1) There was some temperature increase of one of the carloads that was measured, but there never was any “polymerization” occurring in that load.
2) There never was any risk of polymerization in any of the five carloads because polymerization required the addition of another organic chemical needed to activate a polymerization process. Without that key chemical, no amount of heating of the vinyl chloride would have resulted in polymerization. So there never was a reason for the so-called controlled burn.
3) There never was a “controlled burn” because the burn-off was actually an “open burn” which is prohibited by the EPA.
4) The local approval of the burn was only for one tank car load. There was no approval for the additional 4 carloads that were included in the burn.
Someone is not only lacking in knowledge or organic chemistry, but is too lazy to look up basic industry references.
Vinyl chloride will suffer 'runaway' polymerization if excessively heated under pressure -- the polymerization is exothermic; how do they explain the autogenous temperature rise in a sealed car otherwise?
We have noted the seeming idiocy of breaching the other four cars simultaneously, especially since it did not seem all five cars were close enough together that an overpressure breach of the 'runaway' car would breach or damage all four others. I continue to await definitive reporting on the locations of the cars and their 'surroundings'. I am also still awaiting the name(s) of whoever directly ordered the breach and controlled ignition -- you will recall that the official description of what was going to happen ('bright' and 'loud', etc.) came several hours after the wreck, and as I recall after the NS wreck master was threatened with arrest when he attempted to act as incident commander.
Overmod Someone is not only lacking in knowledge or organic chemistry, but is too lazy to look up basic industry references. Vinyl chloride will suffer 'runaway' polymerization if excessively heated under pressure -- the polymerization is exothermic; how do they explain the autogenous temperature rise in a sealed car otherwise? We have noted the seeming idiocy of breaching the other four cars simultaneously, especially since it did not seem all five cars were close enough together that an overpressure breach of the 'runaway' car would breach or damage all four others. I continue to await definitive reporting on the locations of the cars and their 'surroundings'. I am also still awaiting the name(s) of whoever directly ordered the breach and controlled ignition -- you will recall that the official description of what was going to happen ('bright' and 'loud', etc.) came several hours after the wreck, and as I recall after the NS wreck master was threatened with arrest when he attempted to act as incident commander.
See this patent's discussion for some of the preferred stabilization methods and assumptions for vinyl chloride monomer:
https://patentimages.storage.googleapis.com/bd/60/04/3f3e2a4710a07a/US3225108.pdf
Note the very small effective concentration of phenolic and the extended stabilization time even in the presence of some atmospheric oxygen and moisture. But also note the point about not impeding polymerization in process without removing the stabilizer (e.g. via caustic reaction and/or distillation).
News on the current condirion of the East Palestine Population, whtNS has done folr them, and the current nature of the relationship?
daveklepper News on the current condirion of the East Palestine Population, whtNS has done folr them, and the current nature of the relationship?
EuclidInquiring minds want to know.
Hindsight is always 20-20.
At the time, to someone, burning it off seemed to be the right answer. That the collective memory no longer recalls the why does seem to indicate that maybe those same folks now realize it wasn't the answer.
Kinda like people who throw water on burning oil on their stove.
There are landfills and bodies of water all over the country where "out of sight, out of mind" was the once word of the day. And all over the country, there are Superfund sites and brownfields as a result.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Here are some things to ponder that I couldn't post last night.
Keep in mind that 'stabilizers' for vinyl chloride monomer are different chemicals, I won't say 'radically' different because you'll complain, from stabilizers for polyvinyl chloride plastic. The former is what is concerned here, and what the patent covered. Until a report describes precisely what was used in the five cars, and what its concentration may have been, it would be premature at best to try claiming that "the vinyl chloride wouldn't polymerize". You may note in the patent that part of the stabilization that would apply -- effectively, if the times given were accurate -- to normal transit conditions does not impair subsequent polymerization to much more degree than for untreated vinyl chloride; it does not require either distillation or washing with caustic to allow controlled and intended polymerization.
You will also note the reaction conditions given. They are in degrees K, which means you subtract ~273 to get degrees C. Note the critical pressure required to 'keep the vinyl chloride liquid' at this range of temperature.
Now go back to the problem with the one tank car that was said to be suffering a pressure excursion in part because its relief valving had been damaged. The pressure would have eventually broken out a rupture disk in the tank-car structure -- again, the report will contain the location of the likeliest overpressure protection, its orientation after the wreck, and the dimensions of the opening that would have been opened (quickly and irrevocably) should the disk separate.
The temperature of the vinyl chloride corresponding to that rupture pressure would be easily determined by anyone with access to chemical references on vinyl chloride. The stabilizer would do little if anything to affect the relationship of pressure and temperature in the monomer.
