I think I was in the military when this happened as a youngun. Which is probably why I never heard about it until now. What I found surprising is this happened with a three person crew on the freight train. The conclusion of the accident investigation is two or possibly three were asleep or incapacitated. Also, a little scary that many procedures and backups failed at once which I guess PTC will hopefully serve as the final backup now?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XIym5XnGlmY
The video creates more questions than it answers.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
FYI.
Thank You.
BaltACDThe video creates more questions than it answers.
Agree, more drama than facts.
I generally ignore the drama in the video. Too much drama on various social media platforms today and well even seeping into most of society. I remember about 7-10 years ago when I first saw my first "safe room" which I am sure is an alien concept for railroad companies. It is just sad.
If your unaware, a "safe room" is where employees go when the stress of working in a comfortable climate controlled office is just too much and one has to leave the work area and go and relax on a overstuffed sofa in front of a color TV with refreshments close by.
CMStPnP BaltACD The video creates more questions than it answers. Agree, more drama than facts. I generally ignore the drama in the video. Too much drama on various social media platforms today and well even seeping into most of society. I remember about 7-10 years ago when I first saw my first "safe room" which I am sure is an alien concept for railroad companies. It is just sad. If your unaware, a "safe room" is where employees go when the stress of working in a comfortable climate controlled office is just too much and one has to leave the work area and go and relax on a overstuffed sofa in front of a color TV with refreshments close by.
BaltACD The video creates more questions than it answers.
CSX CADS has not had any 'safe rooms'. A 'break room' with vending machines and outlets for staff to plug in their phone chargers and leave their phones in the break room since having them at their desk is verboten.
The video was part of a TV series that made the rounds on what used to be the more educational cable channels. I've seen it a few times, but not recently.
Jeff
Just saw this exact program on Smithsonian Chanel, "Air Disasters", of all programs. Interestinly, it had a different (American) narrator. The hour preceding this was an episode about the SP derailment coming down Cajon Pass in the 1980's which resulted in a gas line explosion and several houses destroyed and multiple casualties.
TLC used to stand for "The Learning Channel" .. my kids laughed at that now.
Did the Alerter replace the Deadman's switch or was there a time when they had both?
By the time of the 1986 Dalehurst crash CN had already started purchasing new locomotives with alerters instead of deadman pedals and was in the process of retrofitting older units with them. The second unit on train 413 (CN 5104) had an alerter, but as it was a spartan cab SD40 it was marshalled in a trailing position and a safety cab GP38-2W (CN 5586) was made the leader.
The documentary gets the basic facts of the crash right. The freight crew ran a red light, most likely due to fatigue and/or the engineer's poor health.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
SD70Dude By the time of the 1986 Dalehurst crash CN had already started purchasing new locomotives with alerters instead of deadman pedals and was in the process of retrofitting older units with them. The second unit on train 413 (CN 5104) had an alerter, but as it was a spartan cab SD40 it was marshalled in a trailing position and a safety cab GP38-2W (CN 5586) was made the leader. The documentary gets the basic facts of the crash right. The freight crew ran a red light, most likely due to fatigue and/or the engineer's poor health.
The Conductor's 'testimony' had all the truthfulness as did the head end crew's absence of testimony. The Conductor was just as asleep as was the head end crew.
Have participated in a number of Carrier held 'Investigations'. When faced with 'facts' the guilty will still try to 'blame the equipment'.
At the time of the incident, did CN Rules require trains to call signals over the Road Radio Channel? Did CN Rules require the Conductor on the rear to respond with the identification of the signal that the head end called?
BaltACD The Conductor's 'testimony' had all the truthfulness as did the head end crew's absence of testimony. The Conductor was just as asleep as was the head end crew.
That is my belief as well, though no one will ever be able to prove it 100% for certain.
Wayne Smith spent the layover at his away-from-home girlfriend's apartment, she being one of the Edson operators. The official documents mention the two of them "going for coffee" but from what I've heard there was something much stronger on the table at her apartment. I believe it's more likely that Smith didn't get a wink of sleep that night, as opposed to the 3.5 to 4 hours he claimed. At this point it is also worth noting that Smith was not drug tested after the crash, as he appeared to be sober and alert and participated in emergency calls and the attempt to move the underailed portion of 413's tail end after the crash (more on that in a bit).
This operator's father was a prominent CN official who continued to be heavily involved in the CN Pensioners Association until his fairly recent death, and she went on to have a long career as a dispatcher. Neither of their names appear on the Foisy Inquiry's witness list. Smith also passed away a few years ago.
Even having said that, the main fault here still rests with the head-end crew of CN 413, but the company is not blameless either. Jack Hudson's health issues were well known to CN management and he met the criteria to be medically restricted to yard service, but he was not as this would have come with a significant pay cut compared to working a mainline road pool and would have been viewed as a demotion.
