CSSHEGEWISCH France had been bled white during the carnage of WW1, and that fact in itself goes a long way in explaining why the French put so much faith in the Maginot Line. It would have been trench warfare with a lot less casualties. The Third Republic itself was losing a lot of popular support and more than a few people were willing to replace it with an authoritarian regime, probably similar to the Petain government but without the Occupation. The French will to fight another war just wasn't there.
France had been bled white during the carnage of WW1, and that fact in itself goes a long way in explaining why the French put so much faith in the Maginot Line. It would have been trench warfare with a lot less casualties.
The Third Republic itself was losing a lot of popular support and more than a few people were willing to replace it with an authoritarian regime, probably similar to the Petain government but without the Occupation.
The French will to fight another war just wasn't there.
Excellent point. That is what I meant by the context. This is good historical analysis.
Murphy Siding Overmod charlie hebdo It is questionable, regardless of Churchill's self-serving view and that of his apologists, that intervention against Germany earlier was possible, unless one disregards the context of the period 1933-39. There were many potential opportunities to nip the course of German aggression during that period, many of them involving French self-interest. Most of these would have involved action 'short of war', if that's what you mean by 'intervention against Germany', but among other things they would have had the effect of stopping Hitler's 'momentum' as a capable leader with insight about the jaded democracies, etc. We can safely disregard most of Churchill's ability to influence much of anything in British policy in those years, but I think the many instances he notes where 'action could have been taken' -- admittedly with the benefit of considerable hindsight, but also far from implausible as sensible matters of policy -- do represent areas where a small amount of action could have kept Hitler's government from becoming the danger it was after 1939, and perhaps avoided the chance for war entirely. On the other hand, the situation could have become far worse in a number of ways than it was, particularly if the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact had persisted several more years, or if Doenitz' plans for U-boat construction had been observed. I had not realized until comparatively recently just how worthless the anti-submarine efforts in 1942 actually were, for example. I *think* it was Goering who was quoted as saying that if France and England had intervened when Germany marched into the Rhineland, German troops would have had to retreat with their tailes between their legs.
Overmod charlie hebdo It is questionable, regardless of Churchill's self-serving view and that of his apologists, that intervention against Germany earlier was possible, unless one disregards the context of the period 1933-39. There were many potential opportunities to nip the course of German aggression during that period, many of them involving French self-interest. Most of these would have involved action 'short of war', if that's what you mean by 'intervention against Germany', but among other things they would have had the effect of stopping Hitler's 'momentum' as a capable leader with insight about the jaded democracies, etc. We can safely disregard most of Churchill's ability to influence much of anything in British policy in those years, but I think the many instances he notes where 'action could have been taken' -- admittedly with the benefit of considerable hindsight, but also far from implausible as sensible matters of policy -- do represent areas where a small amount of action could have kept Hitler's government from becoming the danger it was after 1939, and perhaps avoided the chance for war entirely. On the other hand, the situation could have become far worse in a number of ways than it was, particularly if the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact had persisted several more years, or if Doenitz' plans for U-boat construction had been observed. I had not realized until comparatively recently just how worthless the anti-submarine efforts in 1942 actually were, for example.
charlie hebdo It is questionable, regardless of Churchill's self-serving view and that of his apologists, that intervention against Germany earlier was possible, unless one disregards the context of the period 1933-39.
There were many potential opportunities to nip the course of German aggression during that period, many of them involving French self-interest. Most of these would have involved action 'short of war', if that's what you mean by 'intervention against Germany', but among other things they would have had the effect of stopping Hitler's 'momentum' as a capable leader with insight about the jaded democracies, etc.
We can safely disregard most of Churchill's ability to influence much of anything in British policy in those years, but I think the many instances he notes where 'action could have been taken' -- admittedly with the benefit of considerable hindsight, but also far from implausible as sensible matters of policy -- do represent areas where a small amount of action could have kept Hitler's government from becoming the danger it was after 1939, and perhaps avoided the chance for war entirely.
On the other hand, the situation could have become far worse in a number of ways than it was, particularly if the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact had persisted several more years, or if Doenitz' plans for U-boat construction had been observed. I had not realized until comparatively recently just how worthless the anti-submarine efforts in 1942 actually were, for example.
I *think* it was Goering who was quoted as saying that if France and England had intervened when Germany marched into the Rhineland, German troops would have had to retreat with their tailes between their legs.
And the French had an Army division standing right there, and did nothing to prevent Hitler from reoccupying the Rhineland.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
charlie hebdoCoulda woulda shoulda is the stuff of silly programs on the history channel. Its just 'what if?' speculation, not serious history.