However, with runaway pressure the reaction kinetics leading to polymerization may outweigh the chain-terminating action of the quantity of phenolic present. Since there is no other mechanism that would have produced autogenous heating in the still-sealed tank car, whether or not it was supposed to be "impossible" to induce polymerization would have to be discussed only after the actual cause of the temperature rise observed, other than polymerization, was determined and to the extent possible counteracted. (In this case, at low ambient temperature, in my opinion water spraying would have been effective...)
Now, it was a considerable time between the initial recognition that the car couldn't be vented, and the temperature inside it was observed to be rising, and the time the decision to conduct the 'controlled burn' was announced. As I recall, and it could be easily fact-checked both here and in the docket, that announcement was made by public responders (the 'bright' and 'loud' notice) some hours after the accident had settled. And it was then some time longer before the actual 'action' was taken. That does not jibe, at all, with someone's claim that the situation 'would be critical in another 13 minutes' and immediate serious action needed to be taken. To me there's also a cognitive dissonance between the claim now made that the observed temperature was fluctuating up and down and the claim the pressure, as detemined by the temperature, would reach dangerous critical runaway in under 15 minutes.
I suspect there has been some creative generation of alternative fact in here somewhere, perhaps with the sort of long-term political goals or advantage we have discussed previously. Now that claims of objective science are being interjected, it is much more important to correlate what early reports and timing of events were reported as being.
Likewise, it bothers me that the supposed "chemical required to initiate polymerization in stabilized vinyl chloride' doesn't have a name. It is unlikely to be a trade secret; the usual chemical is an organic peroxide like methyl ethyl ketone peroxide or the benzoyl peroxide beloved of acne-suffering teens.
EuclidThe core issue in East Palestine and the greater region of Ohio and Pennsylvania is the degree and effect of residents’ exposure to vinyl chloride due to the open burn of five tank car loads of the chemical for the purpose of disposing of it. ...
The purpose of the burn was so that people wouldn't be exposed to vinyl chloride. In addition to reducing the chance of explosion, burning it would convert it into other products (HCl, phosgene) while also bad, but at least combustion heats the products causing them to rise into the atmosphere and disperse to a lower concentration. Vinyl chloride is a heaver-than-air gas that could have been a disaster if it escaped unburned.
MidlandMike Euclid The core issue in East Palestine and the greater region of Ohio and Pennsylvania is the degree and effect of residents’ exposure to vinyl chloride due to the open burn of five tank car loads of the chemical for the purpose of disposing of it. ... The purpose of the burn was so that people wouldn't be exposed to vinyl chloride. In addition to reducing the chance of explosion, burning it would convert it into other products (HCl, phosgene) while also bad, but at least combustion heats the products causing them to rise into the atmosphere and disperse to a lower concentration. Vinyl chloride is a heaver-than-air gas that could have been a disaster if it escaped unburned.
Euclid The core issue in East Palestine and the greater region of Ohio and Pennsylvania is the degree and effect of residents’ exposure to vinyl chloride due to the open burn of five tank car loads of the chemical for the purpose of disposing of it. ...
Euclid, I agree there was panic forcing unwise decisions, but who is to say that you or I, even with the best training, would not have made the same very-rash decisions.
And pointing the finger at whose panic it was, does not seem to me to be particularly useful
Important to learn the lessons for the future, get to the manufacturer FAST. And Hazmat Transportationb must always have that ability.
And what is the situation with the people of East Palestine now?
EuclidIf you read/listen to the two links I posted at the start of this thread, it is not hard to conclude that there is another explanation for the rush to do an open burn-off.
My opinion at this point, based only on the information provided up to this point, is that someone 'other than Norfolk Southern employees' was responsible for the planning, for taking all five cars of vinyl chloride simultaneously, and for the choice of inducing what was basically a BLEVE not only in the overpressured car, but the other four presumably cold ones -- accounting for the comparatively great amount of unreacted vinyl chloride that showed up in the streams.
And that a great deal of manipulation is beginning to take place to shuck responsibility for that, and to pass it onto Norfolk Southern for... reasons other than objective fact.
It may transpire that Norfolk Southern originally requested that prompt action be taken to facilitate opening the line to traffic at the earliest possible time. It seems to me that exploding multiple cars of vinyl-chloride monomer in 20-degree weather would not possibly facilitate that, and even a cursory reference to publically-accessible industry information would surely back that up. In any case we shouldn't overlook that Norfolk Southern was taken out of the chain of incident command, under duress, hours before the decision was taken to do the burn. I presume the cars were placarded, and that first responders understood how to look up and read the reference in the Orange Book [and, as Tree reminded me, call CHEMTREC]. It will be interesting to read the interviews in the docket and see who actuallly checked what, or what their stories are at the time their interview was conducted.
