NS serious derailment late feb 3 ( ~2100 )

[Overmod]

Just in case anyone can't understand the menu-bar structure in the link Zug provided, here is the text of Senate 576:

https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/576/text?s=1&r=5

Note the quiet imposition of a Federal mandate for two-man crews, and of not blocking crossings.

Note also the massively increased 'civil penalties' (up to 1% of a Class 1's income per incident) and the yearly imposition of $1M per railroad for 'improved first responder training'.

[Overmod]

Meanwhile, over on the House side, the RAIL Act:

https://billjohnson.house.gov/uploadedfiles/johnoh_013_xml.pdf

Seems to have some of the strangely stilted language constructions used in S.576, including the provision about not blocking crossings and getting rid of the abbreviated pre-departure inspection.

[jeffhergert]

Reading both, they're going to have to install a whole lot of detectors.  I don't mean on the main lines that already have them every 20 oe so miles.  I mean on many secondary main and branch lines of the class ones.  On many regional and short lines.  There's a lot of trackage that handles hazmat in large quantities that don't have detectors.

There's things that are good and some questionable.  However, what congress legislates and how the FRA interprets and imposes that legislation may not be exactly in agreement.

Jeff 

[Euclid]

Here is some good information with an overhead photo showing 25 of the derailed cars in an elongated, accordion-like pileup.  Each car has a graphic callout describing its contents.

 

As I understand, there were 50 cars total derailed, so this photo is half of them.

 

The five contiguous cars of vinyl chloride begin at the upper edge of the photo.  All 25 of the cars show considerable effects of being burned in fire.  Prior to this news, I had wondered if the Vinyl chloride cars were merely heated by radiant transfer of heat from the active fire.  I suppose the cars were able to withstand prolonged exposure to the fire because of large mass of vinyl chloride that would have to heat up from ambient temperature prevailing the night of the derailment.     

 

Seeing this, I cannot imagine why the vinyl chloride did not explode and burn in what must have been a massive, aggressive derailment fire.  Clearly, the vinyl chloride cars were directly involved in the full flame of this fire.

 

There is also lots of information on the cleanup, the amount of waste needing to be reprocessed, and the question of whether the site will ever be completely cleaned up.  Apparently there are a lot of such sites that have never been totally cleaned up, and their present status of cleanup is indefinite. 

 

https://www.npr.org/2023/03/03/1160481769/east-palestine-derailment-toxic-waste-cleanup

 

I recall the contamination of soil and groundwater surrounding the Republic Creosote plant in St. Louis Park, MN.  They pressure treated timbers and ties, and after treating, they stored them on about 80 acres of land served by a network of 2-foot-gage track.  It was largely sand soil, and rain washed down over the stacks of treated ties and timbers over the years.  The creosote leached down deep into the sand and eventually contaminated the aquifer.  It was eventually detected in about 7 deep municipal wells in the vicinity.  It was in the news a lot during the 1970s, and I don’t recall how it was finally resolved.   

[Reading467]

There's a discrepancy between the listing on the photo (Creditied to the EPA) in the NPR report and the pdf  "Train 32N- East Palestine Derail list", which is on the EPA page dedicated to this wreck.  On the list, RACX 51629 was carrying Dipropylene Glycol.  In the photo, it's listed as carrying Vinyl Chloride (VC).  The 5th car of VC was farther back in the consist (car 53 on line 55 of the pdf).  Also, in the photo, some of the chemical names of the cars following GATX 95098 were incomplete, but that could've been a space issue. 

The first four VC cars, TILX 402025 thru GATX 95098, vented VC through their Pressure Relief Devices during the initial fire. The product did ignite, but outside of the cars. The closest car that were placarded for combustibles or flammables was SHPX 211226. The status of that car was listed as unknown on the report. 

Two covered hoppers of Polyethylene, roughly 100 feet on the ground in front of the VC block , also caught fire.

[BaltACD]

If what is reported in the linked article is factual - NS procedures in the immediate aftermath of the derailment are at big variance to the procedures that were in effect on CSX at the time I retired in 2016.

On CSX the Conductor was supposed to provide Train Documents to first responders upon their arrival.  Part of the Train Documents was a Product Data Sheet for each of the HAZMAT commodities that the train contains as well as identification of which cars contain which HAZMAT by car initial and number.

