trolley wire which was supplemented the entire route byt a substantial copper feeder. The feeder wires were 8 or 10 times the size of the catenary wire or the HVAC lines. These heavy copper cables would have been prohibitively expensive to use to move DC from the dams to the mainline. Poles would have had to have been really close together to support the weight realtive to the length. I would suggest any future railroad electrification would use the same technology. Solid state electronics, computer automation and technological advances make the cost of a substation less of a capital constraint than when the MILW electrified their lines in the early 1900s.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by uzurpator

QUOTE: [i]from Michael Sol/[i]However, future planning does not seem to account for the fact that 100kv, 200 kv, 350 kv and 500 kv AC supply sources will not be available in the not-so-distant future, as these lines are converted to DC for its inherent long distance transmission efficiency and environmental advantages.

3 phase AC is the cheapest form of moving energy. Period. HVDC is used where it is impossible to string typical high tension line - usually to connect an island to a mainland or to connect two off-phase systems. Cost of a high power converter is astronomical.

This is pretty outdated. And more words like "astronomical."

AC was preferred as recently as the 1970s but that view began to change in that decade as engineers looked at the overwhelming success of the John Day Dam HVDC line to California.

It does however underscore the fact that railway engineering is often guided by conventional wisdoms rather than ongoing analysis.

This is the current view on HvDC.

With sources.

According to Siemens Power Engineering Guide, Transmission & Distribution, 2004, p. 36, the primary advantage of DC for high voltage transmission is "economic transmission of bulk power over long distances." They also note that it is used "for connection of asynchronous power grid systems," and for "connection of synchronous but weak power grid systems," as well as for "increasing the transmission capacity of existing rights-of-way." 1/36, p. 1.

Siemens notes that HVDC systems can "stabilize weak AC links or supply even more active power, where the AC system reaches the short-circuit capability," but that, in cases where bulk power is transmitted over long distances, which they see as 1,000 km or more, the HVDC is economically superior to HVAC as it can transmit more power, more efficiently.

A paper entitled "High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) Transmission Systems Technology Review Paper" by Rudervall, Carpentier, and Sharma, prepared for the World Bank, listed the advantages of HVDC over HVAC in the following order: environmental advantages, the most economical to build and operate, facilitates asynchronous connections, power flow control, and the stability and power quality of the transmission.

According to these gentlemen, the cost of HVAC systems begins to exceed the cost of construction of a comparable HVDC system when the transmission distance exceeds 670 km which is only 419 miles. At 1000 miles, the cost of a comparable HVDC system is 75% the cost of an HVAC system, and the differential increases as distance increases, that is, the cost of the HVAC systems increases more rapidly than the cost of the HVDC with increasing distance. [p. 6].

They specifically note: "The investment cost for for HVDC converter stations are higher than for high voltage AC substations. On the other hand, the costs of transmission medium (overhead lines and cables), land acquisition/right of way costs are lower in the HVDC case. Moreover, the operation and maintenance costs are lower in the HVDC case. Initial loss levels are high in the HVDC system, but they do not vary with distance. In contrast, loss levels increase with distance in a high voltage AC system." [p. 7].

Interestingly, "technological developments have tended to push HVDC system costs downward, while environmental considerations have resulted in pushing up the high voltage AC system costs."

The largest project on earth is in Brazil, and dwarfs our Bonneville Power project lines, carries 1,440 MW. It operates at 600 kVDC with a rated power of 6300 MW, transmitting over 490 miles, and was gradually phased in to current capacity in the mid to late 1980s. "HVDC was chosen basically for two reasons: partly to be able to supply power from the 50 Hz generators to the 60 Hz system, and partly because an HVDC link was economically preferable for the long distance involved." In 1990, an HVDC project in India brought on line a 500 k VDC system carrying 1500 MW over 500 miles, and the "most important reasons" for using the DC system were "better economics, halved right of way requirements, lower transmission losses, and better stability and control."

As I remarked when I suggested that DC utilizes the cross section of the conductor more efficiently than AC, "HVDC can carry more power for a given size of conductor." [p. 14].

The World Bank study states that the general convention for choosing HVDC over HVAC is when "large amounts of power (>500 MW) needed to be transmitted over long distances (>500 km, 310 miles). Transmitting under water was the next most commonly considered reason, and connecting asynchronous AC systems the third most common reason for using HVDC.