Meanwhile, consult the timeline again, and tell me no one had time to consult the manufacturer or shipper on how to proceed...
daveklepperImportant to learn the lessons for the future, get to the manufacturer FAST. And Hazmat Transportationb must always have that ability.
We already have mandatory placarding, and recording of the placard information in the train consist, and a published reference to quickly consult how to handle the associated hazardous material. What is 'necessary' is to ensure first that the Orange Book reference corresponding to a load is clear, concise, and up-to-date regarding how to react in what may be different circumstances, and second that if there is any uncertainty about how to proceed on the information given, THEN clear and 24/7 access to manufacturer, shipper, or appropriate clearinghouse be provided in the Book itself (if not, indeed, in the consist information being tracked by the railroad(s) involved).
Three lines covering stabilizers and initiators would likely have prevented the issue here. Even if the specific materials are trade secrets, that has never been a 'bar' to compiling very precise technical information on how to dose and use proprietary chemicals with coded names. (Technical formularies are infuriatingly full of that sort of thing...)
daveklepperAnd what is the situation with the people of East Palestine now?
Of course East Palestine now has to wait for the "next" NS incident on the rebuilt line. With all the pile-on sources eager to point out how incompetent/heartless/mercenary/etc. Norfolk Southern and its doxxable management are. If, as I suspect, there is political expediency or CYA involved, this ill-serves the victim communities.
The number for CHEMTREC ((800) 262-8200) is in the orange book, and on every MSDS.
They have at their fingertips virtually all the information responders need when dealing with a hazmat incident. Including the manufacturer, particularly in the case of car loads - which is one reason the car number is also painted on the top of tank cars.
Overmod I presume the cars were placarded, and that first responders understood how to look up and read the reference in the Orange Book [and, as Tree reminded me, call CHEMTREC].
Presumptions of correct actions are not necessarily correct, as you know full well, especially in urgent situations with conflucting needs and actors.
Why should we trust this manufacturer of Vinyl Chloride? IMO it is in their best interest to make these claims. They may be true or not. Only a very independent labatory can study a precise reaction of the VC under labatory conditions. My orange book is not up to date. Is VC only under one plackard or is it divided into sections depending on how each load's chemistry is in the load.
charlie hebdoPresumptions of correct actions are not necessarily correct, as you know full well, especially in urgent situations with conflucting needs and actors.
As the old saying goes, "when you're up to your a** in alligators, it's hard to remember that your mission is to drain the swamp."
That's not a reference to the current usage of the term "drain the swamp."
blue streak 1Why should we trust this manufacturer of Vinal Cloride? ...
Presumably they know how to spell it. In as much as the manufacturer is handling it daily in their manufacturing processes - they either know how to handle it or their employees are dying in droves.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
charlie hebdo Overmod I presume the cars were placarded, and that first responders understood how to look up and read the reference in the Orange Book [and, as Tree reminded me, call CHEMTREC]. Presumptions of correct actions are not necessarily correct, as you know full well, especially in urgent situations with conflicting needs and actors.
Presumptions of correct actions are not necessarily correct, as you know full well, especially in urgent situations with conflicting needs and actors.
Remember that the official pravda is now that nobody would have advised, authorized, or condoned the 'controlled burn'. So there had to be a great deal of protracted running in circles, screaming and shouting for hours, leaving enough attention free to threaten NS personnel with arrest, without anyone actually finding the (now supposedly self-evident) references that established hazmat response procedure would have located within minutes... asynchronously with any on-site proceedings requiring foreground attention.
I'm all for giving emergency responders the benefit of a doubt... but the cumulative research and actions taken here only involve excuses, and demonstrably poor ones.
Chemical plant employees generally don't die while at work. They usually make it to retirement and then die of some weird cancer. Their family members might also have elevated rates of health problems.
There's a reason that the Chemtrec name and phone numbers are written on the side of pretty much every tank car assigned to dangerous goods service, just like the placards with the UN number of whatever's in there. Some cars even have the chemical's common name painted on the side.
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-an Articulate Malcontent
daveklepper Euclid, I agree there was panic forcing unwise decisions, but who is to say that you or I, even with the best training, would not have made the same very-rash decisions. And pointing the finger at whose panic it was, does not seem to me to be particularly useful Important to learn the lessons for the future, get to the manufacturer FAST. And Hazmat Transportationb must always have that ability. And what is the situation with the people of East Palestine now?