The article states that only 20 minutes of inward video was available - 15 minutes before the incident and 5 minutes after because the engine had been returned to service and and most of the video had been over written.  On CSX when a incident happens, the Road Foremen of Engines is notified and is expected to respond and download all appropriate data concerning trainhandling as well as videos.

I have no idea what NS procedures are!

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2023/03/22/senators-hear-from-norfolk-southern-ntsb-derailment-ohio/11492652002/

[Overmod]

jeffhergert

Reading both, they're going to have to install a whole lot of detectors.

I would dearly love to know where both these bills got their common language and common emphasis on items not germane to the safety issue at hand.  Something pointedly missing that in my opinion should not have been is formalization of the tracking between detectors, most specifically to detect unusual profiles of temperature rise or developing acoustic signature -- that's much more important than guaranteeing two-man crews, or getting rid of an apparently hated abbreviated pre-departure inspection protocol, or avoiding stopping key trains on crossings.

[blue streak 1]

Well what a lot of posters here have suspected. NTSB saying pressure relief valves  seem to not have functioned properly.   However more test of the valves will be needed,

RRD23MR005.aspx (ntsb.gov)

[dpeltier]

BaltACD

The article states that only 20 minutes of inward video was available - 15 minutes before the incident and 5 minutes after because the engine had been returned to service and and most of the video had been over written.  On CSX when a incident happens, the Road Foremen of Engines is notified and is expected to respond and download all appropriate data concerning trainhandling as well as videos.

But they didn't HAVE inward-facing cameras at that time, did they?

Inward-facing cameras raise privacy concerns. Those privacy concerns are overridden by the need to investigate accidents, but the policy should be tailored to support the need to investigate by minimizing the invasion of privacy. Anyone who has a DriveCam in their company vehicle understands this - at BNSF DriveCams only save 15 SECONDS before (and 5 seconds after) a triggering event.

In this case 15 minutes before and 5 minutes after the incident is more than enough time to determine whether the crew contributed to the incident or its aftermath. The ranting and raving of politicians looking to score points by attacking others is par for the course, but is unrelated to safety.

Dan

Speaking for myself, not my employer

[tree68]

blue streak 1

Well what a lot of posters here have suspected. NTSB saying pressure relief valves  seem to not have functioned properly.   However more test of the valves will be needed,

RRD23MR005.aspx (ntsb.gov)

Thought I saw something about plastic covers melting, which may have hindered the valves operation.

[Overmod]

blue streak 1

Well what a lot of posters here have suspected. NTSB saying pressure relief valves  seem to not have functioned properly.

Report actually says nothing of the kind, so far.  It notes that molten aluminum splashed over parts of the valve, but says nothing about whether that impeded actual release; it also notes (as what is really a red herring here) that one of the valves had an improperly aluminum-washed spring that was 'incompatible with vinyl chloride monomer' (but this would not have impeded actuation of the valve).  See the valve detail from the report:

 

The important detail here is going to involve the behavior of the specific pressure relief on the car suffering the polymerization.  One early report said the PRD was 'not functioning'; another made reference to the rising scream of a relief valve subjected to a mass flow in excess of its nominal capacity -- the latter being one of the nightmare scenarios for vinyl chloride under pressure.  

Another thing that is going to require very careful commentary: note the position of the 'five' vinyl-chloride cars in the train (one being over 20 cars away from the other four) yet all five of them were subjected to controlled release simultaneously.  Which of these cars was suffering the pressure runaway?

[ns145]

Overmod

Another thing that is going to require very careful commentary: note the position of the 'five' vinyl-chloride cars in the train (one being over 20 cars away from the other four) yet all five of them were subjected to controlled release simultaneously.  Which of these cars was suffering the pressure runaway?

I thought at the time that NS might have rushed the controlled release on all 5 vinyl chloride tank cars to avoid a "Weyauwega" type scenario where their primary mainline to the East Coast would be out of service for weeks.  I remember at the time of the Weyauwega derailment in 1996 that the fires and evacuation seemed to just go on and on forever.  From a practical standpoint, the country could do without the Wisconsin Central's mainline for 2 weeks.  Two weeks or more without NS' primary route to the East Coast could have been pretty brutal to already struggling supply chains. 