The paper points out, however, that technological advances are continuing to bring the costs of HVDC installations down compared to HVAC, and that the economic feasibility point in favor of HVDC systems as a transmission medium -- as opposed to a purpose relating to stability or effectuating trans-grid power transfer -- may now be as low as 200 MW and only 40 miles. This is very significant, not only because of the rapidity with which this transmission frontier was reached -- this was fantasy just ten years ago -- but how close this is, relatively speaking, to requirements of heavy DC railway electrification, particularly in the context of auxilliary use of railway corridors for electric power transmission.

Indeed, Siemens reports that 10 of 17 recent HVDC installations that it has made around the world were for long distance transmission purposes, rather than for other -- stability or AC system integration purposes. What is also interesting is that of the remaining seven systems which Siemens has constructed, so called back-to-back, several have been built in the US to facilitate AC grid connections. There are now a number of DC systems which are now being constructed simply to buffer AC systems. The "ease of conversion" which long justified AC technology has been found to have serious defects and Edison would probably be gratified that engineers now must turn to DC to permit AC to AC systems transmission. Interestingly, I can find no cost analysis that adds the cost of these HVDC back-to-back systems to any "true" cost of the associated HVAC systems that require them. The HVDC systems have no such hidden but necessary costs.

A U.S. Department of Energy Symposium held August 3, 2001, "Analysis and Concepts to Address Electric Infrastructure Needs", strongly suggested expanding general use of HVDC lines in the United States, arguing that conversion of existing HVAC lines to DC would double the capacity of such systems and that fact alone justified a review of existing HVAC systems as a way of meeting demand which has exceeded current transmission capacity in the United States. A prophetic paper given the recent AC power grid fiasco in the Northeast. Engineers at the symposium pointed out that not only could HVDC move substantially more power than a similar HVAC system, but that "for an AC line with the same conductor and insulators per phase, losses were 50% higher" than for the HVDC systems and the efficiency of HVDC systems meant power savings. This was the basis for my statement that, the longer the system, the greater the DC advantage. "A simple rule of thumb may be applied in that the cost of a DC transmission line may be 80 to 100% of the cost of an AC line whose rated line voltage is the same as the rated pole to ground voltage of the DC line ... [however] the cost advantage of DC transmission for traversing long distances is that it may be rated at twice the power flow capacity of an AC line of the same voltage." "HVDC Transmission,"Dennis Woodford, Manitoba HVDC Research Centre, 3/18/98.

An IEEE paper suggests the same: "Challenging Opportunities for Incoming Engineers in HVDC Transmission Technology," Katancevic, IEEE Paper, 2002
Winter Meeting: "Cost of transmission losses caused with HVDC are far and away lower than costs of HVAC transmission losses." ... "For very long distance transmission links, ... decisive [also] are the construction costs [in favor of HVDC]."

The point of all of this is that conventional wisdoms can create compelling orthodoxies even among professionals. Even the history books write, as a form of drama, the "battle" between Tesla and Edison over AC vs DC and that "AC won." This became a conventional wisdom that somehow DC was just a electrical stepchild, an obsolete approach to mass electrification that never could go very far for a variety of technical reasons. However, as current trends indicate, DC is now, ironically, the medium that enjoys cutting edge technological advances which demonstrate decisive economic superiority over AC in precisely those areas which the general misconception believed DC was most inferior, high voltage transmission.

This is why DC railway electrification papers are once again as common as AC papers at international conferences.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[greyhounds]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by greyhounds

I'd reccomend a back copy of "Railroad History #181" - autumn 1999 from the Railway & Locomotive Historical Society. It has two good articles on the subject.

1) "Risk and the Real Cost of Electrification" by William L Withuhn
2) "Why the Santa Fe Isn't Under Wires" by Wallace W. Abbey

Good writing on why the decision was made not to electrify.

I know one of the gentlemen quite well, and have an immense personal regard for him, but, with all due respect, of these two gentlemen one is an historian and the other a retired public relations executive. and neither has a management or engineering background. Railroad History, while I enjoy the journal, is usually not thought of as a serious journal of engineering analysis. What, exactly, did they discuss?