I spent years working on this part of CN in Alberta, including a fair amount of time on the Edson Subdivision's west end. I've been in the same position as 413's crew, dragging a heavy train up the Obed Hill at 10 to 20 mph on little sleep. I too would have found it very hard to stay awake that morning, especially if I were sick like Mark Edwards was.
BaltACD Have participated in a number of Carrier held 'Investigations'. When faced with 'facts' the guilty will still try to 'blame the equipment'.
If you read through the Foisy report you'll find references to crews questioning the signal system and essentially claiming that it lit the two trains into each other, and some people still believe that to this day. The investigators appear to have taken this theory quite seriously, and they commissioned an independent assessment of CN's CTC system by an outside company with experience with similar control systems. Their conclusion was that all the evidence points to the signal system functioning properly, and while false clear indications are not impossible they are very, very, very rare, they are almost always caused by some physical problem and this should always leave some sort of evidence behind. It would be nearly impossible for a false clear indication to appear in this sort of signal system and then disappear without a trace.
It is well established that the passenger train was operating on permissive signals, one of the passengers in the dome car recalled seeing a "yellow over green" signal a few minutes before the crash. Then and now this would be the proper 'approach limited' or 'clear to limited' indication you get on the eastward approach signal to Dalehurst if you are lined through the turnout to the south track, as VIA #4 was that morning.
It is equally well established that the power switch at Dalehurst was lined for the south track (against 413), as the freight train ran through it and wrecked it. A following freight (771, a loaded train from the Coal Branch) brought their power up and coupled onto 413's tail end to pull the dangerous tank cars away from the fire, only to derail on the damaged switch after moving a short distance backward.
BaltACD At the time of the incident, did CN Rules require trains to call signals over the Road Radio Channel? Did CN Rules require the Conductor on the rear to respond with the identification of the signal that the head end called?
At the time the conductor was required to call the head end and ask for the signal when he thought the engineer could see it, and if there was no response the tail end crew was to pull the air "when practicable". This is mentioned both in the Foisy report and Smith's arbitration hearing, his testimony claims that he called the head end repeatedly on both radios and multiple channels but received no response, though as we've alluded to I think it is more likely that he never tried at all.
Again, there is now way to prove what he did one way or another. And it is important to note that the Obed to Pedley area was and still is a sort of radio dead zone, the line climbs over a high ridge that divides the McLeod and Athabasca watersheds (the Obed Summit is the highest point on CN's mainline, even higher than the continental divide at Yellowhead Pass) and then wraps around several hills and ravines as it gradually descends into the deep Athabasca valley. Today this stretch of track is a known 'break-in-two' and DP comm loss zone due to the undulating profile and rugged terrain.
Even if Smith did make the radio calls he claimed no one who would have heard them survived the crash, I don't think the passenger train's tail end crew could have heard anything from 413's caboose on their little handheld radios.
CN fired Smith in July 1986, but he was given his job back at Arbitration nearly a year later. His and all the other cases are available to read for free on the Canadian Railway Office of Arbitration website (croa.com).
http://arbitrations.netfirms.com/croa/20/CR1677.html
SD70Dude BaltACD The Conductor's 'testimony' had all the truthfulness as did the head end crew's absence of testimony. The Conductor was just as asleep as was the head end crew. That is my belief as well, though no one will ever be able to prove it 100% for certain. Wayne Smith spent the layover at his away-from-home girlfriend's apartment, she being one of the Edson operators. The official documents mention the two of them "going for coffee" but from what I've heard there was something much stronger on the table at her apartment. I believe it's more likely that Smith didn't get a wink of sleep that night, as opposed to the 3.5 to 4 hours he claimed. At this point it is also worth noting that Smith was not drug tested after the crash, as he appeared to be sober and alert and participated in emergency calls and the attempt to move the underailed portion of 413's tail end after the crash (more on that in a bit). This operator's father was a prominent CN official who continued to be heavily involved in the CN Pensioners Association until his fairly recent death, and she went on to have a long career as a dispatcher. Neither of their names appear on the Foisy Inquiry's witness list. Smith also passed away a few years ago. Even having said that, the main fault here still rests with the head-end crew of CN 413, but the company is not blameless either. Jack Hudson's health issues were well known to CN management and he met the criteria to be medically restricted to yard service, but he was not as this would have come with a significant pay cut compared to working a mainline road pool and would have been viewed as a demotion. I spent years working on this part of CN in Alberta, including a fair amount of time on the Edson Subdivision's west end. I've been in the same position as 413's crew, dragging a heavy train up the Obed Hill at 10 to 20 mph on little sleep. I too would have found it very hard to stay awake that morning, especially if I were sick like Mark Edwards was. BaltACD Have participated in a number of Carrier held 'Investigations'. When faced with 'facts' the guilty will still try to 'blame the equipment'. If you