IIRC, the Nazi's attempted to blow up the fill at PRR's Horsehoe Curve during WWII because of the huge effect that it would have had on the US war effort (Operation Pastorius).  A prolonged service outage at East Palestine could have had a very similar effect a hundred+ miles west on the same ex-PRR mainline.  If there is an info trail that leads investigators to this particular "train of thought" having occurred at NS and without any backing from the Federal government, the outcome certainly wouldn't be good for NS.  And any backroom backing from the Federal government wouldn't be good for anyone in the Administration. 

Anyway if anyone needs some background info on the Weyauwega derailment,  given that it happened nearly 30 years ago, there is a nice summary on Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weyauwega,_Wisconsin,_derailment.

[Overmod]

Mentioning Weyauwega reminded me of the Miamisburg accident in 1986, which resulted in the foundation of OHSET and (as I recall) calls for better and more complete communication of information on hazardous material in consists.

[Euclid]

ns145

 

 

Overmod

Another thing that is going to require very careful commentary: note the position of the 'five' vinyl-chloride cars in the train (one being over 20 cars away from the other four) yet all five of them were subjected to controlled release simultaneously.  Which of these cars was suffering the pressure runaway?

 

 

 

I thought at the time that NS might have rushed the controlled release on all 5 vinyl chloride tank cars to avoid a "Weyauwega" type scenario where their primary mainline to the East Coast would be out of service for weeks.  I remember at the time of the Weyauwega derailment in 1996 that the fires and evacuation seemed to just go on and on forever.  From a practical standpoint, the country could do without the Wisconsin Central's mainline for 2 weeks.  Two weeks or more without NS' primary route to the East Coast could have been pretty brutal to already struggling supply chains.  

Prior to the post above by Reading467, I had not realized that the vinyl chloride car that was experiencing rising temperature was far removed from the other four cars that were not increasing in temperature.  Even assuming that there were four cars without rising temperature and one with it, I just assumed that they were all subjected to controlled burn just to eliminate the general fuel source of the explosive hazard. 

 

Also, if the five cars were all connected contiguously, I had assumed that the controlled burn of the one overheating car alone may have been impossible if it were adjoining the other four cars.  So that would have been the likely explanation of burning off all five cars at once. 

 

But now, the new information that the overheating car of vinyl chloride was far removed from the other four cars that were not overheating certainly raises the question of a second motive for the burn-off.  That would be to speed up the reopening of the line and resuming its business as soon as possible. 

 

Of course that it a sensitive issue and I am not saying that accelerating the line reopening was the reason for burning all five cars instead of just the one overheating.  I am also not aware of any statements that explain or document the reason for burning the five cars instead of just the one car that was warming.  But I have read news reports in which others have implied as opinion that the purpose of the controlled burn was to speed up the line reopening.

[Overmod]

Euclid

But I have read news reports in which others have implied as opinion that the purpose of burning all five cars instead of just the one overheating car was to speed up the line reopening.

It is getting more and more difficult to wait for the NTSB to report 'definitively' on this issue, without subscribing to inchoate conspiracy theories about pinning blame on NS for as much of the decision as possible.  I'm already highly suspicious that the Secretary of Transportation is being groomed to look presidential by taking commandingly insulting positions in this, and even more suspicious of the legislation that is using this as the analogue of the 2008 Glendale accident to push what is (obviously to me) some precooked agendas.

The thing to watch for in the docket, when it is made available, is the sequence of events concerning the NS responder who was threatened when he tried to become an incident commander.  If the decision to execute the (probably botched, but we shall see) controlled breach was made subsequent to that... chickens, prepare to engage roost.

[Euclid]

Regarding the overhead photo of the wreck from the article posted above, at this link:

https://www.npr.org/2023/03/03/1160481769/east-palestine-derailment-toxic-waste-cleanup

Does the photo show the scene before or after the controlled burn?

[Attuvian1]

Overmod

jeffhergert

Reading both, they're going to have to install a whole lot of detectors.