Best regards, Michael Sol

"One is a historian?" He was curator of transportation at the Smithsonian when the article was written. (Maybe he still is.) I don't think he'd put his name, or the Smithsonian's, on a poorly researched paper.

Anyway, the main point was that the financial risks of electrification are too great. The projected ROI was fantastic, on the order of 32% for the UP. But, the costs were all up front and the payback was years in the future. The company would have a negative cash flow for 9-10 years. Sensativity analysis showed great risks if everything didn't go as planned.

They were projecting diesel fuel and electricity costs 10 years plus out. There was no certainty. In the end it was a "bet the company" proposition. If everything went right there would be tremendous benifits, but if everything didn't go right the corporation would be destroyed financially. There is no way everthing was going to go right. The risk was too great.

Now they did note that the major expense was the new locomotives. If existing diesel electrics can be modified to operate as straight electrics that may reduce the risks.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by greyhounds
"One is a historian?" He was curator of transportation at the Smithsonian when the article was written. (Maybe he still is.)

He is Curator of Transportation History at the Smithsonian.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[jchnhtfd]

Quote from Michael Sol: 'It does however underscore the fact that railway engineering is often guided by conventional wisdoms rather than ongoing analysis.' regarding the tendency of railway engineers to be, in his view, somewhat conservative. Quite true. It is part of the nature of the beast: railway engineers are trained to think in terms of what is going to work, and keep working, for anywhere from 50 years to a century, and it does sometimes give the impression of being rather conservative. There are, however, examples to the contrary, and instances of innovative thinking. Unfortunately, the corpses of the relevant advocates litter the landscape, and tend to deter the rest of us from being too radical.

The remarks regarding high voltage DC transmission for bulk power transfer are quite well taken, and I, for one, have no problem with them. They are all true. They are also almost irrelevant to the ostensible topic of this thread, which is main line electrification.

As is true of so many things in capitalist societies, the question of main line electrification, never mind the details of how it is to be implemented, is primarily an economic question; engineering, and engineering choices, are an important part of the equation, and are gone over with great care to determine the best return on investment. There is no room for ideology there. The fundamental question, which the railway and the engineer must solve, is 'what is the best way (in terms of return on capital) to move the expected traffic from point X to point Y'. If it turns out that a wheelbarrow is the best approach, so be it. If it involves electrifying -- by whatever means -- a given line, so be it. In most cases, it doesn't involve electrification.

If it does involve electrification, then the engineer is -- again -- faced with the task of determining the best way to do it.

Yes, railway engineers tend to be conservative. Frequently, railway equipment and fixed assets appear to be (to the uninitiated) overbuilt. But, as I said above, I would still like to think that railway engineers produce a product with exceptional reliability and safety, at a reasonable cost.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by jchnhtfd

Quote from Michael Sol: 'It does however underscore the fact that railway engineering is often guided by conventional wisdoms rather than ongoing analysis.' regarding the tendency of railway engineers to be, in his view, somewhat conservative.

I think somewhere along the line, my point got missed.

I am speaking to the economic viability of an 80 year old system of railway electrification. I think that qualifies, by any analysis, as advocating a quite conservative view of railway electrification engineering. And this is particularly true from the standpoint of tens of thousands of miles of that system still existing and operating. Nothing is more conservative than well-engineered systems that continue to generate after nearly a century of operation a superb rate of return, for which modern propulsion systems still cannot match in terms of economic efficiency.

The problem is that in the discussion, many people are guided by conventional wisdoms. See the quote cited above: "3 phase AC is the cheapest form of moving energy. Period." Very emphatic. Very wrong. Yet, people seem to feel that this perception of AC power transmission is relevant to evaluating DC railway electrifications. That is found throughout this thread even though long distance transmission and locomotive power supply aren't quite the same things. Yet, that perception colors the debate.

Technology continues to change, in some cases requiring a reassessment of these conventional wisdoms that, in this case, makes assumptions that AC is just simply superior to DC. Since this is the startng place for many people -- see this thread -- the discussion doesn't go very far when the bias interferes with the discussion.

The first place that people, even engineers, start to fall flat on their face is this uninformed assumption: "AC is the cheapest form of moving energy. Period." To have a rational discussion, these mythologies have to be dispensed with. Once readers get the idea that these "inherent" advantages do not, in fact, exist at all, then the discussion can proceed to discuss genuine merits not simply obsolete ideas which not only distort the discussion, but are in fact wrong.