Proper alternate history is applying the tools and lessons of serious history to precisely the small accidents or choices that so often determine 'real' history. That is a very different thing from making up some alternate reality according to wishful thinking (Looking Backward being a particularly egregious example of how NOT to do it), which is all too easy a thing to do even in the absence of accurate hindsight.
I happen to enjoy the fictional craft of alternate history, which is sorta in between these two: you set yourself some changes and make the result look as correct and believable by good historiographical standards as you can. One very funny example was a science-fiction story which posited the invention of the heat engine a century or so early and went on to describe the development of fighter aircraft in the American Civil War ... complete with a raft of scholarly 'references' and footnotes to give it that verisimilitudinous flair. Point is that nobody really thinks this is 'history', but it's fun to see if the results follow properly from the premises.
Masquerading 'what if' as serious history: there I agree with you, especially when it's given that 'History Channel' spin to keep the war-porn fans on the edge of their seat for an extended period of ratings time.
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Coulda woulda shoulda is the stuff of silly programs on the history channel. Its just 'what if?' speculation, not serious history.
charlie hebdoIt is questionable, regardless of Churchill's self-serving view and that of his apologists, that intervention against Germany earlier was possible, unless one disregards the context of the period 1933-39.
BaltACD charlie hebdo More often than not, that has been true. But in the case of WWII, I and most historians don't see that there was any alternative. So Germany and Japan weren't on ego trips with their acts of aggression during the 30's?
charlie hebdo More often than not, that has been true. But in the case of WWII, I and most historians don't see that there was any alternative.
So Germany and Japan weren't on ego trips with their acts of aggression during the 30's?
My point was that conflict with the Axis was inevitable
It is questionable, regardless of Churchill's self-serving view and that of his apologists, that intervention against Germany earlier was possible, unless one disregards the context of the period 1933-39. At least that is the view of many actual historians. Of course, disregarding the actual context and having perfect hindsight, anyone can say earlier I tervention should/could have occurred.
It's been said that in both theaters, there were people on the allied side who wanted war...
And that they accomplished their goal by ignoring Axis actions.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
BaltACD charlie hebdo So Germany and Japan weren't on ego trips with their acts of aggression during the 30's?
charlie hebdo
Churchill made the point that, repeatedly, even minuscule interventions could have shut down the progress of German aggression or substantially reduced or terminated the production of military equipment and supplies. Even after formal declaration of 'war' over the invasion of Poland it took considerable time... and decided isolationist lack of action particularly by the United States... before things got to the point 'there wasn't any alternative'.
In the case of Japan, things are a bit different: had we not provided their industry with so much 'assistance' and then shot our foreign policy in the foot with a total embargo on oil, things might have gone a bit differently. Not too much, though; the British certainly underestimated the Japanese badly, and in the early months of the war so did we (notably in aircraft performance).
Overcoming these effects, and the 'momentum' behind them, is what much if not most of the American dying -- including all the merchant sailors in coastal traffic killed in the first year of the war for us -- involved. As it was, the great enormity of the butcher's bill that would have involved once we decided on an invasion rather than blockade/containment strategy -- operations Olympic and Coronet -- would have dwarfed what we actually experienced.
Victrola1Watching footage of how vulnerable railroads were to air attack in WWII may have been on his mind.
Vulnerability of railroads as transportation doesn't hold a candle to vulnerability of Todt's Autobahns, which of course are the actual 'model' for the defense highways as built (and the somewhat earlier Pennsylvania Turnpike, built with the suicidal design that has only an Armco barrier between the mutually-opposed fast lanes). There is a pretty good discussion of the difference in Staufer's Thoroughbreds, where he points out that it is much simpler to lay a new track over even substantially cratered ground than to provide even slow-speed mobility for typical wheeled vehicles.
The argument for defense highways involves somewhat improved survival for the individual vehicles, in part under presumed conditions of air superiority. You cannot interdict traffic on a multilane road by blowing up some of the vehicles nearly as easily as you can by shooting up locomotives and leaving trains blocking the line.
In both cases, susceptibility to PGM becomes extreme, but the situation is worse for railroads in that (sort of like the flip side of the argument that trains don't jump out at vehicles) trains can't dodge or jink to avoid fire, and they have enormous inertial mass compared to their braking or acceleration capability. Consequently the firing solution for even long-standoff hits involves relatively little computation or expensive equipment or propellants. If a system like Thor is possible, the situation becomes far worse still.