 

 

I would dearly love to know where both these bills got their common language and common emphasis on items not germane to the safety issue at hand.  Something pointedly missing that in my opinion should not have been is formalization of the tracking between detectors, most specifically to detect unusual profiles of temperature rise or developing acoustic signature -- that's much more important than guaranteeing two-man crews, or getting rid of an apparently hated abbreviated pre-departure inspection protocol, or avoiding stopping key trains on crossings.

Overmod -

A couple days late, but -

Regarding the common language and emphasis, I would not at all be surprised that any number of congressional offices have at hand "boiler plate" issues and texts that fit the agendas of the current office holders.  Particularly in areas related not only to their committee assignments but their regional concerns and hobbyhorses as well.  When an event happens the staffers hop to it, dust off past bills and proposals and slap together portions of new ones paragraphs at a time. "Hey, Sandy, this one's related - kinda - let's throw it in.  Maybe it'll stick this time around."

Attuvian John

 

[CSSHEGEWISCH]

What did Mark Twain say in his comparison of law and sausages??

[blue streak 1]

Euclid

 Prior to the post above by Reading467, I had not realized that the vinyl chloride car that was experiencing rising temperature was far removed from the other four cars that were not increasing in temperature.  

That is an incorrect statement.  Please look at this link and scroll down to the picture.  All 5 cars were together.  That is cars 26 - 30.

The challenges of East Palestine's toxic waste cleanup : NPR 

[ns145]

blue streak 1

 

 

Euclid

 Prior to the post above by Reading467, I had not realized that the vinyl chloride car that was experiencing rising temperature was far removed from the other four cars that were not increasing in temperature.  

 

 

 

That is an incorrect statement.  Please look at this link and scroll down to the picture.  All 5 cars were together.  That is cars 26 - 30.

The challenges of East Palestine's toxic waste cleanup : NPR 

 

They weren't all blocked together according to USEPA:  https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-02/TRAIN%2032N%20-%20EAST%20PALESTINE%20-%20derail%20list%20Norfolk%20Southern%20document.pdf

First four were Lines 28-31 and the fifth Line 55.  Lines 25-63 all appear to have burned or been affected by nearby fires.  Remember the Line #'s include the locomotives.

I haven't seen a report listing the specific car that they were concerned about exploding.

[BaltACD]

While not directly railroad related - now Chocolate seems to be HAZMAT

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2023/03/25/pennsylvania-chocolate-factory-explosion-5-dead-6-missing/11541640002/

[Overmod]

BaltACD

While not directly railroad related - now Chocolate seems to be HAZMAT

Almost has to be a process-steam accident from the description.  But -- without knowing the specific enthalpy of cocoa powder -- I'd bet it would sustain a critical-mixture deflagration as well as, say, flour dust would.  Or confectioner's sugar...

(I might add that I've seen sugar used as a critical fuel ingredient in rocket fuel...)

But now it may be time for the Government to bring up that molasses is a proven hazmat -- many were killed by it in Boston.

[tree68]

The missing are down to five - one lucky soul found alive in the rubble overnight.

Gas has been mentioned in several stories I've seen.  

The possibility of dust can't be discounted - it's levelled more than a few grain elevators.

Get your chocolate bunnies while you can.

[BaltACD]

Overmod

 

BaltACD

While not directly railroad related - now Chocolate seems to be HAZMAT 

Almost has to be a process-steam accident from the description.  But -- without knowing the specific enthalpy of cocoa powder -- I'd bet it would sustain a critical-mixture deflagration as well as, say, flour dust would.  Or confectioner's sugar... 

(I might add that I've seen sugar used as a critical fuel ingredient in rocket fuel...)

But now it may be time for the Government to bring up that molasses is a proven hazmat -- many were killed by it in Boston.

Imperial Sugar at Port Wentworth, GA (outside Savannah) blew up in February 2008 killing 14.

[Euclid]

Here is a paper describing proper handling and risks of vinyl chloride.

 

https://nj.gov/health/eoh/rtkweb/documents/fs/2001.pdf

 

Since it is routinely shipped by rail in tank cars, there is always a possibility of a derailment breaching the tank cars and spilling the chemical.  Such an event has the potential to violate many of the precautions that outlined in this paper.  One such precaution is to not release vinyl chloride onto the ground.  This can cause groundwater contamination.  It can also store vinyl chloride and release it back into the air.