However, from the standpoint of future electrification, the steady, and remarkably rapid progress of HvDC suggests a trend to show that the very conventional reasons for AC railway electrification -- access to and ease of use of existing AC delivery installations -- will most likely become obsolete within our lifetimes. This is probable, not just possible. What is remarkable is that while much of the electrical engineering community is looking at this rapid evolution, this very thread, and indeed your post, shows the evidence that for this particular application -- railway electrification -- there is a stubborn resistance to even considering the operating and economic implications.

Something that good engineering, and in particular conservative engineering, always takes into account.

If there is a profound example of the advantages of conservative engineering, it is found in the 47,000 miles of existing 3kvDC railway electrification still operating around the world, nearly a century after the first wires for it were strung on the Milwaukee Road.

Hence, my point.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[greyhounds]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by greyhounds
"One is a historian?" He was curator of transportation at the Smithsonian when the article was written. (Maybe he still is.)

He is Curator of Transportation History at the Smithsonian.

Best regards, Michael Sol

Well the publication I cited says he is "curator of transportatiion", not "Curator of Transportation History". See page 80 of "Railroad History", autumn 1999, #181.

It's best if you don't pick at insignificant details.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by greyhounds

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by greyhounds
"One is a historian?" He was curator of transportation at the Smithsonian when the article was written. (Maybe he still is.)

He is Curator of Transportation History at the Smithsonian.

Best regards, Michael Sol

Well the book I cited says he is "curator of transportatiion", not Curator of Transportation History. See page 80 of "Railroad History", autumn 1999, #181.

It's best if you don't pick at insignificant details.

Railroad History apparently had a typo. I did not question you, you questioned my characterization of him as a historian. If you thought it important enough to question my characterization, don't be offended when you get an answer.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[bobwilcox]

Bill's current title is Curator, Division of Work and Industry, National Museum of American History. You can see his cv at: http://americanhistory.si.edu/about/staff.cfm?key=12&staffkey=706

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by bobwilcox

Bill's current title is Curator, Division of Work and Industry, National Museum of American History. You can see his cv at: http://americanhistory.si.edu/about/staff.cfm?key=12&staffkey=706

Greyhounds would characterize this as an insignificant detail.

The Smthsonian's staff page is at the following:

http://www.si.edu/ofg/Staffhp/withuhnw.htm

That page contains the following text:

William L. Withuhn
Curator of Transportation History

National Museum of American History
Smithsonian Institution
PO Box 37012
MRC 628
Washington, D.C. 20013-7012
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Research Interests
writing book, "The American Steam Locomotive: An Engineering History, 1880-1960."
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current Research Projects
"Woody Guthrie" (SITES); Smithsonian Presidio Trust Partnership Exhibits Proposal (San Francisco); Urban Transportatation Museum, Lowell National Historical Park (National Park Service, Lowell, Mass); "America On The Move," opening at NMAH 2004, a major Smithsonian reinstallation/exhibition of the social history of American transportation, 1876-2000.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recent Publications
"Rails Across America: A History of Railroads in North America," Smithmark Publishers (N.Y.), 1995.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[greyhounds]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by bobwilcox

Bill's current title is Curator, Division of Work and Industry, National Museum of American History. You can see his cv at: http://americanhistory.si.edu/about/staff.cfm?key=12&staffkey=706

Greyhounds would characterize this as an insignificant detail.

The Smthsonian's staff page is at the following:

http://www.si.edu/ofg/Staffhp/withuhnw.htm

That page contains the following text:

William L. Withuhn
Curator of Transportation History

National Museum of American History
Smithsonian Institution
PO Box 37012
MRC 628
Washington, D.C. 20013-7012
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Research Interests
writing book, "The American Steam Locomotive: An Engineering History, 1880-1960."
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current Research Projects
"Woody Guthrie" (SITES); Smithsonian Presidio Trust Partnership Exhibits Proposal (San Francisco); Urban Transportatation Museum, Lowell National Historical Park (National Park Service, Lowell, Mass); "America On The Move," opening at NMAH 2004, a major Smithsonian reinstallation/exhibition of the social history of American transportation, 1876-2000.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recent Publications
"Rails Across America: A History of Railroads in North America," Smithmark Publishers (N.Y.), 1995.