The interstate higway system was built in the name of the national defense. Former General, President Eisenhower was a big adovocate of building interstate highways.
Watching footage of how vulnerable railroads were to air attack in WWII may have been on his mind.
charlie hebdoMore often than not, that has been true. But in the case of WWII, I and most historians don't see that there was any alternative.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
More often than not, that has been true. But in the case of WWII, I and most historians don't see that there was any alternative.
CSSHEGEWISCHAs Bob Withorn will also attest, the problem with dramatic wartime footage is that it hardly conveys the cold reality of the air war.
War is a three letter word for death. Winners or Losers it makes no difference - death is the result of war.
War is old men playing ego games using young peoples lives as the game pieces.
As Bob Withorn will also attest, the problem with dramatic wartime footage is that it hardly conveys the cold reality of the air war.
Rail facilities were certainly attacked in WW1 by aircraft, with the exception of Zeppelins, as far as I know. Cities were attacked by Zepps but with marginal success. Just how effective bombing was by conventional aircraft is open to question, but of course tactical and strategic bombing was really in it's infancy. The practitioners were "making it up" as they went along.
The problem is, there's just no dramatic footage of the same like there is with WW2. And of course, the fighter pilots of World War One are the ones who got most of the publicity.
Perhaps we could introduce the topic of ground attack aircraft, bombers and Zeppelins' roles in attacking railway facilities in WWI?
LOL, I've been busy for a bit and missed the whole, sneaky return of this topic. As my interest is mainly prior to WWII, not much I can add. However, given the interest, maybe Kalmbach will consider a special issue devoted to planes strafing Trains.
Mike
CSSHEGEWISCHAs an aside, the very first 8th AF mission in 1942 to Rouen targeted railroad yards.
If I remember correctly, a great many early 8th Air Force missions targeted railroad facilities -- specific targeting of French railroad facilities, trains, and workers being a high stated priority even before the runup and invasion in 1944. Most histories I have read sort of gloss over the human consequences of this. As Wayne says, you do what you must in wartime, and I don't think it can be denied that the war was shortened by repeatedly "interdicting French internal transportation". But a great many French civilian railwaymen caught between the rock of the Nazi occupation and the hard place of targeted air superiority had little reason to love us by the end, if indeed any reason left to them at all.
It may be because I'm more oriented to the 8th AF and the ETO, but I tend to associate train-busting more with P-47's and Hawker Typhoons.
As an aside, the very first 8th AF mission in 1942 to Rouen targeted railroad yards.
CSSHEGEWISCH,
I would agree with you. They lost a few planes to flack over French Indo China but most were over Formosa. More were lost to mechanical failures on the 10- 13 hour missions mostly over water. I suspect they had some light ground fire but the squadrons had a blast filling the trains full of 50cal holes
I've done the narrow gauge railway on Rugen- It's well worth seeing and there is a place where it runs on dual-gauge track, but no dual-gauge pointwork which is what I was hoping to see.
CSSHEGEWISCHGiven my dad's history, I could say a few things here about B-24's but I won't.
Just say that they flew out of at least one field in Northern Ireland that had a railroad across the runway, complete with traffic lights for the planes and appropriately 'interlocked' signals for the railroad. Might be interesting to see if there were any 'attacks' on trains as aircraft returned damaged from missions and needed to get down fast for one reason or another...
BOB WITHORNBack in Spring 1945, my dad's bomb group spent a fair amount of time attacking railyards, rail bridges, rolling stock mostly in the Saigon area. After each of the rail bridge bombing missions, one squadron would drop down to tree tops and use up their 50 cal. any trains etc. They were flying B-24's.
zugmannI was always told an open knuckle could close on a car hit at a crossing and "hold onto it", instead of deflecting it.
tree68 zugmann True superstition is taking your rain gear so it won't rain. I thought that was a fact of life. Silly me...
zugmann True superstition is taking your rain gear so it won't rain.
I thought that was a fact of life. Silly me...
True SUPERSTITUTION is trying to decide if the race track requires rain tires, intermediates or slicks - BEFORE you start going to the false grid for the race. Knowing you are your only pit crew.
zugmannTrue superstition is taking your rain gear so it won't rain.
zugmann True superstitionis taking your rain gear so it won't rain.
True superstitionis taking your rain gear so it won't rain.
That one's not a superstition, it's 100% legit.
I've seen open knuckles fill with snow/ice, and then have to melt it out with fusees before making a joint (the pin will freeze in place and refuse to drop).
I've been told the same thing can happen with dead animal material, but I've (thankfully) never experienced that. Because I make sure to close the knuckle every time.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
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