 

During the NS “controlled released” response, how many gallons of vinyl chloride were released onto the ground?  It was reported that a ditch had been dug and the vinyl chloride was released into the ditch and set on fire.

 

In a derailment, vinyl chloride could be spilled by breached tank cars that have derailed, or it might be contained without leaking from cars that have derailed, but not breached.  So I would expect there to be a well-established and fully equipped emergency response team ready to swing into action in the case of a derailment involving vinyl chloride.  It would be a derailment stabilization contractor sort of like a Hulcher Fire Department.   

 

In the case of this East Palestine wreck, was the explosion stabilization plan right out of a standard procedure book of the industries involved?  Or was this just conceived on the fly for this particular incident?  Governor Shapiro of Pennsylvania stated there were safer options available.  What options was he referring to? 

 

Consider this question:  Say you had a derailment that put ten contiguous tank car loads of vinyl chloride on the ground in random positions, but not leaking or breached.  What would be the procedure of recovering those loaded tank cars along with cleaning up the rest of the wreck?

[Overmod]

Euclid

Governor Shapiro of Pennsylvania stated there were safer options available.  What options was he referring to?

20/20 hindsight options, I suspect... we'll have to wait for a more detailed statement, which I'm sure will be forthcoming when expedient, or see how carefully it comes to be woven into the NTSB report(s).

Consider this question:  Say you had a derailment that put ten contiguous tank car loads of vinyl chloride on the ground in random positions, but not leaking or breached.  What would be the procedure of recovering those loaded tank cars along with cleaning up the rest of the wreck?

I have no experience either as a wreckmaster or a first responder, so I defer to anyone here with distinctive competence. 

IMHO one of the immediate things is going to be to move and align the cars so the pressure-relief valves are above liquid level -- there are some techniques including flat-jacking that might accomplish this reasonably quickly without risk of additional damage or 'overshoot' before the relief valves can function correctly -- and then as much of the access piping and valves can be reached without risk of the car moving or rolling unexpectedly (including as it gets lighter during unloading).

You'd then connect purgeable hoses to appropriate positions on the car.  I would have to check the piping on the car to determine if it would allow safe transfer, and this would likely be a source of damage in any foreseeable wreck bad enough to put ten cars on the ground 'in random positions', but there may be a 'siphon' connection in the dome that could be used to connect safely at the top of the dome.  You would then extract the contents of the car with pressurized dry nitrogen or similar inert gas (CO2 might work in this case) into a suitable tank -- here' a Hulcher-like contractor could provide tank swap-bodies on a suitable offroad chassis that could traverse rough terrain to reach a suitable loading position and attitude.  The recovered vinyl chloride might then be re-transferred to auitable road or rail tanks located a safe distance from the accident site.

[blue streak 1]

Hve one more item that needs the federal legislation.  Require all real estate transactions within 1000 feet of any rail line hauling Haz Mat to have a mandated separate disclosure that the property is within a possible Haz Mat derailment location.  For all active and idle rail lines that may be reactivated.

EDIT:  If buyer closes anyway punative damages will not be awardable.

[blue streak 1]

duplicaaaaaaaated

[BaltACD]

blue streak 1

Hve one more item that needs the federal legislation.  Require all real estate transactions within 1000 feet of any rail line hauling Haz Mat to have a mandated separate disclosure that the property is within a possible Haz Mat derailment location.  For all active and idle rail lines that may be reactivated.

EDIT:  If buyer closes anyway punative damages will not be awardable.

My house in Maryland is 1/2 mile from CSX's Old Main Line

My condo in Florida is 2/3 mile from the FEC's Bowden Yard and 5.6 miles from CSX's A Line.

[CSSHEGEWISCH]

blue streak 1

Hve one more item that needs the federal legislation.  Require all real estate transactions within 1000 feet of any rail line hauling Haz Mat to have a mandated separate disclosure that the property is within a possible Haz Mat derailment location.  For all active and idle rail lines that may be reactivated.

EDIT:  If buyer closes anyway punative damages will not be awardable.

 

And how long do you think it will be before the ambulance chasers move to get such a clause stricken?