Best regards, Michael Sol

Well, we agree. I do characterize this as an insignificant detail. Whether the man is(was) "Curator of Transportation" or "Curator of Transporation History" at the Smithsonian has absolutely nothing to do with anything significant.

Discussion of his writing on why studies of establishing main line freight electrification in the US came up negative would be relavent and interesting - but you're stuck on his title. (There were such studies on the BN, ATSF, ICG, Conrail, and the UP, maybe more.) They produced no electrification. And what main line freight electrification that did exist, Conrail, Milwaukee, Virginian, etc. -- was shut down in favor of diesel operation.

Now understanding why would be interesting. And maybe things have changed.

But you want to argue about one word in a title.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: by greyhounds:Whether the man is(was) "Curator of Transportation" or "Curator of Transporation History" at the Smithsonian has absolutely nothing to do with anything significant.

This is typical. You brought it up -- ""Historian?".

Yes, I answered.

That's about as far as the discussion needed to go.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[jchnhtfd]

As a railway engineer, I will consider any technology which will help my railroad run better, last longer, and be cost effective. Power beams, if they ever prove feasible. Big springs. Whatever.

Mr. Sol appears to feel that his point has been missed; I haven't missed it. I am well aware of it.

Perhaps, however, he has missed mine?

End of participation.

James C. Hall, PhD, PE

[Murphy Siding]

It would be a genuine shame to *lose* an interesting thread with 73 views and 1026 views, over petty bickering.[V] Come on, guys-don't suck the fun out of this.

Thanks

[nanaimo73]

A few years ago I saw some video of large dump trucks at an open pit mine which ran on diesel engines. When they were climbing out of the pit they used catenary. Is this common ?

These trucks apear to be full electric.
http://www.mining-technology.com/contractors/transportation/gia/

[Leon Silverman]

These discussions compare the actions of the Milwaukee Railroad with various European railroads. Milwaukee financed, built, and ultimately discarded electrication as a private corporation. Correct me if I am wrong, but weren't the European railroad electrification financed and built by Government Organizations, equivalent to Britrak, Polandtrak, Germantrak, etc.? The fact that it might take a railroad like Union Pacific ten years to realize a positive return on investment means that electrication in the USA could only be financed by the US government. Considering our current preoccupation with the war on terror and hurricane recovery efforts, this is not likely to happen no matter what the economics are, even if you could claim it would ultimately eliminate our dependency on oil imports.

[daveklepper]

Regarding tunnels, a center third rail electrification would make more sense than overhead catenary which would limit clearances and preclude double stacks. This could be DC at 3000V

[greyhounds]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Leon Silverman

These discussions compare the actions of the Milwaukee Railroad with various European railroads. Milwaukee financed, built, and ultimately discarded electrication as a private corporation. Correct me if I am wrong, but weren't the European railroad electrification financed and built by Government Organizations, equivalent to Britrak, Polandtrak, Germantrak, etc.? The fact that it might take a railroad like Union Pacific ten years to realize a positive return on investment means that electrication in the USA could only be financed by the US government. Considering our current preoccupation with the war on terror and hurricane recovery efforts, this is not likely to happen no matter what the economics are, even if you could claim it would ultimately eliminate our dependency on oil imports.

No, we haven't shut down the country to repair huricane damage and fight the war. The O'Hare expansion got the go ahead, only to be stopped in court. But the Government was ready to act. Same with a lot of highway projects. The Interstate Highway System was constructed at the height of the Cold War. We can do more than one thing at a time.

Mainline freight electrification in the US would produce tremendous benifits - think of what would happen to the price of diesel fuel if the railroads didn't need near as much - but the risks of the huge capital costs have to be mitigated. There is a role for the government here in mitigating the risks.

How to structure this is an interesting question. The government can't assume all the risks or money will be wasted. And the taxpayers should get their money back. But expecting a private company to go into a negative cash flow situation for a decade is unrealistic. And any govt funds would include "strings" - these must be minimized. The railroads don't want to become puppets on those strings.

Right now, I don't have a clue as to how such a thing shold be structured - but it sure would be good if those perisables out of California (half of what is consumed in the US, not to mention Canada) could ride in the reefer units drawing power from the overhead wire instead of small diesel gen sets. And a train going downhill in dynamic could feed power to a train going uphill instead of wasting the energy, and, and, and!!