read through the Foisy report you'll find references to crews questioning the signal system and essentially claiming that it lit the two trains into each other, and some people still believe that to this day. The investigators appear to have taken this theory quite seriously, and they commissioned an independent assessment of CN's CTC system by an outside company with experience with similar control systems. Their conclusion was that all the evidence points to the signal system functioning properly, and while false clear indications are not impossible they are very, very, very rare, they are almost always caused by some physical problem and this should always leave some sort of evidence behind. It would be nearly impossible for a false clear indication to appear in this sort of signal system and then disappear without a trace. It is well established that the passenger train was operating on permissive signals, one of the passengers in the dome car recalled seeing a "yellow over green" signal a few minutes before the crash. Then and now this would be the proper 'approach limited' or 'clear to limited' indication you get on the eastward approach signal to Dalehurst if you are lined through the turnout to the south track, as VIA #4 was that morning. It is equally well established that the power switch at Dalehurst was lined for the south track (against 413), as the freight train ran through it and wrecked it. A following freight (771, a loaded train from the Coal Branch) brought their power up and coupled onto 413's tail end to pull the dangerous tank cars away from the fire, only to derail on the damaged switch after moving a short distance backward. BaltACD At the time of the incident, did CN Rules require trains to call signals over the Road Radio Channel? Did CN Rules require the Conductor on the rear to respond with the identification of the signal that the head end called? At the time the conductor was required to call the head end and ask for the signal when he thought the engineer could see it, and if there was no response the tail end crew was to pull the air "when practicable". This is mentioned both in the Foisy report and Smith's arbitration hearing, his testimony claims that he called the head end repeatedly on both radios and multiple channels but received no response, though as we've alluded to I think it is more likely that he never tried at all. Again, there is now way to prove what he did one way or another. And it is important to note that the Obed to Pedley area was and still is a sort of radio dead zone, the line climbs over a high ridge that divides the McLeod and Athabasca watersheds (the Obed Summit is the highest point on CN's mainline, even higher than the continental divide at Yellowhead Pass) and then wraps around several hills and ravines as it gradually descends into the deep Athabasca valley. Today this stretch of track is a known 'break-in-two' and DP comm loss zone due to the undulating profile and rugged terrain. Even if Smith did make the radio calls he claimed no one who would have heard them survived the crash, I don't think the passenger train's tail end crew could have heard anything from 413's caboose on their little handheld radios. CN fired Smith in July 1986, but he was given his job back at Arbitration nearly a year later. His and all the other cases are available to read for free on the Canadian Railway Office of Arbitration website (croa.com). http://arbitrations.netfirms.com/croa/20/CR1677.html
This is a great write up and synopsis.. thanks.
I've seen this episode a few times, and it stirs me every time. Perhaps the hiring criteria, particularly as they relate to medical fitness, were badly out of wack. Hudson wasn't that old, but he had a bunch of medical issues that make me question how healthy he was when he first hired on. I think Foisy got it right... lots of blame to go around.. the crew, the railroad, the culture..
Ulrich... This is a great write up and synopsis.. thanks. I've seen this episode a few times, and it stirs me every time. Perhaps the hiring criteria, particularly as they relate to medical fitness, were badly out of wack. Hudson wasn't that old, but he had a bunch of medical issues that make me question how healthy he was when he first hired on. I think Foisy got it right... lots of blame to go around.. the crew, the railroad, the culture..
Conductor 'convicts' himself two ways. Saying he radioed the head end multiple times without response - AND HE DIDN'T APPLY THE AIR from his location on the train. He also did not comment on the increase of speed - riding a caboose, EVERY rail joint makes itself well know to the ones that occupy the caboose. Faster equals more rail joint 'impacts' closer together - no matter if it is welded or jointed rail.
On CSX over the last decade or more that I worked, the company utilized 'Operation Red Block'. Where one could mark off because they felt they were not able to perform the job they were called for. The primary cause for a Red Block mark off was intended to be those under the influence of intoxicants, liquid or powder. Being too tired to do the job is also an accepted reason. NOTE - a Red Block mark off puts one in contact with substance abuse councilors however there is no disciplinary record started. Did the CN have an Operation Red Block program when this incident happened?
YES - there is more than enough responsibility to be apportioned in this incident.
I would think that programs like Red Block, as well intended as they may be, require alot of trust between the employer and the employee to be effective. An employee may feel reluctant to book off for fear of repercussion from an immediate supervisor.. i.e. "book off if you want to, but don't blame me if you're suddenly not getting any hours.. wink wink".. I've seen it happen in my industry.. a measure to improve safety is instead wielded to inflict discipline.
The conductor struck me as a tragic figure as well.. a man out of his depth.. i.e. "I just wanted to get home".. No doubt this accident weighed heavily on him to the end of his days.
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