Euclid I have seen quotes by others such as the Governor of Pennsylvania that makes that same allegation.
In my opinion, since this thread is nothing more than a series of opinions:
The only things that change more than the winds that blow the burning chemicals are the political winds. I think there's a lot of backtracking, amnesia, maybe some outright untruthfulness regarding of what really happened and who wanted what before what was decided became unpopular a few days later. (in simpler terms, a lot of covering of posteriors after the fact). "I was for it before I was against it", etc.
Drawing conclusions from a few articles seems pretty pointless. I don't think we'll ever know what really went down.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
Euclid MidlandMike Euclid The core issue in East Palestine and the greater region of Ohio and Pennsylvania is the degree and effect of residents’ exposure to vinyl chloride due to the open burn of five tank car loads of the chemical for the purpose of disposing of it. ... The purpose of the burn was so that people wouldn't be exposed to vinyl chloride. In addition to reducing the chance of explosion, burning it would convert it into other products (HCl, phosgene) while also bad, but at least combustion heats the products causing them to rise into the atmosphere and disperse to a lower concentration. Vinyl chloride is a heaver-than-air gas that could have been a disaster if it escaped unburned. That is definitely the consensus view of the group of officials that decided on the burn-off. But the manufacturer of the vinyl chloride and the EPA disagree with that consensus conclusion. I see no reason to believe that the consensus members had any expertise that would qualify their conclusion. Clearly, they were put into a position of panic in which there was only the burn-off option. The manufacturer of the vinyl chloride disagreed and told them there was no chance of polymerization and no indication of a pressure rise trend. The NTSB provided the temperature logs that showed no rising trend. Was there any consultation with a contractor who could come on site and offer to off-load the product and remove it from the site in an orderly and safe manner? If not, why not? And why was the advice of the vinyl chloride manufacturer rejected by the consensus? For that matter, why was the consensus not informed of the decision to add four more carloads to the one carload that was originally thought to be the only problem? Who made that decision to add four more carloads without any approval? If you read/listen to the two links I posted at the start of this thread, it is not hard to conclude that there is another explanation for the rush to do an open burn-off.
I went back and read the two links you provided.
EuclidI see no reason to believe that the consensus members had any expertise that would qualify their conclusion. ...
From your Politico link:
The unified command consisting of first responders, railroad officials and hazardous materials experts on the scene faced with burning the chemicals or risking an explosion that could have sent shrapnel knifing into the surrounding neighborhood, painted a picture of a difficult decision that had to be made in less than the amount of time it takes to cook a frozen pizza — just 13 minutes.
As far as the link from Status Coup, that EPA member didn't know he was being recorded and may have been spouting off and embellishing. The EPA said they had no real-time information on the situation.
While the first responders might not be experts on stabilized vinyl chloride, they have extensive hazmet training, and are experts in public safety, which they base their decisions on. I worked in the oil fields for 35 years, where there are lots of things that burn, explode, and otherwise cause you to stop breathing, and I have worked with first responders on some of those situations. I give them the benifit of the doubt.
blue streak 1Why should we trust this manufacturer of Vinyl Cloride?
What do they have to gain by saying their product will not explode if the truth is that is can explode? If they say it cannot explode and it does explode, wouldn't they be increasing their liability by saying it can't explode? I look for the motive, and in this case, I see no motive for them to lie, and a strong motive to tell the truth.
Euclid What do they have to gain by saying their product will not explode if the truth is that is can explode?
What do they have to gain by saying their product will not explode if the truth is that is can explode?
As an example, ammonium nitrate was thought to quite safe and was/is relatively safe in small quantities. Then came Texas City.
Euclid blue streak 1 Why should we trust this manufacturer of Vinyl Chloride?
blue streak 1
Why should we trust this manufacturer of Vinyl Chloride?
Remember, they added a pleasant scent to carbon tetrachloride so the workers would be less offended by it.
blue streak 1 blue streak 1 Why should we trust this manufacturer of Vinyl Chloride? As said by others . Listen , be skeptical and verify. I have buried more than one person who believed the mis information by cigarette makers.
blue streak 1 Why should we trust this manufacturer of Vinyl Chloride?
Euclid... The EPA also confirmed that there was no danger of explosion. So where did this dire warning come from? Nobody seems to know. No verification was sought or executed. Once the original consensus was achieved, no further listening, skepticism, or verification was needed or wanted because a decision had been made.
EPA said they had no real time information, so how could they have affected the incident commands decision. As part of my hazmet training, regarding unified incident command procedures, as I recall they do a review afterward to see if it was appropriate and if procedures need adjustment in furure incidents.
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