[bobwilcox]

There may be a Federal role for fixed investments other than electrification but we can't even get Amtrak's capital neeeds covered.

[greyhounds]

QUOTE: Originally posted by bobwilcox

There may be a Federal role for fixed investments other than electrification but we can't even get Amtrak's capital neeeds covered.

Please don't bring Amtrak into this. Amtrak is guaranteed to loose any money invested in it. This thing will create, not destroy, the country's wealth. It's not Amtrak. Joining the two will only make this less likely to occur.

[dehusman]

The problem with electrification isn't the transmission of the electricity. The problem is that you have to change engines or have special engines that are very expensive.

Dave H.

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by greyhounds

QUOTE: Originally posted by Leon Silverman

These discussions compare the actions of the Milwaukee Railroad with various European railroads. Milwaukee financed, built, and ultimately discarded electrication as a private corporation. Correct me if I am wrong, but weren't the European railroad electrification financed and built by Government Organizations, equivalent to Britrak, Polandtrak, Germantrak, etc.? The fact that it might take a railroad like Union Pacific ten years to realize a positive return on investment means that electrication in the USA could only be financed by the US government. Considering our current preoccupation with the war on terror and hurricane recovery efforts, this is not likely to happen no matter what the economics are, even if you could claim it would ultimately eliminate our dependency on oil imports.

No, we haven't shut down the country to repair huricane damage and fight the war. The O'Hare expansion got the go ahead, only to be stopped in court. But the Government was ready to act. Same with a lot of highway projects. The Interstate Highway System was constructed at the height of the Cold War. We can do more than one thing at a time.

Mainline freight electrification in the US would produce tremendous benifits - think of what would happen to the price of diesel fuel if the railroads didn't need near as much - but the risks of the huge capital costs have to be mitigated. There is a role for the government here in mitigating the risks.

How to structure this is an interesting question. The government can't assume all the risks or money will be wasted. And the taxpayers should get their money back. But expecting a private company to go into a negative cash flow situation for a decade is unrealistic. And any govt funds would include "strings" - these must be minimized. The railroads don't want to become puppets on those strings.

Right now, I don't have a clue as to how such a thing shold be structured - but it sure would be good if those perisables out of California (half of what is consumed in the US, not to mention Canada) could ride in the reefer units drawing power from the overhead wire instead of small diesel gen sets. And a train going downhill in dynamic could feed power to a train going uphill instead of wasting the energy, and, and, and!!

Hmmm. Government participation in rail infrastructure modernization? We covered that in the Open Access thread.

Chalk up another for OA!

[greyhounds]

QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal

QUOTE: Originally posted by greyhounds

QUOTE: Originally posted by Leon Silverman

These discussions compare the actions of the Milwaukee Railroad with various European railroads. Milwaukee financed, built, and ultimately discarded electrication as a private corporation. Correct me if I am wrong, but weren't the European railroad electrification financed and built by Government Organizations, equivalent to Britrak, Polandtrak, Germantrak, etc.? The fact that it might take a railroad like Union Pacific ten years to realize a positive return on investment means that electrication in the USA could only be financed by the US government. Considering our current preoccupation with the war on terror and hurricane recovery efforts, this is not likely to happen no matter what the economics are, even if you could claim it would ultimately eliminate our dependency on oil imports.

No, we haven't shut down the country to repair huricane damage and fight the war. The O'Hare expansion got the go ahead, only to be stopped in court. But the Government was ready to act. Same with a lot of highway projects. The Interstate Highway System was constructed at the height of the Cold War. We can do more than one thing at a time.

Mainline freight electrification in the US would produce tremendous benifits - think of what would happen to the price of diesel fuel if the railroads didn't need near as much - but the risks of the huge capital costs have to be mitigated. There is a role for the government here in mitigating the risks.

How to structure this is an interesting question. The government can't assume all the risks or money will be wasted. And the taxpayers should get their money back. But expecting a private company to go into a negative cash flow situation for a decade is unrealistic. And any govt funds would include "strings" - these must be minimized. The railroads don't want to become puppets on those strings.

Right now, I don't have a clue as to how such a thing shold be structured - but it sure would be good if those perisables out of California (half of what is consumed in the US, not to mention Canada) could ride in the reefer units drawing power from the overhead wire instead of small diesel gen sets. And a train going downhill in dynamic could feed power to a train going uphill instead of wasting the energy, and, and, and!!

Hmmm. Government participation in rail infrastructure modernization? We covered that in the Open Access thread.

Chalk up another for OA!

Yep! This is why it won't work. People will try to drag in their pet, unproven, projects like Amtak and Open Access. Instead of keeping it a straight project to electrify the main freight lines they'll try to load it up with their "pets".

The politicians will join in so they can "make a difference" and wield power.

Just buy some more diesel electrics and move the freight. Oh well, it was worth a thought.

[MichaelSol]

Well, in the 1970s, there was a government program for railroad electrification, administered by the FRA. No one took advantage of it. Milwaukee Road's legal department had run it through to final FRA approval, but Chairman Quinn failed to present it to the Board: politics trumped economics.

I do note that the railroads gladly participated in the 3R and 4R programs when government money was otherwise available, and gladly took advantage of government efforts to cut back on "excess capacity" by eliminating future needed capacity.

Whether government intervention into railroad infrastructure modernization would or wouldn't "work," the railroads jumped in with both feet to the extent that it created the basis for our modern infrastructure, however one might feel about that infrastructure.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by dehusman

The problem with electrification isn't the transmission of the electricity. The problem is that you have to change engines ...

How much do you think that problem costs?

Best regards, Michael Sol

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by greyhounds
Anyway, the main point was that the financial risks of electrification are too great. The projected ROI was fantastic, on the order of 32% for the UP. But, the costs were all up front and the payback was years in the future. The company would have a negative cash flow for 9-10 years. Sensativity analysis showed great risks if everything didn't go as planned.

Costs of any project are almost always up front. Something doesn't sound right here.

"The company would have a negative cash flow for 9-10 years." Guess what the negative cash flow period is for a new road diesel. Does Withun say? Isn't that important to know?

What was the risk analysis of staying with the same system, based on the well known historical trends that diesel fuel costs always trend up, while electric power costs almost always trend down?

This is the part that is usually missing: the analysis of the risk of not changing.

In 1970, electric power price per kilowatt hour averaged 8 cents in the US. In places like Montana with abundant Hydroelectric resources, the price was closer to 5 cents per kilowatt hour. Diesel fuel was less than 8 cents per gallon.

This year, electric power costs are at 4.5 cents per kilowatt hour in Montana (industrial), and range from 2.39 cents in Washington state (industrial) to 7 cents in Eastern states.

Diesel fuel has gone up from 8 cents per gallon in the early 1970s to $1.17 for railroads in 2004 to $2.19 this year. While we happen to think it's just awful, this isn't that far off the historical trend that has existed since WWII and, indeed, confirms that trend.

How does Withun deal with that historical probability in his analysis? I am curious.

Given that the historical trends have been well defined and accepted -- Bonneville Power Administration noted and recognized them, in fact emphasized them, in a railroad electrification proposal made to the Milwaukee Road and several other Western railroads (GN, NP, UP, and SP) in the early 1950s -- I have an impression from the description of the Withun article that it is likely that the real "risk" factor was not assessed. The question is interesting enough that I will get the paper and read it.

This is a standard business school problem: to do a risk analysis for the change, but not for staying the same. A single risk or sensitivity analysis is fairly meaningless without the corresponding risk analysis. It is the comparison of risks that is important, not "a" single risk.

After all, the risk of the staying the same is high. Most businesses ultimately fail when they stay the same, not when they change.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Tulyar15]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Leon Silverman

These discussions compare the actions of the Milwaukee Railroad with various European railroads. Milwaukee financed, built, and ultimately discarded electrication as a private corporation. Correct me if I am wrong, but weren't the European railroad electrification financed and built by Government Organizations, equivalent to Britrak, Polandtrak, Germantrak, etc.?

Most of the European ones may have been but the Southern railway in England electrification programme in the 1920's and 1930's was done under private ownership.
The French TGV's were originally going to be gas turbine (as was the first British Advanced Passenger Train) but the oil price hike after 1974 saw the decision to go for electric TGV's instead.

As for the problem of changing locos, the Southern Region of British Rail solved that by developing the electro-diesel - an electric loco with a small diesel engine. Also I believe some railroads in the vicinity of New York city fit pick up shoes to their diesel locos so they can draw power from the third rail when running on electrified lines thereabouts.

[Isambard]

Can anyone comment regarding potential electrification of Canadian railway mainlines in view of climbing diesel fuel rates and increasing traffic density e.g. the Quebec City-Montreal-Toronto-Windsor corridor or the Calgary-Vancouver or Edmonton -Vancouver routes? Viable propositions or pipe dreams?

[greyhounds]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by greyhounds
Anyway, the main point was that the financial risks of electrification are too great. The projected ROI was fantastic, on the order of 32% for the UP. But, the costs were all up front and the payback was years in the future. The company would have a negative cash flow for 9-10 years. Sensativity analysis showed great risks if everything didn't go as planned.

Costs of any project are almost always up front. Something doesn't sound right here.

"The company would have a negative cash flow for 9-10 years." Guess what the negative cash flow period is for a new road diesel. Does Withun say? Isn't that important to know?

What was the risk analysis of staying with the same system, based on the well known historical trends that diesel fuel costs always trend up, while electric power costs almost always trend down?

This is the part that is usually missing: the analysis of the risk of not changing.

In 1970, electric power price per kilowatt hour averaged 8 cents in the US. In places like Montana with abundant Hydroelectric resources, the price was closer to 5 cents per kilowatt hour. Diesel fuel was less than 8 cents per gallon.

This year, electric power costs are at 4.5 cents per kilowatt hour in Montana (industrial), and range from 2.39 cents in Washington state (industrial) to 7 cents in Eastern states.

Diesel fuel has gone up from 8 cents per gallon in the early 1970s to $1.17 for railroads in 2004 to $2.19 this year. While we happen to think it's just awful, this isn't that far off the historical trend that has existed since WWII and, indeed, confirms that trend.

How does Withun deal with that historical probability in his analysis? I am curious.

Given that the historical trends have been well defined and accepted -- Bonneville Power Administration noted and recognized them, in fact emphasized them, in a railroad electrification proposal made to the Milwaukee Road and several other Western railroads (GN, NP, UP, and SP) in the early 1950s -- I have an impression from the description of the Withun article that it is likely that the real "risk" factor was not assessed. The question is interesting enough that I will get the paper and read it.

This is a standard business school problem: to do a risk analysis for the change, but not for staying the same. A single risk or sensitivity analysis is fairly meaningless without the corresponding risk analysis. It is the comparison of risks that is important, not "a" single risk.

After all, the risk of the staying the same is high. Most businesses ultimately fail when they stay the same, not when they change.

Best regards, Michael Sol

It's not that the costs were upfront. It's that they were so large and upfront.

It was a "bet the compny" proposition with a reasonable chance that they could loose. All the analysis came down indicating the risk was too great. Claiming the analysis were wrong, every one of them, is a road to nowhere. A way needs to be found to mitigate the risk.

This wasn't a case of one management team arriving at the wrong conclusion, something that does happen. There were numerous independant electricfication studies done. Not one of them produced an electrification project.

I don't think a diesel purchase involves much negative cash flow. GE will finance its equipment. The diesel locomotive will begin to produce revenue ton miles almost as soon as it arrives on the property. That revenue will offset the finance charges. And diesels can be bought incramentally on shorter lead times that electrification. There's more certainty in the projections with the shorter time frames. Remember, if the projections about diesel fuel costs, electricity costs, etc. ten years out are wrong, the company will be destroyed. They're risking "other people's money" on what will happen ten years from now. Not exactly a prudent thing to do.

Why don't we quit arguing over old analysis and try to come up with a way to reduce the risks of electrification? I think that's the key.

There is a need to:

1) convert existing diesel electrics to also operate as straight electrics - reducing the capital costs greatly.

2) deal with the electric current in a way that doesn't require rebuilding of the entire signal system. Including grade crossing protection.

3) assure an uninteruptable adequate power supply

4) keep "pet" projects such as open access, Amtrak, lower freight rates for farmers, etc. out of the process.

Do these four things and the risks of electrification will be reduced significantly. Will they be reduced enough to justify it, who knows?